Highlighting the Most Significant Work of

Foreword Soldiers who have conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan understand the importance of developing an understanding of the culture and history of the regions in which they are fighting. We are engaged in wars in which leaders must understand the capabilities of their forces in context of the enemy, terrain, and population. Cultural and historical understanding is important on many levels. It is important to understand the ethnic, tribal, and sectarian dynamics that shape popular perceptions of our forces, our indigenous partners, and the enemy. Commander Aboul-Enein and ARMOR provides leaders charged with preparing their troopers for full-spectrum challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan an invaluable gift by making the work of Ali al-Wardi accessible. A s professor Steve Metz of the U. S. Army War College has pointed out, there are two principal bat-tlegrounds in counterinsurgency: intelligence and perception. Intelligence without the context of

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History cultural and historical understanding is of limited value. Cultural and historical understanding is essential to defining the nature of the conflict, understanding the nature of the enemy, identifying the fears and aspirations of various communities, and evaluating sources of information. It is also important to understanding the second- and third-order effects of our actions to ensure we do not confuse activity with progress toward achieving our goals and objectives. Historical and cultural understanding is also important to ensuring soldier discipline and moral conduct while conducting operations in challenging and ambiguous counterinsurgency environments. An understanding of the environment reduces uncertainty, which is a major source of combat stress that can lead to the erosion of discipline and ethical standards. An understanding of the historical memories and perspectives of the population allows soldiers to empathize with the people. Empathy, in turn, will help soldiers understand the need to exercise restraint and protect the population while aggressively pursuing brutal and murderous enemies. Achieving a level of cultural understanding that permits effective counterinsurgency operations requires education and the first step is reading history. Our regiment was introduced indirectly to the writings of Ali al-Wardi by foreign area officer, Major Dan Barnard, as we prepared for operations in northern Iraq. The insights we gained from Photo: Muhammed Mahdi Karim http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kaaba_mirror_edit_jj.jpg

Major Barnard’s summaries of the work’s themes, further informed and qualified by his research on Iraq, helped lay a foundation for understanding the enemy and the various cultural and historical dynamics with which our troops and Iraqi partners would interact. This series of high-quality articles in one of our Nation’s premier professional military journals will be of urgent interest to any soldier serving in Iraq and will also prove invaluable to foreign area officers and others serving in the Middle East. O n the surface, al-Wardi’s 1969 work, “Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History,” appears to offer a comprehensive and detailed Iraqi history through the early 20th century, culminating with the 1920 insurrection against British occupation and the formation of the Iraqi monarchy.1 This history is, in itself, relevant to our troops and leaders. Perhaps most importantly, al-Wardi’s writings shed light on how groups within Iraq have used historical narratives to construct their contemporary identities. A basic understanding of how modern Iraqis perceive themselves is critical to understanding the operational and tactical environments in which we are operating. Al-Wardi provides a window into the stories and legends that shaped the fragmented identities of modern Iraq; stories and legends that expose abroad array of jealousies, mistrust, and revenge for ancient grievances. Al-Wardi attempts to distill the social psychology of these various groups through sweeping discussions of the Iraqi character, especially the dichotomy between tribe and town, as well as the roles and reputations of the Sunni and Shia communities and their influential ulama (Islamic scholars). These characterizations illuminate the contested identity of the Iraqi population. Millennia of urban culture is in constant interaction and tension with the tribes of the desert. Smaller rivalries between tribes operate within grand clashes between two empires: the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shia and Persian Safavid Empire. Al-Wardi’s history is not dry and antiquarian; modern readers with experience in Iraq will find deeply relevant the social fissures created by wars that left behind an inheritance of sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions. The suspicions, prejudices, and doubts of today, al-Wardi shows, are rooted in perceived sins of the past. The narratives within al-Wardi’s multivolume opus include stereotypic profiles of a cast of Iraqi characters, ranging from the Sunni Bedouin tribesman of the western desert, to the agrarian and commercial riverine townsmen, to the Shia Mujta-hids of the holy shrine cities. These narratives and profiles help educate Americans on the iconic and legendary past of Iraq. Although historians might argue the details of his accounts and sociologists might challenge his portrayals of the various communities, al-Wardi remains valuable in understanding a commonly held sense of Iraq’s historical memory today. Soldiers and leaders should keep in mind that Iraqi historical symbolism can be used for good or ill. Images of a shared Iraqi past can help bind together a fragile nation as the post-Saddam state develops. However, that same history can also be abused to stir up dormant hatreds and promote division. Ancient Shia grievances against Sunni Ottoman massacres and misgovernment can fan a sense of revenge and exclusion of Sunnis today. Historical Sunni anger over Safavid Iran’s influence or fears of Shia theocratic abuses can help motivate Sunni rejection of the Shia majority Iraqi government. Narrower grievances against Kurds, Turkmen, or any of the other smaller Iraqi minority communities, can also be extracted from al-Wardi’s history, and further aggravate modern-day conflicts. Even micro-conflicts based in tribal vendetta or town suspicion of the Bedouin can find ample historical basis. By comprehensively educating soldiers about the full context of