Remote Areas of Afghanistan: “Getting a Foot in the Door”

“The tasks to be done require logistical support in the form of funds, equipment, and qualified personnel. These should be made readily available and given with a minimum of red tape. Moreover, the manipulation of this logistical support is a political act and it must be allocated with a priority in favor of villages or districts where the population is most active on the side of the counterinsurgent.”1 The preceding quote from David Galu-la’s book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, summarizes what appears to be an obvious method of distributing support; creates the idea that resources should be given only to local nationals who support the efforts of multinational forces and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA); and establishes that support should obviously be withheld from villages or people who would simply turn over the supplies to insurgents. Under most circumstances, this approach would be effective; however, what approach would be effective when a unit deploys to an isolated area not knowing what side its local citizens support or if they support any side at all? There still exist citizens in remote areas of Afghanistan who have not experienced firsthand the effects of unlawful insurgency, and the few who have do not connect these operations with a larger framework. Most of these places are located across from the Tribal Areas in Pakistan, which is convenient for anti-coalition militia (ACM) fighters, who use these villages as way stations and safe havens. The villagers, who identify with these fighters based on tribal alliances or shared Muslim faith, provide aid to the fighters without realizing they are supporting any cause. Withholding logistics support from such places as away to “punish” villagers for aiding the insurgency will have absolutely no effect. These people have lived for generations without aid from the IRoA, so denying them aid now will not impact their daily lives in the least. Supplying a neighboring area with support as an example of benefits associated with cooperating with the government does not always seem to work in these outer-lying areas. Many villages are geographically located in close proximity, but have nothing to do with each other socially; even two villages composed of the same tribesmen might have severed relationships due to a feud that happened 250 years ago. Choosing one village to serve as an example of “benefits for government cooperation” and neglecting its neighbors will likely cause jealousy in the “have-not” village and push its citizens into the enemy’scamp. As far as the have-not villagers are concerned, they did not do anything against the government and are unfairly being discriminated against (Afghanistan’s people can think of many things that mark their clan as distinct from every other), so they are forced to join the opposition to that government. Bringing gifts and distributing them wide ly, without attached strings, seems to work best when entering anew area in a remote location. In February 2008, in Support of Operation Winter Stand V, Anvil Troop traveled to the area around Nakumkheyl Village in the Torah Wrey Valley. Task Force Eagle’s intent for Winter Stand was to conduct air assault missions into traditional AMC safe havens when these insurgents were wintering in Pakistan, which would demonstrate to the residents the benefits of supporting the government. Anvil Troop was met with a hostile reception; shura elders refused Anvil Troop pashtunwali (hospitality) and informed them they were not welcome. For 2 days, Anvil leaders attempted to explain to the elders that they would bring civil affairs projects, new clothes, and food for their people, but the shura members insisted that coalition presence would only bring trouble. It was obvious that two of the elders were influencing the rest, but removing these two influential elders was not an attractive option. Our chances of being accepted by the elders was further damaged by the same two elders when they told the elders that coalition forces were just in the area to arrest innocent individuals who the government unjustly did not like. So, for 2 days Anvil leaders tried in vain to isolate these two elders in an attempt to reason with the rest of the elders, who served as representatives from five different villages in the area. During the afternoon on the second day, after repeated unsuccessful meetings with shura elders, Anvil Troop and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) decided to call some curious boys over to the mission support site and give them some shoes. They instructed the boys to tell their parents that the IRoA had sent more supplies, but they must come to the pickup area to get the supplies. The next day, as an element traveled to an area outside the immediate influence of the hostile shura members, the Afghan National Army (ANA) gave out humanitarian civil assistance (HCA) to everyone who wanted it, telling them that more would be distributed at a shura the next day. The villagers were also told that neighboring villages would be invited to the same shura. If the villagers from the Nakumkheyl Shura did not want their free supplies, then their neighbors were welcome to the un-claimed goods. There were a large number of attendees at the shura the following day. ANSF and Anvil leaders simply explained that the IRoA had sent HCA and coalition forces as its duty to the people to ensure they survived the winter. There were no accusations of ACM activity and no one was asked to swear any oaths of allegiance. The two truckloads of HCA were then distributed evenly to everyone in attendance, which supported the position that the government in Kabul was real and its job was to serve the people. Suddenly, the shura elders who had spread negative stories about the coalition did not seem so credible. Many of the villagers began to view the troublemakers as a hindrance to their rights, depriving them of necessities. Another shura was held by the sub-governor of Bermel a few days later and attendance was doubled. When the troublemakers tried to impede the process, the sub-governor had them arrested for not agreeing to attend the Bermel Shura at least once a month. The villagers did not protest the arrest because it now appeared justified; it was a government official removing individuals who were irrationally interfering with events that would benefit the average person. — 37 “Bringing gifts and distributing them wide ly, without attached strings, seems to work best when entering anew area in a remote location. In February 2008, in Support of Operation Winter Stand V, Anvil Troop traveled to the area around Nakumkheyl Village in the Torah Wrey Valley. Task Force Eagle’s intent for Winter Stand was to conduct air assault missions into traditional AMC safe havens when these insurgents were wintering in Pakistan, which would demonstrate to the residents the benefits of supporting the government.”

