The 72d Tank Battalion in Operation Touchdown

Depth and Synchronization at the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge: The 72d Tank Battalion in Operation Touchdown by Captain Scott D. Aiken (Reprinted from September-October 1992) The application of what is now the AirLand Battle [Army doctrinal] tenets of depth and synchronization resulted in the 72d Tank Battalion’s suc cess in Operation Touchdown from 10 to 12 Oc tober 1951. This operation led to the ultimate victory of the 2d Infantry Division at the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge in Korea. In this operation, both tenets were used with highly fa vorable results. The 72d Tank Battalion’s actions in Operation Touchdown characterized depth in time, space, and resources. This armored attack is also a perfect example of syn chronization with its classic use of combined arms tied to excellent engi neer and logistics plans. Early in the autumn of 1951, Gen eral Matthew Ridgway authorized limited objective attacks to seize important terrain features across the Korean front. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army commander, de termined that it was necessary to im prove the position of his right flank. This decision led to the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge being fought by the 2d Infantry Division.1 Heartbreak Ridge was an extension of Bloody Ridge and was located in the eastern part of the Eighth Army’s sector. Heartbreak Ridge was a long, narrow ridge running north to south. It was located between the Mundung-ni Valley to the west and the Satae-ri Valley to the east.2 Operation Touchdown was con ceived after the 2d Infantry Division conducted several unsuccessful piecemeal frontal assaults against strong North Korean defenses from 13 September to 1 October. These attacks were never larger than battalion strength and repeatedly stormed Hills 931 and 851. These endeavors proved costly and ineffective. Despite the val iant efforts of the 2d Infantry Divi sion, the enemy retained Heartbreak Ridge with strong defenses; positions were so elaborate that some bunkers could hold an entire 1,000-man North Korean regiment.3 Major General Robert N. Young, 2d Infantry Divi sion commander, decided that these frontal attacks should cease. Instead, he called for a coordinated attack by the entire division, supported with powerful combined arms assets.4 This attack was designated “Operation Touchdown.” Operation Touchdown was so named because it involved a long “end run” around the flank of the enemy at Heartbreak Ridge to cut his lines of communication, concen trated at the northern entrance to the Mun dung-ni Valley.5 General Young believed that Operation Touchdown would work because the simultaneous advance of all three regiments in the division would eliminate the enemy’s advantage of being able to concentrate his fire, particularly mortars. Once the attack commenced, the enemy would be hard pressed to move reinforce ments from one sector to another.6 The advance of the regiments would be supplemented with two powerful armored thrusts. One attack would be conducted up the Satae-ri Valley. This task force would break behind enemy lines, disrupt enemy communications, and inflict casualties. The second armored thrust was the key to Operation Touchdown. It was to be a tank/infantry drive up the Mun dung-ni Valley.7 Operation Touchdown was a drastic shift of technique in the Heartbreak Ridge battle, trading relentless frontal assaults for maneuver against the enemy’s weak points. The effective use of armor by the 2d Infantry Division was to be the key to Operation Touchdown’s success. Task Force Sturman was organized with tanks and elements from the 23d Infantry Regiment. It began opera tions on 3 October as a supporting ef fort. Task Force Sturman was to conduct several raids in the Satae-ri Valley east of Heartbreak Ridge to engage the North Korean emplacements from the rear. When the infantry attacks began, the task force was to keep the enemy pinned down. On the opposite side of the division sector, the advance of the infantry would provide cover for the division’s engineers building the tank track to Mundung-ni. When the job was fin ished, the tanks of the 72d Tank Bat talion would duplicate Key to the 72d Tank Battalion’s fight was the “Easy 8” M4 Sherman. March-April 2007 — 17 the job of Task Force Sturman but on a larger scale.8 Operation Touchdown made great use of the tank/infantry team to conduct extended maneuver into the enemy’s rear. Supporting arms would play an im portant role in the attack of the 72d Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Valley. The five days before Opera tion Touchdown were used to ex tensively plan and coordinate supporting arms.9 Artillery, mortars, and close air support would be used considerably before and during Operation Touchdown. Additionally, the machine guns of the 82d Antiaircraft Battalion were used to suppress enemy positions in the hills overlook ing the valley where vital engineer projects were being conducted. This suppression allowed engineers to clear the valley floor of enemy mines and obstacles with little opposition from communist patrols or snipers.10 This is an example of the efficient use of all available resources allocated to the division commander to increase his combat power. The 72d Tank Battalion’s foray in the Mundung-ni Valley was reinforced by a massive engineer effort. Preliminary engineer