Iraqi history, reading al-Wardi helps leaders, alongside their Iraqi partners, begin to understand and counter specious claims of various extremist leaders and organizations. Reading al-Wardi might also help combat common fallacies, including broad generalizations about “Arabs” or “Iraq- A RMOR is pleased to offer a unique collection of essays highlighting Iraq’s social, political, and military history. Dr. Ali al-Wardi (1913-1995, hereafter referred to as Wardi) attended the American University of Beirut in 1943. Following graduation from American University, he traveled to the United States to attain his master’sand doctorate degrees in Sociology at the University of Texas in 1948 and 1950, respectively. He would return to Iraq and spend a career teaching; however, his main legacy is a multivolume work in Arabic that he began in the late 1950s and completed in 1969. It highlights the history of Iraq from the arrival of the Ottomans to the monarchy of King Faisal I in 1925. The series is entitled, “Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History,” and was initially published by Baghdad publishers, and Alwarrak Publishing of London released anew edition of the volume in 2007. This is an extraordinary work, which I was first drawn to by a Special Operations Forces unit serving in Mosul. The unit detained a major religious figure leader for al-Qaeda in Iraq in western Mosul who used the Wardi volumes of Iraqi history to incite the population against coalition forces. The detainee mentioned these volumes as a required source to prey upon the imagery of Iraq’s history with the Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Wahabis, and Persians. Upon getting this tip and a few pages of the volume, I acquired a set from the Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room and set about reading the materials. I uncovered a treasure trove of historical information vital to the understanding of Iraq and its relationship with Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Iran, as well as the internal relationship between the tribes and the great regional powers; in particular, the Ottomans and Persians. This is the first in a series of review essays featured in ARMOR highlighting the most important aspects of Wardi’s work. Volume one, the subject of this essay, takes readers from the start of the Ottoman period to the mid-19th century. Pages reveal the history of Iraq, Persia, Shiite Islam, Sunni Islam, Ottoman Turkey, and much more. Readers may recognize some of the stories in this work as being recounted by local nationals in Iraq; probably from their points of view or passed down between tribal generations. If so, add your voice by writing your recollections and experiences and sending them to ARMOR for potential publication. Early Shiism in Persia W e cannot understand Iraq without delving into the early history of Shiism in Persia. After the death of Prophet Mu-Part 1 of the ARMOR Series: The Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali 28 — is,” particularly those fueled by the recent fascination with T. E. Lawrence’s pithy axioms for dealing with “Arabs.” Al-Wardi is a useful antidote to these broad racial assumptions with his more nuanced description of the social cleavages between regions, towns, tribes, and ethnicities. Counterinsurgency in Iraq has proven to its many veterans to be a very local mission that demands a nuanced understanding of unique and shifting conditions. Understanding the seams of resentments and accusations of the factions within a town, or even within a neighborhood, is a key to effective operations. Al-Wardi is an excellent resource for soldiers to begin to gain an understanding necessary for success in the complex tactical environments of Iraq. Another valuable perspective that al-Wardi provides Western readers is an understanding of popular perceptions of foreign invaders in mainstream Iraqi culture. Depictions of foreign rule, be it Ottoman, Safavid, or British, accompanied by lurid tales of humiliation and oppression at the hands of the armies of occupation, are recurring themes in al-Wardi’s histories and in the popular consciousness of Iraq. Al-Wardi devotes hundreds of pages, in particular, to the violent tribal uprising in 1920 against British occupation forces (under the League of Nations Mandate) that irrevocably altered the British project in Mesopotamia. Al-Wardi’s narrative highlights the importance of clarifying our intentions and building relationships with the population based on a clear communication of intentions and respect. Regardless of disagreements among historians regarding the actual facts of the revolt, the heroic narrative related by al-Wardi is significant to American soldiers. In this popular portrayal of the revolt, tribal leaders rebel against the arrogant and insulting British occupation, asserting their sovereignty through a tribal call to arms strengthened by jihad. Despite the actual military failure of the rebellion, this legendary version of the revolt, as taught in Baathist schoolbooks, depicts the British being thrown out through the brave and bold action of valiant Iraqi tribesmen. The symbolism of this revolt remained so lasting and powerful that Saddam Hussein showed a film depicting the 1920 revolt on the eve of the American invasion in 2003. Since the beginning of the American occupation, the revolt has remained an open symbol of nationalism and a violent rejection of “foreign rule” among current insurgents, ranging from Shia clerics, invoking the “sons of the 1920 revolt,” to Sunni insurgent groups naming themselves “the 1920 revolution brigades.” The value to the soldier is an understanding of how some insurgent and militia organizations today cloak themselves in this patriotic symbolism and see themselves as nationalists. The silver lining to the dark cloud of insurgent violence is that appeals to patriotism, no matter how misguided, imply a loyalty to the Iraqi nation. Hence, as with many members of the current Sunni “awakening,” former insurgents who see themselves as nationalists can be persuaded to cooperate with a sovereign Iraqi government, and with our forces, if they understand our desire to help them build a strong Iraqi state. In sharp opposition are the nihilists: the apocalyptic takfiri extremists (of either Sunni or Shia variety) who cannot countenance cooperation with any representative government. I raq today is not a mirror of the past. It is not composed of the same Bedouin tribes as the time of the Islamic conquests. Nor is Iran reprising a role from the ancient Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Nor