Using Tactical Site Exploitation to Target the Insurgent Network

“All units collect and report information. Combined with the mosaic nature of insurgencies, this means that the intelligence flow in counterinsurgency is more bottom-up than top-down. Conducting aggressive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and pushing intelligence collection assets and analysis down to the tactical level, sometimes as far as company level, therefore benefit all ‘echelons.’”1 Today’s Army has adapted to meet the counterinsurgency threats in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, certain requirements have escalated; specifically, to identify, collect, and preserve targeted material and personnel for potential intelligence value and host-nation prosecution. One result of this adaptation process has been an increased scope of responsibility, at the maneuver company level, to conduct a detailed exploitation on an objective. This exploitation, combined with an increased requirement for bottom-up intelligence-driven operations, has led to multiple ad hoc solutions and expanded roles for combat arms soldiers. Platoon- and company-level organizations now conduct tasks previously discounted or performed by supporting agencies. To meet the increased requirement of supporting the intelligence process and targeting the threat network through effective exploitation, company-level and below formations are conducting a type of exploitation referred to as “tactical site exploitation” (TSE). Development of multiple ad hoc organizations, such as company intelligence support teams, further exemplifies the increased burden on company commanders to manage operations and intelligence, as well as expand the skill sets and warfighting capabilities of soldiers at the lowest level. Traditionally, soldiers have been adept at meeting emerging requirements; however, the increased roles executed by soldiers within maneuver units are beginning to exceed their capabilities. Understanding the basic requirements of TSE, and evaluating the enduring requirement to exploit objectives, specifically when facing an asymmetric threat, requires a thorough analysis to determine an optimal solution. To understand the evolution of TSE and evaluate the enduring requirements, we need to view the basic threat context that initiated TSE developments. The Threat Scenario The small home enclosed within a courtyard was isolated by the security element of first squad, setting the conditions to clear the objective and conduct the search. The platoon leader directed that the search element, second squad (+), look closely for hidden improvised explosive device (IED) components. As the reserve, third squad was observing the exfiltration route back to the combat outpost (COP). The cordon and search mission was based on intelligence developed primarily through interrogation of two insurgents at the brigade detention facility (BDF). The platoon apprehended the two insurgents earlier that week when it observed the insurgents emplacing an IED. The interrogation revealed information regarding a third insurgent. This insurgent was expected to be on the objective, coordinating another IED emplacement. Upon investigation, however, the third insurgent was not found in the targeted house. The only personnel observed by the search element were three small children and two women dressed in full burkas. After conducting a 15-minute search, the search element had found nothing. The two women stood passively in one cor- 6 — ner of the room clutching the children. Frustrated, the platoon leader called the company commander and reported the situation; just another dead-end lead. He requested that the platoon leave the area immediately rather than risk contact with an IED or sniper during retrograde back to the combat outpost. Once the platoon left the area, the targeted bomb builder took off his burka and recovered the detonation devices hidden under his sister’s garment. The insurgent had concealed his identity, and more importantly, he prevented the search team from finding the new trigger device he had developed. He waited until dark that evening, and then moved his operations to another location to avoid the risk of another search of his sister’s home. He was able to link up with another explosives courier and continue developing IEDs for the jihadist zealots that would emplace them during the following days. Three days after the unsuccessful cordon and search mission, the platoon suffered three casualties due to an IED attack near the same area previously searched. Months later, the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) linked the explosives and the trigger devices to the same bomb maker previously identified in the brigade detention facility. The Counter-Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC) matched a fingerprint lifted at the attack site by the weapons intelligence team (WIT) team to that of an individual enrolled in the biometrics database during a routine patrol. The IED maker was later apprehended by coalition forces. Is this a Typical Scenario? Similar and recurring scenarios have triggered efforts to enhance the capability of forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initially, recommended solutions to this challenge ranged from treating every objective like a crime scene to integrating search training efforts at basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. The scenario above highlights some of the many challenges tactical forces face regarding the threat when combined with cultural environment considerations. Specifically, the scenario relates to counterinsurgency operations where IEDs and sniper attacks emphasize the asymmetric threat. Soldiers must initiate TSE on initial contact to effectively attack IED and sniper networks, and ultimately eliminate this insurgent capability. Recent efforts have spanned abroad range of issues, which include:

• Developing doctrinal resources as a framework for site exploitation.

