Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq

At 0800 hours, three individuals with information about a known terrorist cell approach an access gate at a U. S. controlled base. Four of their relatives had been detained at a traffic control point three days prior and they want to trade information for the release of their relatives. There is no counterintelligence (CI) team at battalion level, so the battalion S2 has to gather information. The S2 will take information from all three individuals separately. The S2 must determine if their stories are legitimate by comparing their stories with the four detainees’ stories, attack pattern analysis, and past human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting. The detainees are key because they can validate the information given by the three walk-ups. If the detainees were processed according to division, the battalion could not validate their stories. The detainees confirm the three walk-up stories after four hours of questioning. The battalion S2 uses attack pattern analysis in questioning to validate their reports — the source should know details of attacks if their information is valid. The battalion S2 now attempts to pinpoint the location of the objective area. He can use the source to take him there or the source can pinpoint the location on a map, imagery, or pictures. Once the location is pinpointed, the battalion S2 plans the operation. He plans and produces products in conjunction with the battalion S3, who issues a warning order (WARNO) to the maneuver element conducting the raid. Once the order is given, the battalion S2 will accompany the unit to assist with questioning detainees on the objective, identifying critical informa tion/evidence on the objective, and advis ing the command element on ground. Once the detainees and contraband are secure, they move back to the forward operating base (FOB). It is now 0300 hours; six people are in the battalion holding facility with valuable information — at 0800 hours, there will be others at the gate to give information. The cycle will continue. Military intelligence assets organized, equipped, and trained to win a conventional, linear war are failing to provide battalions with the analyzed intelligence and information needed to conduct effective combat and stability operations in Iraq. This article discusses the shortcomings of tactical intelligence that one battalion task force encountered during Operation Iraqi Freedom and provides recommendations on organizing, equipping, and training tactical level military intelligence assets. Task Force 1st Battalion, 68th (1-68) Armor, was operating north of Baghdad as part of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. On 25 June 2003, the task force first moved south from Tuz, Iraq, into its current area of responsibility (AOR), and was made up of two armor companies, one infantry company, a headquarters company (scout and mortar platoons), a separate infantry platoon, a howitzer battery, an engineer platoon, and a civil affairs team. The task force later lost the howitzer battery, separate infantry platoon, and engineer platoon. The infantry company was detached from December 2003 through February 2004. The battalion’s AOR was approximately 800 square kilometers and was split by Highway 1, the primary north-south main supply route (MSR) in Iraq. The main population center is the Tarmiyah district, an outer, agrarian suburb of the Baghdad governate with an estimated population of 150,000. The AOR also includes an area south of the Balad airfield, which belongs to the Salah Din governate. With the exception of Highway 1 and a few paved roads, irrigation canals and dirt roads, which become nearly impassible during wet weather, dominate the area. The area is host to homes and farms belonging to a large number of high-ranking Ba’ath-ists, including Chemical Ali and others directly related to the former dictator. The population is highly tribal and generally unwilling to work with the coalition, unless coerced by money, force, or shame. During the task force’s deployment, not one local leader came forward with relevant information about enemy attackers. The enemy conducted over 250 attacks in the area of operations from 26 June 18 — telligence analyst, and one 19Z50 S2 noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). A total of five specialists, with standard intelligence analyst qualifications, are authorized to do the same exact job as specialists at brigade, division, and corps levels — except the battalion must be more detailed and responsive. According to the MTOE, 1-68 Armor’s S2 shop was 100 percent strength at all times. The S2 shop was also assigned one all-source analysis system (ASAS) computer, which was limited because there was no conduit between battalion and brigade until seven months into operations. Like most conventional battalions, 1-68 Armor’s brigade had no analysis and control equipment (ACE), which resulted in extremely limited capability to access or leverage division- and national-level assets. All of these assets were used and maintained elsewhere in theater. The task force started with relatively little information and what was available was on a macro level and not very helpful. The S2 shop created databases, which would help determine enemy disposition, composition, and strength in the AOR. In the stability and support operations environment, it is very difficult to define cri- — 19 #