are American soldiers and coalition partners walking in the imperial footsteps of the British mandate. Iraq is not even the revolutionary country of the 1950s and 1960s, awash in Arab nationalism and Baathist ideology, during which al-Wardi was writing. However, modern Iraqis do have powerful, if fragmentary, memories and cultural associations of all of that history, and al-Wardi is an excellent place for students of Iraq to begin their studies. I am indebted to Major Dan Barnard for his assistance with this Foreword. — Colonel H. R. McMaster, U. S. Army hammad in 632 CE, a schism developed between Muslims over succession. This dispute digressed into two major civil wars and a religious schism between Shi-at Ali (the Party of Ali), the Shiites, and the majority of Muslims, who believed that succession was not based solely on the hereditary rule of Prophet Muhammad. Shiites have held that Ali and the Prophet’s family have been denied their rightful place as leaders of Muslims. Another name for Shiites, is “ahl al-bayt” (followers of Muhammad’s house) while Sunnis are commonly referred to as the “ahl al-sunna” (followers of Muhammad’s path). Persia (modern-day Iran) was primarily Sunni and remained so until 16th century CE. Muslims did not enter in mass into Shiism until the arrival of the Safavid Dynasty in 1501. Before the Safavids, Shiites lived in Nishapur and “We cannot understand Iraq without delving into the early history of Shiism in Persia. After the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, a schism developed between Muslims over succession. This dispute digressed into two major civil wars and a religious schism between Shiat Ali (the Party of Ali), the Shiites, and the majority of Muslims, who believed that succession was not based solely on the hereditary rule of Prophet Muhammad.” “Muhammad Preaching,” by Grigory Gagarin. al-Wardi — 29

Qom, with a few minority Shiite clusters in Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Khorasan. The gradual transition of Iran into a Shiite nation had a profound impact on Iraq, since most of the Shiite holy sites resided in Iraq. Over the course of hundreds of years, Iraq would evolve into a Shiite Arab majority dependent on Persian Shiite clergy. This dynamic may change in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom as more Arab Shiites take control of their own affairs — a scenario that is being watched and managed by Iran. One of the main schisms between Sunnis and Shiites is over the concept of shafaa (intercession), which is a general belief on the use of the sahaba (the Prophet Muhammad’s companions) as intercessors between themselves and God. The practice is frowned on by Sunni Muslim purists, who believe there are no intercessors between humankind and God. Over the course of early Islamic history, some clerics began to rank order intercessors based on their closeness to the Prophet Muhammad. Some Muslims began to view the caliphate based on a person’s lineage (to intercede in the hereafter) rather than on competent or consensus governance. This formed an essential element of what would evolve into the Shiite view of Ali’s absolute requirement to succeed Muhammad, and the evolution of the twelve imams from the ahl al-bayt as intercessors. Sunnis reject these notions as blasphemous innovations that detract from the worship of God. The Janissaries W ardi devotes several sections of the book on the evolution of the Janissary corps, which led to a revolution in military affairs that did much to expand the Ottoman Empire in its early stages. The earliest forms of marching to the beat of drums, the integration of cannon and infantry would be realized by the Janissary corps. Established in 1326, Orkhan (Orhan), one of the founders of the Ottoman dynasty, who succeeded the founder Osman I, founded an army made up of non-Muslim, mainly Christian slaves, captured from youth and educated in Islam arts and warfare. Their loyalty was to the sultan only. S heikh Bektash, a cleric from Khorasan (modern-day Tajikistan and Afghanistan), with a reputation for piety, was invited by the sultan to minister to this innovative military formation. Sheikh Bektash named the formation “Yeni Chari” (meaning new army), Inkishari in Arabic, and Janissary in English. He served as a figurehead for the Janissaries and was called “father” by those the public coined the “boys of Hajj Bektash.” Sheikh Bektash assigned a cleric to each battalion. Over time, ranks were assigned based on the kitchen mess, as Janissaries believed they were eating from the dining table of the sultan. Today in Iraq, these ranks remain in last names such as the Jarbashi family, which comes from the Jarbashi (kettle holder) Pasha, a senior rank in the early Janissaries. The Bektashi order of Sufism is a Shiite order and initially the concept of rejecting and even insulting the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman. The Bektashi order was eventually compelled to alter its Shiite views. Today, the order is a Sunni Sufi order. The Janissaries’ appetite for the conscription of Christian children drove some of the expansion of the early Ottoman period into the Balkans. Major victories of the Ottomans were the defeat of Tamerlane in 1402 and the capture in 1453 of Constantinople with 250,000 troops, 180 warships, and cannon for the first time in written record. S afavids began as an obscure Sufi order in what is now Iranian Azerbaijan, the order was known as “Qizilbashi,” which meant “redheads,” termed for the headdresses they wore with twelve red cockades in memory of the twelve imams. Ismail began his own movement of Qizilbash warriors that conquered the Caucuses, Persia, and portions of Iraq. In 1508, Ismail crowned himself shah, and brought order in the eyes of Baghdad residents. After visiting the tombs of Hussein and Ali, he refurbished Shiite holy sites and ordered the demolition of the tomb of Abu Hanifa, the founder the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam and considered a holy site by Sunnis. Ismail I would be the first of several Safavid Kings of Persia, a dynasty that lasted until 1760, and would propagate Shiism in Persia, north Afghanistan, India, and Iraq. Ismail would retain Baghdad until 1512, at which time he was attacked by Ottoman forces under Sultan Selim I (the Grim). Selim elicited a fatwa (religious opinion) from Ottoman clerics sanctioning the killing of Shiites as apostates, which began around of Shiite purges. Selim I tasked a special security apparatus to eliminate 70,000 Shiites, of which 30,000 were jailed and 40,000 were killed. I n 1514, the Ottomans