• Fielding identity management tools, such as biometric automated toolsets (BAT) and handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE), down to the squad level.

• Proposed force design updates (FDU) to increase intelligence analysis capabilities at both the brigade and joint levels, and shift some of that capability to the company level.

• Enhanced cultural understanding and awareness through counterintelligence seminars.

• Improved search techniques for tactical forces through training and organization. The Army has two primary issues to address regarding TSE, which include determining if the current brigade combat team (BCT) organization is capable of conducting TSE within the structure, training, and skill sets available when facing future adversaries; and identifying the Army’s enduring requirement relating to TSE. Collectively, the Army and the entire joint community have established ad hoc organizations and implemented “stove pipe” solutions to provide the BCT with the appropriate TSE capabilities. The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions to the problem are as vast as the diverse opinions regarding actual requirements. The U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) integrated capabilities development team (ICDT) is supporting the joint IEDD effort. The ICDT leads the Army’s collaboration to solve the challenges related to attacking the IED network, defeating the IED, and training the force. The ICDT efforts have resulted in the development of skills and capabilities that have reduced the IED threat. The Department of the Army (DA) G3 directed the establishment of an IEDD integrated process team (IPT) to conduct a holistic look at the IEDD proposed solutions and identify the enduring requirements for the Army, which includes a site exploitation (SE) working group. The SE working group identified the need for a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to determine enduring requirements for TSE within the BCT and subordinate formations. Efforts are currently underway to conduct this CBA. Additionally, the sniper defeat (SD) ICDT has identified TSE as an area of focus in supporting their efforts. The Army assigned the U. S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) as the proponent for SE because it is the organization best aligned to lead the effort to solve SE issues. The U. S. Army Armor Center, as a supporting effort, is the lead organization for TSE. CAC and the Armor Center, working with a number of other schools and centers, are initiating efforts to determine the Army’s enduring TSE requirements. Doctrine and Organizational Developments A primary problem relating to TSE and SE was identified by Brigadier General Joe Ramirez, Deputy Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, during the Directors of Training (DOT) Conference held at Fort Leavenworth in mid-2007. Ramirez referenced the initial draft TSE appendix for U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, which the Armor Center developed, and determined that the absence of a doctrinal foundation inhibited the development and integration of various DOTMLPF solutions.2 Such doctrine must describe the integrated concept of site exploitation and the exploitation process, and must clearly define and differentiate terms used to “To meet the increased requirement of supporting the intelligence process and targeting the threat network through effective exploitation, company-level and below formations are conducting a type of exploitation referred to as ‘tactical site exploitation’ (TSE). Development of multiple ad hoc organizations, such as company intelligence support teams, further exemplify the increased burden on company commanders to manage operations and intelligence, as well as expand the skill sets and warfighting capabilities of soldiers at the lowest level.” — 7 address TSE and sensitive site exploitation (SSE), thus avoiding misuse and confusion. Following the conference, the site exploitation working group, members from multiple centers of excellence (COEs), and the Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD), drafted and staffed a proposed definition for site exploitation operations. The result defined site exploitation operations as: “Related activities that gather and make use of the personnel, information, and/or material found during the conduct of operations in order to support tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.” Within the context of SE, the two distinct areas addressed are SSE and TSE. Soldiers supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) often incorrectly use these terms synonymously, which has led to some confusion in various Army organizations as to their true definitions, as well as the exploitation activities themselves (what elements conduct the exploitation). SSE is best described in the context of a “sensitive site,” which is “a designated geographically limited area with special military diplomatic, economic, or informational sensitivity to the United States.”3 SSE is currently defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms, as “A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.”4 Examples of sensitive sites are described in FM 2-0, Intelligence, and may include war crime sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government, storage areas for enemy classified files, or research and production facilities involving breakthrough technologies. Although still used, “sensitive site exploitation” is considered a legacy term relating to specialized teams formed during initial OIF operations to support the exploitation of suspected sensitive sites to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The term proliferated and was subsequently used throughout Central Command (CENTCOM) to describe the actions by any agency attempting to exploit an objective for information. The Armor Center’s Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development introduced the term “tactical site exploitation,” or TSE, and defined it as “the actions taken to ensure that personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material at a site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected in order to facilitate follow-on actions.”5 This term was included in the initial draft of FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, and subsequently published