Predator Palace: Gaining a Foothold

“I hear the war drums pounding again,” remarked Sergeant First Class (SFC) Patrick Thompson, referring to the rumors he heard in the dining facility that morning about a possible upcoming deployment. War drums already? It was 24 November 2004. Barely two years ago, SFC Thompson heard those same “war drums” pounding as he packed his bags and joined 3d Infantry Division’s March 2003 invasion into Baghdad. He and the brave men of third platoon, Bravo Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, 82d Airborne Division endured along year of austere living conditions. Ten days after SFC Thompson made the comment about the war drums, he and I were tightly packed on a C17 transport aircraft taking off from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, headed for Baghdad, Iraq. Ironic, I thought to myself; Sergeant Thompson is a prophet. I had assumed the coveted position of sapper platoon leader (PL) just five months prior to our deployment. It was sobering to think that just 12 months ago, I had earned my commission as a second lieutenant. My Army experience amounted to the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the Sapper Leader Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School, which wasn’t too shabby for a lieutenant. Compared to my men, however, I might as well have been a private; it was humbling to stand before them. The men of third platoon were combat-proven, battle-hardened warriors, wearing combat patches on their uniforms to prove it. Sadly, their platoon leader was the only member of the platoon without a combat patch — I had much to learn. Several days into our deployment, we discovered why we were so desperately needed. Third platoon had been called on to support the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (3-325 AIR) (Blue Falcons), 82d Airborne Division in its efforts to seize and secure a series of violent insurgent strongholds north of Baghdad. Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, with the U. S. Army’s help, planned to initiate a democratic election process that would lead Iraq to political stability. This election process would select a government to provide security and peace in what was now a war-torn country. Prime Minister Allawi could not, however, elicit voter participation without first providing security to the Iraqi populace — security so desperately needed. At the onset of election efforts, Baghdad’s citizens lived in a constant state of fear and abject horror. Days before third platoon arrived in Iraq, three Iraqi election officials working for Allawi were pulled from their car and executed. Terrorists committed similar incidents throughout the city on a weekly basis, broadcasting their message with poignant clarity — support for Iraq’selection processes would not be tolerated. Cable News Network (CNN) and Fox News were quick to publicize pictures of the executions, labeling Haifa Street and the surrounding area north of Baghdad “an all-out war zone.”1 Haifa Street, we would later discover, was one of the insurgent strongholds the Blue Falcons were called on to help seize and secure. The street, which has along history of violence, is roughly 2 miles in length and surrounded by high-rise, densely-populated apartment buildings. It serves as a main high-speed avenue of approach northwest from Baghdad’s Green Zone and is frequented by U. S. troops. Haifa Street was the site of several massive car bombings (one of which killed 47 civilians) and countless improvised explosive devices (IED) and grenade ambushes, which claimed the lives of at least 12 American troops. Luckily for us, the Blue Falcons were not the only U. S. Army unit assigned such a daunting mission. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, (Task Force 1-9), a mechanized cavalry outfit from Fort Hood, Texas, had been attempt-Predator Palace: Gaining a Foothold Predator Palace: Gaining a Foothold 36 — ing to secure Haifa Street for the past five months. During their brief stint, the battle-weary soldiers conducted over 100 patrols up and down Haifa Street, which they renamed “Grenade Alley” and “Purple Heart Lane,” ripping down Zarqawi banners and collecting abandoned Iraqi security force uniforms.2 They received AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), and mortar fire during nearly every patrol. Three soldiers were killed in action and 60 out of 118 men qualified for Purple Heart medals, which were awarded for wounds sustained during combat.3 On a positive note, Task Force 1-9 accumulated intimate knowledge of the terrain and enemy situation, especially near Haifa Street’s most notorious neighborhoods. They provided the Blue Falcons with satellite imagery depicting