defeated the Safavids in the Battle of Chaldiran. The Janissaries refused to press the route of Safavid forces for lack of supplies and appropriate clothing for the winter. Selim was livid and had Janissary leaders executed for not pressing the attack. Baghdad, Karbala, and what is now modern-day Iraq fell, along with Tabriz, in what is now Iran. I n 1516, Ottoman cannons swept away the Mamelukes in Syria. Next, the Ottomans crossed the Sinai, taking Egypt in 1517, and defeating the remaining Mamelukes in Cairo. Touman Bey, “The earliest forms of marching to the beat of drums, the integration of cannon and infantry would be realized by the Janissary corps. Established in 1326, Orkhan (Orhan), one of the founders of the Ottoman dynasty, who succeeded the founder Osman I, founded an army made up of non-Muslim, mainly Christian slaves, captured from youth and educated in Islam arts and warfare. Their loyalty was to the sultan only.” 30 — leader of the Mamelukes, was hung from Bab Zuweila, one of Cairo’s gates. Muhammad al-Mutawakkil, whose lineage traces back to the Abbasid Caliphs, was located in Cairo. The Ottomans, and Selim, in particular, sought al-Mutawakkil to recover the mantle of Prophet Muhammad and his sword, along with the keys to the Kaaba, the house built to God by Prophet Abraham in Mecca. Mutawakkil then transferred power to Selim and made him caliph and commander of the faithful in 1517, a title the Ottomans would keep until 1924. However, when Selim took the mantle of caliph, some clerics argued that the caliph must come from Prophet Muhammad’s lineage. I n 1524, Ismail I, the Safavid founder died, and his son, Tahmasap I, reigned from 1524 to 1576. He was 10 years old, and his Ottoman counterpart was Suleiman the Magnificent, who sent the young shah a congratulatory note, while simultaneously preparing for war. Alarmed by the Ottoman preparations, the Safavids wrote to the Hungarian monarch seeking a common alliance against the Ottomans. Word of this secret correspondence between the Shiite Safavids and Christian Hungarians leaked, and Suleiman responded by condemning all Persians currently held captive. The Ottoman armies drove toward Tabriz despite the cold weather that caused them to drift south toward Baghdad. Aside from Ottoman infantry and cavalry, they integrated cannons for the first time in combat. This was the Persian’s first experience with cannons; fortunately for them, this experience proved successful. Safavid forces retreated and left Baghdad exposed and open for the taking. The Ottoman conquest of Baghdad occurred in December 1534, and Suleiman forbade looting and pillaging since the city surrendered without a fight. S uleiman visited Shiite holy sites, ordering the renovations started by Shah Ismail I, his foe, to be completed. He continued the stipends for clerics who serviced these tombs and improved on the Husseiniyah Canal to bring fresh water from the Euphrates into Karbala, the site of Hussein’s massacre in 670 CE. He also rebuilt the Sunni shrine of the tomb of Abu Hanifa, which was demolished by Shah Ismail in his conquest of Baghdad in 1512. Suleiman established baths and markets and built the Baghdad citadel, garrisoning it with 150 troops and one of his large cannons. The cannon would assume a mythological status among Baghdad’s residents. Shah Ismail I made it a point to publicly disavow and insult the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman), which was uncomfortable for many Muslims of the period as it is today among Sunnis and a few Shiites. The three were Prophet Muhammad’s closest companions and intermarriage preserved and expanded the infant Islamic society after Muhammad’s death; they were also a source of many of Muhammad’s sayings, and among Sunnis, were one of the ten blessed to go immediately to paradise. Shah Ismail began the campaign to impose Shiism on Persia, changing the character of Iran and impacting the region with an increase in Shiite converts, both forced and through actual belief. The significance of Iraq as the spiritual epicenter of Shiism continued to grow due primarily to the majority of the twelve imams buried there, which include perhaps the two most important, Ali and his son, Hussein. Hurling insults at the three caliphs (whom Shiites believe usurped the caliphate from Ali) became a test of loyalty for Shah Ismail when dealing with the Persians. If he detected hesitation, the “infidel” would be killed. He then ordered the public reading of insults of the three caliphs in markets, mosques, and streets, as a means not only of affirming this new state doctrine, but more importantly to detect dissenters for liquidation. Wardi uses the example of Galileo’s repudiation of his celestial theories before the inquisition, where Galileo repudiated his lifetime work in astronomy to save himself from the inquisition. The author compares this to famous Sunni cleric, Shams al-Deen al-Jafari, who was compelled to repudiate the three caliphs to save himself from persecution. Shah Ismail was the first to organize the public morning rituals commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein, which is now known as “Ashoura,” and falls on the tenth day of Muharram. The first Ashoura rituals were conducted among the Buyyids around 1055 CE without much fanfare and were subsequently neglected. The rituals were not considered a normal practice in Baghdad at that time. Shah Ismail revived the practice after 500 years of neglect and added the taziyyah (passion plays) rituals to give it both a somber and carnival-like atmosphere to affect the emotions of his subjects, encouraging them to convert more Sunnis, Zoroastrians, and Sufis to Shiism. Another innovation of Islamic practice ordered by Shah Ismail was adding the phrase, “Ali is the friend of God,” at the end of the prayer call, which continues to stir debate among Shiites today. Shiism Takes a Formalized Structure in Persia Shah Ismail died in 1524 at the age of 38. The new shah, Tahmasap I, only 10 years old, was of the belief that he could not combine the functions of leader of the faith and the Safavid state, so he delegated this responsibility to the fuqaha (clergy). The new shah and his ministers enticed a known cleric from Baalbek (in modern day Lebanon), Sheikh Ali al-Karkhi, to manage the Safavid Empire’s religious affairs. The cleric would travel from Baalbek to Qazwain, the first capital of the Safavid Empire, to meet the shah and his advisors. The shah then issued a firman (decree) to be distributed throughout the empire that Sheikh Ali was the deputy to the Hidden Imam, and that he is to be obeyed. Some Arab