“The free distribution of HCA is just the first step; it simply allows the company a “foot in the door.” To have a lasting effect, the coalition must quickly escalate civil affairs involvement to begin building projects, which will develop the area by providing infrastructure, employment, and closer ties to the government in Kabul. If a company limits itself to distributing HCA as a nonlethal offensive, it will simply be creating a welfare economy in an area, which will not bring the population into the IRoA’s orbit.” By simply giving away supplies at the beginning of the week, Anvil Troop showed the villagers that they were being denied something they did not even know they wanted or needed. Also, by distributing HCA with no initial strings attached, Anvil Troop created the impression that goods distribution was normal in a country run by the IRoA. The villagers saw the goods as items they wanted, needed, and later deserved, and accepted them without realizing what HCA represents in a political context. The IRoA’s free distribution of the HCA, as opposed to using the goods as a bribe to compel villagers to support the government, made the villagers de facto supporters of the government. It created a situation where villagers began to rely on simple gifts that made their lives better, and realize that these benefits were provided by the IRoA. The ACM, however, viewed the acceptance of anything from the IRoA as a political act, but could not do anything about it without negatively affecting its information management campaign. As seen in many villages in Afghanistan, the ACM’s only counter-tactic to free distribution of HCA is to force villagers to destroy the goods given to them. In the eyes of the villagers, they were asked to destroy mosque rugs, cooking oils, children’s clothing, and food rightfully belonging to them — for a cause with which they never agreed. This forced the ACM into an outsider role, attempting to dictate the villagers’ behavior, and as a result, coalition forces became the agents of maintaining the status quo. The system currently in place by Task Force Eagle serves as an effective meth-and effect. Afghans do not like to be manipulated and to arbitrarily change the rules of the game results in their distrust of coalition motives, causing them to refuse contact with the coalition and return to the way of life they have lived for thousands of years. On the other hand, withholding HCA without a concrete reason will create a vacuum that the ACM can quickly fill. If a village disassociates from the coalition and refuses to accept HCA, the ACM can simply move in and provide the same items, or cash, to the villagers so they can continue to enjoy the benefits to which they have become accustomed. Although HCA distribution introduces villagers to a better way of living, it does not intertwine their well-being with the success of the IRoA. Infrastructure development projects, on the other hand, can do just that if they are awarded judiciously. These projects also have the benefit of offering a means of long-term quality of life improvements that the ACM does not have the resources to replicate. Infrastructure development projects are powerful weapons in a counterinsurgency environment. For example, building a school in a village demonstrates that the government is working for the people and it has the capability to accomplish big projects. Once the project is completed, however, it does nothing more to bring the villagers into the sphere of the IRoA. In effect, the project becomes just an elaborate HCA distribution: the village gets something it did not have and is grateful, but once the project is complete the villagers can choose to ignore the IRoA and coalition. Of course, the government does not have the option of taking back the new school. If the ACM does something foolish, such as destroy the school, the villagers might turn against them; on the other hand, it may plant the idea that the government cannot protect the village. 38 — od to enable company commanders to use the valuable tool of HCA. Basically, a company can stockpile as much HCA as it needs to have goods available when visiting a village. Commanders should ensure they have plenty of HCA on hand at all times in the event a local leader engagement develops during a mission. During revisits to villages the company should redistribute HCA, which will remind villagers that such visits are beneficial and will reduce the probability of the coalition being attacked on its way to the villages. If the ACM does attack the coalition, the villagers will resent these attacks and the ACM because it is preventing the delivery of goods. The free distribution of HCA is just the first step; it simply allows the company a “foot in the door.” To have a lasting effect, the coalition must quickly escalate civil affairs involvement to begin building projects, which will develop the area by providing infrastructure, employment, and closer ties to the government in Kabul. If a company limits itself to distributing HCA as a nonlethal offensive, it will simply be creating a welfare economy in an area, which will not bring the population into the IRoA’s orbit. Villagers will continue to accept HCA, which means they are passively supporting the government, but will never be forced to actively support it. If the coalition places caveats on HCA distribution, the Afghans will then resent the government and become suspicious of coalition efforts. However, if there is evidence of a village actively supporting the ACM, the HCA will be withheld as punishment, but the villagers understand the concrete cause

If local leaders are involved from the beginning of the project, they are obligated to support the government. By having elders nominate projects and recommend contractors, they are publicly viewed as working for the government. The elders can ensure their villagers are hired to work on the project, giving them a vested interest. At this point, if the ACM destroys the project, the villagers will see it as a direct attack on their village and not on the government. Eventually, however, the ACM will destroy the projects because the building of infrastructure means the government is acting as a legitimate entity, which makes the ACM illegitimate. Another added benefit for the government is the elders will become targets for the ACM, based on their involvement with a project, requiring them to get even closer to the IRoA for protection. Initially, this scenario was difficult to create in Afghanistan because the system was not set up for a company to move into an area and employ locals to build projects. Typically, the company would move into an area and request projects, which the battalion civil affairs team would oversee, but they could not select the contractor. The contracting office, interested in ensuring the government’s money was spent on quality work, chose contractors with whom they were familiar. These contractors were not from the company’s operational area, which caused some problems with the locals, and diminished the positive effects that using local contractors to complete the work would have. As stated before, a civil affairs project built without the input and participation of local elders is nothing more than an expensive HCA distribution. All contracts require contractors to hire local workers; however, the village shura realizes the real money is made by the contractor so they may not allow their villagers to work for outside contractors. The Afghans feel they do not need to prove themselves to get contracts; if they get a contract and fail to complete it correctly, then outsiders can be brought in without hard feelings, but the villagers feel they should be given the first chance when building anything on their lands. The villagers in our operational area did not accept the new projects built by outsiders as an improvement to their lives; they viewed it as the government giving their money to someone else. They would reluctantly accept the project, but the practice of higher headquarters letting contracts did not maximize the effects civil affairs projects would have. To facilitate maximum effects, Task Force Eagle’s civil affairs team participated in creating anew policy that opened up contract bidding to local villagers. Only time will tell if the villagers can actually do a good job with the projects, but the new policy had an immediate positive effect on how local villagers participated with the government process. The villagers began visiting the shuras to ask about upcoming projects and suggesting their own projects to increase their chances of getting contracts. Once local villagers realize the benefits associated with working with coalition forces, stipulations can be placed on the aid they are provided. For example, the company can negotiate in areas such as forcing two sub-tribes to cooperate on planning and executing projects; tying the number of awarded projects to a decrease in improvised explosive device (IED) activity; or asking the villagers to prove their support by providing soldiers and police to the government. The first step, however, is to ensure they are given a free taste of HCA benefits at first contact so they know what they have been missing. Notes 1David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, 30 August 2006. Captain Tim Kelly is currently serving as commander, Anvil Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry (Airborne), attached to 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), Bermel District, Paktika Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He received a B. A. from the University of Southern California. His military education includes U. S. Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, Officer Candidate School, I Corps Primary Leadership Development Course, and Armor Crewman One Station Unit Training. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include: S4, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry (Airborne), Schweinfurt, Germany, and Naray, Afghanistan; assistant S3, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne); and operations officer, G1/J1, Southern European Task Force, Vicenza, Italy, and Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. “If local leaders are involved from the beginning of the project, they are obligated to support the government. By having elders nominate projects and recommend contractors, they are publicly viewed as working for the government. The elders can ensure their villagers are hired to work on the project, giving them a vested interest. At this point, if the ACM destroys the project, the villagers will see it as a direct attack on their village and not on the government.” — 39