From Surviving to Thriving: Developing a Diverse Army Officer Corps in an Era of Persistent Conflict

In an era of the all-volunteer military, it becomes particularly important to encourage officers to become committed to personally directed, life-long learning, and to ascertain that the military establishment is committed to supporting them in these endeavors.1 — Dr. Don M. Snider The U. S. Army has invested substantial resources and energy in developing a strategy for growing leaders capable of succeeding in a complex operational environment with persistent conflict. A policy that operationalizes this strategy is allowing commanders the authority to approve short periods of individual leader development, which range from civilian service opportunities to cultural immersion at critical points in an officer’s career. The benefit of this policy is to develop a diverse officer corps with specialized talents and individuals motivated by a self-directed, life-long approach to learning. This relatively small change in Army regulations will have strategic implications for producing an officer corps capable of thriving, instead of merely surviving, in a dynamic and uncertain operational environment. The “Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS),” a 15- page document recently signed by General George Casey and drafted by Colonel Daniel Shanahan at the Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, outlines the Army’s approach to leader development as part of the Army Capstone Concept.2 The document describes the challenge of developing leaders, exhausted from 10 years of war, who are about to enter a more difficult operating environment. The ALDS describes the future operating environment as “even more uncertain, complex, and competitive” than recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan with “hybrid threats that challenge us across the full spectrum of operations.”3 This operational environment tests leaders with extended campaigns, decentralized decisionmaking, and ill-structured problems.4 Compounding the complexity of leader development in this environment is a reliance on forming networks with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners to navigate multifaceted missions. Thus, the 18 operating environment the ALDS describes requires an organization capable of complex tasks and continual adaptation. Although it never explicitly uses the terminology, the ALDS alludes to a need for the Army to become a learning organization to thrive in an era of persistent conflict. Paul Senge first popularized the concept of a “learning organization” in his 1990 book, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of a Learn ing Organization.5 Senge defines a learning organization as an organization “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together.”6 Simply put, a learning organization is capable of being flexible and adaptive if it “discovers how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels.”7 While his definition seems lofty and overly subjective for an organization as large as the Army, two characteristics he describes are not so different from goals stated in the ALDS. The first is mental models, which are “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures and images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”8 In the complex operational environment the ALDS describes, there is a need to continually revisit and evaluate current assumptions, which ultimately drive decisionmaking and thought processes. If officers at all levels do not offer candid criticism of mental models or challenge assumptions, the result is “entrenched models,” which prevent framing ill-structured problems and hinder the development of effective solutions.9 The second characteristic of a learning organization Senge describes is personal mastery, which is the “discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively.”10 Essentially what Senge describes is an organization where individuals are deeply committed to the process of learning. Senge argues that most of this learning is not the result of formal training, rather incidental learning the individual garners from self-reflection and curiosity. He also claims that “individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning… but without it, no organizational learning occurs.”11 This suggests the Army is unable to learn as an organization in a changing operational environment if its officers do not possess personal mastery through an active and personal commitment to learning. Without satisfying these two characteristics, the Army will not effectively develop its leaders to become members of a learning, forward-thinking organization. To the Army’s credit, the ALDS hints at the characteristics Senge attributes to a learning organization. The ALDS explicitly states it seeks to develop leaders who are “broad enough to operate with a global mindset and across the spectrum of conflict, able to operate in JIIM environments, and culturally astute and able to use this awareness…to achieve an intercultural edge.”12 Developing these leaders requires a commitment to personal mastery through broad experiences and creating mental models capable of functioning in JIIM and intercultural environments. Additionally, the ALDS outlines eight imperatives to guide policy actions for leader development, three of which are notable. The first is to “encourage an equal commitment by the institution, by leaders, and by individual