and Persian historians, including Wardi, consider Sheikh Ali not only the first state-sponsored spiritual leader in Shiism, but, in effect, the actual ruler of the Safavid Empire. Sheikh Ali would affirm and make the Twelver Shiism and the Shiite Jafari School of Islam the official religion of the empire. He began to enforce morality, organize the clergy, and appoint every cleric in every town and village to teach his approved doctrine. There would be dissent on Sheikh Ali’s power, not only “The Janissaries’ appetite for the conscription of Christian children drove some of the expansion of the early Ottoman period into the Balkans. Major victories of the Ottomans were the defeat of Tamerlane in 1402 and the capture in 1453 of Constantinople with 250,000 troops, 180 warships, and cannon for the first time in written record.” — 31 from Sunnis and non-Islamic faiths present in Persia, but from Shiites. Sheikh Ibrahim Qutaifi, a senior Shiite cleric, argued that any government that does not have the missing Imam (Muhammad al-Mahdi), who went into occultation in 939 CE, as its head is an oppressive and imperfect regime. Clergy have no place in any government. The shah attempted to entice Qutaifi with gifts, and when he rejected the gifts, Sheikh Ali chastised him. The reply from Qutaifi was scathing, comparing Sheikh Ali to the third Imam Hassan, who accepted bribes from Muawiyah in return for Hassan, the older son of Ali, renouncing the caliphate. Sheikh Ali would marginalize this lone voice among the Shiite clergy, but this argument gained momentum and split the Shiite clergy, a split that has endured into present day. Sheikh Ali reinstated the Friday prayers, which were long considered by Shiites as optional or not observed because they were conducted by an oppressive state without the missing imam as its head. He issued propaganda that the shah’s government was just and communal prayers are now mandatory. One of the Safavid Shiite clerics, Sheikh Hussein Abdel-Samad, settled in Bahrain and introduced the twelve version of Shiism on the island. Shah Abbas I (The Great) I n 1588, Shah Abbas I assumed the Safavid throne. He was 17, and during his reign, he would face threats from the west, the Ottomans, the east, and the Uzbek tribes. The Uzbeks had taken over Heart following a 9-month siege. They captured the Imam Rida Mosque, looting its treasures, and eventually occupied most of Khorasan (modern day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and northern Afghanistan). Shah Abbas made a truce with the Ottomans in 1590 and turned his attention to the Uzbeks. Agreements with the Turks included relinquishing Azerbaijan, Georgia, and halting the public damnations of the three caliphs. This was not an auspicious start, but a smart move, as Abbas could not conduct a two-front war, and he would finally defeat the Uzbeks in

1597. The defeat of the Uzbeks thus began the golden age of Abbas. He moved his capital from Qazwain to Isfahan, where he built the famous blue-tiled domed mosque and made the new city the envy of the region. I n 1602, Abbas began raids on Ottoman territories, retaking Tabriz, and for the first time, equipping the Safavid armies with cannons. By 1623, he had retaken Baghdad following a 3-month siege, and like his predecessor Ismail I, destroyed the Sunni tomb of Abu Hanifa. Abbas inaugurated his arrival in Baghdad with a Sunni genocide. Rolls were distributed with the names of Sunni families. A Shiite cleric, Sheikh Hussein, was so disgusted by these events that he saved thousands of lives by switching Sunni names into Shiite rolls, vouching for the conversion of Sunnis. This was, however, an anomaly. Abbas then set about a renovation project of the Shiite holy sites of Najaf, Karballah, Samarrai, and Kazimiyah. Ottomans React: Murad IV (the last Ottoman Sultan to Command in the Field): 1612-1640 M urad IV had laid siege to Baghdad in 1624, 1630, and 1637; all three attempts to capture the city failed. The sultan’s patience ran out and he reached for his personal standard, a flag known as al-Tugh al-Hamayuni. The sultan issued a firman (imperial decree) for the fall of Baghdad. He once again rode at the head of his army, but was reputed to be in Arab battledress to look like Prophet Muhammad’s companions. With him were five cannons that ranged in size from 18 to 20 pounds. He planted the flag on the outskirts of Azamiyah within sight of the demolished tomb of Abu Hanifa and nearby mosque declaring, “I refuse to enter except as conqueror of Baghdad!” He would inspect, drill, and train his Janissaries and troops, encouraging and inspiring them. O n 22 December 1638, cannons opened up. Murad’s Grand Vizier (senior minister), Muhammad Pasha, lost his nerve and Murad chastised to the point that the Grand Vizier took his sword and led Janissaries to Baghdad. The Grand Vizier was killed by a bomb while engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Baghdad was taken before the end of 1638. A massacre of Shiites ensued, and it is reputed that those who screamed “Al-Dar, and Aman!” were “saved” by Murad, who ordered they not be molested and threatened execution for those who violated this open declaration of sanctuary. Murad visited the Abu Hanifa Mosque at Azamiyah, remarking, “I have now achieved the purpose of my visit.” M urad left Baghdad on 17 January 1639 and left one of his heavy cannons at the Baghdad citadel. The cannon quickly took on the nickname “Toob Abu Khuzama,” and over the years, became an object of veneration, as residents brought infants to place inside the mouth of the cannon three times as a form of blessing. There are many stories as to the origin of the name, but mostly the lore is that Angel Gabriel aided Murad IV in re-liberating Baghdad. Most Iraqis under Saddam Hussein forgot the significance of the cannon and it is unclear if such an item survived the looting that occurred in 2003. The cannon, reputed to be located in a downtown square, would undoubtedly be prized for its copper. During this period (1666-1694), the Safavids suffered a series of weak shahs, leading up to Shah Suleiman. Under the Safavid Shahs Suleiman and Hussein, the Safavids found anew charismatic Sheikh-ul-Islam, a senior cleric who would direct the empire’s religious affairs. This man, Sheikh Mohammad Baqir al-Majlisi, led a zealous inquisition in 1699 and forced conversion of Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Sufi Muslims, “In 1588, Shah Abbas I assumed the Safavid throne. He was 17, and during his reign, he would face threats from the west, the Ottomans, the east, and the Uzbek tribes. The Uzbeks had taken over Heart following a 9-month siege. They captured the Imam Rida Mosque, looting its treasures, and eventually occupied most of Khorasan (modern day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and northern Afghanistan). Shah Abbas made a truce with the Ottomans in 1590 and turned his attention to the Uzbeks.” “Murad IV had laid siege to Baghdad in 1624, 1630, and 1637; all three attempts to capture the city failed. The sultan’s patience ran out and he reached for his personal standard, a flag known as al-Tugh al-Hamayuni. The sultan issued a firman (imperial decree) for the fall of Baghdad. He once again rode at the head of his army, but was reputed to be in Arab battledress to look like Prophet Muhammad’s companions.” 32 —

