Sustainment Operations and the Forward Operating Base

Most battalions in Iraq regard the forward operating base (FOB) as home, refuge, and safe haven. More importantly, FOBs allow maneuver commanders to sus tain and protect forces while remaining within zones of operation. The FOB has four distinct functions and activities — security, facility maintenance and construction, quality of life, and traditional com bat service support (CSS) operations. By mid-April 2003, “major ground combat operations” were coming to a close in Iraq. Units, such as 2d Battalion, 69th (2-69) Armor, 3d Infantry Division, established FOBs as they transitioned from maneuver to urban operations. At the end of April, 1st Battalion, 13th (1-13) Armor (Dakota), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, conducted a relief in place with 2-69 Armor. The relief in place included assuming responsibility of FOB operations. The new Dakota FOB was nestled between the Baghdad city of Kadha-myia and the Tigris River. Later in the year, it was named “Camp Hunte” after the late Specialist Simeon Hunte, a Dakota soldier killed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to being liberated by coalition forces, the FOB was one of Iraq’s many military compounds serving Saddam’s regime as a defense and military intelligence headquarters. With ample space, an existing infrastructure, and an ideal location, it was the logical choice for a battalion FOB. Before handing over reigns to Dakota, 2-69 Armor spent approximately a month on the FOB. 1-13 Armor began the process of making Camp Hunte home for the next year, and its headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) assumed control of Camp Hunte with a specific mission to provide continuous security and maintenance of Camp Hunte (Dakota’s FOB) and provide the battalion a safe and secure area to conduct combat, stability, and support operations. Security The first order of business was security. Camp Hunte was well protected with the Tigris River providing natural barriers covering over half of the camp’s boundary. Two 10-foot concrete walls protected the remainder of the FOB with barbed wire and concertina wire reinforcing vulnerable areas. Threat assessments analyzed individuals and groups that continued to fight coalition forces. Local and national groups, such as former regime loyalists (FRL), religious extremists, al-Qaeda fighters, whabi, criminals, and various other oppor-tunists posed the greatest threat. Identifying the enemy and understanding how he might attack the FOB proved to be challenging. In addition, the asymmetrical environment forced us to consider every possible threat and conceivable course of action. Significant attention was given to analyzing weapons and methods of attack the enemy might use, regardless of whom the enemy was. The most likely threats were: rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks; coordinated mounted attack; improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne explosive devices; dismounted attacks; mortar/indirect fires; unauthorized access; surveillance; and drive-by shootings. — 39

Vignettes were developed and used as enemy templates to create a security and guard force to defeat specific threats. A security force usually included 30 soldiers, two interpreters, five vehicles (including one M1A1), and four crew-served weapons. The majority of security forces were arrayed at the four gates covering access points to Camp Hunte. Additionally, roving patrols and a quick reaction force (QRF) allowed for complete coverage and flexibility in repositioning combat power. To establish and sustain a secure camp, we trained ready and alert soldiers to participate in security missions; created depth in gate construction and layout to deny enemy access; provided continuous assessments and improvements to overall security; aggressively patrolled areas of responsibility; identified threats early to defeat enemy forces prior to attacks; maintained significant combat power forward to defend FOB; and modified and changed force protection measures to break predictable patterns in operations. Eleven months of combat operations proved that initial assessments were accurate. Camp Hunte was attacked with mor tars on 87 occasions, small-arms attacks on 148 occasions, RPG attacks on 60 occasions, and IEDs emplaced in the vicinity of the FOB on five occasions. How ever, the enemy neither gained entry to the FOB nor penetrated security. Despite constant attacks, we did not lose any soldiers and just a few were wounded while on the FOB. In assessing these attacks individually, we learned several valuable lessons:

• NCO leadership is critical to the disciplined conduct of guard force operations.

• Daily guard mount, train ing, and inspections make effective security operations possible.

• Tactical vignettes used at the squad level to rehearse individual soldier actions provide an understanding of the threat, rules of engagement (ROE), and actions on contact. (Soldiers must understand ROE in detail, and more often than not, the decision to engage a target rests with the individual soldier and not the leader, and sol diers must understand when ROE “al lows” them to engage and when they “should” engage.)

• Continuous improvement of security positions and varying guard routines help defeat enemy surveillance efforts. (Do not become predictable to enemy surveillance, never be satisfied, and continue to improve force protection measures.)

• Retain enough combat power to respond to specific threats in the vicinity of the FOB.

• Create depth to security through emplacing physical barriers, patrolling forward positions, and positioning security forces.

• Non-modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), such as inspection mirrors, convex security mirrors, metal-detecting wands, and handheld radios, are required.