1) The S2 was on every single raid as the subject matter expert to advise commanders and expedite combat decisions on the ground. S2 35D D Only one DIV directed mission and three BDE missions were executed in the SASO ENV; nearly all actionable intelligence was produced at the BN level S2 35D 2) Produce a packet for each detainee, with multiple sworn statements, pictures, evidence, a Coalition Provisional Authority worksheet, inventories of all personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany the detainee — roughly a minimum two-hour process for each detainee. S2 35D D DIV and BDE intelligence shops do not process detainees. All written work is done at BN and the detainees are handed over to DIV MPs. 97E & 95B 3) Interrogate or tactically question all detainees and civilians on the battlefields who may have been involved with an attack or have information of value. S2 35D D DIV and BDE S2 shops are not in the middle of the battle and have HUMINT and interrogation teams assigned to deal with these issues. 97E 4) Run source/contact information for over 50 different contacts ranging from former Iraqi intelligence agents, high-ranking Ba’ath party officials, general officers, sheiks, government officials, and numerous other civilians. S2 35D D BDE and DIV S2 shops rarely talk to sources because they have HUMINT TMs for that. Battalions have no organic

WANT TO SAVE LIVES. 95% of all HUMINT is lost because no one is there to collect it at the source (BN). 97B 5) Maintain and update a black/white/grey list and HUMINT database.

35D D Black/white/grey lists are developed from bottom up. 99% of the names at BN level will be derived from HUMINT at BN level and below. BDE and DIV black lists will be derived from the bottom and the top. 99% of your BN targets will come from a BN Blacklist. 97B 6) Maintain a detainee holding facilitate that could accommodate detainees 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with food, water, shelter, and medical care if necessary.

19Z50 D BDE and DIV S2 shops do not have to worry about detaining anyone. All of these specified and implied tasks are handled at the BN level.

7) Ensure all seized propaganda, paperwork, and any other relevant written information was translated and analyzed in a timely manner.

96B30 D BDE and DIV S2 sections do not understand the value of seized propaganda or documents nor are they involved in the processing. Valuable information is being thrown away or bypassed because of lack of assets at lower. Only someone with an intimate under standing of their AO could identify what is important. 97L & 97B Figure 1 teria, so everything is important. Initially, the S2 shop was tracking everything from traffic patterns to electrical blackouts, flares, light usage, and various other factors. The data became overwhelming and unmanageable. Eventually, the re quirements were narrowed down to 29 tasks; the seven most important ones are shown in Figure 1. Tasks are listed by duty position and responsibility (POC); however, limited manpower dictated every soldier being capable of performing every task. The military occupational specialty (MOS) on the far right of the chart is appropriate for the task. Six of the seven most important daily tasks were not within any MOS field assigned to the battalion S2 shop; however, we performed these tasks daily. The S2 shop spent less than 50 percent of its time doing analysis because the specified and implied tasks required of the battalion S2 shop in the current threat environment go far beyond its capabilities and resources. The battalion S2 shop must provide continuous intelligence and mission analysis to support combat and stability operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week for up to a year. It must do this without traditionally available products, such as doctrinal templates and off-through March 2004. These included mortar and rocket attacks on forward operating bases, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms ambushes, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. In addition to attacks on coalition forces, attackers have targeted contractors, police, local leaders, and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) soldiers. The task force’s primary tactical missions include raids, cordon and searches, area security, route security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted/dismounted ambushes. The task force detained over 700 enemy fighters and killed or wounded unknown numbers. The task force also rebuilt schools, completed irrigation projects, reformed the local government (firing a host of city councilmen, mayors, ministry workers, and police), and recruited and trained local police, as well as 180 ICDC soldiers. The Battalion S2 Shop The standard modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for an armor battalion’s intelligence section is one 35D captain, one 35D second lieutenant who serves as the battalion intelligence center coordinator (BICC), one 96B30 senior intelligence analyst, one 96B10 in-

Detainee Handling One of the most time-consuming tasks of the S2 shop in Iraq is processing detainees. This task should not be underestimated. Processing detainees in a short time (the standard is 24 hours) is a daunting task under any circumstances. In Iraq, where all information and sources are suspect, familial/tribal ties and loyalties seem ubiquitous and exact locations of targets and identification papers are rarely available — simply determining the accuracy of names is a challenge. Challenges of detainee processing, taken from actual experiences during 1-68 Armor’s deployment, include scenarios such as:

• An informant gives the battalion S2 information about an alleged attack cell. The informant provides names and locations of the personnel. A raid is conducted. All named individuals (four) are present on the objective and are detained, along with two additional personnel (adult males), but no weapons or contraband equipment is found.