members of the profession to life-long learning and development.”13 This recognizes a learning organization is created by both willing individuals and an organization willing to support the learning of those individuals. The second is managing the “Army’s military and civilian talent to benefit both the institution and the individual.”14 This imperative recognizes that the Army “needs and values a mix of generalists and specialists that collectively provide diverse talents.”15 This is particularly important for mental models that require diverse perspectives from individuals throughout the organization instead of a groupthink mentality, which operates under common assumptions. The third imperative is preparing “select leaders for responsibility at the national level” by providing “additional opportunities for broadening and advanced assignments.”16 This ties individual commitment to learning supported by the institution; thus, the ALDS has elements that reflect the characteristics of a learning organization, which is prerequisite to adaptability in an era of persistent conflict. However, even though the language in the ALDS alludes to a learning organization, the reality is that the Army does not resemble a learning organization and lacks policies to fully support a learning organization. The vast majority of officer career paths are standardized with regards to assignments and training (see Figure 1). This standardized path also reflects the Army’s approach to professional military education (PME) such as basic officer leader courses, captain career courses, intermediate-level education (ILE), precommand courses, and the Army War College. As a result, the Army does not have an appropriate mix of generalists and specialists because there is a lack of diverse assignments and education in the officer corps. This results in barriers to mental models and often leads to groupthink with outdated assumptions developed in rigid courses that do not evolve quickly over time. The lack of specialization prevents personal mastery of cultural and technical expertise of the current operational environment. Additionally, a lack of specialization discourages individual officers from committing to a lifetime of learning because the Army limits the scope of their knowledge to common core training and assignments without creating an opportunity for them to stand out among their peers. Thus, there is a large gap between the language and goals of ALDS and the reality of an Army struggling to adapt to the demands of the current operational environment. Complicating the change needed to move the Army toward becoming a learning organization is a number of constraints that must be considered before evaluating policy changes. These con- “The ‘Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS),’ a 15-page document recently signed by General George Casey and drafted by Colonel Daniel Shanahan at the Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, outlines the Army’s approach to leader development as part of the Army Capstone Concept. The document describes the challenge of developing leaders, exhausted from 10 years of war, who are about to enter a more difficult operating environment.” 19 straints are best articulated in a recent report, “Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps,” published by The Center for a New American Security, an independent and nonpartisan research institution. The report identifies four trends in the current operational environment that will influence the skills and knowledge officers must develop:  “Increased incidence of ‘wars amongst the people.’  Humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in parts of the world with which the United States has little experience.  Widespread access to highly destructive weapons.  The 24-hour global media environment.”17 However, the study recognizes the solution for developing these skills in officers is not as “simple as adding even more to the already-packed training and professional military education curriculum for junior and intermediate-grade leaders.”18 Instead, the report cites a need for a distribution and specialization of talents across knowledge areas and differentiated career paths that are not based on standardized assignments and experiences. Further, the report argues a need for “encouraging the accession and retention of more of the best available talent in the officer corps” by offering “more diverse and flexible career paths that encourage risk-taking and unconventional assignments.”19 Additionally, policies aimed at leader development are constrained to limited resources given the skyrocketing future budgetary outlays in other areas of government spending. Even though General Martin Dempsey, commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), stated that leader development is his first priority for training and resources, a policy must exist in the reality of diminishing financial resources. Thus, there are numerous barriers to achieving the difficult goal of operationalizing the ALDS into tangible policy changes. One possible way to operationalize the ALDS is through a subtle regulation change, which has strategic implications for developing a diverse officer corps of specialized talents mixed with common core training. According to Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-10, Leaves and Passes, “commanders of units, normally commanded by officers in the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher are authorized to approve [permissive temporary duty] when the period of absence is 10 days or less.”20 Permissive temporary duty (PTDY) is defined as “a nonchargeable absence from duty…at no expense to the Government to perform a semi-official activity that benefits the Service and the soldier.”21 Historically, PTDY has primarily been used to give a soldier up to ten days to look for off-post housing when arriving at anew unit but has been rarely used for “participation in a program that will enhance the soldier’s value to the Army.”22 However, this is a potentially powerful tool to allow officers to demonstrate their commitment to individual leader development with institutional support from the Army. Commanders in the rank of O5 and above should be authorized to approve up to 30 days of PTDY for officers who have completed a key developmental position, are en route to or from a PME course, or at their discretion. The commander should retain the ability to grant PTDY at any time, primarily after successful completion of key developmental positions, such as company commander, and en route to or from PME training such as career courses and ILE. For approval, officers must submit an attachment to a PTDY request, which outlines the purpose of the leader development, along with a detailed plan of what the requestor seeks to accomplish. On completion of the PTDY, the officer will submit a report to the U. S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), and a summary of the officer’straining will be added to the officer’s record brief (ORB). HRC will add the report and summary to a database, which can be accessed by commanders who seek officers with experience and specialization in certain areas. As a result, senior Army leaders can leverage the referent knowledge of a diverse officer corps. The impact of this regulation change di-versifies not only the officer corps as a whole, but also the experiences of individual officers. Figure 1 illustrates the progression over time of granting PTDY to officers at critical points in their careers. The first opportunity for individual leader development is after BOLC and before arriving at the gaining unit. In this example, the officer is aware of an impending deployment to Afghanistan, and during his 30-day PTDY, he travels to an Afghan cultural center in New York City where he spends time interacting with former Afghan citizens, practicing the Pashto language, and understanding subtle cultural nuances to develop skills for leader engagements. Following his deployment to Afghanistan and attendance at the captain career course, the same officer uses PTDY to volunteer for reconstruction efforts in Thailand after an earthquake damages part of the country. During this time, the officer networks with civilian disaster relief agencies, such as the Red Cross, World Vision, and UNICEF, observing their strengths and weaknesses, which will help prepare the offi-Rank Professional Military Education Individual Leader Development (30 Days PTDY) Assignments 2LT/ 1LT Basic Officer Leader Course Study Pashto/Afghan Cultural Center Platoon Leader/Executive Officer/BN Staff Officer

Captain Career Course Volunteer Thailand Earthquake with Civilian Relief Agencies Company Commander/BN or BDE Staff Officer House Armed Services Congressional Fellowship

Division G3 Operations BN Operations and Executive Officer/BDE Staff Officer

Pre-Command Course Internship with Defense Intelligence Agency BN Commander/BDE or Division Staff Officer

Army War College African Union Peace and Security Council BDE Commander/ Division Staff Officer Figure 1. Example officer timeline integrated with 30-day individual leadership development events 20 cer to work with them later in his career. On completion of company command, this officer uses PTDY to participate in a compressed Congressional Fellowship with the House Armed Services Committee and learns about the appropriations process for defense spending. Following completion of ILE, this officer arrives at his unit, but before becoming a battalion operations officer, he uses his PTDY in the division operations shop to learn how planning works two levels higher in his chain of command. This process of personally directed, lifelong learning continues at the pace of the individual officer’s motivation, and the Army supports his endeavors, which provides the foundation for a learning organization. The opportunities for leader development on PTDY are limited only by the creativity of individual officers. Table 1 provides just a small list of opportunities available to officers with the implementation of this PTDY policy for individual development. A brief look at this list illustrates the point that this policy naturally allows leaders to prepare for the threats described in the Army Capstone Concept and the ALDS. As a result, there are a substantial number of benefits for the Army if it adopts this policy change: Specialists mixed with generalists in the officer corps. Officers will have a chance to excel in specialized areas, such as emergency response, weapons of mass destruction, and language training (see Table 1 for more areas), during PTDY. Specializa-tions will exist in the context of common core training in PME courses, removing the pressure to squeeze specialized training (such as cultural training) into an already full PME course schedule. Not only does specialized training create an officer corps with abroad range of capabilities prepared to handle dynamic