Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step in Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight

, Major Brandon Garner, and Captain Richard Thompson According to counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, the struggle for a population’s support is the core of the counterinsurgency fight. To truly get to know the population, you must really understand its culture. One could argue that the U. S. military was not attuned to this at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but soldiers and leaders with the experience of multiple rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan understand and actively accept these two ideas as central to our current fight. The population is the center of gravity and must be considered first in everything we do. The key to success is finding ways to separate the insurgents from the population; therefore, it is critical that we understand the human terrain in which we operate. The important question is no longer “why” or “if” we need this information — but “how” we gather it. How does a tactical-level military unit amass the necessary information about the area in which it operates? Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry (TF Dragon), 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division from Fort Benning, Georgia, inherited an area southeast of Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom V that had not seen a consistent coalition presence in nearly 2 years. TF Dragon’s operational environment straddled a Sunni/Shia sectarian fault line with the majority of the Sunnis living along the Tigris River (our western boundary), and Shia areas in the north (close to Baghdad) and the east (along the Baghdad-Al Kut highway). The information gap between what we knew and what we needed to know was fairly significant. To fill this gap, the entire battalion began focusing on the systematic collection of information about the local people in our assigned area of operations (AO) through a process we described as human terrain mapping. As a result of con ducting human terrain mapping, TF Dragon was able to better understand the population, gain the trust of local leaders, and demonstrate our commitment to local communities. This, in turn, led to the development of actionable intelligence on insurgent activities, the construction of a biometric census of military-age males, and improved security. The Importance of Having Human Terrain Mapping The center of gravity in all counterinsurgency operations is the population; controlling the population is essential to the isolation/dislocation of insurgents. Isolating the insurgents facilitates a unit’s efforts to deal effectively with both the enemy (through lethal targeting) and the local population (through nonlethal targeting). This enables units to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population within which they hide. At the tactical level of this fight, this is the critical ac- 14 — tion. We discovered that developing a human terrain map of the task force’s AO was the best way to enable control of the population, defined in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, as “determining who lives in an area and what they do.” In simple terms, a human terrain map outlines who the players are.1 As any veteran, leader, or student of this war recognizes, insurgents hold the upper hand with their better understanding of local customs and politics, their ability to speak the language, their freedom of movement within the society, and their better comprehension of the population’s interests. Unfortunately, the enemy in this war does not wear a uniform; this war comes without a program outlining the players. In preparation for our current combat tour, TF Dragon’s leaders looked hard at the examples of units that were enjoying success on the battlefields of Iraq. Overwhelmingly, the units that seemed to be winning the fight had made significant inroads with local leaders and found proactive ways to understand and respect local cultural norms and address specific community needs. Although we recognized and understood this lesson, when we arrived in our AO, we found that very little of this data had been collected, and the information that was available was spread out across the continuity files of nearly every staff section. Furthermore, when we tried early on to verify the information, we found that people had moved, opinions had changed, and, in many cases, not much was known. Therefore, TF Dragon’s commanders and staff outlined a plan by which we could capture the human terrain mapping information in a medium that all soldiers could monitor and understand. Once the formatting and baseline information requirements were set, we leveraged the shared situational awareness enhancing capabilities of the command post of the future (CPOF) to maintain a visual database. Each company in our task force was allocated a CPOF to post the results of their human terrain mapping. Each company identified the specific data points about their AO, which included religious boundaries, key economic structures, mosques, and sheiks. When incidents occurred in specific areas, all companies could plot the location and contact the local sheik to gain intelligence or ask critical questions. Screenshot of Human Terrain Mapping We saw the first step of the counterinsurgency fight as determining the human dynamics of a particular area. We identified each tribe, town, city, or village within which the enemy might have sought refuge. We determined who supported the insurgents and their needs and wants. In essence, a human terrain map is the physical manifestation or tool to collect and catalog cultural and ethnographical information encapsulated in the historical counterinsurgency principle of understanding the environment. Defining Tactical Human Terrain Mapping The human terrain mapping effort that TF Dragon began in the early summer of 2007 was a deliberate process designed to gain ethnographic information about our operating environment. With nearly 400,000 people in the Dragon’s AO, and little coalition presence over the past 2 years, there was a critical requirement for ethnographic information. To accomplish this, we planned and executed a deliberate process of decentralized patrols to answer specific questions about the population we secured. The goal was to answer specific information requirements about each separate village and town, which included:  Defining (graphically) each tribal area with specific attention to where they adjoined or overlapped with neighboring tribes.  Location and contact information for each sheik or village muhktar and any other important people such as government officials, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), etc.  Location of mosques, schools, and areas of commerce/markets.  Identification of the population’s battle rhythm or pattern of life such as when they wake up, sleep, shop, etc.  Nearest ISF locations/checkpoints.  Economic driving forces and employment histories.  Employment/unemployment levels.  Determining if people are moving in or out of the AO.  Identifying anti-coalition presence and/or activities.  Access to essential services such as fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc.  Local population concerns/issues. Human terrain mapping information was gathered by platoon-level combat patrols, conducted during daylight hours. To avoid pattern-setting and predictability, companies planned these terrain mapping missions in a systematic, yet unpredictable to the enemy, pattern. In this way, all areas would be covered without making it obvious to the insurgents which areas might be visited next. For example, our B Company used the main road in their AO (running between Jisr Diyala and “We saw the first step of the counterinsurgency fight as determining the human dynamics of a particular area. We identified each tribe, town, city, or village within which the enemy might have sought ref uge. We determined who supported the insurgents and their needs and wants. In essence, a human terrain map is the physical manifestation or tool to collect and catalog cultural and ethnographical information encapsulated in the historical counterinsurgency principle of understanding the environment.” — 15

Salman Pak, near Baghdad) as the focal point, and began with the villages on the east and west side of this main thoroughfare. Each day, they would alternate direction, moving north or south of the villages they had previously visited. After 2 or 3 days of patrolling, they would schedule a day with no patrols to further disrupt any patterns they may have been setting. Patrols were planned and organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. Our three critical tasks included security, information gathering, and relationship building. As the composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some augmentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to ensure a first-hand look at the AO. Additionally, the company’s fire support officer (FSO), acting as the company’s intelligence officer, accompanied the commander on every patrol, which enabled us to build a framework to address the three critical tasks. The commander focused on building relationships with key individuals, while his FSO (augmented by part of the platoon) focused on answering specific information requirements and the platoon leader concentrated on security. In addition to these three sub-element tasks, everyone within the patrol contributed to the delivery of information operations themes and messages. Generally, these themes included the rewards program (money for information of extremist activities), examples of the positive steps taken by the local government and/ or ISF, and the benefits of cooperation with the coalition. Whenever possible, these messages were delivered in the form of pamphlets or handouts given to local citizens. Knowing these messages and having handouts prepared was considered TF Dragon’s information operations basic load, and was the responsibility of every soldier on the patrol. During a typical human terrain mapping patrol, the platoon would move tactically and establish a cordon around the specific area to be mapped. As this was being set, the commander/FSO would move to the likely center of the town or begin immediately talking with citizens to determine the residence of the local sheik or village leader. While the commander met with these citizens, the FSO (and any augmentees) talked with as many of the military-age males as possible. The commander asked the sheik or village elder for permission to enter the military-age men of the village into our biometric-data system (HIIDES/BATS). Depending on the reaction to this request, the platoon might establish a centralized location and begin this process. If the sheik/elder appeared to be uncomfortable with this request, the unit would arrange a date to return to the village and revisit the biometric-data system entry process. However, most local leaders immediately agreed with the request and viewed the biometric census as evidence of their innocence and willingness to cooperate with coalition forces. Throughout the entire patrol, soldiers talked to as many people as possible to pass on specific information operation themes/handouts. On average, these patrols took about 2 to 4 hours to complete. Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with civil affairs teams, human intelligence collection teams, psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, and/or additional medical personnel. These military specialists provided specific areas of expertise to assist the patrols, and were leveraged to enhance the perceived importance of the tactical unit. For example, having a unit medic treat a civilian, especially a child, with an acute problem provided direct evidence of our unit’s goodwill, as well as added the tangible benefit of cooperation with the coalition. Additionally, having special teams along increased the overall number of people we could talk with in the village and increased the number of human sensors that could report on our information requirements. This augmentation also provided excellent start points for “Team Village,” an element combining civil affairs, human intelligence collection, and PSYOP teams, which targeted specific effects for follow-on visits. Special care and planning was taken to ensure that these special teams did not interrupt or interfere with the relationship between the company/platoon and the population that was being mapped. We placed a lot of importance on the supremacy of the responsible company commander (the landowner) as the primary point of contact for each village leader. We worked to preclude any confusion among local leaders as to who would make decisions regarding projects or future support. This is especially critical when dealing with civil affairs teams, who are often seen in the eyes of the population as the “money guys.” Through a deliberate effort, we made it clear that these teams supported the company commander, not the other way around. Following every patrol, the responsible platoon/company would prepare a detailed analysis of the area that was mapped, and links were made to other villages based on sect, tribes, and terrain. The results were a census-like compilation of data that was collated by the task force staff. “Patrols were planned and organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. Our three critical tasks included security, information gathering, and relationship building. As the composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some augmentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to ensure a first-hand look at the AO.” 16 —

The primary actors at the battalion level were the S2, the effects/information operations cell, and the S5. This helped in developing and refining both lethal and nonlethal targeting. Human terrain mapping also provided a graphical depiction of where potential sectarian fault lines may be located, which gave us a focal point to begin our efforts to quickly establish security so other logical lines of operation could be worked. We used this approach to deliberately develop our human terrain map. The overall process took more than 2 months when balanced with other tactical missions. Of note, information contributing to our overall human terrain map was also gathered on offensive missions. During intelligence-driven raids, cordon and searches, and attacks, the platoons/companies used the same information requirements used on our human terrain mapping patrols. Our unit’s biggest success was getting all military-age males entered into the biometric data system, which enabled an additional data point for piecing together the intelligence picture on the extremist groups in TF Dragon’s AO. It also allowed the intelligence officer to cross reference the person against the database built during previous human terrain mapping missions. For example, if we had met an individual during a human terrain mapping patrol in Baker Company’s AO and he turned up on the objective during a Crusader Company mission, we were immediately alerted to this person’s presence in two different areas of the battlefield. Cross referencing allowed the intelligence officer to possibly link the person to an extremist cell that may reside in one part of AO Dragon, but is conducting missions in another portion, thus allowing us to create an initial link diagram of possible extremist activities. The Importance of Doing Human Terrain Mapping In retrospect, having a human terrain map is not nearly as valuable as doing human terrain mapping. Human terrain mapping provided an effective technique to learn and begin to understand the battlespace for which we were responsible. In other words, if the type of information we gathered had been available when we first arrived (for example, in a database), we might have had a false sense of how well we understood our environment. There is a tremendous advantage gained in the actual process of gathering ethnographic information. By way of analogy, having a ready-made database would be similar to doing math on a calculator instead of actually learning the hard way how to solve math problems — in conducting human terrain mapping, we learned to multiply the hard way. Specific Benefits of Human Terrain Mapping The benefits of human terrain mapping are numerous; however, there are seven significant benefits worth mentioning: Human terrain mapping provides a practical start point for gathering human intelligence (HUMINT). Human terrain mapping affords coalition forces the opportunity to become acquainted with leaders of the different tribes, towns, villages, and cities of a particular AO. If a unit earns the respect and trust of village sheiks and elders, the locals are more willing to provide intelligence. As our units moved through the various villages and towns of AO Dragon, they consistently found local citizens more than willing to provide information, but who were hesitant to call our “tips hotline” or visit our combat outposts. As often as possible, we tried to integrate our supporting HUMINT collection teams into human terrain mapping patrols, which provided an excellent opportunity to make initial contacts and develop sources. It also provided good inside knowledge of local citizens and a ready-made cross-reference capability, providing a better framework for determining the reliability or motivations of informants. Human terrain mapping puts a human face on contact with the population being secured. An intended second-order effect of human terrain mapping is to enable a unit to move into unfamiliar territory and begin separating the insurgents from the population. In the words of one company commander, “I believe it was vital to the initial impression of the locals in our AO that they saw us out walking amongst them, knocking on doors, shaking hands, and asking questions specific to that family/tribe. I feel it put a human face on our company and opened the door to many of the initial dialogues that we are currently exploiting with great success.” Human terrain mapping is critical to building trusted networks. The number one tenet of the 3d Infantry Division’s counterinsurgency philosophy is “It’s all about the people.” Building a trusted network involves personal relationships between coalition leaders at the tactical level and the leaders of the population they secure. Once these relationships are built, units are better able to deliver and assess the effects of information operations messages and PSYOP products, determine if local governments are talking to their constituents, and, if necessary, minimize unrest among the population through consequence-management procedures. Human terrain mapping has an indirect effect on the enemy. Having soldiers out in the village conducting foot patrols among the civilian population was vital to the initial tone set by 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry. If the enemy tested our strength, we were out of our vehicles with a gun barrel and set of eyes in every direction, prepared to maneuver instantly on contact. We approached every human terrain mapping patrol as if the enemy was watching and assessing our every move. Human terrain mapping brought us closer to the locals and deterred enemy contact. Human terrain mapping provides unforeseen opportunities to demonstrate our resolve to the population. During the process of getting to know local leaders “Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with civil affairs teams, human intelligence collection teams, psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, and/or additional medical personnel. These military specialists provided specific areas of expertise to assist the patrols, and were leveraged to enhance the perceived importance of the tactical unit. For example, having a unit medic treat a civilian, especially a child, with an acute problem provided direct evidence of our unit’s goodwill, as well as added the tangible benefit of cooperation with the coalition.” — 17 and meeting with them in their villages, the companies of TF Dragon oftentimes conducted hasty raids on weapons traf-fickers and improvised explosive device (IED) emplacers. These raids proved to local leaders that our soldiers were dedicated to making their villages more secure. Furthermore, these raids also proved to local leaders that when given critical intelligence information, coalition forces act on it. Human terrain mapping provides ground-level insight into local politics, motivations, and differences — and this can be the start point for reconciliation. Understanding the differences between Sunni and Shia areas is easy; finding the start point for reconciliation is not. However, once a unit has met and befriended leaders from separate areas, those leaders now have a common association — a partnership with us. For example, in one particular TF Dragon area, Sunni and Shia families living as neighbors had different sheiks as their leaders. Unfortunately, the sheiks in these areas were not eager to work together to reconcile their differences. To add further confusion to the situation, al-Qaeda forces often attacked both the Shia and the Sunni as a means to keep their foothold. After working numerous human terrain mapping patrols in these areas to outline the villages and actually identify the leaders, the company commander earned the trust of both the Sunni and Shia leaders. Using this as leverage, he facilitated discussions between the two sheiks based on the common goals of security and economic development. Human terrain mapping gives tactical-level units significantly improved firsthand knowledge of their areas of operation. Nothing can replace the importance of personal reconnaissance — this principle has existed in our doctrine for decades. Even though the data entered into biometric databases includes addresses and street names, this information is often difficult to include/catalog on map overlays. Furthermore, different people may refer to streets/locations by different names, and roads in rural areas are not generally trafficable by coalition vehicles. As the U. S. Army continues to examine this aspect of counterinsurgency warfare, we would warn, based on experience, against relying on an automated solution to this problem, or against creating a singular special-staff section to provide human terrain insight. From what we learned, a unit must either physically go out and collect this information initially, or develop a process to continuously reassess the information they have, if they inherited a developed map from a previous unit. Counterinsurgency is probably the most difficult form of warfare because it forces military professionals out of their “comfort zones,” and into the complex realm of interacting with human beings. Central to this is gaining the population’s support, which often requires a simultaneous effort to drive a wedge that will isolate the insurgents. Human terrain mapping enables units to better understand — and exploit — these complex human relationships, which is time and energy well spent. Note 1Headquarters, Department of the U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 2006. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr is currently serving as commander, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. A. from the University of Minnesota, an M. S. from Saint Mary’s College of Kansas, and an M. M. A. S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; and XO, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne, Fort Bragg. Major John Cushing is currently serving as S3, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d BCT, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. A. from the United States Military Academy and an M. S. from the University of Virginia. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include brigade planner, 2d Brigade, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA; commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA; and instructor, Department of Systems Engineering, U. S. Army Military Academy, West Point, NY. Major Matthew B. Garner is currently deployed to Iraq as assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d BCT, 3ID. He received a B. A. from the University of Texas – San Antonio. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3ID, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III and V; assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3ID, OIF III; battalion maintenance officer, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; and armor company XO and platoon leader, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX. Captain Rich Thompson is currently serving as commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d BCT, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. A. from Troy University, Alabama. His military education includes Infantry Captains Career Course, Officer Candidate School, Ranger School, Pathfinder School, and Special Forces Combat Diver and Dive Supervisor Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include deputy S3, 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA; platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3ID, Fort Benning; and platoon sergeant, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning. “Human terrain mapping affords coalition forces the opportunity to become acquainted with leaders of the different tribes, towns, villages, and cities of a particular AO. If a unit earns the respect and trust of village sheiks and elders, the locals are more willing to provide intelligence.” 18 —