endeavors began as early as 1 October when Lieuten ant Colonel Robert W. Love, the divi sion engineer officer, was ordered to get a road to Mundung-ni ready for tank traffic. The time schedule would not allow for an entire road to be built. The existing road would have to be widened and repaired in some parts and completely built in others. Sections had to be bypassed and built or widened later. One detour used was a stream bed, which complicated the effort. Enemy antitank mines were laid throughout the valley.11 “The road … leading to the Mundung-ni Valley had been virtually obliterated by an elaborate pattern of cratering done with the avowed pur pose of blocking a tank thrust.”12 Countermine operations, obstacle re duction, and road building in the Mundung-ni Valley were extensive and lasted throughout the operation. However, the fruits of the engineer’s efforts would be reaped when the 72d Tank Battalion violently overran Mundung-ni. The logistics preparation for the 72d Tank Battalion’s actions was su pervised by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Cornel-son, G4, 2d Infantry Division. This preparation began around 1 Oc tober. Special equipment would allow tanks to move over obstacles or wet areas. This equipment was obtained and issued to the 72d Tank Battal ion.13 A requirement for numerous explo sives and for tactical bridging was foreseen before the operation and was acquired.14 The 2d Engineer Battalion would later use over 40 tons of explosives in clearing mines and building the road up the Mundung-ni Valley.15 This liberal use of explosives was the only technique that would allow such a massive engineering endeavor to take place rapidly. Extensive logistics preparation allowed for this requirement of explosives to be met. This expense in explosives was fully justified by reducing vehicle and equip ment losses.l6 The projected daily expenditure of artillery ammunition for the division totaled 20,000 rounds, which made up the bulk of the 1,200 tons of supplies that needed to be moved forward each day, more than the division’s organic transportation would allow. Thus, the use of forward supply dumps and air-delivered supplies would supplement the division’s trucks. Air drops of food, ammunition, and medical supplies were of inestimable value during Operation Touchdown.17 By 2 October, the logistics portion of the operations order was nearly complete and planning continued for an ammunition supply point and emergency class I and class III dumps. The task then turned to stockpiling fuel, rations, and ammunition at these forward areas.18 Considerable forethought and effort by the 2d Infantry Division G4 ensured that all fuel, demolitions, and ammunition requests were met. This allowed the 72d Tank Battalion to conduct its attack fully supported with supplies, engi neer efforts, and indirect fires. Considerable preparatory bombard ment of the Mundung-ni Valley by U.S. warplanes and artillery began days before the operation. On 3 Octo ber, 35 sorties were flown on planned objectives. On 4 October, 7,100 rounds of artillery ammunition and 45 sorties of air strikes were used.19 Task Force Sturman was active on 4 October. In less than three hours, the force knocked out 14 bunkers of the North Korean 19th Regiment in the Satae-ri Valley.20 By 5 October, over 45,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were trucked to the ammunition stor age point near Pol-mal. Additionally, 20,000 gallons of fuel and large amounts of rations were moved to forward supply dumps.21 As H-hour approached, artillery ex penditure increased dramatically and Marine Corps Corsairs attacked enemy positions with napalm, rockets, and machine guns.22 Supporting arms were brought to bear on the initial ob jectives of all three regiments. On the evening of 5 October at 2100 hours, Opera tion Touchdown commenced. The 2d Infantry Division initiated the attack with the 9th, 23d, and 38th Regi ments abreast. By early the next day, the central peak of Heartbreak Ridge at Hill 931 was in the 2d Division’s possession as the attack moved to the north.23 Task Force Sturman continued its ef fective runs up the Satae-ri Valley. On 6 October, the task force destroyed 35 enemy Halftrack-mounted quad .50 calibers, nominally air defense weapons, were often used in Korea to suppress infantry ambushes. They kept patrols and snipers from interfering with road improvements prior to the “end run” up the Mundung-ni Valley in Operation Touchdown. 18 — March-April 2007 bunkers.24 This armored task force continued its success on 9 and 10 October by destroying several enemy bunkers on Hill 851.25 On 10 October, the road to Mun dung-ni was complete. Infantry from the 23d and 38th Regiments seized Hills 931 and