in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 07-26, Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations.6 Equally important and integrated in both TSE and SSE is technical exploitation, which CADD’s draft definition describes as, “the application of specialized means to assess personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material in order to generate intelligence to support follow-on actions.” Technical exploitation primarily supports BCT operations through agencies and specialized assets not normally organic to the BCT, such as weapons intelligence teams (WIT), CEXC, or other task force elements organized under joint tenets within CENTCOM to support theater IED defeat efforts. Site exploitation has emerged as the overarching concept in the absence of current doctrine outlining the interaction of existent and emerging technical intelligence (TECHINT) agencies and on-site exploitation requirements. CADD is currently developing doctrine to codify these concepts and agency relationships. TECHINT has not historically provided the immediate direct support to tactical operations that we see today. The need to support tactically based targeting operations to remove various IED (bomb maker, funding, and emplacement) networks has influenced the efforts of multiple centers of excellence in developing concepts and capabilities, which range from every soldier is a sensor (ES2) to law enforcement programs (LEP). These programs support the BCT’s analysis of criminal activity linked to funding or supporting insurgent activity. As an example, the TECHINT effort in OIF was also supported by other government agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Since March 2005, ATF has deployed special agent certified explosives specialists and explosives enforcement officers to support the Iraq CEXC within CENTCOM.7 Site Exploitation Advances The integration and linkages within the exploitation process have evolved exponentially over the past few years, as the Army moves to improve the integrated exploitation process. The Army has improved its ability to effectively search for, identify, and properly collect documents and media of value for subsequent exploitation by joint organizations. The resulting intelligence analysis and dissemination tempo for these products has expanded to include support to tactical operations, which has increased support to the BCT, enhancing the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and threat network targeting. Military search operations are focused at the tactical level to ensure that tactical units can effectively identify, preserve, and collect material during tactical operations (for subsequent analysis or criminal prosecution). The improved search focus can be attributed to early OIF challenges in the Central Criminal Courts of Iraq (CCCI), and the inability to consistently identify, collect, and preserve evidence along with corroborating witness state- “Biometric automated toolset (BAT) is an accurate, timely, and efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects and saves biometric data in a database that can be searched or queried. It incorporates iris scan, fingerprints, photographs, and biographical information of any individual, and stores the collected data on a central server located on a secure network.” 8 — ments for prosecution. Initial TSE efforts focused on ensuring that soldiers were cognizant of evidentiary requirements for CCCI prosecution. Military search, a key TSE task, has evolved beyond that to the point where various agencies provide “search” training with emphasis ranging from systematic routine search techniques to forensic collection to support biometric identification. The shift from major combat operations to irregular warfare has identified the importance of supporting the criminal prosecution of detainees for various crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. The document and media exploitation (DOMEX) process, particularly through its captured documents, media, and material chain of custody procedures, provides direct support to the criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) process through preservation of potential evidence. Technical exploitation support has been enhanced by employing personnel with specific skills who can effectively search/analyze specific sites or incidents and subsequently evaluate and exploit the related findings. This effort has been centered on the capacity and capabilities supported by WIT and their availability to support the BCT commander, as well as the integration and employment of specialized joint assets. Jointly staffed WIT teams are currently employed in direct support of maneuver BCT commanders, with one team per BCT assigned to joint task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets and organizations support the collection and evaluation of IED-related material by rendering IEDs safe and by providing first-line tactical exploitation, collection, and evaluation of IEDs and components. EOD exploitation supports a two-way flow of information on IEDs for tactical and technical intelligence. EOD personnel can ensure that enemy explosives and ordnance are rendered safe and subsequently exploited to facilitate effective threat analysis and targeting. Biometric advancements and identity management equipment have improved the Army’s ability to identify and track potential insurgents. Through effective collection, exploitation assets can link individuals to material by using forensic analysis, which enables more effective targeting at the operational level. At the tactical level, the tools supporting identity management provide rapid on-site identity confirmation of high-value individuals (HVI) and facilitate enrollment of unknown personnel. The following tools are primary assets that support the BCT in identity management:

• Biometric automated toolset (BAT) is an accurate, timely, and efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects and saves biometric data in a database that can be searched or queried. It incorporates iris scan, fingerprints, photographs, and biographical information of any individual, and stores the collected data on a central server located on a secure network. Additionally, BAT has the ability to create identification cards that aid in the timely identification or verification of personnel.

• Handheld interagency identification detection equipment (HIIDE) is a portable, battery-operated, handheld, multimodal (iris, fingerprint, facial photo, biographic contextual information) biometric device that can support biometric identification tasks and biometric enrollment tasks. The HIIDE system is interoperable with BAT. With an increased scope of responsibility and capabilities to support effective exploitation, with an emphasis on tactical-level organizations, challenges exist within the Army as to the training strategies needed to promote these efforts. TRADOC’s zero-growth policy regarding institutional training, combined with the systematic approach to training development within the institutional domain, constrain the ability to find effective solutions to current problems. Multiple agencies not normally as- “Military search operations are focused at the tactical level to ensure that tactical units can effectively identify, preserve, and collect material during tactical operations (for subsequent analysis or criminal prosecution). The improved search focus can be attributed to early OIF challenges in the Central Criminal Courts of Iraq (CCCI), and the inability to consistently identify, collect, and preserve evidence along with corroborating witness statements for prosecution. Initial TSE efforts focused on ensuring that soldiers were cognizant of evidentiary requirements for CCCI prosecution.” — 9 sociated with training the force, such as the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), have developed training products and provided mobile training teams (MTTs) to address the operational requirements that have emerged based on the threat and the truncated Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model. Improving the Army’s Search Techniques While the integrated efforts outlined above may be complex and require linkages to joint agencies and processes, emerging requirements for search may have the most impact on BCT forces, their current structure, and the training requirements based on the capabilities we now expect infantry, reconnaissance, and armor soldiers to execute. An evaluation of recent efforts to improve search training exemplifies the problems across the institutional and operational training domain. The CEHC has aggressively argued for the formal assignment of a search proponent in an effort to ensure uniformity of search training to meet Forces Command (FORS COM) requirements. The premise is that one agency serves as the coordinating lead or proponent for search, since there are a number of agencies teaching search with different agendas, equipment lists, and focus. Currently, NGIC trains two separate search MTTs. One focuses on biometrics support and forensic collection, which is taught by the biometrics department; and the other focuses on properly handling and collecting material and media, which is taught by the DOMEX department. Each MTT teaches a skill to support their subsequent portion of exploitation. The Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) at the National Training Center (NTC) is attempting to expand the existing search training to link integrating tasks, such as tactical questioning and employment of biometric tools, into the training. JCOE training supports current requirements for the collective task of conducting TSE, but does not solve the requirement of defining the tasks and responsibilities in relation to the various soldiers within the BCT. This limits the subsequent development of training that will ensure all the search requirements are achieved. Search should be viewed as a supporting task for TSE and other collective tasks, and in tegrated at various levels. Additionally, search requirements and capabilities need to be clarified by task and condition to encompass the range of search skills such as personnel, area, vehicle, and building search. Quantifying what type of search skills are required by soldiers is a key to resolving this issue. However, what is being intimated is that every soldier requires search skills and training, which sounds like an institutional training requirement that will not simply be solved by MTT. Reports from joint task forces indicate that units operating in theater require effectively trained search personnel. This report should be quantified within the context of the unit’s specific mission — is Task Force Troy looking for basic search requirements, media collection for exploitation, and/or forensic preservation for exploitation, or perhaps there’s a gap in training within the EOD and WIT teams who support collection and analysis efforts? This leads back to the root question: are we expecting entry-level 11B/19D/19K soldiers to become forensic evidence collectors? Until we quantify the requirement from the bottom up, by skill set required, we will continue to flounder in this area. All existing search training initiatives may be valid, but the target audience requires clear delineation. One solution is to ensure specifically trained personnel with specialized search skills that are resident with military police, EOD agencies, chemical personnel, and other specially trained assets are integrated into mission sets. Meanwhile, basic capabilities and an understanding of basic search skills and evidence handling could be taught to standard for maneuver company-level soldiers and linked to an integrated capability within the BCT; however, we should not expect entry-level 11B/19D/19K soldiers to become forensic evidence collectors. The Process — Practical Application Considerations Currently, TSE is focused on meeting three primary purposes for the maneuver commander:

• Answering information requirements.

