Israel’s Influence on Mounted Warfare

It is a known fact that the home of mounted warfare is located at Fort Knox, Kentucky. However, if one poses a question about the birthplace of mounted warfare, responses range from silent thought to varied suggestions. Rarely, though, will anyone think to mention Israel, which is arguably both the birthplace of mounted warfare and the great battle lab for modern innovations in mounted warfare. I recently lead a group of six cadets from the Arkansas State University’s Reserve Officers Training Corps program on a staff ride to Israel to visit this great birthplace and battle lab. Commissioning programs across the country regularly use staff rides within their course of instruction to incorporate military history and lessons learned into their curricula. Such exploits are normally conducted at a location in close proximity to the campus due to ease and funding, but a generous grant from the University Middle East Studies Committee allowed us to broaden our focus for an unforgettable staff ride experience. Our main objectives for the staff ride were Megiddo and the Golan Heights area, which highlight the beginning and evo lution of mounted warfare. The countless battles that were fought in these locations were the focus of our preliminary study, which included two days of lecture at Tel Aviv University by distinguished professors of Israeli and military history. The fact that most of these professors had fought in some or all of the Arab-Israeli wars was an added bonus. Their academic and military experience demonstrates that Israel is indeed a crucible of mounted warfare, highlighting the roots of mounted warfare at Megiddo, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Megiddo is the alleged “jewel in the crown” of biblical archaeology. Rising above the most important land route in the ancient Near East, the strategic city dominated international traffic for over 6,000 years, from ca. 7,000 B. C. E. through to biblical times.1 The very location of Megiddo within the fertile plain of Jezreel and the surrounding restricted terrain, makes this area a likely battleground. This ground indeed is the site of epic battles that decided the fate of western Asia. It was here in the year 1469 B. C. E. that the Egyptian Pharaoh Thutmose III led 10,000 men in a rapid and unexpected march against rebel Palestinian chieftains. Advancing in a concave formation, Thut-mose’s army enveloped the rebels and severed their lines of communication with fortress Megiddo. Being the first great battle in recorded history, it is the first battle known to be conducted in accordance with the recognized principles of war. In addition, this battle is arguably the beginning of mounted warfare, as during this battle the Egyptians revolutionized the chariot that enabled mobility, shock action, firepower from its archers, and a degree of force protection.2 There would be many more battles at Me giddo after Thutmose’s victory in his “golden chariot.” On this same plain, the Israelites overcame the supremacy of the Canaanite charioteers and Gideon ambushed the plundering camel-borne no-mads from Midian.3 Fighting on foot against amounted force, Gideon knew his only chance for victory was to surprise the enemy at night while they were dismounted. In a well-coordinated attack with a small force, Gideon and his chosen 300 men caused so much panic within the Midians that they attacked each other and fled.4 In 609 B. C. E., Pharoah Necho easily defeated a Jewish army under Josiah in the biblical battle of Armageddon. On 16 April 1799, there was a battle between 1,500 French against 25,000 Turks where the French held their enemy at bay until relieved by a cavalry charge led by Napoleon Bonaparte. In May 1918, British cavalry under Field Marshall Edmund Allenby defeated Turkish forces encamped on the plain as his cavalry attacked through the same pass as Thutmose III.5 In the First Arab-Israeli War of 1947-1949, this area was again a battlefield as Israeli Defense Forces from the Golani and Carmeli brigades counterattacked to regain the initiative from invading Iraqi forces.6 All of these battles highlight the importance of terrain, intelligence, firepower, mobility, shock effect, and lines of communication, which remain unchanged since the beginning of the history of war.7 Clearly, as in all military history there are lessons to be learned from all of the Megiddo battles that are applicable even to today’s armored force. Agility, dislocating the enemy, bringing strength to bear against enemy weaknesses, use of terrain, audacity, and perseverance are just a few of the elements of leadership, training, and tactics that one could derive from these battles and apply to the modern noncontiguous battlefield. As one history professor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, stated, “never mistake primitive for unsophisticated.”8 While means and methods may change, the endstate of battlefield victory should be the forethought of every U. S. Army leader, and one should not underestimate what the knowledge of