areas of significant activity, known enemy locations, and ideal patrol routes to maximize presence while minimizing risk to maneuvering forces. The men of Task Force 1-9 were tremendously helpful and happy to welcome us to their team. The Events A thorough satellite imagery reconnaissance of Haifa Street and the surrounding area revealed an old fortress rumored to once have been occupied by Saddam Hussein’s third and youngest daughter Hala.4 The fortress, affectionately dubbed as “Predator Palace,” seemed like an ideal location for a combat outpost (COP). Americans and Iraqis could jointly establish a base of operations from which they could conduct daily patrols, engaging and winning the trust of the local populace, while simultaneously gathering intelligence on insurgent locations and activities. This intelligence would facilitate raids and ambushes, during which we would capture or root out terrorists and thus quell the violence on Haifa Street, thereby setting the conditions for a peaceful and productive election process. Task Force 1-9’s engineer company commander, Captain (CPT) Horsey, was one step ahead of us; he had also identified Predator Palace as suitable and ideal, but was unable to personally visit the site to conduct an engineer reconnaissance. SFC Thompson and I met with CPT Horsey and explained our ideas and concerns. CPT Horsey suggested that all three of us visit the site together to conduct a force protection assessment, and we agreed. During our reconnaissance, we identified a few areas of interest. The walls surrounding the fortress were made of thin non-reinforced concrete which, we assessed, were currently unable to protect palace occupants from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and RPG attacks. The three high-speed avenues of approach leading into the palace required machine gun positions from which to observe and engage the enemy with direct fire weapons systems. The riverbank to the north and east required antipersonnel blocking obstacles to prevent swimmers from infiltrating the palace undetected from the Tigris River. Finally, Predator Palace required several hundred sandbags to wall up the open doorways and windows, and also to protect future oc cupants from AK-47, RPG, and mortar fire. Once we returned from the reconnaissance, CPT Horsey alerted his company while SFC Thompson and I began platoon-level troop leading procedures. The platoon’s leadership gathered to deliver a warning order with the satellite imagery we used for our engineer reconnaissance. Our squad leaders had plenty of questions, mostly about supplies and barrier material, but SFC Thompson was one step ahead. Before issuing my warning order, SFC Thompson met with Task Force 1-9’s logistics officer (S4) and gave him a “shopping list” of supplies and barrier material needed to complete our force protection plan. To match SFC Thompson’s prowess, I had to be one hell of a platoon leader. I made sure to coordinate with several of Task Force 1-9’s maneuver elements to make this force protection plan happen. Simultaneously, CPT Horsey contacted the task force commander and initiated the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) for what was now dubbed, “Operation Field of Dreams.” To sum up the order, Operation Field of Dreams tasked Charlie Company, Task Force 1-9, to provide armored transportation (M2 Bradley tracked vehicles) from Camp Independence north along the deadly Haifa Street to Predator Palace gate. SFC Thompson coordinated with Task Force 1-9’s S4 to provide palletized load system (PLS) trucks equipped with downloadable “flat rack” trailers to transport concertina wire; fence pickets; sandbags; meals, ready to eat (MREs); fuel; and bottled water to the palace. Operation Field of Dreams also tasked the attack aviation unit attached to Task Force 1-9 to provide overhead security and close air support (CAS) for the barrier plan. CPT Horsey’s engineer company was tasked to provide two M9 armored combat earthmovers (ACEs) from his assault and obstacle section to clear the heavily wooded areas surrounding the palace, which would prevent insurgents from approaching the palace undetected and lobbing grenades over the wall at friendly forces. The engineer company would also provide two M60A1 armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs) to block traf- “Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, with the U. S. Army’s help, planned to initiate a democratic election process that would lead Iraq to political stability. This election process would select a government to provide security and peace in what was now a war-torn country. Prime Minister Allawi could not, however, elicit voter participation without first providing security