• If concrete buildings are available, use them to house soldiers. (Mortar rounds do little damage to reinforced concrete as opposed to sheet-metal buildings.) “Camp Hunte contained more than 100 buildings, which ranged from completely gutted or destroyed to relatively intact and inhabitable. Before the United States occupied the area, looters had stripped all the buildings of doors, windows, electrical fixtures, wiring, and plumbing.” “The first sergeant se lected and supervised teams of skilled civilian electricians, plumbers, and engineers to create an FOB public works (FPW) department. Selecting and hiring local civilian technicians and workers proved invaluable for sustainment operations. We salvaged fourteen 12-ton central air conditioner units and purchased 53 window units, which provided air conditioning to the entire task force. In addition, we acquired electricity by tapping into the Baghdad electric grid and repairing a large turbine generator, “big blue,” for backup power.” 40 —

Facility Maintenance and Construction Site selection for a unit’s FOB may be the most important decision a commander will make as the unit transitions from combat to stability and support operations. Consideration must be given to force protection, facility conditions, available resources for repair, distance from zone of operation, and the need to maintain a presence in zone. Each consideration must be analyzed and weighed against opposing considerations. For example, a commander must examine both the potential costs and benefits for each course of action to make decisions such as whether to establish an FOB 40 to 50 kilometers away in an existing facility that needs little repair and is relatively secure or select an FOB within the zone that needs repairs while sacrificing security. For the Dakotas, the decision was already made. Camp Hunte was in zone, considerably secure, and already possessed repairable facilities. Camp Hunte contained more than 100 buildings, which ranged from completely gutted or destroyed to relatively intact and inhabitable. Before the United States occupied the area, looters had stripped all the buildings of doors, windows, electrical fixtures, wiring, and plumbing. As 2-69 Armor occupied the FOB, looters were seen running away carrying toilets on their heads. Regardless, it was time to dig in and make the FOB home. Responsibility to provide basic services, such as running water, electricity, garbage, sewer, air conditioning, and heating, fell to HHC. The first sergeant took on the awesome responsibility of building an FOB out of the ashes and rubble of destroyed Iraqi facilities. Work priorities were established and resources identified. The first sergeant se lected and supervised teams of skilled civilian electricians, plumbers, and engineers to create an FOB public works (FPW) department. Selecting and hiring local civilian technicians and workers proved invaluable for sustainment operations. We salvaged fourteen 12-ton central air conditioner units and purchased 53 window units, which provided air conditioning to the entire task force. In addition, we acquired electricity by tapping into the Baghdad electric grid and repairing a large turbine generator, “big blue,” for backup power. Running water was provided to all 800 soldiers of the task force by rebuilding a looted and destroyed pump station capable of providing 100,000 gallons of water per day. The existing pump house was flooded, looted, and initially believed to be beyond repair. With a little engineering experience and resilient Iraqi help, we bypassed the chlorine gas filtration system, rebuilt circuit boards, replaced four large pumps, and repaired miles of pipe. Nearly every day for two months we rewired electrical panels, replaced pumps and test pipes, and pieced the pump station together. Only then did we tackle the task of repairing hundreds of broken water lines. Along the way, we learned that one senior NCO should be identified as FOB non commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) or “mayor.” In our case, the HHC first sergeant fit the bill. The position requires some advanced mechanical and electrical engineering skills. The selected “mayor” must have the unit’s support in allocating resources and setting work priorities. Early identification of skilled and trustworthy civilians will save time and money. Creating a small team of skilled salary paid civilian workers is less expensive and more productive than contracting small projects. Hiring local laborers adds to the credibility of U. S. forces within the local population. Do your best to build redundancy in all systems. Quality of Life When a soldier has his mind on things, such as laundry, showers, sleeping, eating, and calling home, is he ready fight? Is he ready to patrol a dangerous street in Huryia if he hasn’t talked to his wife in 30 days and is only thinking about home? Quality of life has as much an impact on sustainment operations as does maintenance and security. With some creative ideas and hard work, we took care of our soldiers and provided a relatively high standard of living. The availability of running water greatly improved each soldier’s quality of life. Showers were installed in the majority of buildings, and if running water was not possible in a building, then a shower trailer was positioned directly outside the building. Every soldier had the opportunity to shower daily and had several options for laundry. With running water avail able, they could wash clothes by hand and air dry on the clothesline. As an alternative, soldiers could drop off laundry through a quartermaster-type laundry service monitored by the supply sergeant. We also allowed a local business to set up a laundry service on the camp. Several local vendors were allowed to set up small shops to sell items such as pack- “Medical support was provided by our medical platoon. Each line company was task organized with three medics and an M113 for internal medical support. The forward aid station (FAS) and main aid station (MAS) were collocated in a troop medical clinic (TMC). Normal sick call hours were established to deal with routine care.” — 41 aged foods, souvenirs, sodas, and movies. One specific vendor repaired, filled, and maintained a swimming pool at no expense to the unit in exchange for allowing him to set up a small shop. The dining facility (DFAC) building became the center for morale, welfare, and recreational (MWR) activities. Funds were used to buy free weights, televisions, and a stereo system to build a large gym. The battalion chapel and a game room with billiards and ping-pong tables were also located in the DFAC building. Eventually, soldiers had access to internet and telephones in three separate buildings. Two local vendors were allowed to set up “internet cafes” at modest prices, as well as the U. S. Army-contracted internet service. Outside, numerous volleyball courts and basketball courts were constructed. Twice a month, the battalion adjutant coordinated a visit from the finance company to provide soldiers with casual pay. A large civilian bus was turned into a mobile post exchange (PX) that made daily rounds to each unit on the FOB. The ration cycle for the entire 12 months was A-M-A. While the majority of units received contracted class I support from Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR), we cooked hot meals and fed our soldiers. A renovated Iraqi mess served our needs. In addition to normal rations, we supplemented meals by requesting support from our division logistics resupply point (LRP). Soldiers will work long hours and days on end if they are taken care of. Making quality of life a priority lets our soldiers know we care. It allows soldiers to stay focused while fighting in a dangerous environment, and when they return to the FOB, they can relax and decompress after a day on the streets. Traditional Combat Service Support While securing and repairing the FOB and improving the quality of life for soldiers, HHC still had its doctrinal mission to support the task force. As a “legacy force” unit, we had a robust organic support structure. Our deployed strength was 302 soldiers. This included 15 cooks, 54 support platoon soldiers, 27 medics, 15 -30 level mechanics as a maintenance support team, and all MTOE property. Un like the new Force XXI units using “supply point distribution,” we were self-supported. HHC remained on the FOB with all the combat trains. Every day, for 350 days, we organized the trains and convoyed to the brigade support area (BSA) as a logistics package (LOGPAC). Class I, II, III, IV, VIII, and IX, as well as mail, was pulled forward from the BSA. In a traditional style, the daily LOGPAC was the bread and butter of HHC. Traveling with large convoys 30 kilometers to the BSA through the streets and highways of Baghdad could prove difficult at times. It was extremely important to ensure the LOGPAC was armed and ready to respond to contact. We task organized the support platoon with four additional up-armored high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) armed with.50-caliber machine guns and trained and qualified gunners in the platoon. Every supply truck in the LOGPAC rolled with a.50 caliber in a ring mount. Our LOGPAC looked more like a combat patrol and less like a logistics element. Daily threat briefings, detailed convoy briefings, and good leadership enabled safe and effective LOGPAC operations. Medical support was provided by our medical platoon. Each line company was task organized with three medics and an M113 for internal medical support. The forward aid station (FAS) and main aid station (MAS) were collocated in a troop medical clinic (TMC). Normal sick call hours were established to deal with routine care. The medics maintained a medical QRF to respond to any serious injury in zone or medical evacuation needed. A concrete helipad capable of hosting four UH60s was constructed to support aerial evacuation. The medical platoon leader resourced an additional front-line ambulance (FLA) that served as the primary medical transport and QRF. No matter how much you plan, each day will present new challenges for HHC leaders. Daily review of priorities and threat assessments will assist in preparing for the inevitable fragmentary order, so remain focused on the number one priority of force protection and allow your leaders to excel in an extremely demanding environment. The Dakotas never failed to support soldiers and always accomplished their mission. CPT Jay Blakley is currently serving as cavalry and infantry team trainer, 2d Battalion, 351st Infantry Regiment, Camp Blanding, FL. He was commissioned as an Armor officer from the U. S. Army Officer Candidate School in 1995. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, headquarters and headquarters company, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS; S3 air, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS; and S3 air and commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS. 42 — FOB continued from previous page These skills also assist in normal encounters, which helps determine the validity of what people tell you and why.

