Armor in Vietnam

(Reprinted from May-June 1966) “You can’t use Armor in Viet nam!” This often-heard pro nouncement has been widely be lieved, especially in view of the obvious difficulty of Vietnamese terrain, the elusive nature of the insurgent enemy, and the tragic failure of French armor in the area. It has, in fact, been so widely believed as to severely inhibit serious thought on the subject. But for all its dogmatic strength and apparent credibility, the as sertion simply is not true. It is not even true that you can’t use medium tanks in Vietnam, which is what most people really mean, although medium tanks are in fact seriously limited and probably could not measure up to a cost-effective study, except in the Central Plateau. Need for Armor But armor is not the medium tank or any other specific machine. It is a concept: the concept of mobility, firepower, and shock effect on the battlefield. And the need for mobility, firepower, and shock effect is an inherent part of warfare, which does not depend on either the century or the geographical area in which the war is fought. This need has been filled in various times and places by light, swift horsemen; by heavily armed and armored knights; by chariots; by elephants; and more recently, by a wide variety of armored vehicles. The need exists in Vietnam just as urgently as it has existed elsewhere. The question is how best to meet the need, for if it is not met, there will be needless infantry casualties. Let me make this point very clear. This article is not to glorify armor, but to explain how armor can and does contribute to the overall effort — and how it could contribute still further — for the simple reason that every time armor could contribute, but does not, infantrymen die without need. Terrain Considerations Vietnam is divided into four distinct terrain areas — the Delta, the Mountains, the Coastal Plain, and the Central Plateau — each with different effects on vehicular mobility (Figure 1). The Delta. There are two Del tas, the old and the new. To most, the term connotes the new Delta from the Saigon River to the southern tip of the country. This heavily populated rice bowl is a vast, utterly flat region of paddies traversed by a few roads and crisscrossed by a dense network of deep, steep-banked canals and broad tidal rivers. It contains the desolate Plain of Reeds and is punctuated by the Seven Mountains near the southwestern tip of Cambodia, the U Minh Forests near the Gulf of Siam, and dense mangrove swamps along the coast of the South China Sea. Each of these is, for different reasons, a poor place for offensive military operations and is, therefore, a VC base area. The old Delta generally north of Saigon is, by contrast, somewhat higher, devoid of canals and major rivers, and covered by large forests and rubber plantations. It contains the notorious War Zones C and D. The Mountains. The northern two-thirds of the country consists of the rugged, jungle-covered, sparsely populated Anna-mite Mountains. Land communications are limited to a very few inferior and easily interdicted roads and trails, and to the stream lines along the narrow floors of deep valleys, which are occasionally interrupted by sheer waterfalls impassable to vehicles. Vehicular movement off of the very scarce roads and trails is nearly impossible, and even foot movement is exceedingly difficult. The moun tains offer refuge to the VC. The Coastal Plain. The Coastal Plain is discontinuous, being seg mented by mountain spurs reach ing to the sea. Small segments surround Phan Thiet, Phan Rang, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa, and Qui Nhon. Continuing northward, major segments extend from Quang Ngai to Da Nang, and from below Hue north across the 17th Parallel. The plain is heavily populated and is tied together by Highway 1 and a single-track, frequently interdicted rail- — 33

Figure 1 road. From the coast to its maximum inland depth of about 20 miles, the plain consists of a narrow sandy strip backed up by rice paddies and separated from the mountains in most instances by a single range of open hills called the Piedmont. The segments are further com partmented by several unfordable rivers. The Central Plateau. The Central Plateau extends along the Cambodian border from Kontum through Pleiku to Ban-Me-Thuot. It is thinly populated and lacks significant rivers. It is covered by vast forests, especially in the north, and savannah areas of tall grass. Although roads are scarce, cross-country mobility outside the forests is excellent. Effects on Combat Vehicles Armored cars. Armored cars are roadbound everywhere except on the Central Plateau, and dur ing the dry season, in certain areas of the Coastal Plain. In these areas, they are useful as relief forces for small outposts and for limited offensive combat. Their primary — and vital — mission, however, is highway security and convoy es cort. They are invaluable in this role and, when present, discourage all but the largest and best organized of ambushes. U. S. forces have no armored cars. The Viet namese have three troops plus separate platoons organic to the sectors (provinces). Many more are needed. Because of the post-World War II hiatus in American armored car development, the V100 “Commando” appears to be the only reasonably available, modern U. S. car for the purpose. Tanks. As previously mentioned, medium tanks are severely restricted in Vietnam. They are able to negotiate coastal sand, Piedmont hills, the Central Plateau, and — surprising to some — rice paddies without difficulty. When they are able to bring the Cong to engagement, the results are terrible to behold. They have been, therefore, useful adjuncts to the defense of such vital areas as Da Nang and have even enjoyed some limited offensive success in both the 3d Marine Division and 1st Infantry Division sectors. We expect considerable benefits from a recently