history can contribute to contemporary operations. While these early battles of mounted warfare in Israel demonstrate their utility for study, it was the study of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 that truly changed U. S. Army doctrine. Known both as the Yom Kippur War and the Ramadan War, this war had much more significance than what one would normally attribute to a relatively brief and limited regional conflict. This is primarily because opposing forces were equipped by the United States and Soviet Union superpowers, and each side was interested in assessing the effectiveness and limitations of their weapons, technology, and tactics.9 After World War II, most global conflicts, such as Vietnam, were guerrilla-style wars where the assault rifle was the dominant weapon on the battlefield. Israel’s success with their tanks and air force during the 1967 and 1973 wars changed that model and the tankers of the Israeli Armored Corps became some of the most feared and respected practitioners of armored warfare to be emulated by all.10 Following the quagmire of Vietnam and focusing on the Soviet threat in Europe, Americans in particular wanted to see what the 1973 war in the Middle East had to teach about the likely scope of future wars. American armor generals, such as Major General Donn A. Starry, arrived in Israel shortly after the war to walk the battlefields and confer with Israeli colleagues. What they found were tank battles of “unprecedented intensity” caused not only by the high number of tanks involved, but also by the lethality of weapons with extended range and improved accuracy. Of particular note was the combined tank loss of the Arab and Israeli forces in the first week of the war, which exceeded the entire U. S. Army’s tank inventory in Europe. This and other observations would play a major role in revising U. S. Army doctrine and reshaping the American armored corps.11 According to General Starry, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provided “a fortuitous field trial of useful concepts” for strategy, operational concepts, tactics, organizations, equipment, and training.12 For example, the average engagement range for tanks during World War II was 750 yards; whereas, Israeli tanks were engaging the enemy from 2,000 to 3,000 yards and more in 1973. This war also highlighted the proliferation of anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. The effects on U. S. armor training varied from using terrain and sagger drills to new ideas for tank gunnery doctrine such as the desirability of opening fire first and at long range.13 The lessons of the 1973 war brought forth another significant change to the “Israel’s success with their tanks and air force during the 1967 and 1973 wars changed that model and the tankers of the Israeli Armored Corps became some of the most feared and respected practitioners of armored warfare to be emulated by all.” 24 —

U. S. Army, and a revision of the U. S. Army’s operations field manual. The operations manual that appeared in 1976 was largely written by General William E. DePuy and deeply rooted to the lethality and combined arms success demonstrated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Perhaps even overemphasizing the lessons of the war, DePuy would advocate a doctrine of “active defense” as the way to win the first battle against the expected Soviet horde in Europe.14 While fortunately this doctrine would not be tested on the battlefield, it was emotionally debated within the Army as anew renaissance of military thought prevailed. In this atmosphere of debate and change, another version of the operations manual appeared in 1982 under the new U. S. Army Training and Doctrine com mander, who coincidentally was General Donn Starry. While Starry had assisted DePuy in developing active defense and drew similar lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, his experience as a corps commander in Germany and the team of military intellectuals he assembled led to the development of AirLand Battle doctrine to emphasize operational maneuver.15 This doctrine would be validated on the battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, and even to day, continues to influence military thought and operations during yet another period of intellectual wrangling over transformation. As we debate and pursue our own vision of the objective force and its capabilities, it is interesting to note the Israeli Defense Force’s achievement. Israel’sown tank design of the Merkava, which ironically means “chariot” in the Hebrew language, proved to be a first-class fighting vehicle in Lebanon during 1982.16 Serving as a main battle tank and a platform for carrying infantry within the protection of its armor, while equipped with a 60mm mortar, the Merkava is an excellent demonstration of a combined arms oriented combat vehicle that can effective ly perform in various environments. Israeli expertise regarding tanks in urban terrain has particular value for our own tactics, techniques, and procedures, as we continue operations in similar