• Train with media!

• Learn Arabic. Iraqis admire soldiers who take the time to learn a little Arabic.

• Train more at lower levels. Most operations in Iraq occur at the section level. Platoon leaders or platoon sergeants led their sections daily, while company leaders conducted their own coordination.

• Train soldiers to integrate other forces. Psychological operations, military work ing dogs, civil affairs, aviation, and Iraqi security forces became habitual attachments in Iraq.

• Train combative. Restraints and submission holds leave options in escalation of force, prior to using deadly force. Many times, Iraqis told us that we were the real Muslims. They were amazed by our generosity, righteousness, integrity, and discipline. They only saw this if they let down their guard enough to see through the foreign invader. Iraqis are both proud and ashamed of their nation, their people, and their history. They contradicted themselves constantly with stories of Iraqi betrayal, Muslim pride and virtue, wishes for Saddam’s return to restore order, praise for newfound freedoms and amenities, hatred for other religious groups, and relationships that have upended every bit of bigotry they knew. The people can be won over. Former Fedayeen soldiers have come to our side to fight against their former friends simply because they saw firsthand how readily the Americans help Iraqis. The cynic might say this demonstrates just how the Iraqis sway in their loyalties, that you cannot ever trust them. Only time will tell. CPT Jason Pape is currently serving as troop commander, H Troop, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS. He received a B. S. from Michigan State University. His military education includes the Armor Officers Career Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officers Basic Course, Airborne School, and the Scout Platoon Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor (Wolfpack), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, throughout its deployment to Iraq; battalion maintenance officer and S3 Air, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, Fort Riley, KS; commander, headquarters and headquarters detachment, Combat Support Coordination Team, Taegu, South Korea; and tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, S3 air, and tank company XO, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. Winning from Page 38