arrived battalion in the Central Plateau. The nemesis of the tank, however, is the unfordable water obstacle. Current model tanks cannot swim and existing highway bridges are more often than not too weak or too narrow to support them. Engineer tactical bridging is truck-mounted and, therefore, useless away from the highways. AVLBs, being wider than medium tanks, cause more problems than they solve during on-highway move ments. Light tanks suffer the same limitations as medium tanks, but being lighter and narrower, they are able to make better use of existing bridges. This allows them access to larger and more widespread operational areas and increases their opportunities to engage Viet Cong (VC). The 76- mm gun of the M41A3 is no less deadly than the M48’s 90mm against troops and field fortifications and, surprisingly, the M41 stands up every bit as well as the M48 against VC’s shaped-charge type antitank weapons. Light tanks are, therefore, markedly more useful than medium tanks in the Coastal Plain and the northern or “old” portion of the Delta and are just as good as medium tanks in the Central Plateau. Neither type can function in the mountains or in the “new” Delta. It is one of the minor tragedies of our time that the U. S. Ar my phased out the M41 without producing a timely replacement. The result is that U. S. forces in Vietnam have no light tanks while the Viet namese have only five troops of M41s. What is needed, of course, is a semi-amphibious tank, such as the General Sheridan, which would not be stopped by rivers and canals. Armored personnel carriers (APC). The M113 APC is the backbone of Armor in Vietnam for one simple and overriding reason — it can move! In the summer of 1962, two troops of M113s were introduced experimentally into the new portion of the Delta. They were successful beyond all expectations. The two troops were able to negotiate the Delta’s rivers and canals and, between 11 June and 30 September 1962, killed a total of 502 VC and captured 184 more while losing only 4 of their own men killed and 9 wounded. The M113 force has, therefore, been expanded to its present strength of one U. S. mechanized battalion and 24 Vietnamese troops. And more could be used. M113s are found everywhere in Vietnam except the jungle-covered mountains. They work hand-in-glove with the infantry, but not as personnel carriers. Rather, mobility has proven much more important than firepower in the face of this particular combination of terrain and enemy, and the M113 has become the main battle tank of Vietnam. Firepower, of course, is not to be ignored, and the M113 has been locally modified by the addition of gunshields and hatch armor for the protection of.50-caliber gunners (see Figure 2) and by mount ing a.30-caliber machine gun on each side of the cargo hatch. Three vehicles in each troop mount 81mm mor tars and two carry 57mm recoilless rifles in lieu of one of the ma chine guns. This adds up to such an impressive array of fire- 34 — power that VC show great reluctance to engage even a single troop of M113s with less than a full battalion well dug in along some antitank obstacle and heavily reinforced with recoilless rifles, ba zoo kas, and the like. Cynics discounted the M113’s early success and predicted it would come to an end as soon as VC acquired antitank weapons. This has not proven to be the case. VC has long since distributed 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles, 3.5" rocket launchers, and 82mm Chinese “Panzerfausts” to battalion level in considerable quantity — as many, in fact, as he can carry and supply with ammunition, as long as he remains tied to foot mobility. The result has been the replacement of “cowboy and Indian” antics by sound armor tactics while Vietnamese armor has piled up an impressive 15.8-to-1 kill ratio from 11 June 1962 through 31 December 1965 (6,275 VC confirmed dead — the real total is doubtless much higher — against 397 friendly killed in action). No armored vehicle can ever be invulnerable, but the M113 is dem onstrably better protection than a fatigue shirt for its crew. True, a goodly number are penetrated from time to time, but less than one out of seven penetrated vehicles is destroyed and the eight- to twelve-man crews suffer only about.8 personnel losses per penetration. Command and reconnaissance vehicles. The familiar quarter-ton truck is entirely roadbound in Vietnam and is therefore little or no use for command and recon operations. The M114 command and recon vehicle was introduced shortly after the M113s, but unfor tunately fell flat on its face. (Almost literally — the major problem was that its front slope protruded beyond the track and dug into dikes and canal banks before the track could get a foothold, thereby preventing the M114s exiting from paddies or canals.) There is at present no satisfactory command and recon vehicle in Vietnam. It would be interesting to see what the new M113½ — a scaled-down M113 with a three-man crew — could do. Tactical Employment General. At first glance, armor tactics in Vietnam may seem highly unorthodox. If you will consider what has been said about the various vehicles, however, you will see that the APC has simply assumed the orthodox role of the main battle tank. By the same token, the light tank has, in those areas where it can operate, taken on the role of the main battle tank supporting the actions of the M113 by heavy firepower and, where possible, adding weight to the assault. With these substitutions in mind, standard doctrine becomes applicable. Armor in Vietnam, as presently equipped, is capable of the full range of normal armor operations. It performs best, however, when em ployed on offensive missions in close cooperation with infantry. The ultimate tactical objective of the Vietnamese trooper is to phy sically overrun the enemy and crush him beneath his tracks. All of his efforts are directed to