Ar Rumaylah Airfi eld Succumbs To Hasty Attack

During Operation Desert Storm, the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Reg i ment (ACR) conducted a hasty attack on the Ar Rumaylah Southwest Airfield in southern Iraq. This article is written from the viewpoint of the cavalry troop executive officer and scout platoon leader. On 28 February 1991, 2d Squadron, 3d (2/3) ACR culminated its 400-kilometer assault into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm with a hasty attack that captured the Ar Rumaylah Southwest Airfield in southern Iraq, part of a complex that made up the largest ammo supply point in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. In the course of the attack, the squadron captured nearly 300 enemy prisoners of war, destroyed tons of Iraqi equipment, and most importantly, suffered no friendly casualties. The following is an account of the hasty attack on the airfield from the viewpoint of the executive officer, G Troop, 2/3 ACR, and the scout platoon leader, 1st Platoon, E Troop, 2/3 ACR. Background During Operation Desert Storm, the 3d ACR had the mission to provide flank security for the XVIII Airborne Corps during its assault into Iraq. For hundreds of kilometers, “Sabre Squadron” traveled side by side with the 24th Infantry Division over treacherous terrain, through rain and driving sandstorms, securing a series of objectives with no enemy contact. As the squadron pushed farther east toward the city of Basra, it began to encounter small pockets of enemy forces that initially put forth light resistance, but were easily neutralized and captured. The squadron’s movement halted on 27 February as the regiment awaited further word on future offensive operations and a possible cease-fire. At the time of the hasty attack, the squadron organization was that of a table of organization and equipment (TOE) regimental cavalry squadron, with three armored cavalry troops equipped with M1A1 (heavy) tanks and M3A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, a tank company, an M109 howitzer battery, and a huge array of combat support and service support assets. The cavalry troop consisted of two scout platoons, equipped with six M3A2s; two tank platoons, equipped with four M1Als; one 4.2-inch mortar section, equipped with two M106A2 mortar carriers; and the troop combat trains. Timeline — 28 February At 0515 hours, the squadron conducted stand-to procedures. At the completion of stand-to, the squadron can then issue any orders or stand the troops down to a lower readiness level. At this time, squadron had received no further orders to continue offensive operations and instructed units to lower their readiness level and await further instructions. On this morning, G Troop’s mission-capable vehicles included eight out of nine tanks, all assigned Bradleys, and one of two mortar vehicles. Both inoperative vehicles had been evacuated to the squadron’s unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) for repairs, but the UMCP was still on the move, trying to catch up with the rest of the squadron, and repairs on the vehicles had not been possible. First Platoon, E Troop, had five mission-capable Bradleys, with its sixth Bradley assigned to the troop commander. At 0730 hours, squadron sent word to its units that a cease-fire would go into effect at 0800 hours local time. This information was relayed to all the line platoons of both troops, which was followed by a feeling of relief and cautious optimism among soldiers. At 0922 hours, the cautious optimism came to an end. Squadron informed the troops that the regiment had been alerted and had received orders to move on line to secure a downed helicopter about 20 kilometers east of its current position. Both troops moved to REDCON 1, E Troop taking the center and lead of the squadron formation, and G Troop taking position in the northernmost part of the squadron zone. Departure time was set for 0945 hours. At 0945 hours, 1st Platoon, E Troop, initiated movement in a scout platoon “vee” formation, followed by its supporting tank platoon, 2d Platoon. In the squadron formation, each scout platoon had about 1.5- to 2-kilometer-wide zones with the distance between vehicles no more than 500 meters. One of the Iraqi tanks destroyed in the squadron attack on the Ar Rumaylah Southwest Airfield in southern Iraq. PHOTO: CW2 Gerhard P. Turner Ar Rumaylah Airfield Succumbs To Hasty Attack by Captain A. A. Puryear and Lieutenant Gerald R. Haywood, II (Reprinted from September-October 1991) 36 —