threats, it also provides common training in the principles of full-spectrum operations. Ability of senior leaders to leverage referent knowledge from a diverse officer corps. Taking advantage of PTDY and tracking individual officer development in a central database at HRC provides senior leaders the opportunity to immediately leverage officers for specific assignments. Indeed, this same process occurred informally when General Petraeus hand-picked his staff officers based on individual experiences and referent knowledge, which contributed to the success of the ‘surge’ strategy in Iraq. Ability to react immediately to changes in the operational environment. Unlike many Army programs, which have a lag time from mobilization to implementation to impact, this policy immediately reacts to changes in the operational environment. As previously mentioned, the central database at HRC can track officers with unique abilities to respond to an imminent threat. However, in the event that referent knowledge in the officer corps is unavailable for a particular threat, this policy allows officers to immediately develop specific knowledge before deploying to a particular operational environment. For example, a captain graduates from the career course knowing he is deploying to a particular location. He now has the option of committing his PTDY time to language/cultural training or understanding governance and economic issues related to a specific area of operations. This process transforms the Army from a ‘smart card’ approach, which oversimplifies complex issues, to officers capable of leading organizations as subject-matter experts. Experiencing JIIM operations as a junior officer. Many JIIM assignments are restricted to senior officers, which prevents junior leaders from integrating into JIIM operations. PTDY facilitates officers learning from and forming small networks with interagency personnel who create direct contacts and interagency trust, which can be leveraged throughout one’s career in the Army. Low cost. One primary benefit of PTDY includes the financial and planning responsibility, which is handed off to the officer. This provides an ideal incentive for individuals, as responsible stakeholders for institutional lifelong learning, which encourages the development of a diverse officer corps without the costs associated with a PME course. The minimal costs are limited to developing a database to track individual officer development reports and a small amount of personnel to manage it. Instead of creating an additional program in the Army that diverts resources and personnel, which is often the solution in most bureaucratic organizations, this system pushes the onus on the individual officer to create and report his development. Increased retention related to individual officer satisfaction. A PTDY leader-development program would increase officer satisfaction and ultimately increase retention. The Army has been using a combination of incentives (primarily financial) to reverse the trend of dwindling officer retention rates in an environment with multiple deployments and family stress. However, financial incentives are weak because the Army does not have the resources to pay the true private sector market value of an officer, and officers who want to leave the Army to chase higher paychecks will leave regardless. In this

Volunteer in Haiti Understand disaster relief and civilian agency coordination Work with metropolitan police force Understand civilian approach to targeting and gang conflict Border patrol Experience with control and security of border operations

Develop knowledge of supply chains and logistical methods Adventure race in the Caribbean Raise money for Combined Federal Campaign charity Work with Air Force squadron Develop expertise on close air support (CAS) application

Understand agricultural development methods Internship with CNN Develop appreciation and understanding of media capabilities Observe foreign military academy Conduct leader engagements with other nations Red Cross Understand coordination for mass casualty (MASCAL) situations Table 1: Example activities for individual leader development “Even though General Martin Dempsey, commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), stated that leader development is his first priority for training and resources, a policy must exist in the reality of diminishing financial resources. Thus, there are numerous barriers to achieving the difficult goal of operationalizing the ALDS into tangible policy changes.” 21 program, PTDY creates opportunities for personal and professional development, which attracts and retains officers with lifelong commitments to self-directed learning and service — the officers who should compose the future bench of senior leaders. Many officers choose to leave the Army due to peer standardization of career tracks and feel their talents are both mismanaged and underutilized. The PTDY policy directly deals with this concern, giving officers control of specialized talents and planned opportunities for professional growth. Additionally, the Army career timelines offer very few opportunities for planned personal growth such as volunteering abroad or serving as part of a religious ministry for extended periods. This protected time ensures officers have the option to seek personal fulfillment through civilian service opportunities or religious trips, both of which still add professional value to the Army. Even though the