to the Iraqi populace — security so desperately needed.” — 37 fic on Haifa Street several hundred meters to the north and south of the palace to prevent VBIEDs from interdicting our force protection efforts. CPT Horsey’s idea to use two of his expandable bridges to block traffic was sheer brilliance. Task Force 3-325 AIR volunteered its Bravo Company, commanded by CPT Massey, to provide security and additional manpower for our engineers. Bravo’s infantrymen would help us transport and stack thousands of sandbags to reinforce windows, doors, and other weak spots within the palace. They would also pull local security for us as we pounded hundreds of fence pickets into the ground, strung concertina wire fences, and built machine gun nests. Since local Iraqi workers were unwilling to operate cranes and drive barrier transport trucks for fear of being executed, a U. S. Army National Guard engineer company attached to Task Force 1-9 volunteered to help. The company supplied two cranes with operators and several long-bed trucks that would transport concrete barrier trucks to and from Camp Independence. The Iraqi government was already enforcing an 8:00 p.m. nightly curfew in an effort to curtail violence, so we capitalized on the curfew and maneuvered forces to Predator Palace under the cover of night. This was ideal because it minimized civilian interference with our movement and it also rendered curfew-breaking insurgents easier to identify and target. Once at the palace, we would quickly establish local security, set AVLBs “Haifa Street, we would later discover, was one of the insurgent strongholds the Blue Falcons were called on to help seize and secure. The street, which has along history of violence, is roughly 2 miles in length and surrounded by high-rise, dense ly-populated apartment buildings. It serves as a main high-speed avenue of approach northwest from Baghdad’s Green Zone and is frequented by U. S. troops. Haifa Street was the site of several massive car bombings (one of which killed 47 civilians) and countless improvised explosive devices (IED) and grenade ambushes, which claimed the lives of at least 12 American troops.” 38 — down to block the roads, and then call sup ply trucks and crane operators forward to begin working. We would continue working together as long as it would take, focusing the majority of our heavy lifting during hours of limited visibility to minimize risk. Surprisingly, our plan worked better than we imagined. Operation Field of Dreams began at 8:00 p.m. on 22 December 2004. Our tactical combat patrol from Camp Independence to Predator Palace was quiet and without incident, and AVLBs were already blocking the road when we arrived. After a quick sweep of Predator Palace, infantrymen set a tight security perimeter around the court yard and gave us the “thumbs up.” I, in turn, called CPT Horsey and gave him the “thumbs up” for his assault and obstacle section (Reaper 6) to begin clearing the heavily wooded area outside the east gate. His ACE blade team plowed over trees and shrubs up to 6 inches in diameter, leaving nothing but dirt in their tracks. The National Guard crane-barrier team was hot on the heels of CPT Horsey’s ACE blade team, emplacing tall concrete barriers around the palace to reinforce its walls. They began at the east gate and worked their way clockwise to the south gate. Soon after the ACE blade team began working, I saw the first PLS truck arrive at the south gate to drop off its first load of sandbags. The PLS truck backed up as close as possible to Predator Palace’s north entrance to minimize carrying distance for the heavy sandbags. Once the PLS flat rack was downloaded, infantrymen and sappers unfastened the cargo straps and began carrying sandbags inside the palace. The sandbags were stacked neatly and carefully, blocking windows, doors, and other weak areas using an overlapping pattern (bricklaying technique), reinforced every five layers with wooden 2x4 beams. Once satisfied that the sand bag detail was under control, I headed back to SFC Thompson and retrieved my radio. I then sent SFC Thompson to check on our first squad, who were pound ing fence pickets and stringing a triple-strand concertina wire fence outside the east gate. At this point, the National Guard crane-barrier team was picking up speed; the first 8 to 10 concrete barriers had taken the longest to emplace, but the crane operator and the truck driver quickly fell into a rhythm, speeding up the process as they worked. At one point, the crane team was emplacing barriers so fast that the truck driver could not supply them quickly enough! The moan and whine of tracked vehicles, combined with the chop-chop of Apache helicopter teams patrolling overhead, kept the