• Facilitating subsequent operations (through intelligence, analysis, and targeting).

• Facilitating criminal prosecution by host-nation authorities. Answering information requirements. All operations are founded in effective reconnaissance, and every soldier can make observations that answer the commander’s information requirements and support the development of situational awareness, which drives planning and execution. The commander should provide clearly understood commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), which can be supported by effective TSE. Forces can use TSE to answer CCIR through a range of tools from tactical questioning to DOMEX. Effective planning for patrols, cordon and searches, raids, and other counterinsurgency operations can yield information that answers CCIR. When conducted effectively, TSE can protect valuable information that is properly col lected and analyzed, and can answer higher headquarters’ CCIR. The value of information is further emphasized in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeavor. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and insurgents. Commanders require accurate intelligence about these three areas to best address the “Search should be viewed as a supporting task for TSE and other collective tasks, and integrated at various levels. Additionally, search requirements and capabilities need to be clarified by task and condition to encompass the range of search skills such as personnel, area, vehicle, and building search. Quantifying what type of search skills are required by soldiers is a key to resolving this issue.” 10 — issues driving the insurgency. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents require an effective intelligence capability to be successful. Both attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks while trying to neutralize their opponent’s intelligence capabilities.”8 Facilitate subsequent operations. The information gained from TSE can lead to immediate follow-on actions on or near the objective, or may require detailed analysis to support the targeting process. Effective TSE provides critical data for inclusion in the intelligence process that subsequently supports targeting. Soldiers identify material and personnel of interest, collect these items and, after the operation is complete, conduct a debrief with the S2. The material that was collected is processed and analyzed; appropriate agencies conduct personnel interrogation; and the intelligence process develops information for inclusion in the targeting process. Facilitate host nation prosecution. Stability operations often support attempts to establish local governance and control. These operations may focus on assisting local law enforcement with the capture and subsequent prosecution of criminal/insurgent targets. Collection of material that can be associated with criminal/insurgent activity and provided to the local government for prosecution is critical to the success of operational and strategic Army objectives. Generally, the collection of material for prosecution purposes coincides with the collection of material for exploitation in the intelligence and targeting cycle. Commander’s guidance for handling this type of material dictates the priority. At the battalion level and above, the judge advocate general (JAG) can assist the staff and subordinate elements in coordinating the collection of material for criminal prosecution. From an execution perspective, TSE falls along four basic tasks, which when effectively integrated, support the exploitation objectives. These basic primary tasks include:

• Search.

• Collection.

• Tactical questioning.

• Analysis. Also nested within these tasks are the preservation considerations within the context of the tactical situation. To effectively execute TSE, planning must be fully integrated within the MDMP or troop leading procedures (TLP). The analysis of mission requirements is the prevailing tenet that will support effective exploitation of a site or objective. In a counterinsurgency environment, almost every tactical mission will require, or lead to, some form of exploitation, and leaders should plan accordingly. The requirement to conduct a detailed exploitation based on criticality or expected value of a site will dictate how an organization will task organize elements for the operation. Triggers and decision points for routine operations executed at the small-unit level still require coordinating instructions to subordinate elements and effective use of CCIR. When staff analysis of the mission dictates that TSE is a critical or primary task, the planning considerations and level of detail should escalate appropriately. The concept and organization of a formalized exploitation team or element within an organization established solely to respond to an objective or an event to conduct exploitation tasks is heavily debated. From a maneuver BCT perspective, TSE should be planned, organized, and executed in the same context as a combined arms breaching operation. In the deliberate planning process, the appropriate TSE elements should be task organized to meet the exploitation requirements anticipated on the objective and tasked/resourced accordingly. This technique is similar to task organizing a breach force with the assets required to reduce an obstacle. Assignment of a specified task and purpose to elements conducting TSE operations at all levels will clarify responsibilities and ensure the commanders’ end-state objectives are met. If resources are not available to execute the required tasks or mission, specialized support should be requested through higher headquarters. All specialized support elements must be integrated into the plan, or coordinated as a reactionary capability based on specific criteria or triggers, with planning considerations for response times and security requirements. Hasty TSE should be considered synonymous with the manner in which an infantry squad would conduct a hasty breach of a blocked entryway. A hasty breaching operation will be executed based on the tenets and principles of the breaching operation. TSE should be executed using basic standard organizational requirements and tasks. When facing a hasty exploitation, soldiers should be tasked via fragmentary orders to conduct the exploitation based on training and capabilities and within the prescribed context of SE. Small unit standing operating procedures (SOP) should be developed outlining exploitation team organization, requirements, and tasks by element. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) should be clearly disseminated and associated with decisions (triggers) that require external support from specialized exploitation agencies. BCT Deliberate TSE Operations Scenario The BCT has determined through collaborative analysis that a group of individuals are coordinating development of IEDs in a small neighborhood, which includes a storage building. Intelligence developed over time has indicated that three individuals linked to specific IED events are involved in IED construction. There are three buildings on the objective where the IED components are stored and constructed. The storage building is used as a distribution point for the individuals emplacing the IEDs. The components are delivered from multiple sources, therefore, while suspected insurgent personnel located on the objective are targeted for apprehension, the material may also be exploited in an attempt to trace the components to the point of origin and link the material to the supplier (the higher network). This operation, a standard cordon and search mission, will include a critical and deliberate TSE requirement, with the efforts Organizing for TSE Task organization for TSE depends on the complexity of the objective and METT-TC First Soldiers on Obj Search Element

