See/Observe Without Being Seen
Article
“Far ahead of the leading elements, scouts are the commander’s eye. Whatever an aircraft observes from the air will not remain hidden to the crew of an armored reconnaissance vehicle.”
The opening quote describes the German Army’s Armored Reconnaissance Corps when it was established in 1956. Today, the current operating environment (COE) presents a host of unpredictable factors that have an immediate and considerable impact on the course of operations. Essentially nothing has changed about the interest in gathering information about the enemy; but what about ongoing operations challenges? International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) The ISAF in Afghanistan showcases some aspects that characterize the employment of the German Army’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) corps and the demands it can meet. The ISAF operation is without any doubt the most difficult challenge the Bundeswehr has faced to date. The German government’s Afghanistan concept is the political capstone document; the ISAF operations plan (OPLAN) provides the military framework. The forces have a support mission, which is based on the knowledge that reconstruction is impossible without security, and long-term security can only be achieved through progress in economic and social developments. Bundeswehr missions revolve around the issue of security. Task performance is determined by three essential factors: Environmental conditions. The theater of operations is a challenge in itself. Long distances and difficult road conditions have to be covered. In addition, difficult climate conditions can push soldiers and their equipment to the limits. Battlefield conditions. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF units are exposed to permanent threats of attacks from small arms, mortars, missiles, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The quality of IEDs is improving steadily. Unlike traditional conflict with regular forces, it is difficult to identify, neutralize, or eliminate opposing militant forces in this asymmetric type of conflict. Threat conditions. The threat situation and mission require a specific method of conducting operations. On one hand, self-protection must not be neglected; on the other hand, visible presence must be ensured throughout the area of operations. Short-range defense of friendly objects relies on patrols to scan the civilian situation and joint operations with ANSF targeting opposing force groups, which cover virtually the entire spectrum of a stabilization operation. These operations share the common thread of military elements directly involved in confidence building and reconstruction measures. Single Source Reconnaissance The broad spectrum of reconnaissance results from issues of military relevance and the civilian situational picture which must be provided to the tactical/operational commander as soon as possible and correspond with mission and associated requirements. Apart from appropriate command and control assets, this method always calls for employing a composite force under a unified command. Therefore, the German Army decided to amalgamate its ISR assets within a newly created ISR corps. The new ISR corps, its role and composition based on lessons learned in recent operations, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Congo, and Afghanistan, is intended to provide eyes at the ground level and an aerial view coupled with a substantive human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. This is not to say that ISR troops can only be employed at the tactical level under an ISR force command. This would prompt an autonomy drive among branches, on top of what has already been observed among certain functional chains, which would be counterproductive to the objective of conducting operations without friction. Figure 1. Fennek recce patrol. — 41 Ground sen 0 km approx. 10 approx. 5 km nsor OBS-Post MoSeS
By moving ISR assets under a unified command, while still allowing interaction with other arms, the ISR corps has provided commanders with faster, more reliable, and more precise information on potential and actual enemy force composition, layout, operations, and plans. Within the German Army, the ISR corps has seen the creation of four companies, which provide brigade ISR, and five battalions, one of which is a division-level asset, and the other four operate as brigade ISR formations.1 The whole restructuring process of the German Army’s ISR capabilities is accompanied by a concept development and experimentation project. The new ISR corps concept is being assessed within this project, and by mid-2009, draft ISR branch manuals will be published. Sometime during 2009 or 2010, the new ISR doctrine will be validated during a final exercise, which will be the culmination of this project. Modern and Mission-Oriented Equipment The ISR corps already has abroad range of autonomous, powerful, and complementary technical systems. The Fennek reconnaissance vehicle, with BOSA ground sensor equipment, and the Aladin minidrone enable ground-based scout reconnaissance units to embody their slogan “videre sine videri” (see/observe without being seen). In the future, an unmanned mobile sensor system, called MoSeS, will be employed as well. One reconnaissance patrol (Fennek 2) will be capable of covering an area of some 50 square kilometers. The Fennek command and control (C2) component already enables us to summarize data from different sensors and transmit, in target data quality, nearly simultaneously. Introducing the integrated C2 system enhances this component. The Mikado and LUNA (Luftgestützte Unbemannte Nahaufklärungs Ausstattung) systems for airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance increase the flexibility and quality for reconnaissance operations in sensitive areas. Technical means and sensor systems, such as the ground surveillance radar (BÜR) or the LEGAR 2 battlefield reconnaissance radar, will strengthen the approach of scout reconnaissance from a distance, as well as available identification methods. The radar range is up to 40km with the capability to track multiple targets on the ground in very low airspace. However, technology-assisted reconnaissance cannot replace humans as reconnaissance mediums on the ground. This is particularly true during urban operations, which are becoming more and more important. The powerful technical reconnaissance systems are therefore effectively complemented by the special qualities of the long-range reconnaissance troops and field intelligence forces — the assets that round off the performance spectrum of the ISR corps. The ISR Center The German Army’s new ISR Center is located at Munster, Germany. Major General Campbell, commanding general, U. S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, attended the activation ceremony on 6 March 2008. All course-based ISR training is concentrated at this location to ensure a common understanding of ISR and promote the development of a specific and corporate ISR identity. The training center currently conducts 64 different training courses for officers and noncommissioned officers. Colonel Graf Strachwitz, who visited the Armor Center in October 2008, is the chief of Army ISR. He also serves as the commander of the training center and is tasked with developing ISR doctrine, training products, and ISR systems and organizations to enhance the combat effectiveness of the current and future ISR corps. Lessons Identified from Operational Deployments Human intelligence. There is a permanent demand for additional human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities from all theaters. To meet this demand, the ISR branch constantly reviews HUMINT structures and capabilities regarding their efficiency and the quantification of additional HUMINT personnel required. Based on these reviews, a “basic HUMINT” course for non-HUMINT personnel was established. Skills/career paths. The quantity and variety of sensors, complex operational environment, and sheer amount of data and information require highly qualified personnel through all ranks. A wide range of specialized skills and correlated career paths was developed to build up human resources required to meet future challeng- 42 — Figure 2. ISR battalion stabilization forces. = 12 Recce Patrols
Citation
Lieutenant Colonel Dirk Schubert, German Army. “See/Observe Without Being Seen.” ARMOR, March-April 2009, pp. 40-43.
Report a transcription error, attribution issue, page-boundary problem, or stronger source. The article title and URL will be attached automatically.
Keep researching across Trackpads.
Move from scholarship to archives, long-form history, books, and audio without losing the thread.
Read deeper with Trackpads Books
Trackpads books turn research themes into longer narrative and reference works. Book purchases help support the project.
Explore Trackpads Books ↗Listen to the history
Continue with Trackpads podcasts for military-history series, interviews, and narrated features.
Browse Trackpads Podcasts ↗