night from being too quiet. ACE teams plowed over tree after tree and M2 Bradleys patrolled back and forth along Haifa Street; their 25mm barrels pointed toward the Carter Apartments. As I watched the Bradleys patrol, I reflected back to Task Force 1-9’s intelligence officer (S2) who briefed enemy com position, disposition, and activity. The S2 predicted sniper fire, RPG attacks, and sporadic AK-47 gunfire originating from the Carter Apartments. He also predicted heavy mortar fire from the surrounding alleyways and grenades being lobbed from the balconies of Carter Apartments. Yet, throughout the first night, there was no activity reported whatsoever; nor was there any sign of anyone, anywhere. Maybe the insurgents were sleeping, or maybe they were watching us — making careful observation of our patterns and waiting for the perfect moment to strike. Maybe they fled the area, intimidated by U. S. forces and fearful for their own lives. Whatever the reason, they didn’t attack us at all that night. Time flew by. With so many things going on all at once, I quickly lost track of time. Before long, the sun began to rise and the skyline began to light up. Morning light would signify the end of Operation Field of Dreams, day 1. Once Baghdad’s nightly cur few was lifted, the National Guard crane-barrier team and the Task Force 1-9 resupply team did not feel safe working outside the pal ace walls or traveling on Haifa Street. To mitigate risk and keep from losing more soldiers to the insurgent cause, the Task Force 1-9 commander ordered all force protection efforts to cease during daylight hours. CPT Massey worked out a plan with me and SFC Johnson to rotate shifts — B Company’s infantrymen would patrol during the day while we slept. In reciprocation, we would conduct force protection upgrades to B Company’s fortress at night while its men slept. It was a great plan and would work out quite well over the next few days. However, on this particular day, we decided to continue working inside the palace walls to improve survivability within the fort. Staff Sergeant (SSG) Runkle and his first squad continued to erect triple-strand concertina fences within the gates of the fortress, focusing their efforts on the banks of the Tigris River. Once complete, they shifted their focus to constructing another triple-strand concertina wire outside the gates of Predator Palace, running generally southeast from the east gate to Haifa Street. Sergeant (SGT) Travis and his second squad, with the help of some exhausted infantrymen, managed to continue downloading the last flat-rack that was delivered prior to dawn. They reinforced and improved the existing sandbag walls that protected Predator Palace’s occupants from shrapnel and small-arms fire. SGT Weiczorek and the majority of his third squad shifted their focus to building machine gun nests atop the south gate arch. Two sappers from SGT Weiczorek’s squad were detached to cut down trees outside the south gate, “Bravo’s infantrymen would help us transport and stack thousands of sandbags to reinforce windows, doors, and other weak spots within the palace. They would also pull local security for us as we pounded hundreds of fence pickets into the ground, strung concertina wire fences, and built machine gun nests.” — 39 providing an unobstructed view of Haifa Street from the machine gun positions. At noon, around the same time CPT Massey sent out his first dismounted patrol, I put my platoon to sleep. They had spent all of the previous day planning and preparing their equipment for last night’s mission, and had worked all night to improve the fort’s survivability. Their rest was well-deserved — I would wake them at sunset for day 2. SFC Thompson and I were also exhausted, but first, we had to take care of our men. CPT Massey’s patrol departed without a hitch, while the remainder of his company manned guard posts and the machine gun nests we built — they were more exhausted than we were. Operation Field of Dreams, day 2 began at 8:00 p.m. that night with the arrival of the crane-barrier team and the first sandbag-laden PLS flat-rack of the day. The crane-barrier team emplaced over 50 tall concrete barriers the night prior, reinforcing the palace perimeter from the east gate to south gate. Tonight would be an easier night for the wary National Guard unit, as they only had 25 concrete barriers and three scud bunkers to emplace. Their focus would be on reinforcing the palace wall from the south gate to west gate, then reinforcing Predator Palace’s northern entrance from small-arms fire aimed from across the Tigris River. Finally, three scud bunkers would be emplaced near the palace and surrounding guard positions to provide overhead cover from mortar and rocket