Tech Teams Specialized elements Time on Objective: Complexity of Objective: Functions From Engineer School — 11 linked to operational and potentially strategic objectives. Integration of the entire suite of BCT capabilities should be coordinated to conduct effective exploitation of the objective. The staff evaluates all assets available during mission analysis, along with their capabilities and limitations, prior to developing courses of action (COA). Additionally, the integration of the WIT and CEXC should be considered for this mission and potentially requested from the joint task force. Traditional cordon and search considerations apply. Additionally, when specifically looking at the exploitation of the objective, the staff should consider the following:

• Available EOD assets.

• Detainee handling.

• Integration of HUMINT teams with tactical interrogation capability.

• Availability and classification of linguists.

• Forensic collection capacity.

• Biometric asset availability.

• WIT/CEXC integration if available.

• Joint, interagency, and multinational asset availability.

• Documentation asset availability; for example, the combat photographer may assist in site documentation.

• Time on the objective (time required to fully exploit the importance of the site). Within the identified assets and capabilities, the element tasked with conducting TSE is configured to meet the following basic requirements:

• A unit leader specifically tasked to complete the TSE requirements.

• A specified search element with leadership, assigned all assets required to conduct an effective search, including collection and protection of the material on the objective or site.

• An appropriate tactical questioning element with corresponding linguist capabilities.

• Personnel capable of conducting a search of individuals located on the objective.

• A documentation element (or assistant element leader) responsible for supervising or conducting the documentation of the objective with photographs and site sketches documenting where personnel and material were located and recovered. “Anticipatory planning is essential to seizing and retaining the initiative. It involves projecting thoughts forward in time and space to determine how to influence events before they occur, rather than responding to events dictated by others. To seize the initiative, commanders must anticipate events and act purposefully and effectively before enemies do, starting with the initial commander’s visualization.”9 Company-Level Tactical Site Exploitation Scenario Referring to the threat scenario at the beginning of this article, the basic requirements ensuring successful TSE can be identified. When the company commander initiates TLP, specifically upon receipt and analysis of a mission and while making a tentative plan, the tasks associated with successful TSE execution should be identified. The majority of these tasks remain the same for every mission that includes a TSE requirement; they should be specifically assigned during the orders process and coordinated through rehearsals and SOP. Below is a list of tasking requirements and tasks:

• Assign a TSE team leader (TL). It is imperative that one individual be responsible for the overall TSE portion of the mission. During basic cordon and search missions, this could be the “The concept and organization of a formalized exploitation team or element within an organization established solely to respond to an objective or an event to conduct exploitation tasks is heavily debated. From a maneuver BCT perspective, TSE should be planned, organized, and executed in the same context as a combined arms breaching operation. In the deliberate planning process, the appropriate TSE elements should be task organized to meet the exploitation requirements anticipated on the objective and tasked/resourced accordingly.” 12 —

2.

SEARCH & TQ.

1.

search element leader, or a specific squad leader, within the platoon tasked as the search element.

• If available based on the size and scope of the mission and troops available, an assistant TSE team leader (ATL) can support the following documentation tasks:  Complete a sketch of the site, annotating where personnel and material collected from the site were located; and  Coordinate video collection of the site (digital camera or video), chain of custody, and documentation procedures.