this end and the psychological — or “shock” — effect on the enemy of this armor equivalent to “the spirit of the Bayonet” is very great indeed. Reconnaissance. In close country against an enemy who hides or flees rather than fights in the face of odds, reconnaissance becomes a detailed search by large numbers of dismounted personnel for which armor is not especially well suited. Armored cavalry or armor with attached infantry can, of course, search relatively open areas, but the likelihood of finding significant enemy forces in such areas is slight. In general, then, infantry recon noiters for armor in Vietnam. Strike force. The usual Vietnamese “search and destroy” operation finds an infantry reg- i ment deployed as skirmishers to conduct a detailed, hole-by-hole and bush-by-bush search with an armor troop held well forward in reserve. When a significant enemy is found, however, it is unlikely that the deployed friendly infantry will have a preponder ance of force at the point of contact. The armor troop is, therefore, committed to the as sault to destroy the enemy. Encircling force. As an alternative, an armor troop or squadron may be dispatched to encircle the area to be searched and block escape there from. If the enemy attempts to flee, he is destroyed by fire. If he stands his ground, the armor is committed as before — only this time from the rear — to the assault. Sweep. The armor “sweep” is used in the absence of firm in telligence or as an economy-of-force measure in hostile terrain. It is also useful to check on se curity and The M113 APC is the backbone of armor in Vietnam for one simple reason — it can move! Figure 2 Continued on Page 39 — 35

To fully develop its potential, armor in Vietnam needs: more M113s to kill more VC; more light tanks on preferably anew semi-amphibious tank to kill VC more efficiently; more armored cars to secure more vital highways; and last, but by far most importantly, armor needs more understanding of its capabilities so that its units will be more fully and appropriately employed to help the infantry by closing with and destroying the enemy! Lieutenant Colonel Raymond R. Battreall Jr. has contributed to ARMOR in the past. He is a 1949 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and received a Master’s Degree from the University of Pennsylvania. A gradu ate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, he was senior advisor, Armor Command with the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, when this article was published in 1966. Vietnam from Page 35 — 39 in terms of general location and type of unit, but little was known about the actual percentage strength of enemy forces. The troops also received an accurate estimate of enemy morale and probable course of action when told to expect small pockets of enemy forces that would resist at first, but quickly surrender when pressed. Improve: If the troops could have had access to any satellite or aerial photography reconnaissance of the area, the attack on the airfield could have been planned in greater detail. Line platoons were forced to stumble their way through the airfield to determine the actual locations of enemy positions. Combat Service Support Sustain: The organization of the troop combat trains proved to be very effective. Whenever possible, the fuelers need to be under direct control of the troop first sergeant so he can rapidly bring them forward to refuel the tanks. It became very apparent during constant operations that M1 tanks need to be refueled based on time not distance covered. The XO and first sergeant have to work together in the planning of combat service support, with the primary execution left in the hands of the first sergeant, while the XO assists the commander in the command and control of the troop and manages the flow of combat information between troop and squadron. Command and Control Sustain: In both troops, scout and tank platoon teams operated on the same platoon radio net. This provided both platoons with immediate information about the battlefield situation, allowing for quicker response times and more efficient cross talk between platoon leaders. Both troops also found that using fixed call signs enabled shorter and more efficient radio transmissions. Improve: At times during the attack, it was very difficult to get an accurate location, due to the lack of easily identified terrain and the use of operational control measures based only on grid lines. Without question, there is great need for more satellite navigational devices for use during desert operations. Too often, the troops found themselves in places with barren, featureless terrain that made determining an accurate location nearly impossible, even for the best map readers. Each troop had three satellite navigational devices, one to the troop commander and one to each scout platoon leader. The rest of the troop relied on them for accurate grid locations. The troops need more of these systems in both the combat and service support elements to aid in the quick and accurate reporting of current location. Conclusion The 2d Squadron conducted a successful movement to contact/hasty attack using rapid movement, teamwork, overwatch, and massed fires. Platoons and troops carried the fight to the enemy using aggressive cavalry tactics. The Ar Rumaylah battle is probably typical of the future battles cavalry must fight and win. Captain A. A. Puryear is a 1986 graduate of Washington and Lee University. A graduate of AOBC, he has served as a tank and scout platoon leader, and a cavalry troop executive officer. He was assistant S1, 2/3 ACR, when this article was published in 1991. Lieutenant Gerald R. Haywood, II, is a 1988 Distinguished Military Graduate of Brigham Young University. A graduate of AOBC and SPLC, he has served as a tank and scout platoon leader. He was assistant S3, 2/3 ACR, when this article was published in 1991.