attacks. Before sunrise on the second night, the crane-barrier team was “mission complete” and had departed safely. They did tremendous work. SGT Travis’s second squad, with some help from CPT Massey’s infantrymen, erected a machine gun nest guarding the east gate from the palace courtyard. Simultaneously, SSG Runkle and his first squad made last-minute improvements to the sandbag walls within Predator Palace. SGT Wieczorek and his third squad shifted their focus to “safety construction,” building handrails around the second- and third-story ledges to prevent soldiers from accidentally falling off. By and large, third platoon was “mission complete” midway through the night and was catching up on sleep and eating MREs by sunrise. By sunrise on day 2, SFC Thompson and I ran out of things to improve — there wasn’t much else we could do to improve the already massive force protection efforts surrounding Predator Palace. We decided to leave SGT Travis and his second squad behind for any additional engineer support, with the solid guarantee that my platoon was “on call” and would return if needed. CPT Horsey and the sappers of A Company, 8th Engineers were also heading out, so SFC Thompson asked about empty seats. CPT Horsey requested a platoon of Bradleys that were outside the gate conducting a patrol of Haifa Street; they happily obliged. As my platoon boarded the Bradley, I heard sporadic gunfire outside the gate — the first gunfire I’d heard since we began Operation Field of Dreams. “Great,” I thought. “Here they come, just as I’m leaving.” Outcomes The ramifications of the Predator Palace fortification mission were immediately apparent. Later that week, I heard that insurgents had fired exhaustively at our machine gun positions, simultaneously launching mortars and grenades over the wall and inside the palace’s courtyard. It was the first of many failed attempts to influence CPT Massey and the brave men of Bravo Company. Each and every time they attacked, insurgents met their fate at the hands of his infantrymen. Later that week, CPT Massey increased the intensity and frequency of his patrols. He escalated from low-intensity reconnaissance and security patrols along Haifa Street to high-intensity raids of the Carter Apartments and surrounding buildings. Sometimes he would send his entire company after someone who sprayed a few rounds at his reconnaissance patrol and ran into a nearby building to hide. On several instances, CPT Massey’s patrols located weapons caches and IED-making material, though each time in a different area. The more his company patrolled, the more the Iraqi citizens began to trust him. Sometimes, Iraqi citizens would come out to greet him personally and give him information about insurgents hiding in the area, which was unheard of prior to Operation Field of Dreams. Though CPT Massey felt successful at times, he was also frequently dumbfounded that the more he patrolled his area of operations, the more his patrols were greeted with gunfire and grenade attacks — it should have been the opposite. CPT Massey and his Blue Falcons maintained the intensity and ferocity of their patrols for more than 3 months. In March 2005, the Blue Falcons relinquished responsibility of the fortress to 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division.5 Six months later, Dennis Steele, a writer for the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Magazine, visited Haifa Street to do a follow-up story on Iraqi progress since CPT Massey’s handover. During his visit, he marveled at the lack of violence that supposedly made the street famous. Haifa Street was, as he explained, “a showcase of Iraqi security.”6 Steele credits the pacification of violence “The Iraqi government was already enforcing an 8:00 p.m. nightly curfew in an effort to curtail violence, so we capitalized on the curfew and maneuvered forces to Predator Palace under the cover of night. This was ideal because it minimized civilian interference with our movement and it also rendered curfew-breaking insurgents easier to identify and target.” 