G Troop began moving in a standard split-vee formation, two scout platoons abreast, each supported by a tank platoon. The G Troop combat trains moved close behind and centered between the two tank platoons. This location for the combat trains provides maximum security when enemy contact is not expected and the distance can be increased when contact is possible. If contact is made by the lead scouts, the combat trains can halt their movement or back off if necessary. At this time, the G Troop combat trains consisted of the troop XO in his M577A2 command post vehicle, the troop first sergeant in his M113A2 APC, the medic armored personnel carrier (APC), maintenance APC, M88A2 recovery vehicle, a ground surveillance radar (GSR) APC, two M998 HMMWVs, and two heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fuelers. About 4 kilometers beyond the line of departure, E Troop reached the crash site and moved forward to secure it. The helicopter was totaled, with wreckage everywhere, and the fuselage showed signs of antiaircraft fire. At 0951 hours, the squadron received a change of mission from regiment to spread out, cover the entire sector, and move to the 98 north-south (N-S) gridline to establish a screen. At this time, both troops shifted south 2 kilometers from the planned positions to close the seam between 2d Squadron and 1st Squadron. In addition, the squadron was in struct ed not to engage in direct fire unless fired on. During G Troop’s movement east, 2d Platoon lost one tank to an engine fire and the mortar section lost one mortar track to a blown engine. The tank was quickly recovered by the troop’s M88 and the mortar track was recovered by the troop maintenance APC. Because the squadron’s UMCP was still moving and had not been established, the vehicles were brought along with the rest of the combat trains. The tank’s turret was still operational, so the crew manned the weapons system to provide some additional firepower to support the combat trains. The squadron continued its movement east and began to encounter unoccupied fighting positions and unexploded munitions from allied bombing. As the squadron moved closer to the airfield, it became very apparent that enemy forces occupied the airfield. As 1st Platoon, E Troop, came within 3 kilometers of the airfield, one of the Bradley commanders spotted a chain-link fence surrounding the airfield. The lead scout sections assumed overwatch positions and a close inspection quickly revealed the fence was not booby-trapped or mined. After inspecting the fence, the platoon visually acquired two tanks and five antiaircraft positions. It appeared that the crews were running to man them. Wanting to take advantage of the surprise, 1st Platoon called for 2d Platoon’s mine plow tank to crash the fence. 2d Platoon quickly responded, sending the tank at a high rate of speed through the fence, tearing a gaping hole. 2d Platoon now took the lead through the fence due to the presence of enemy armor. At 1027 hours, E Troop responded to live fire from several ZSU 23-4s and quickly destroyed the weapons systems. The troop continued to push through the airfield, 1st Platoon engaging the air defense weapons, and 2d Platoon dealing with the armored threat. The Bradleys soon came under direct small-arms fire. A rocket propelled grenade (RPG) round streaked just a few feet above a 2d Platoon tank, and another passed by within 6 feet of one of 1st Platoon’s Bradleys. Scouts reported dug-in machine gun positions in zone and the platoon quickly massed fires to destroy the positions. G Troop received its first enemy fire when 3d Platoon was taken under fire by machine gun positions. In a hasty assault of the position, 3d Platoon destroyed three air defense guns, three trucks, and captured twelve Iraqi soldiers. The combat trains moved forward to assist with Iraqi casualties and link up with 3d Platoon, whose combat lifesavers had begun basic first aid on wounded Iraqis. After the medics and additional combat lifesavers from the troop first sergeant’s vehicle arrived on station, they began to treat the wounded prisoners. Once the prisoners were stabilized, a scout section from 3d Platoon escorted the medics back to the squadron forward aid station so the casualties could re ceive further treatment and be evacuated. After 1st Platoon, E Troop, silenced the infantry positions on the airfield, surrendering soldiers began coming out of bunkers and buildings as the platoon moved through the area. Members of 1st Platoon motioned the Iraqis to the center of the airfield where 3d Platoon, E Troop, had established the troop prisoner collection point. 1st Platoon, E Troop, then linked up with 1st Platoon, G Troop, to close the Ar Rumaylah Airfield. Hasty attack by 2d Squadron, 3d ACR, 28 February 1991. — 37 seam between the two troops. These two platoons, along with 2d Platoon, E Troop, received the mission to destroy some abandoned artillery pieces. Both E and G Troop continued their movement east, destroying more enemy equipment with demolitions and direct fire, and capturing more enemy prisoners. At 1201 hours, regiment set a limit of advance (LOA) for tanks at the 10 north-south gridline, and the 12 north-south for the scouts. Both troops had to pull back slightly to set a screen line on the LOA. The large number of prisoners created transportation problems. The troops’ HMMWVs were filled quickly to maximum capacity, and the troops were reluctant to sacrifice combat power to transport them back to the squadron collection point. The solution came from the enemy. Numerous cargo trucks in various states of repair were left by fleeing Iraqis, and the troops hooked up the cargo trucks to APCs and towed them back to the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) collection point filled with Iraqi prisoners. Once set on the screen line, the G Troop first sergeant moved to the squadron trains to pick up a cargo HEMTT with a resupply of tank and Bradley ammunition. Platoon sergeants began rotating their platoons back to the troop trains to resupply ammunition