Christians, and those “Hellenized” Muslims, influenced by Greek classical philosophy. He added much to Shiite orthopraxis, dictating or writing 50,000 words per day; he collected Shiite ha-diths (sayings and actions) of the Imams, and left a written record on everything from sermons and personal law to conducting morning ceremonies for Hussein, and much more. His Bi-haar al-Anwar is still used today and is considered the largest multivolume commentary on Shiism. When the printing press was introduced to Persia during the reign of the Qajar dynasty, this work was among the first to be published. Tribal Ebbs and Flows in Iraq When central imperial authority broke down, be it Safavid or Ottoman, skirmishes between these two powers, or outright wars, the Bedouin (hereafter referred to as the tribal) trend emerged. These tribal challenges were more prevalent in southern Iraq and some tribal confederacies evolved into autonomous emirates that only paid tribute to the Ottomans or Safavids. Each ashirah (clan) could not exist alone and was forced to ally with other clans and tribes. Urban areas of Iraq and villages guaranteed security by allying with tribes. Aside from protection, the tribes agreed to exact vengeance if there was a wrongful death or murder. A large city, such as Baghdad, Wardi reveals, had districts and city sections allied with different tribes in a delicate balance of influence and protection. I n 1640, the Shammar Tribal Confederation migrated from middle Arabia northward toward the Levant, waging a 20-year war with the tribe occupying the Levant, the Mawali Confederacy. The Mawalis fled southern Iraq and migrated further north to Syria after ending up on the losing side of a conflict against the Shammar. In the 1660s, the Anayzah Tribal Confederacy emerged from Arabia and clashed with the Mawali and Shammar, causing the Shammar to penetrate deeper into Iraq along the Euphrates River. Hassan Pasha: Ottoman Governor of Baghdad From 1638 to 1738, the Ottomans would have thirty valis (governors) of Baghdad. Wardi’s volumes cover most of the Ottoman valis, but only a few are dedicated an entire chapter. In volume one, the first vali mentioned, Hassan Pasha, took charge of Iraq in 1704, and would use roving cannons, cavalry, and infantry at the decisive point to pacify the tribes of Iraq. His first test came with tribes that sacked Mosul. Hassan Pasha declared the tribes responsible, particularly the Shahwan and Aziz tribes’ hypocritical factions. The Ottoman vali led these two tribes into a pass north of Mosul called, “al-Khanuq” (the chokepoints), where he concentrated cannon, musket, and bomb fire on both tribes. Hassan Pasha did prevent assaults on the women of these tribes. With this victory, he issued a proclamation declaring that the Prophet Muhammad had renewed social order and that tribes engaged in sacking Ottoman cities are disloyal to the Ottoman Sultan, the only commander of the faithful and caliph. “As brigands, you will be dealt with Islamically as brigands, and we will reach you even in the ends of the earth; your beheading is nothing new to us,” were the words Hassan Pasha used to open his rule of Iraq and tribal pacification campaign. I n 1708, Hassan Pasha’s subjugation of tribes, such as the Bani Saad, would lead to coalescing tribes into one of the largest confederations in Iraq’s history. The confederacy was led by Mu-ghamis al-Manaa of the Murtafiq tribe and included the Ghazia, Miah, Shammar, Khazaal, Zubaid, al-Asarrai, and Bani Khalid tribes. This confederation numbered more than 100,000 tribal warriors. Hassan Pasha would entice this confederacy to battle him on the outskirts of Basra, an open desert plain. The Ottomans opened up with cannon, muskets, and grenades, which led to 10,000 casualties at the onset and demoralized the tenuous tribal alliance. Hassan Pasha understood the fragility of the tribal confederation and used gold, silver, and promises of protection to undermine the fabric of the alliance just prior to the battle. Hassan Pasha paid in gold for every head provided him from the renegade tribes. Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History offers no explanation as to why the tribes opposing Hassan Pasha did not capitalize on guerrilla warfare and instead chose to directly confront the Ottoman forces. The Ottomans also capitalized on the tribal elders refusing to subjugate themselves to a single leader. With any invader to the Middle East, there will always be tribes with the invaders and tribes against the invaders; others will switch sides based on the highest bidder and offers of protection. According to the book, the natural state of tribal interest is self-preservation. Fall of the Safavids A s Hassan Pasha pacified Iraq’s tribes, the Safavids were descending toward their fall, which came not at the hands of the Ottomans, but instead at the hands of the Afghans. The Safavids had occupied a good portion of Afghanistan and experienced heavy resistance from the Afghan Sunni tribes toward their imposition of Shiism. Unlike in Persia, the Afghans refused to convert in mass and revenge seethed under the surface of Safavid control of Afghan dominions. I n 1707, while on his way to the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), Sunni cleric, Mir Wais, encountered Sunni Hanafi clerics and Hanbali Sunni clerics. Mir Wais derived a fatwa, endorsed by several Sunni clerics, sanctioning the killing of Persian Shiites as heretics, which drew objections from Sunni clerics led by Abdel-Kareem al-Sindi in Mecca. In Medina, Mir Wais spent the night inside the mosque under the Prophet Muhammad’s tomb. While he slept, he dreamed the Prophet handed him a sword and took the dream as a sign that his mission to demonize Persian Shiites was a holy mission. I n 1709, Mir Wais was back in Afghanistan and energized a movement that captured Kandahar. Mir Wais died