40 — to CPT Massey’s aggressive patrolling technique, perpetuated by the Iraqi army unit emulating CPT Massey’s techniques, and currently occupying Predator Palace. He explains that violent neighborhoods can be quelled through the use of continuous “overwhelming forces” and consistent, aggressive action.7 Michael Hastings, a Newsweek reporter, following in Steele’s footsteps, did a follow-up of the infamous “Purple Heart Alley” two years after CPT Massey’s unit relinquished control. What Hastings discovered is quite the opposite. Consequences of the lack of aggressive patrolling were evident in his January 2007 Newsweek article, “The Battle for Haifa Street.”8 Upon arrival, Hastings discovered that recently, 27 dead bodies (later found to be family members of Haifa Street’s Iraqi police chief) were dumped in an alleyway next to a police station. The scene seems disturbingly reminiscent of the Iraqi election official executions: once again, the insurgents broadcasted a crystal clear message — although this time 24 dead bodies stronger — that support for Iraqi stability and security will not be tolerated. The Iraqi police chief looked on in horror as he saw 27 members of his family reduced to lifeless corpses. Iraqi army advisor Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Steve Duke made a move to diffuse the situation; he attempted to persuade locals to help him remove the bodies.9 The locals refused for fear of their lives, a situation that was all too familiar. LTC Duke attempted to move the bodies himself and was greeted with a hail of bullets from insurgents in a nearby apartment complex. Insurgents once again had the initiative; once again, the citizens of Haifa Street were petrified with fear and abject horror. One can theorize that the aggressive and relentless pace CPT Massey and his unit set as a precedent must have lost momentum over the years. How could this happen? Lessons Learned David Kilcullen, author of the famous publication, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” echoes three essential lessons to be learned from Operation Field of Dreams. In my opinion, Kilcullen’s most non-negotiable and relevant lesson is counterinsurgency principle 10: You must “be there.” He states that, “Your first order of business is to establish presence … living in your sector, in close proximity to the population.”10 That’s exactly why the engineers built up and reinforced Predator Palace. Instead of commuting to Haifa Street from Camp Independence daily to conduct patrols, we built a combat outpost on Haifa Street so we could live with and win the trust of the local populace. When the troopers of Task Force 1-9 first arrived in country, they patrolled neighborhoods much like Haifa Street in armored convoys several hours a day. Unfortunately, they paid for that mistake with blood.11 Commuting to combat from a super forward operating base, Kilcullen says, “degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.”12 Put another way, it doesn’twin any hearts and minds, nor does it gain the trust of the local populace. Insurgents were one step ahead of Task Force 1-9, well aware of their tactics, techniques, procedures, and patterns. Our enemies know they cannot defeat us head on; this is exactly why they attack us asymmetrically. Insurgents will go into hiding when we patrol through their areas in force and they will return once our patrols are complete. After all, we may own the street and “The ramifications of the Predator Palace fortification mission were immediately apparent. Later that week, I heard that insurgents had fired exhaustively at our machine gun positions, simultaneously launching mortars and grenades over the wall and inside the palace’s courtyard.” — 41 the neighborhood for 4 hours a day, but that means they own it for the other 20. The heavily-fortified Predator Palace outpost, combined with CPT Massey’s aggressive, frequent, and unpredictable patrolling procedures denied the insurgents neighborhood ownership and influence. Equally relevant is Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency article 13, which states that “building trust networks” will “displace enemy networks, bringing him into the open to fight you.”13 At one point, CPT Massey was dumbfounded at the increased frequency of attacks that did not seem to coincide with the increased security he thought he was providing. In actuality, the insurgency network had been disrupted by the fortification and occupation of Predator Palace and by CPT Massey’s frequent patrols. Civilians were initially fearful and skeptical of U. S. forces occupying Predator Palace, as they thought it would bring more violence into their community. Although incidents did initially spike, the locals felt a tremendous sense of security knowing there was now an American presence in their community and their neighborhoods were being continuously patrolled. Finally, Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency article 16 highlights the importance of practicing “deterrent patrolling,” which he defines as “flooding an area with numerous small patrols working together to keep your enemy off balance.”14 CPT Massey’s enemy was, indeed, knocked off balance as he continually sent out patrols at erratic times and in small numbers. Instead of sending his infantrymen out in company- or platoon-sized formation, he spread his men out across a wide area to keep them