expended during the attack and top off their fuel tanks. Both E and G Troop continued to conduct clearing operations, capturing more Iraqi soldiers and destroying weapons caches filled with hundreds of AK-47s, grenades, and RPGs. The squadron halted its movement about 28 kilometers west of the city of Basra. Over the next several days, the squadron continued clearing bunkers, rounding up EPWs, and destroying enemy equipment. These operations continued until the regiment received orders to return to Saudi Arabia on 7 March 1991. Observations Maneuver Sustain: Troop combat trains must always stay close to the troop main body. Just as tanks provide direct fire overwatch for scouts, the troop combat trains must provide combat service support overwatch for line platoons. The trains are always on call to provide fuel to M1A1 tanks, medical support for injured soldiers (friendly and enemy), and maintenance recovery for inoperative vehicles. For the scout platoon, basic doctrine proved to be extremely successful and easy to control. Improve: The only way the combat trains can stay in close proximity to the troop main body is to have vehicles capable of matching speed with M1s and M3s. While the MTOE authorized M113A3 APCs for the first sergeant, medic, and maintenance crews, G Troop was still equipped with older and slower M113A2s. The requirement should also extend to the M106 mortar carrier and the M577 command post vehicle. These vehicles are also required to keep up with the troop, but were unable to accomplish the task. The troop must have an A3 equivalent chassis for these M113-series vehicles so these critical support assets can maintain pace with the rest of the troop. Fire Support Sustain: The troop fire support officer (FSO) controls the movement of the troop mortars, a task that used to be assigned to the troop XO. With the mortars under his control, the FSO can provide mortar fire support more quickly when needed, and the XO is free to perform his command and control tasks. There were no preplanned artillery targets on the airfield, but the squadron’s artillery battery was set and ready to fire on targets of opportunity. Because of the fast pace of the attack and the ease with which the troops were able to defeat the enemy forces, no artillery fire was needed. Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability Sustain: The mine-clearing plow mounted on the M1A1 tank and the blade on the M88 recovery vehicle were invaluable in ensuring mobility of the troop combat trains. During the troop’s movement, G Troop com bat trains encountered numerous small berms that would have greatly slowed the movement of fueler HEMTT and the M113-series vehicles. A radio call to either of these vehicles resulted in a quick cut through the berm that greatly aided the ease of movement for these vehicles. For the scout platoon, the mine plow tank also provided a quick, responsive breaching capability, as illustrated by the use of the mine plow tank to crash through the airfield fence. Improve: The troop commander’sand maintenance section’s M998 HMMWVs proved to be critically important to the accomplishment of numerous missions during the course of the attack. However, these vehicles, along with Stinger team vehicles and others, would have been very vulnerable to any type of direct or indirect fire. The argument is that these vehicles belong in rear areas and not near the front lines, but the reality is that these vehicles are needed forward. These vehicles should be outfitted with Kevlar armor packages similar to the armament carrier model HMMWVs used by the light infantry, battalion scouts, and military police. This addition would provide the needed survivability for these vehicles to operate forward where they are needed. Air Defense Thanks to the air superiority enjoyed by allied forces, the squadron’s air defense systems were never put to the test in combat. Intelligence Sustain: While enemy intelligence had been sketchy during the assault into Iraq, the intelligence before that attack on the airfield was good. The templated positions on the airfield were very accurate PHOTO: CPT A. A. Puryear A G Troop tank loaded with Iraqi prisoners moves to the troop’s EPW collection point. 38 —

“show the flag” in presumably friendly areas. Essentially a reconnaissance in force, this mission must be undertaken only by elements sufficiently powerful enough to take care of themselves if significant enemy is found — at least a full troop with an attached rifle company and pre ferably a squadron or task force. The sweeping armor may find the enemy, in which case it attacks and destroys him. More likely, the enemy will hide. In this case, he is not doing what he had intended to do, and the sweep will have a marked “spoiling” effect. By continuing to move unpre dictably about, armor can dominate a very large area, keeping the enemy off balance and foiling his plans for extended periods. As a byproduct of such operations, civilian morale is greatly enhanced by the reassuring sight of powerful government forces. Area security. Even when an area has been cleared, the threat of VC raids from outside the area remains. Local militia are responsible for guarding hamlets, bridges, and the like, but they must be supported by a relief force strong enough to destroy