in 1715, and in 1722, his son, Mir Mahmoud, led his father’s Afghan army into Persia, capturing the Safavid capital of Isfahan. Mir Mahmoud invited 300 Safavid notables to a feast where he massacred all of them along with 200 of their children. The bloodshed continued when Mir Mahmoud ordered the deaths of 3,000 Persian soldiers for regicide. These soldiers had defected to Mir Mahmoud during the siege of Isfahan. Fifteen days of killing followed and mainly targeted functionaries of the Safavid bureaucracy. In 1725, Mir Mahmoud killed the remaining member of the Safavid dynasty. Mir Mahmoud was considered mad and was killed by Afghan tribesmen who elevated Mahmoud’s cousin, Ashraf Khan, to the position of leadership. H assan Pasha watched these developments from Baghdad and worked with the sultan to shore up Baghdad’s defenses by reinforcing walls and trenches and renovating wells. Hassan Pasha corresponded with Mir Mahmoud, who responded using a hand-delivered note from an ambassador, Mohammad Sadek Khan, who stated his religious duty to purify Islam from Shiism. Hassan Pasha and the Afghan emissary conspired to shore up the Afghans in undermining the Safavid Persians. Hassan Pasha lamented the collapse of the Safavids at the hands of the Afghans, so he lobbied clerics in Constantinople (now Istanbul) for a fatwa against the Rawafid (another epithet used to describe Shiites; still in use today by al-Qaeda). I n 1723, Hassan Pasha’s lobbying efforts were successful and he garnered not only a regular army of Janissaries armed with cannon, but elicited Iraqi tribal adversaries to join him on a campaign against the dying Safavid Empire and partake in the — 33 spoils of war. The first major Persian city to fall was Karman-shah. Hassan Pasha never lived to see the expedition’send state; he died of natural causes in the autumn of 1723 and was buried in Azamiyah, a suburb of Baghdad, at the Abu Hanifa mosque. Ahmed Pasha, son of Hassan Pasha: The New Vali of Baghdad, 1724 A hmed Pasha was on campaign in Persia, leading parts of his father’s expedition when word reached him of his father’s death, and the Ottoman Sultan’s firman appointing him vali of Baghdad. A popular ruler, Hassan Pasha’s death led to tribal rebellion within Iraq, and by 1725, a massive confederacy of the Bani Lem, Shammar, and Al’a Shibl was formed. Ahmed Pasha’s first order of business was to restore order in Iraq and deal with these challenges to Ottoman authority, which he successfully suppressed in time to face another challenge from Afghan tribal leader, Ashraf Khan. A shraf Khan sent an emissary to Istanbul with a religious opinion endorsed by nineteen Sunni Afghan clerics, indicating there can be only one commander of the faithful and caliph, since both the Ottomans and Afghans are carving Safavid Persia. The Afghan leader claimed lineage from Prophet Muhammad’s companion, Khalid ibn al-Waleed, and believed that he was more of a legitimate heir to the caliphate than the Ottoman Sultan, who was unrelated to Muhammad or any of his companions. The Ottoman clergy countered with a saying attributed to Prophet Muhammad, “If there are two caliphs, turn against one.” War was declared. A hmed Pasha met the forces of Ashraf Khan between Hamdan and Isfahan on the 20th of October 1726. Ashraf Khan understood he was no match for Ottoman forces and sent clerics to negotiate. This was a ruse to undermine Ottoman morale by arguing that Sunni should not fight Sunni and fighters would be answerable to God for this sin. This tactic was first employed by Muawiyyah ibn Abu Sufyan, founder of the Umayyad dynasty, against Ali (Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and fourth caliph) in 658 CE at the Battle of Siffin. I n the case of Ahmed Pasha, 12,000 Kurds allied to Ottoman forces refused to fight and fled the field; Ashraf Khan dealt a tactical defeat to the Ottomans, but understood he had to negotiate, as he could not hold out strategically in Persia and northern Afghanistan if the Ottomans brought their forces to bear in significant numbers. In 1727, the Afghans and Ottomans declared a truce. Among the gifts given to the sultan was an elephant, which came from Baghdad on its way to Istanbul. Baghdad residents of the time called that year, “the year of the elephant,” which was the first time in memory that any resident had ever seen the large creature. The Ottoman sultan conceded Ashraf Khan as king of Persia, and Ashraf Khan conceded his claim to the caliphate and accepted being a vassal of the Ottoman sultan. Nadir Qali, the Re-Emergence of the Safavids S afavid Persian Emperor, Tahmasap II, faced crumbling frontiers in 1731, following battles with the Afghans and Ottomans. He faced Ottoman forces and suffered a crushing military defeat that allowed the Ottomans to gain Armenia and Georgia. Since 1729, Nadir Qali had succeeded in routing the Afghans from eastern Persian frontiers and was livid about the shah’s losses. In 1731, at the head of a battle-hardened army, Nadir Qali replaced Tahmasap II with his infant son, who was called “regent.” Nadir Qali effectively ruled the Safavid Empire until his assassination in 1747. Nadir Qali’s first order of business was to throw down a gauntlet at the feet of Ahmed Pasha, the Ottoman vali of Baghdad, demanding the return of Persian prisoners and the right to visit the tombs of the Shiite imams. In January 1733, Nadir Qali took the offensive, crossing the Diyala River and marching for Baghdad. European engineers were with his army and helped construct crossing bridges; however, Nadir Qali’s first siege of Baghdad failed due to the inadequacy of Persian cannons. Nonetheless, this 7-month siege of Baghdad led to the deaths of 100,000 people. The Ottoman commander was Uthman (the lame) Pasha. He was a hero to the Ottomans and the arch-nemesis of Nadir Qali. This was a war between two charismatic commanders, who both led from the saddle. Nadir Qali lost Baghdad, but not before losing his flag bearer and having his horse killed from beneath him. The Persian’s lost 30,000 men to death and 3,000 became prisoners. Nadir Qali fled back into Persia, but returned to face Uthman Pasha 3 months later at the head of a larger force and with a firm belief that the only way to conquer Baghdad was to beat Uthman Pasha. N adir Qali understood this one charismatic Ottoman field commander was the enemy’s center of gravity, whose death or capture would most certainly vanquish any Ottoman ambitions in Baghdad. These two warriors engaged in battle near Kirkuk in late 1733. Nadir Qali’s hopes were realized as Uthman Pasha was killed during the course of the