environments. More than the equipment and methodology, though, is the morale of the Israeli soldier and citizen. The people are friendly and very proud of their nation. Everyone, men and women, serves a mandatory period in the armed forces so they do not take their security, freedom, or land for granted. This is evident upon arriving at the airport and is reinforced at every location you visit within Israel. Even many of their television shows, a more substantive version of reality television, highlight the rigorous training and pride of their armed forces. Masada, a striking symbol of this pride, is a fortress that towers above the Judean Desert. It was here in 73 A. D. that Jewish rebels made their last stand against Roman legions that laid siege to the fortress for approximately seven months. Finally, after building a ramp of sand and rock, the Romans breached the fortress only to find that the rebels had killed themselves to die as free men rather than suffer enslavement. Today, cadets of the Israeli Armored Corps receive their commissions on Masada as they vow to fight for their country and freedom at any cost. Many, such as the tankers who gave their lives during the 1973 war, have already paid that price. To think that one has nothing to learn vicariously through the experiences of others, especially when the stakes are as high as human life or national survival, is an attitude that probably deserves some reflection here at home as we continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism. The successes of our operations in Afghanistan and the “shock and awe” demonstrated by the “thunder run” to Baghdad are commendable and noteworthy. However, much remains to be done as our Nation remains at war and redefines the role of its Army and armored force during transformation. Each of us must continue to do our part, and our senior leaders have charged us with answering the call to arms. Colonel Kevin Benson sums things up very well in the May-June 2004 issue ofARMOR.“We are living in an age where it is easier to denigrate than offer constructive criticism. We are also an Army at war and must temper our debates for the greater need of the service.”17 As we continue this debate, an eye to the past can clearly be balanced against the pro- “Israel’sown tank design of the Merkava, which ironically means “chariot” in the Hebrew language, proved to be a first-class fighting vehicle in Lebanon during

1982. Serving as a main battle tank and a platform for carrying infantry within the protection of its armor, while equipped with a 60mm mortar, the Merkava is an excellent demonstration of a combined arms oriented combat vehicle that can effective ly perform in various environments.” Continued on Page 50 — 25 trends in mounted war fare, such as those provided by Israel, as we continue to become the Army of tomorrow. Notes 1Information at http://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/ archaeology/megiddo/introduction.html, accessed January 2004. 2Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare, New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 7. 3Werner Keller, The Bible as History, New York, Bantam Books, 1982, pp. 187 and 215. 4Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of the Bible, New York, Random House, 1978, pp. 55- 56. 5Keller, p. 215. 6Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974, Garden City, NJ, Military Book Club, 1978, p. 51. 7Bellamy, p. 8. 8Dr. Christopher Gabel, lecture at the Military History Instructor Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2004. 9Dupuy, p. 584. 10Tom Donnelly and Sean Naylor, Clash of Chariots: The Great Tank Battles, New York, Berkley Books, 1996, p. 210. 11Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, New York, Schocken Books, 2004, pp. 508-509. 12General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army,” Military Review, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1983, p. 6. 13Rabinovich, p. 509. 14Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, Lawrence, KS, University of Kansas Press, 2004, pp. 255-262. 15Ibid. 16Citino, p. 185. 17Colonel Kevin C. M. Benson, “Thoughts on Restructuring Army Brigades,” ARMOR, May-June 2004, p. 23. MAJ Jim Dunivan is currently a student at the Irish Command and General Staff College, Curragh Camp, Newbridge, CO Kildare, Ireland. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from Arkansas State University. His military education includes the Armor Officers Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the Armor Officers Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant professor of military science, Arkansas State University, Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, Jonesboro, AR; small group instructor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; assistant TRADOC Systems Manager for Training, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, Fort Knox; commander, B Troop, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader and XO, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, Fort Riley, KS.