How Information Operations Enable Combatant Commanders to Dominate Today’s Battlefield

In a world of asymmetric warfare, one area gaining a great deal of attention is information operations (IO). Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, defines IO as: “the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MD), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own.”1 The Necessity to Integrate IO into Battle Planning “For the coalition to make significant progress toward winning the information war, it needs to address two central issues; providing Iraqi media security and, more importantly, facilitating access to the most relevant stories-of-interest. Should the coalition continue to overlook these two fundamental issues, the insurgents will remain the dominant and most influential group having an impact on the Iraqi population’s perceptions and behavior.”2 Obtaining information superiority is critical to achieving success, especially in Iraq. With the citizens of Iraq having access to media through outlets such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Iraqiya, Al Hurra, and other Arab television stations, positive portrayal of information pertaining to coalition forces (CF) is necessary to win the local population’s hearts and minds. According to JP 3-13, “Adversaries are increasingly exploring and testing nonlethal or symmetrical warfare tactics that can thwart U. S. military objectives, especially those that are heavily reliant on information systems. This requires the U. S. military to employ defensive technologies and utilize leading-edge tactics and procedures to prevent our forces and systems from being successfully attacked.”3 Combatant commanders must realize the necessity to integrate IO into battle plans; well-planned and synchronized IO assists the commander in achieving an endstate devoid of enemy kinetic strikes in the near term, while simultaneously fostering better relationships with local nationals in the long term. To accomplish this goal, leaders at company and battalion levels should use their brigade S7, public affairs office (PAO), combat camera, and tactical psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams; these entities have access to their counterparts at division who have reach back to their corps sections. The commander should make certain that the local media accompanies his units when they are conducting operations that emphasize positive coalition forces activities and efforts, thereby placing a “good face” on coalition forces. For example, the command should invite the local media to a cooperative medical engagement where the unit provides medical services to a community in need. With the local media in attendance, they can cover the event and broadcast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon. Perhaps another example would be to invite the local media to a veterinarian operation where the unit provides services to a rural community that has livestock. This requires a major effort, which begins with the brigade S7, PAO, and tactical PSYOP team leader, all of whom collectively coordinate with their division counterparts. By doing so, the local media fills airtime with “good-news” stories that show what the coalition is doing to enhance the Iraqi people’s standard of living. This also serves to eliminate potential negative airtime while reinforcing coalition forces’ activities, which are directed toward winning the population’s “hearts and minds.” Iraqi Media Section “Contrary to what many doctrine writers and military scholars might believe, this out-of-box approach has worked extremely well. As of October 2007, the IMS has conducted 38 battlefield circulations, bringing Iraqi media crews to the story, translated and disseminated over 300 good-news stories in Arabic. Market penetration for IMS-translated articles remains constant at just over 50 percent and battlefield circulations average over 98 percent.”4 I personally witnessed the creation of an Iraqi media section (IMS) in the Bagh- “With the local media in attendance, they can cover the event and broadcast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon. Perhaps another example would be to invite the local media to a veterinarian operation where the unit provides services to a rural community that has livestock.” 20 — dad Province from May to September

2007. In this short time period, I watched Task Force Marne resource and implement a division-level Iraqi media section whose sole function was to engage the local media to promote good-news stories in the division’s operational environment. This was a huge task as there were no clearcut doctrinal publications to provide guidance. Furthermore, aligning Iraqi media with IO is contrary to current public affairs doctrine. How It Gets Done Coordinating and integrating local media begins with the commander’s understanding of his operational environment. Good troop commanders use IO to their advantage; by knowing their operational environment and the local population and leaders, these commanders were better able to exploit positive events. Their success began by working closely with the brigade S7, who, in turn, worked with the division G7, who possessed assets to get the Iraqi media to the scene. Close and constant coordination would see the arrival of the division Iraqi media section and the Iraqi media crews just in time to capture the high pay-off event and then, under the protection of the soldiers and supervision of the Iraqi media section lead, the Iraqi media crews would return to home base where they broadcasted the good-news story. Using IO in the commander’s operational environment creates closer relationships between coalition forces and local leaders and citizens. I also witnessed a maturing phenomenon known as “concerned local citizens,” who are local nationals working to provide security within their neighborhoods. These concerned local citizens will eventually become members of the Iraqi Security Forces or work force where they will become productive citizens, providing a myriad of services to the Iraqi people. Creating concerned local citizen groups leads to the reduction in violence throughout much of Iraq. A U. S. Army cavalry officer outside Baghdad commented that, “IED strikes and small-arms fire against [his] patrols was down 72 percent for the month of June 2007.”5 See Yourself, See the Enemy, and Know Your Local Nationals “The BCT S7s synchronize planning efforts with each of their maneuver battalions and nominate events for Iraq media coverage.”6 The first step in using available assets is to know those assets (see yourself). Knowing there are brigade, division, and corps assets available to assist commanders during daily missions is vital. Commanders who know their enemy will be better prepared to employ available assets and tailor correct messages to reach out and win the hearts and minds of the local nationals (see the enemy). Commanders who know their local population will not only be better prepared to tailor messages, but more importantly, determine the correct delivery mechanism, such as radio, television, newsprint, leaflet, handbill, or tactical loudspeaker operations, for those messages. By using all available assets — brigade, division, and corps — commanders enhance their ability to deliver the right message, by the best means, at the right time, to the widest audience, achieving the greatest results. The end-state of good IO is to reduce the number of kinetic strikes against coalition forces and local nationals, as well as the instruments of the government of Iraq. Notes 1Chairman, Joints Chief of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 13 February 2006, p. ix. 2Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Decarvalho, “Reaching Out to an Influential and Overlooked Population: Task Force Marne Partners with Iraqi Media,” unpublished manuscript, p. 1. 3JP 3-13, Information Operations, p. I-10. 4“Reaching Out to an Influential and Overlooked Population,” p. 4. 5Author’s personal conversation with a brigade executive officer, 30 June 2007. 6“Reaching Out to an Influential and Overlooked Population,” p. 8. Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler served as the Center for Army Lessons Learned liaison officer for Multinational Division-Center (MND-

C) observing information operations. Currently, he is the executive officer, Office of the Special Assistant to the Commanding General, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from Northern Kentucky University. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include executive officer, 4th Brigade, 85th Training Support Division (4/85 TSB), Fort Knox, KY; plans officer, 4/85 TSB, Fort Knox; S3, 103d Chemical Battalion, Kentucky Army National Guard (KYARNG); commander, University of Kentucky, Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Lexington, KY; company commander, 3d Battalion, 123d Armor, KY ARNG; platoon leader, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), Boeblingen, Germany; and tank platoon leader and company XO, C Company, 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, 2d Brigade, Fort Riley, Kansas. “The commander should make certain that the local media accompanies his units when they are conducting operations that emphasize positive coalition forces activities and efforts, thereby placing a “good face” on coalition forces. For example, the command should invite the local media to a cooperative medical engagement where the unit provides medical services to a community in need. With the local media in attendance, they can cover the event and broadcast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon.” — 21