Army’s current operational tempo is fast-paced, 30 days of PTDY allows officers the chance to slow down for personal recovery and contextualize their lessons learned before moving to anew assignment. While there is an abundance of benefits, it is important to recognize and discuss some of the possible drawbacks associated with a PTDY regulatory change. Certainly, there are low financial costs associated with this plan, but there may be hidden personnel costs. For example, adding 30 days to individual development may delay an officer’s arrival to his unit. It also might complicate planning for personnel movements, particularly if it is not known in advance whether an officer will request PTDY or skip the opportunity to begin an assignment earlier. However, officers can mitigate this possibility by notifying HRC, in advance, of their intention to use the PTDY opportunity for individual development. Additionally, many personnel movements to PME courses result in down (or snowbird) time while waiting for a course to begin. Often, officers snowbird for months, using time that could be used for individual leader development and that likely does not conflict with other meaningful training or assignments. Another possible constraint is the limitations an officer may have in affording out-of-pocket costs associated with moving his family to another location for 30 days. One way to mitigate this move is to seek local PTDY development opportu-couraged me from choosing such a divergent learning path, as opposed to the standard cadet summer experience. While attitudes in the Army toward learning seem to have shifted, as evidenced by the language in the ALDS, there may still be opposition to individual officer development through a policy change in PTDY because it deviates from a standard career track. In a complex operational environment such as this, the Army cannot afford to be skeptical of ideas that directly facilitate its development as a learning organization. The Army faces an operational environment with complex challenges and a high level of uncertainty. To thrive, instead of merely survive in this environment, the Army needs to quickly develop a diverse officer corps, with specialized talents that complement common training and enhance their ability to adapt to current threats while anticipating those in the future. Giving commanders the authority to approve 30 days of PTDY at critical points in a career path is the first step to developing a diverse officer corps. Captain Jacob T. Sheehan is currently a student at the Special Forces Qualification Course, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and completed a M. S. as a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom. His military education includes Air Force Freefall Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Special Forces Assessment and Selection, and Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include armored reconnaissance scout platoon leader, B Troop, 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry (4-10 CAV), Fort Carson, CO, and battle captain, 4-10 CAV, Baghdad, Iraq. “Many JIIM assignments are restricted to senior officers, which prevents junior leaders from integrating into JIIM operations. PTDY facilitates officers learning from and forming small networks with interagency personnel who create direct contacts and interagency trust, which can be leveraged throughout one’s career in the Army.” nities that do not require travel. For example, an officer interested in understanding targeting, criminal network analysis, and police techniques could use PTDY at a metropolitan police organization for 30 days. While there are possible drawbacks with such a policy, many of them can be mitigated. As a cadet at the U. S. Military Academy, I was selected as a volunteer to serve as a team member on Crossroads Africa during my last summer at West Point. Crossroads Africa was a specialized opportunity that allowed me to travel to Ghana as part of a small team and work with local nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to achieve development goals such as teaching, digging wells, and building schools. Having the opportunity to participate in Crossroads Africa taught me the cultural skills that allowed me to thrive, instead of simply survive, as a platoon leader in southwestern Baghdad. Leader engagements and rapport-building were familiar experiences as I had interacted with many tribal elders while in Ghana and navigated their local culture. Ironically, there was resistance from certain leaders at West Point, who dis- 1Dr. John A. Nagl, et al., “Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps,” Center for a New American Security, February 2010. 2“A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army,” Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, 25 November 2009, p. 1. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, Doubleday, New York, 1990. 6Ibid, p. 3. 7Ibid, p. 4. 8Ibid, p. 8. 9Ibid. 10Ibid, p. 7. 11Ibid, p. 139. 12“A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st-Century Army,” p. 8. 13Ibid, p. 10. 14Ibid, p. 11. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 17Nagl, et al., p. 5. 18Ibid. 19Ibid, p. 6. 20Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-10, Leaves and Passes, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 15 February 2006, Section XVI, Paragraph 5-31, p. 34. 21Ibid., Section XVII, Paragraph 5-33, p. 37. 22Ibid., Section XVI, Paragraph 5-32, p. 35.