battle. News of this spread inside Baghdad and caused a precipitous decline in morale in Ahmed Pasha’scamp behind the walls of Baghdad. Despite Nadir Qali’s initial success, rampant rumors of a revolt within the Safavid royal family to replace the infant regent he installed in 1731 prevented him from taking Baghdad as planned. Ahmed Pasha Turns against Iraqi Tribes Once Nadir Qali and his army redeployed to Persia, Ahmed Pasha used his forces to violently repress the Iraqi tribes who had allied with the Safavid Persians. The Shammar confederation received the worst of it for spying on behalf of the Persians. Ahmed Pasha, aside from sending Ottoman forces to deal with the Shammar, allied with the Shammar’s rival tribes, the Qashim and Zubaid. Ahmed Pasha also dealt with mutinous Janissaries who lost their nerve during Baghdad’s siege. Of note, the Ottoman vali of Baghdad, subjugated the Shammar, but allowed them “Ashraf Khan understood he was no match for Ottoman forces and sent clerics to negotiate. This was a ruse to undermine Ottoman morale by arguing that Sunni should not fight Sunni and fighters would be answerable to God for this sin. This tactic was first employed by Muawiyyah ibn Abu Su-fyan, founder of the Umayyad dynasty, against Ali (Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and fourth caliph) in 658 CE at the Battle of Siffin.” Battle of Siffin, from an illustration in a 19th century manuscript by Muhammad Rafi Bazil. 34 — to repledge their fealty to the Ottoman Empire, which is when Ahmed Pasha ceased hostilities. Pasha understood the significance of tribal alliances; he could not implement a policy of total elimination due to intermarriage and intermingling of clans and tribes with the Shammar. I n 1738, Ahmed Pasha faced a serious tribal rebellion, popularly known has the “Saadoun Revolt,” whereby the Muntafiq confederacy declared its own sultanate in Najaf and Kufa, taking those cities with 10,000 warriors and surrounding Hila. Ahmed Pasha would suppress the confederacy in 1741 by a mixture of bribes, warfare, and changing alliances. Sheikh Saadoun’s head was embalmed and sent to the Ottoman Sultan as tribute. Nadir Qali Gains Ottoman Acceptance of the Shiite Jafari School N adir Qali and his Shiite clerics reasoned that Jafar al-Sadiq lived in the same era of Malik and Abu Hanifa, and could bridge the gap between Sunni and Shiite schools. There were four recognized Sunni schools: Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali, and Shafei. The Persians argued that Jafar al-Sadiq was not only a scholar of the period, but also a descendant from both Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, and Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s closest companion. Nadir Qali retook Qandahar and captured Kabul, and stood poised for his greatest conquest, Mogul India, under Muhammad Shah. In 1738, he marched into Delhi, having vanquished the Mogul armies, married his son to the Mogul line and set his sights on bridging the Ottoman Sunni and Persian Shiite divide. He deposed the seating Safavid Shah and Nadir Qali and became Nadir Shah from 1743 to 1747. I n 1743, Nadir Shah sent a message to the Ottoman Sultan demanding recognition of the Jafari Shiite School as the fifth madhhab (school) of Islam. The Ottoman clergy rejected his request, and for the third time, Nadir Shah entered Iraq with his army. His attempted siege of Mosul ended in failure and his frustrated forces headed toward Baghdad, but stopped at Kazimiyah, where Nadir Shah sent a note to Ahmed Pasha requesting a truce. This led the Najaf clerical congress to bring together Sunni and Shiite clerics from the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. The clerics agreed to: recognize the Jafari school as the fifth school of Islam; cease Shiite public insults of the Prophet’s companions, the three caliphs, and Muhammad’s wife, Aisha; allow Shiites access to Mecca and Medina; and exchange Wakils (ambassadors). During 1745 in Armenia, major war broke out between the Ottomans and the Persians. The Ottoman Sultan and Nadir Shah managed to avert further escalation of hostilities over Armenia. However, a plot was uncovered by Nadir Shah’s military commanders to kill all Persians, except Uzbeks and Turkomen, in his army. In 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated and declared a Safavid pretender. A member of the Safavid royal family was reinstated and the Ottomans lost a Persian ruler with whom they had reached an understanding. The Safavids experienced a decline and only lasted two more decades, ending with the reign of Ismail III. Chaos ensued in Persian domains. In 1796, the Qajar dynasty was established and lasted until 1925. The Qajars never posed a serious threat to Iraq or the Ottomans. New threats to Iraq and the Ottomans came from the Mamelukes of Egypt, who pushed from Gaza into the Levant. The Wahabi movement in central Arabia emerged from the desert armed with a fanatic zeal that threatened southern Iraq starting as early as 1802 with raids and desecrations of Karbala. Volume 2 of al-Wardi’s multivolume set covers the history of Iraq from 1831 to 1872. It includes the influence of Egyptian commander Viceroy Muhammad Ali Pasha, and his son Ismail, further Wahabi raids, and ends with the Ottoman attempts at imposing conscription on Iraqis in their attempts to modernize. The tensions between Sunnis and Shiites and the details of their discussions are also an invaluable part of Wardi’s work. American military planners cannot afford to deploy without first getting oriented to this history. It provides a social-political-religious and military look at terrain that American military units are now traversing. ARMOR will be working to publish several installments highlighting all eight volumes over the course of the next several editions. Note 1Ali al-Wardi, Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History, Baghdad Publishers, 1969, and Alwarrak Publishing of London, new edition, 2007. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College with additional electives in International Relations and International Law, the Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. “In 1743, Nadir Shah sent a message to the Ottoman Sultan demanding recognition of the Jafari Shiite School as the fifth madhhab (school) of Islam. The Ottoman clergy rejected his request, and for the third time, Nadir Shah entered Iraq with his army. His attempted siege of Mosul ended in failure and his frustrated forces headed toward Baghdad, but stopped at Kazimiyah, where Nadir Shah sent a note to Ahmed Pasha requesting a truce.” — 35