the raiders and mobile enough to arrive in time. Armor is ideal for such service. With good communications, ingenuity, and freedom to act, a troop can adequately cover an infantry regimental sector once the VC main-force units have been cleared out. When the enemy has finally been driven to the mountains where armor cannot follow, this will become armor’s final — and perhaps most vital — contribution. Each troop so employed frees an entire regi ment of regular infantry to pursue the enemy and complete his destruction in the mountains. Conclusions Vietnam may not be an ideal locale for armored divisions, but that does not mean that armor cannot make valuable contributions to the overall effort. Properly equipped and employed, armor can minimize friendly infantry casualties while ensuring the de struction of the enemy in the Delta, Coastal Plain, and Plateau. Once these are won, armor can hold them secure while the infantry, thus freed, finishes the job in the mountains. To fail to capitalize on armor’s potential is to condemn infantrymen needlessly to death. To fully develop its potential, armor in Vietnam needs: more M113s to kill more VC; more light tanks on preferably anew semi-amphibious tank to kill VC more efficiently; more armored cars to secure more vital highways; and last, but by far most importantly, armor needs more understanding of its capabilities so that its units will be more fully and appropriately employed to help the infantry by closing with and destroying the enemy! Lieutenant Colonel Raymond R. Battreall Jr. has contributed to ARMOR in the past. He is a 1949 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and received a Master’s Degree from the University of Pennsylvania. A gradu ate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, he was senior advisor, Armor Command with the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, when this article was published in 1966. Vietnam from Page 35 — 39 in terms of general location and type of unit, but little was known about the actual percentage strength of enemy forces. The troops also received an accurate estimate of enemy morale and probable course of action when told to expect small pockets of enemy forces that would resist at first, but quickly surrender when pressed. Improve: If the troops could have had access to any satellite or aerial photography reconnaissance of the area, the attack on the airfield could have been planned in greater detail. Line platoons were forced to stumble their way through the airfield to determine the actual locations of enemy positions. Combat Service Support Sustain: The organization of the troop combat trains proved to be very effective. Whenever possible, the fuelers need to be under direct control of the troop first sergeant so he can rapidly bring them forward to refuel the tanks. It became very apparent during constant operations that M1 tanks need to be refueled based on time not distance covered. The XO and first sergeant have to work together in the planning of combat service support, with the primary execution left in the hands of the first sergeant, while the XO assists the commander in the command and control of the troop and manages the flow of combat information between troop and squadron. Command and Control Sustain: In both troops, scout and tank platoon teams operated on the same platoon radio net. This provided both platoons with immediate information about the battlefield situation, allowing for quicker response times and more efficient cross talk between platoon leaders. Both troops also found that using fixed call signs enabled shorter and more efficient radio transmissions. Improve: At times during the attack, it was very difficult to get an accurate location, due to the lack of easily identified terrain and the use of operational control measures based only on grid lines. Without question, there is great need for more satellite navigational devices for use during desert operations. Too often, the troops found themselves in places with barren, featureless terrain that made determining an accurate location nearly impossible, even for the best map readers. Each troop had three satellite navigational devices, one to the troop commander and one to each scout platoon leader. The rest of the troop relied on them for accurate grid locations. The troops need more of these systems in both the combat and service support elements to aid in the quick and accurate reporting of current location. Conclusion The 2d Squadron conducted a successful movement to contact/hasty attack using rapid movement, teamwork, overwatch, and massed fires. Platoons and troops carried the fight to the enemy using aggressive cavalry tactics. The Ar Rumaylah battle is probably typical of the future battles cavalry must fight and win. Captain A. A. Puryear is a 1986 graduate of Washington and Lee University. A graduate of AOBC, he has served as a tank and scout platoon leader, and a cavalry troop executive officer. He was assistant S1, 2/3 ACR, when this article was published in 1991. Lieutenant Gerald R. Haywood, II, is a 1988 Distinguished Military Graduate of Brigham Young University. A graduate of AOBC and SPLC, he has served as a tank and scout platoon leader. He was assistant S3, 2/3 ACR, when this article was published in 1991.