• Several independent sources identify a leader/supporter of anticoalition forces. A raid is conducted and the target is detained, along with three of the targets sons, two brothers, and several local Sheiks who were meeting at the target’s house at the time of the raid. No weapons or contraband were found.

• Three Iraqis are engaged while attempting to set up an RPG ambush, one is wounded. They abandon their weapons and egress the area. The blood trail is followed to a house, which contains the wounded Iraqi and five other individuals. One is an old man. It is unclear who the two companions of the wounded Iraqi are and if the others found in the house are accomplices or simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. No weapons or contraband are found. The wounded individual claims to have been shot mistakenly by coalition forces while he was work ing in his fields.

• Two men are stopped during amounted patrol. They are found to be carrying diagrams of an improvised rocket launcher. One is clearly more involved, refuses to speak and is belligerent. The second seems weak, confused, and more likely to talk. Under current standard operating procedures, these individuals are re quired to be sent higher within 24 hours. But do the circumstances sur rounding each case warrant these individuals serving time in prison, or do some of them have information that could be used by the detaining unit to build link diagrams and develop the intelligence picture in the AOR? Clearly, the-shelf enemy courses of action and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). There are no tactical pauses for battalions in Iraq and no chance for the S2 shop to get ahead on its tasks. The current threat situation is that dynamic. Compounding this problem is the fact that most/all of the actionable intelligence used to plan operations will come from within the battalion. Expecting to receive useable enemy situation template (SITTEMP) or detailed intelligence from higher headquarters about targets inside a battalion’s AOR is futile. Battalion AORs are too diverse and brigade AORs are too large to expect this type of help and detail from higher headquarters. Occasionally, national-level assets will provide some actionable intelligence, but this information is incorrect as often as it is correct. For example, if another government agency sends you intelligence but does not want to be involved in the operation or exploit the detainees, the intelligence is most likely suspect. Cooperation between battalion S2 shops sharing boundaries is not unusual, but again, this is most often done battalion to battalion. In addition to the traditional role of analyzing information and creating/refining products in support of operations, the battalion S2 shop is also the primary collector for the battalion. This is a change from convention al intelligence gathering, which takes place above the battalion level and filters down. While every soldier and leader who comes in contact with Iraqis is a potential information collector, it is the battalion S2 shop that must collect, sort, analyze, link, and package this information into useable intelligence. On any given day, it is not unusual for local civilians, Sheiks, police, ICDC soldiers, contractors, known informants, and other government agency representatives to show up for scheduled and unscheduled appointments, interviews, and briefings. These myriad sources all have different priorities and agendas and all want to talk to the battalion S2, civil affairs representative, battalion S3, or commander. Bottom line, if the person has potential intelligence (and many actually do) the lack of resourcing and mission requirements drives the S2 to become the primary collector for the battalion. The challenges of managing interpreters, separating competing ethnic and religious factions, and deconflicting informers with legitimate security concerns are daunting. It was not unusual for 1-68 Armor to have three to four different informers or sources a day arriving to deliver information. Occasionally, the information collected required immediate action. Being the de facto proponent for information collection in theater, the battalion S2 shop is also the principal manager of the many intelligence assets employed at the tactical level. Assets that must be managed include attached or operational control (OPCON) tactical HUMINT teams (THT), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile interrogation teams (MIT), counterintelligence teams, psychological operations, and ground surveillance radar. Each of these collection assets must be integrated into the battalion’s collection plan and S2 personnel serve as subject-matter experts for the battalion in terms of synchronizing these assets, ensuring they are properly utilized. Subsequently, the traditional role of analyzing information and creating/refining products in sup port of operations becomes secondary. The S2 shop will spend 80 percent of its time handling HUMINT sources and detainees. 20 — “One of the most time-consuming tasks of the S2 shop in Iraq is processing detainees. This task should not be underestimated. Processing detainees in a short time (the standard is 24 hours) is a daunting task under any circumstances.”

each case is different, but none of the individuals in the above scenarios have much potential to provide nationally significant intelligence. That fact, coupled with the existing truth that battalions do not receive intelligence from detainees sent higher, argues for a more robust interrogation/investigation capability at the battalion level. Not only would this alleviate the large number of “innocent” Iraqis being sent to coalition prison, but also allow maneuver battalions with vested interest to develop much-needed intelligence in an effort to reduce attacks and defeat the enemy. It would further serve to increase the power of the local battalion commander in relation to local Sheiks and civic leaders because the decision to detain or set free would lie with the individual (the commander) most connected to the area. As highlighted by recent revelations from Abu Grahib prison, every detainee has potential strategic relevance based on the perception of their treatment, as well as their guilt or innocence. The detainee-screening scenario outlined below will further highlight the necessity and importance of the battalion S2 shop’s ability to make recommendations to the battalion commander regarding who is detained and who is released. The battalion commander should be able to face a detainee’s family and feel comfortable about detaining their relative. The reason should not be, “we didn’t have time to figure it out so we sent him up.” The only way to accomplish this is through interrogating, screening, or tactically questioning detainees. Screening (tactically questioning) each detainee requires at least two hours per de tainee. This is just to get basic screening data and information. A detainee packet is completed if the detainee is found to be of higher intelligence value or involved in terrorist activity, which can take up to three hours, depending on available evidence. An incomplete packet often means a detainee is refused for processing by higher headquarters. If the intelligence is immediate and actionable, the detainee is of much more value to the battalion in their AOR. The de tainee can be used to positively identify terrorists, safe houses, weapons caches, and various other areas of interest that could be a value to the battalion. All of this is time-consuming and becomes impossible when detainees are sent to higher headquarters. The Iraqi’s ingrained ability to resist routine questioning, coupled with a lack of understand ing and overburdened brigade-and division-level interrogation teams, guarantee information will never be exploited timely. Obviously, battalions are not prepared to hold detainees for an extended time, nor should they. Empowered battalions with a more robust and experienced intelligence section could certainly help alleviate overcrowded and overburdened detention systems, and conducting interrogation immediately after detention and as close to the alleged incident as possible has been proven more effective. Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) As currently configured, THTs canvas Iraq to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and gather information for brigade and higher headquarters. They are required to make units aware of when and where they will be operating within their AORs; however, this occurs with vary ing degrees of success. In the case of 1-68 Armor, on more than one occasion, a THT operating in the task force’s AOR came under direct fire without the task force’s tactical operations center having any idea a team was operating in the area. On other occasions, the THT spent hours questioning sources and gathering information that was either already known to the task force S2, was irrelevant, or beyond useful significance. Despite attempts to have the THT attached to the task force and/or focus its reconnaissance priorities, it continued to operate on its own timeline and agenda. Typically, the THT operating in 1-68 Armor’s AOR spent three to four hours a day (including travel time), two to three days a week, developing information. For the final four months of the deployment, the THT did not come to the task force’s AOR because of maintenance and security concerns. This experience may not be typical, but the capabilities imbedded in a THT are too valuable to not be used more efficiently. Since tactical information and intelligence collection occurs almost exclusively at the task force level, the THT should work for the task force commander. This will allow the THT to be available to develop intelligence when walk-ups arrive, following enemy engagements, or during actions on the objective. Because the team is imbedded in the task force, its security is inherent and it has the opportunity to circulate throughout the bat tle during normal task force operations, as well as participate in planned operations and detainee questioning. The bot tom line is every battalion task force needs the capabilities a THT brings to the battlefield. The amount of HUMINT reporting received at battalion and below is insurmountable compared to the minimum number of HUMINT teams operating in theater. All of this information is lost daily due to the lack of training and assets at battalion level. To fully exploit all HUMINT reports, a 97B must be at bat talion level. Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT) The MIT is a useful asset that brings a much-needed capability to deployed battalions. Unfortunately, there are too few teams in theater and because of their scarcity, they are rarely found below brigade level. When they are pushed down to battalion, their usefulness is limited because battalion AORs are too diverse for one team to be “read in on.” In 1-68 Armor’s case, much of the information/intelligence gathered was based on personal relationships built over time, coupled with a reputation of fairness and the demonstrated ability/willingness to go after targets regardless of social status. An interrogation cell (with a mature interrogator) incorporated into the existing battalion S2 section is necessary, if the intelligence picture in Iraq is to improve and much of the burden reduced — 21 “In addition to the traditional role of analyzing information and creating/refining products in support of operations, the battalion S2 shop is also the primary collector for the battalion, which is a change from conventional intelligence gathering that takes place above the battalion level and filters down.”

from the existing, ineffective interrogation process. Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1-68 Armor used tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) extensively during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unfortunately, for the times it was used, it provided no actionable information or intelligence. During one event, the TUAV transmitted a grid over 1,000 meters away from the actual target it was observing (1,000m is a significant distance in an urban environment), and the operators had a difficult time identifying the transmitted picture. Because of a lack of confidence in the picture being sent, no forces were sent to counter the threat, and the event was over by the time the situation became clear. The bottom line is a UAV is useful in fixed-site surveillance, tied to a specific trigger or decision point. It is less useful in an area reconnaissance role, and practically useless in tracking or following an escaping or evading enemy. Operators, who cannot identify unfamiliar terrain or the operational significance of what they are looking at, cause UAVs to be ineffective. Training UAV teams at the battalion level would increase this effectiveness. Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) The terrain, coupled with the reality of a battlefield with busy civilian traffic, made GSR less than effective. Often, these teams were simply used as static observation posts. One such team operating in the task force’s AOR performed this job well until it made contact with the enemy. Once in contact, the team quickly shot its basic load, received a casualty, and evacuated the area, leaving the quick reaction force and arriving aircraft to identify and kill the attackers. Again, the ad hoc relationship and (apparently) insufficient training of a military intelligence asset resulted in the ineffective employment of this asset. If troop strength trade offs must be made, adding more MITs at the expense of GSR teams would certainly pay immediate dividends. The actual GSR could be given to scout platoons to use when appropriate. Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) 1-68 Armor had a PSYOPs team attached for the duration of the deployment. From the task force’s perspective, this is one military intelligence asset that was used to its fullest capacity. The three-man PSYOPs team regularly performed human and signal collection, information operations production and broadcast, and product translation. The team was represented at all scheduled targeting meetings and was attached to the battalion’s main effort company for the majority of the deployment. The PSYOPS team was used so aggressively that its vehicle was repeatedly damaged from accidents and enemy attacks. The PSYOPs team was the most responsive external military intelligence asset the task force employed. The fact that it was attached to the task force for the duration of the deployment was critical to its effectiveness. Restructuring the Battalion S2 Shop To maximize the exploitation of intelligence in theater and make the troops-to-tasks more manageable, the battalion S2 shop should have similar capabilities of brigade and division. As shown in Figure 1, soldiers without the proper MOS or training performed six of the seven critical tasks. Figure 2 reflects a recommended table of organization and equipment (TOE) change to properly man a battalion S2 shop for success, not just in Iraq but anywhere in the contemporary operating environment. In the contemporary operating environment, tactical-level intelligence has strategic relevance, and tactical-level en gagements with strategic importance will continue to be won or lost at the task force lev el and below. To better support ma neuver task force commanders, military intelligence assets must be reorganized, retrained and, in some instances, reequipped. Increasing manpower in the battalion S2 shop under the current unit of action MTOE is a step in the right direction; however, the correct skill identifiers and rank/maturity need to be included. The U. S. Army must recognize that in the current environment, with the proliferation of technology to lower and lower levels, actionable intelligence/information with strategic relevance uses the bottom-up process and is not generated by cen tralized and stove-piped assets. The intelligence community will continue to be limited and severely challenged until focus is placed where it needs to be — battalion level. The military intelligence community’s challenge is to transform quickly or risk a slide toward irrelevance at the tactical level. MAJ Bill Benson is currently serving as XO, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. He received a B. A. from the University of New Hampshire and a M. A. from Tennessee Technological University. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including S3, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID, Iraq; team chief, 2d Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee Army National Guard, Knoxville, TN; troop commander, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and scout and tank platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX. CPT Sean Nowlan is currently serving as commander, A Company, Special Troops Battalion, Fort Carson, CO. He received a B. A. from Auburn University. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Military Intelligence Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including battalion S2, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson and Iraq; battalion S3 Air, 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), Vicenza, Italy; company XO, A Company, 1st Battalion, 508th ABCT, Vicenza; and platoon leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 508th ABCT, Vicenza. 22 — Job Title Rank

Duty Description Number of PER Intelligence Officer (S2)

S2X 1LT 35D Manages HUMINT database 2 (Day and Night)

2LT 35D S2 Assistant 2 (Day and Night) Human Intelligence Collector (Interrogator)

97E BN interrogator 2 (Day and Night) Translator

Translate 2 (Day and Night) CI team

97B Collect HUMINT 2 (Day and Night) Imagery Analyst

96D Produce & analyze imagery 2 (Day and Night) Senior Analyst

96B Asst to Senior Analyst 2 (Day and Night) Analyst

96B Database Manager 2 (Day and Night)