• Assign photographer/recorder who is responsible for video documentation of the site. Include 360-degree panoramic photos when possible, along with photographs of every item in its original location before collection. Additionally, items collected should be photographed with the suspected insurgent to support subsequent prosecution.

• Designate a search element, size and scope based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). At a minimum, the search element should be prepared to execute building, area, personnel, and vehicle searches as required, along with employment of the materials that will support search efforts, such as explosive detection assets, metal detectors (both personnel and ground), and other technical assets that will enhance the search. When available, include female soldiers in search team organization to mitigate cultural hurdles.

• A tactical questioning (TQ) element organized, on the basis of linguist availability and number of personnel anticipated on the objective. The TQ element may be one soldier with a linguist (interpreter), or may be organized with personnel prepared to handle detainees using the tenets of segregate, search, silence, safeguard, speed, and tag. The individual employing the HIIDE or BAT for identity management should be incorporated within this element. Commanders at all levels conduct analysis to determine the events or “triggers” that would indicate the requirement of specialized exploitation resources. Company commanders must effectively inform subordinates on their “limit of advance” relating to their exploitation capabilities and the specific information requirements that imply external resources may be required. Leaders ensure subordinates understand the commander’s PIRs, specifically PIR that indicate the presence of critical, exploitable documents, media, weapons related material, or personnel exceeding their exploitation assets. Effective dissemination of PIR and soldiers’ effective recognition and reporting provide the commander with the information required to support effective decisionmaking. When developing a plan, the commander must consider modified requirements for an escalated exploitation by reactionary forces with specialized capabilities such as WIT or military police investigators. These considerations include increased security requirements, increased time on the objective, and coordination requirements for battle handover. The collective task developed by the Armor Center, “conduct tactical site exploitation,” outlines the integrated procedures for conducting TSE.10 To ensure effectiveness of TSE, a thorough debrief must be conducted to ensure successful exploitation. The Way Forward While today’s soldiers are intelligent, aggressive, and adaptable, the increased spectrum of tasks that infantry, reconnaissance, and armor soldiers are expected to execute is rapidly approaching a task saturation point. Additionally, the institutional training domain, while focused on training fundamental soldier tasks, may be behind the curve in meeting the current task requirements to counter today’s increased asymmetrical threat. With the Army’s force generation model taxed in an abbreviated cycle, the institutional training domain may be required to radically modify traditional programs of instruction to meet training requirements traditionally conducted within the operational domain at home station during force generation. Until the Army can establish a baseline for all soldiers, develop tasks, and subsequently implement soldier training (entry level and noncommissioned officer education system), the operational force cannot effectively expand the training to support brigade/battalion search teams. Additionally, the ability to identify the transition points for integrating specialized or “advanced” search skills while simultaneously identifying which soldiers should possess those skills is inhibited. The way forward requires a thorough task analysis and a collaborated capability-based assessment to ensure that the requirements are integrated into future training and force structure. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, December 2006. 2FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion (Draft), Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, TBP. 3FM 2.0, Intelligence, HQDA, GPO, Washington, DC, May 2004. 4Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Department of Defense, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 April 2001 (As Amended through 17 October 2007). 5FM 3-90.5; and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook, Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations, No. 07-26, CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2007. 6Tactical Site Exploitation Training Support Package, Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, August 2007. 7Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Acting Director Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, before the U. S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 19 April, 2007. 8FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 9FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, HQDA, GPO, Washington, DC, January 2005. 10Collective Task 17-2-9400, “Conduct Tactical Site Exploitation,” Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, TBP. Michael Thomas is currently a contractor supporting tactical site exploitation at Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, KY. He served a full military career as a Marine Corps armor officer. He received a B. A. from the University of New Mexico and is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Marine Corps Security Forces, U. S. Naval Central Command, Bahrain; instructor, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; and operations officer, logistics officer, and inspector instructor, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division. TSE Team Leader

Search Element (Squad or team) TQ Element (Senior NCO w/linguist) TSE Assistant TL (Master Gunner) Example notional CO/TM TSE Organization. METT-TC considerations will dictate personnel requirements and availability. Ensure each area has been assigned as a specified task to a subordinate element/individual. — 13