from becoming targets. This paid huge dividends during one particular grenade attack, when SGT Travis sustained superficial shrapnel wounds. Had he and the other squad members been closer together, SGT Travis might not have been so lucky. Another lesson learned from Operation Field of Dreams was that the work is not finished once the neighborhood goes quiet. Once you quell the violence in a hostile community, you must continue to aggressively patrol and engage the local populace. Michael Hastings’ Newsweek article about Haifa Street highlights the consequences of complacent patrolling.15 There are several engineer-specific lessons to be learned from Operation Field of Dreams. First, it is possible to use the armored vehicle launch bridge as a traffic-blocking obstacle, which is definite ly outside-the-box thinking. Secondly, never underestimate the motivation, teamwork, and competence of a National Guard engineer company. The crane-barrier team blew me away with their professionalism and work ethic. Thirdly, always personally conduct an engineer reconnaissance whenever possible. Satellite imagery, while remarkably detailed and exceptionally helpful, is just that — a view of a portion of the earth’s surface seen from above. Satellite imagery cannot tell you where to place machine guns or where the enemy can and cannot engage you with small-arms fire. A proper engineer reconnaissance/force protection assessment must be done in person, with your own eyes. I credit much of our success during Operation Field of Dreams to the leader’s reconnaissance we performed days earlier. Operation Field of Dreams was a success because of all-around teamwork, coordination, support, and a solid understanding of why Predator Palace needed to be occupied and fortified; the sandbag walls and machine gun nests were made possible by engineers and infantrymen building and sweating side by side; Task Force 1-9’s support company kept sandbags, MREs, bottled water, concertina wire, pickets, and building materials in constant supply with frequent PLS truck visits and flat-rack deliveries; the concrete barrier plan outside the palace was successful because of the National Guard’s unparalleled sense of urgency, teamwork, and “esprit de corps;” engineer operations outside the palace (to include CPT Horsey’s tree-clearing ACE missions) would not have been possible without attack aviation overhead and Bradleys patrolling up and down Haifa Street; and B Company’s infantrymen guarded the inside perimeter of Predator Palace to allow engineers to construct triple-strand wire fences along the Tigris riverbank. As mentioned earlier, the ultimate purpose of Operation Field of Dreams was to set the conditions for CPT Massey and his men to root out the terrorists on Haifa Street. The outpost we fortified for his men would allow him to conduct aggressive, intense, and unpredictable patrols through Haifa Street to quell the violence, which, in turn, would set the conditions for Prime Minister Allawi’s peaceful and productive election process. I think we did one hell of a job. Notes 1Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa Street,” Stars and Stripes, 22 September 2004. 2Gretel C. Kovach, “U. S. Soldiers Dig In at Baghdad Palace,” Dallas Morning News, January 3, 2005. 3Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa Street.” 4Scott Peterson, “A Violent Street Finds Calm,” Christian Science Monitor, May 26, 2005. 5Dennis Steele, “Haifa Street: Purple Heart Boulevard Redux,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Magazine, September 2005, p. 24. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. 8Michael Hastings, “The Battle for Haifa Street,” Newsweek, January 12, 2007. 9Ibid. 10David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May 2006, p. 4. 11Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa Street.” 12David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” p. 5. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Hastings, “The Battle for Haifa Street.” Captain Peter J. Young Jr., is currently a Special Forces student, D Company, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Captains Career Course, Engineer Officer Basic Course, Combat Diver Qualification Course, Sapper Leader Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and Jumpmaster School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, B Company, 307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and sapper platoon leader, 3d Platoon, B Company, 307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. “Operation Field of Dreams was a success because of all-around teamwork, coordination, support, and a solid understanding of why Predator Palace needed to be occupied and fortified...” 42 —