605. With these hills under friendly control, the tanks would be protected from enemy antitank squads in most of the restric tive Mundung-ni Valley.26 On 10 Oc tober at 0630 hours, the 72d Tank Battalion complemented the division attack with an armored drive up the Mundung-ni Valley.27 This drive consisted of 68 Sherman tanks and a battalion of the 38th In fantry Regiment that accompanied the tanks to counter any enemy antitank squads.28 This allowed for the maximum mutual support between the tanks and the accompanying infantry. The division plan called for the 72d Tank Battalion to withdraw only as far as necessary to get infantry protec tion. All fuel, maintenance, and ammunition were to be taken forward to them.29 This was accomplished thanks to the extensive logistics planning and stockpiling before the operation. The success of the 72d Tank Battal ion in making its 8-mile attack up the Mundung-ni Valley was due in part to detailed staff planning. Exten sive ground reconnaissance, aerial ob servation, engineering skill, and infan try support was coordinated to produce a highly synchronized attack. On 10 October, the village of Mun dung- ni was seized. The tanks then pushed 1 kilometer north of the village and placed fire on the reverse slope of Hill 841 (slightly NW of Hill 605). Tank losses for the day were sur prisingly light, with two tanks de stroyed and five damaged.30 The communists were surprised at the appearance of tanks in their rear areas.31 The unexpected appearance of tanks at Mundung-ni had caught the Chinese troops of the 204th Division, 68th Army, in exposed positions. These troops were then in the process of relieving elements of the mauled North Korean Fifth Corps.32 The pres ence of Chinese units was proof that the North Koreans had been badly hurt by Operation Touchdown to the degree that help had been sent.33 After 10 October, the 72d Tank Bat talion made daily thrusts further up the valley on 11 and 12 October, de stroying enemy forces and supply dumps each day. The tanks would pull back to the forward infantry units each night for protection.34 These daily thrusts are an example of depth in time. The attacks by the 72d Tank Battalion kept relentless pressure on the enemy for 3 days. The last objective on Heartbreak Ridge was Hill 851. It was finally seized by the 23d Infantry Regiment on 13 October. After several counterattacks in an attempt to reclaim Heartbreak Ridge, the assault was beaten back.35 The 2d Infantry Division won the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge at the cost of 3,700 casualties.36 Estimates of enemy losses totaled close to 25,000.37 This battle marked the last major UN offensive before the re sumption of peace talks in 1951.38 However, months of heavy fighting remained while peace negotiations were ongoing. During these months, the front line along the Eighth Army sector remained exactly where it had been placed by Operation Touch down.39 Operation Touchdown can, therefore, be considered one of the final decisive actions of the Korean War. The 72d Tank Battalion’s action in Operation Touchdown was a classic example of the AirLand Battle tenet of depth. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. By using depth, a commander can obtain the necessary space to ma neuver effectively. He can also gain the necessary time to plan, arrange, and execute operations and the neces sary resources to win.40 The attack by the 72d Tank Battal ion was extended in space, time, and resources. The armored thrust of sev eral miles to Mundung-ni was an extension of the division attack deep into the enemy’s flank and rear. It was possible due to exhaustive engi neer mobility efforts. The duration of the operation placed relentless com bined arms attacks against an outmaneuvered enemy. Prolonged artil lery and aerial bombardment in support of the armored thrust also con tributed to the extension of Operation Touchdown in time and space. Additionally, the resources dedicated and expended on the 72d Tank Battal ion gave depth to the effort. A massive logistics build-up preceded the operation and ensured that ammuni tion, fuel, and other supplies were available for a protracted armor cam paign in both duration and space. Synchronization is the arrangement of all forces and actions on the battlefield in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum combat power at a decisive point.41 Synchronization in cludes the integration of maneuver forces, supporting arms, and combat service support forces for the desired results. The synchronization of the prepara tory artillery and aerial bombard ments, the engineer efforts, the supporting attack by Task Force Sturman, and the armored drive of the 72d Tank Battalion all led to the build-up of combat power against communist forces in the Heartbreak Ridge and Mundung-ni area. Vigilant opera tional security allowed concealment of the progress of the engineers along the road to Mundung-ni. This contrib uted to the surprise of the armored thrust up the valley.42 The shock ef fect of massed armor in the enemy’s rear areas discouraged its initiative toward repelling the infantry assaults to its front, which helped in the capture of Heartbreak Ridge.43 Thorough logistics planning allowed for the sus tainment of this combined arms force once the operation was launched. Operation Touchdown effec tively used the AirLand Battle tenets of depth and synchronization. All of the battlefield activities before and during the period from The snow in this winter view reveals the typical hilly Korean terrain that challenged the 2d ID and the 72d Tank Battalion. Narrow valley floors were easy to block and transverse ridges offered snipers good cover. Deep bunkers higher up resisted frontal assault and often could accommodate an entire North Korean or Chinese regiment. March-April 2007 — 19 in process of achieving, in both organization and materiel.” Later in the article General Devers goes on to say, “The future of armor is limited only by the ingenuity of American industry and the resourcefulness of the officers and enlisted men who belong to armored units. To those qualities there are no limits — nor are there to the future of armor.” Armor’s future is measured by its past successes, which represent an extremely lethal and powerful Armor Force, both of today and tomorrow. General Devers’ very insightful words reiterate this fact; in particular, his closing sentence, “To those qualities there are no limits — nor are there to the future of armor.” Prior to the invasion of Iraq, many strategic thinkers were certain that the tank was less relevant to the contemporary operational environment (COE). The massive steel behemoths that ruled the plains of Europe for decades were too clumsy for a new world order that required troops to rapidly deploy to small conflicts across the globe. It was not long before the idea of “power is increasingly defined not by mass or size, but by swiftness and mobility” caught on. This information age battle thinking prompted the Army to announce a “transformation” program to reduce the reliance on heavy combat units in favor of lighter, more strategically deployable, medium weight forces. The “future combat system,” would be protected not by heavy armor but by a linked computer network of sensors, robots, and precision weapons that would find and destroy the enemy from greater stand-off ranges. This concept is still the key to our future mounted force and is actively in development; however, we now know that tanks are still a vital part of our suc cess in the COE and what continues to make us the “Combat Arm of Decision.” In fact, we know that the Abrams tank will be in our inventory until the year 2050 at least. We must continue to ensure that not only the Abrams, but the entire heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) formation is a current and relevant force for the next 40 years. As future brigade combat teams (FBCTs) come online over the next several years and decades, we must work to keep the entire force modern and capable. They must have comparable capabilities that will enable them to fight together. At the start of World War II, the Army produced huge quantities of modern tanks in record time. Not content with the status quo, Army leaders during the interwar period had laid the groundwork for this remarkable achievement by carefully investing their paltry developmental funds in critical supporting technologies. In a time when technology is advancing at the speed of light, we must stay on the leading edge of combat developments. In 2050, we will certainly not want our mounted force dependent on 2007 technology. Of serious concern to this mounted force are developments for the HBCT and our reconnaissance, surveillance, and security organizations. At this year’s Armor Warfighting Conference, we will address these and other important issues regarding the Armor Force. This forum is a great opportunity for the mounted community and its associates to gather professionally to highlight the greatest mounted force and to enjoy the camaraderie of colleagues, friends, and acquaintances. See you at the conference!

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!

Commander’s Hatch from Page 4 20 — March-April 2007 10 to 12 October focused on the enemy’s rear, at the decisive point of Mundung-ni. This is where communist supply lines were eventually cut. The combination of in fantry and tanks, supported by close air support, artillery, engineers, and logistics efforts produced a group of synchronized combat systems that could fight in depth. These forces overwhelmed the static defenses of the North Koreans and led to the suc cessful conclusion of the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge. Notes 1 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, N.Y., 1967, p. 188. 2 Harry G. Summers Jr., Korean War Alma nac, Facts on File, New York, 1990, p. 134. 3Virgil E. Craven, “Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak Ridge,” Combat Forces Jour nal, December 1953, p. 25. 4Ridgway, p. 189. 5Sam Freedman, “Tankers at Heartbreak,” Armor Magazine, September-October 1952, p. 26. 6Craven, p. 26. 7Robert W. Love, “Engineers in Operation Touchdown,” Military Engineer, September-October 1954, p. 325. 8Craven, p. 26. 9lbid., pp. 26-27. 10James M. Hiscock, “The 82nd at Heartbreak Ridge,” Antiaircraft Journal, May-June 1952, p. 18. 11Craven, pp. 26-27. 12Freedman, p. 27. 13Love, p. 327. 14Ibid., p. 326. 15lbid., p. 329. 16Ibid., p. 331. 17Ridgway, p. 189. 18Amed L. Hinshaw, Heartbreak Ridge: Korea, 1951, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1989, p. 86. 19Ibid., pp. 95-96. 20lbid., p. 93. 21lbid., p. 96. 22Craven, p. 28. 23Hinshaw, p. 101. 24Love, pp. 328-329. 25Clark C. Monroe, Clark C., The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-1951, Toppan Printing. Co., Ltd., Tokyo, 1951, p. 172. 26Ibid. 27Craven, p. 29. 28Freedman, p. 26. 29Hinshaw, p. 112. 30Ibid. 31Love, p. 330. 32Hinshaw, p. 112. 33Craven, p. 29. 34Hinshaw, p. 113. 35Summers, pp. 134-135. 36lbid., p. 30. 37Ibid., p. 135. 38Love, p. 331. 39Craven, p. 25. 40U.S. Government, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 16. 41Ibid. 42Love, p. 331. 43Freedman, p. 25. Captain Scott D. Aiken, U.S. Marine Corps, wrote this article while a student at the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Ad vanced Course at Fort Benn ing, GA, in 1991, followed by assignment as commanding offi cer of India Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (rein), FMF, at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA.