Preparing for the Realities of Killing the Enemy and Taking Ground

, U. S. Marine Corps A combat arms officer’s duty is to kill and train subordinates to kill. This is a blunt, hard, and honest statement. All combat officers, regardless of service, are expected to lead subordinates in situations where death and mass carnage are rampant. To assist the officer in accomplishing this mission, doctrine was created to guide him in the employment of military assets. Using this doctrine and through field exercises, officers develop tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used in battle. Through this process and the reinforcement that occurs through training, the “skill to kill” is taught and continually reinforced. Most combat arms officers and their units show a general proficiency in this skill and are prepared to use it when the Nation calls on them to do so. It can therefore be argued that our military training is successful in instilling the skills to kill. Unfortunately, there are other aspects of combat that are all too often overlooked. These aspects include the “will to kill” and other unpleasant aspects best described through the following quote from Brigadier General Downing’s article, “The Dark Side of Command:” “A combat officer must also expect that some men under his command will be killed. The manuals teach that an officer can expect to lose a certain percentage of men on any particular action. The casualties will be 5 percent, 20 percent, or 50 percent, and military strategies are developed on the basis of men killed. To the small unit commander, however, those will not be percentages but faces and names of men who cannot be forgotten in a lifetime. The young officer must realize that the losses among his men will already have been factored into strategic planning. Even if the officer does his job perfectly, he will lose men. He will make mistakes that will kill men. He will lead his men out to face the enemy knowing full well some will die. That is his job. Some combat officers will not be able to assume such responsibility for very long. Others will handle it well. To increase his chances of success on the battlefield, the young officer must understand that he will lose men, and other aspects of the dark side of combat before the shooting starts.”1 Even with the Global War on Terrorism, a large portion of the U. S. military’s officer corps have not been in combat, nor have they witnessed violent death. These same officers were raised in a society that rightly condemns the killing of another human as barbaric and indecent. Their mission is to take ground and kill the enemy, yet studies show that only two percent of the population is predisposed to kill with out hesitation or remorse. These facts are scientifically proven and still most combat arms officers receive very little, if any, type of lecture or class exposing them to these harsh realities. Even military institutions that teach these courses, such as the 10-week-long U. S. Marine Corp’s Infantry Officer’s Course (IOC) with its classes on killology, are not always successful in overriding 22 years of societal conditioning that killing is wrong. Evidence of this is seen in William Manchester’s Goodbye Darkness: “I shot him with a.45 and I felt remorse and shame. I can remember whispering foolishly ‘I’m sorry’ and then just throwing up … I threw up all over myself. It was a betrayal of what I have been taught since a child.”2 As Dave Grossman describes in his book, On Killing, this is the equivalent of “a world of virgins studying sex, and they got nothing to go on but porno movies.”3 — 13

This leads to the conclusion that combat arms officers, although well indoctrinated with the skills to kill, are not trained to deal with the guilt associated with killing and the guilt associated with watching those you command killed. The True Burden of Command Prior to instilling the will to kill in his subordinates, the combat arms officer must first be prepared to deal with the repercussions of leading men into combat. In doing so, he must realize that the burden of killing and watching the men he leads die will weigh heavily on any officer who commands in combat. One only has to look into the eyes of a veteran of past wars to see this truth. Memories of war are heavy burdens for veterans to carry for a lifetime. The methods a man uses to deal with that burden will be derived from the way in which he was raised, the influences on his life, and the genetic disposition he has prior to going to combat. Although some men will handle this reality better than others, it is a failure of our officer training and indoctrination process that officers are not taught about the emotions they endure when leading men to death. They are not familiarized with successful methods of confronting and ultimately dealing with these emotions. As part of an officer’sentry level training, he must be taught to understand the “essence of the military is that to be a good leader, you must truly love (in a detached fashion) your men, and then you must be willing to kill (or at least give the orders that will result in the deaths of) that of what you love. The paradox of war is that those leaders who are most willing to endanger that which they love can be the ones who are the most liable to win, and therefore most likely to protect their men.”4 It is also imperative that officers study and become intimately familiar with the complex and often contrasting emotions they will feel when commanding in combat. The best way is to learn from commanders who have gone before us and who have dealt with these feelings. This is done through attending professional military education seminars with former commanders who are willing to discuss such topics or through the diligent reading of military books whose authors speak of such emotions. Furthermore, books such as On Killing, Acts of War, and The Face of Battle should be mandatory reading for newly commissioned officers.5 Once read, discussions should be conducted with senior officers to reinforce poignant facts. There are military schools that issue the above-listed books to instructors, but exposing senior and post-command captains to such material truly is coming up a day late and a dollar short. Platoon and company commanders are far more likely to directly order men into harm’sway than are senior staff officers. Furthermore, to company grade officers, the men they order into combat are not merely faceless members of a regiment or division, they are men they live and work with everyday. These captains and lieutenants have formed a bond and mutual respect with their men and it is these faces that leaders remember for the rest of their lives. Countless hours are spent teaching new officers basic troop leading procedures, operational risk management, and other processes, while relatively none are spent on familiarizing or preparing for the emotions he must endure when his decisions are paid for by the blood of his men. Developing Warrior Ethos and the Will to Kill Ideally, to familiarize a warrior with the sights, sounds, and confusion of combat, you would place him in that environment and force him to experience these factors. Those who prove psychologically predisposed to excel under such rigorous circumstances would be retained in combat arms related military operational specialties (MOS). Until the Global War on Terrorism was launched, this type of trial by “The young officer must realize that the losses among his men will already have been factored into strategic planning. Even if the officer does his job perfectly, he will lose men. He will make mistakes that will kill men. He will lead his men out to face the enemy knowing full well some will die. That is his job. Some combat officers will not be able to assume such responsibility for very long.”

fire was the exception vice the norm. Even with conflicts waging in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of U. S. forces who have not experienced combat still outnumbers those who have. Fortunately, com bat arms units have means available to replicate and introduce men to the fear, anxiety, and adrenaline associated with closing with and destroying the enemy. Methods of doing this include forcing their men to “fight” an opponent via grappling, boxing, bayonet training, and others, such as the Marine Corps’ martial arts program. Scientific studies have proven that humans feel a plethora of emotions prior to engaging in any sort of combat. It has also been proven that the anxiety felt prior to combat greatly exceeds that which is felt during combat. For example, John Dollard studied 300 American veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which fought in the Spanish Civil War. Seventy-one percent of them admitted to being afraid before action. Only 15 percent remembered being frightened during battle. These emotions and feelings are a result of the fight or flight instincts, which are common in all animals, to include humans, and are similar to what an athlete feels prior to participating in the “big game.” In no way does this article compare the level of anxiety and pressure associated with controlled competition to that of going to combat and destroying the enemy. It is implied, however, that the emotions a warrior feels prior to engaging in a controlled combative engagement with another warrior are to a much lesser extent to what a warrior will feel prior to engaging in combat. Forcing men to face and deal with these emotions is even more important if one takes into consideration that an increasing number have never been in a fist fight or a situation that has caused them to fear for their lives. They are unaccustomed to dealing with and managing fear. By teaching them the basic fundamentals of hand-to-hand combat and then requiring them to fight an adversary (of ten times a peer), they are forced to become familiar with their body’s nervous reactions. Repetition builds familiarity; familiarity results in force of habit. Teaching close combat skills has also proven to greatly increase confidence. As a company commander, my Marines engaged in Marine Corps martial arts training three times a week. It was amazing to watch their confidence and fighting abilities increase at a rapid rate. Marines engaging in their first combative exercise were often timid and unsure of themselves. Over a period of time, and after being forced to fight engagement after engagement, two things happened. First, their capabilities increased, greatly enhancing their confidence. This confidence transformed into a warrior spirit that was not only evident in the ring, but in field exercises against other units. They truly looked forward to the next “bout,” be it against another Marine or another unit. Second, they learned to mask their fears. Regardless if it is your first boxing match or your one-hundredth, everyone feels anxious and nervous before competing in front of peers and subordinates. However, the Marines learned to mask these fears. As mentioned above, fear and anxiety have been scientifically proven to have a specific effect on humans. Although the levels they will experience in war will be much greater than experienced in peacetime, the familiarization and warrior ethos derived from such training is essential in preparing for that experience. Understanding the Enabling Factors To train and motivate men to kill others in combat, it is important to understand factors that enable men to kill despite being socially and, more often than not, psychology adverse to killing. While at IOC, young Marine infantry officers learn of Stanley Milgram’s controversial experiment in the 1960s where, under the right conditions, his subjects would induce what they believed to be a lethal shock (actually a placebo) to someone they had never met. This experiment proved the extreme extent to the demands placed on them by authority, be it the proximity of the authority figure, the respect for the authority figure, or the legitimacy the authority figure plays in a human taking action to severely hurt or kill another. Only through understanding the roles authority plays in enabling a warrior to kill, can a leader train and motivate his men to do so. In Grossman’s On Killing, the author explains that combat arms officers must understand other aspects of killing: “men in combat are usually motivated to fight not by ideology, or hate, or fear, but by group pressures and processes involving regard for their comrades, respect for their leaders, concern for their own reputation with both, and an urge to contribute to the success of the group.”6 Men will kill if and when they respect their leaders and have developed a sense of camaraderie through adverse training and other circumstances. It is the commander’s job to not only ensure his troops are well trained, but that he serves as a morale compass to his subordinates and fosters in them a sense of team so committed to one another that they will refuse to let one another down. Guilt Associated With Killing “The magnitude of the trauma associated with killing became particularly apparent to me in an interview with Paul, a VFW post commander and sergeant of the 101st Airborne in Bastogne in World War II. He talked freely about his experiences and about the comrades who had been killed, but when I asked about “Prior to instilling the will to kill in his subordinates, the combat arms officer must first be prepared to deal with the repercussions of leading men into combat. In doing so, he must realize that the burden of killing and watching the men he leads die will weigh heavily on any officer who commands in combat. One only has to look into the eyes of a veteran of past wars to see this truth. Memories of war are heavy burdens for veterans to carry for a lifetime.” — 15 his own kills, he stated that usually you couldn’t be sure who it was that did the killing. Then tears welled up in Paul’s eyes and after along pause he said, ‘But the one time I was sure,’ and then his sentence was stopped by a little sob, and pain racked the face of this old gentleman. ‘It still hurts, after all these years?’ I asked in wonder. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘all these years.’ And he would not speak of it again.”7 A combat leader who instills the skill and will to kill then has the morale obligation to ensure his subordinates are prepared to deal with the guilt associated with killing. This can prove to be a dilemma if that combat leader has never had to deal with such feelings. However, just as a leader that has never been in combat must train his unit to shoot, move, and communicate in battle, he must also train them to deal with the repercussions they will feel after closing with and destroying the enemy. In preparing men to deal with this guilt, an officer must understand the response stages to personally killing in combat, which include the concern about killing, the actual kill, exhilaration, remorse, rationalization, and acceptance. During World War II, only 15 to 20 percent of U. S. infantrymen engaged the enemy with direct fire. Due to changes in conditioning and training, the U. S. military has proven that over 90 percent of the infantrymen engaged in combat during the war in Vietnam returned fire on the enemy. This is testament to the success of instilling the skills to kill. However, the emotions after the engagement has ended and the killing is done must be addressed. Excitement is the first emotion most often felt after battle — you have successfully accomplished your mission and you are still alive. This excitement can be seen in a statement taken by a CNN reporter of a U. S. Marine in a video clip excerpt after his unit had killed a number of insurgents in Iraq: “The guys are dead now you know? … but it was a good feeling, you’re like hell ya, let’s do it again.” This exhilaration is often quickly overcome by remorse. This is often caused by the sense of identification or empathy for the humanity of their victims and the fact that you have done what society has deemed wrong. For instance, the following quote was made as a soldier’s immediate response to his first combat experience: “My experience was one of revulsion and disgust … I dropped my weapon and cried … There was so much blood … I vomited … and I cried … I can remember whispering foolishly, I’m sorry.”8 The feeling of remorse is compounded when a member of a servicemen’s unit has been killed or wounded; yet they lived and are excited and euphoric. Not all servicemen will feel this averse to killing. Many will deny these emotions and eventually become hardened. However, whether the killer denies this remorse, deals with it, or is overwhelmed by it, it is always present. As combat arms officers, we must realize that our men will feel remorse and offer them a means by which to manage and overcome. The final emotion felt after a personal kill is one of rationalization and acceptance. This phase is sometimes a lifelong process, which may never be completed. Here, the warrior attempts to overcome his remorse by justifying why he killed the enemy. This may include thoughts, such as “it was him or me,” or “I killed the enemy to save the lives of my friends.” It is during this phase that a commander needs to understand that he can take actions to ensure his men are prepared to deal with each phase. It is imperative that a warrior knows why he will feel ex- “Men will kill if and when they respect their leaders and have developed a sense of camaraderie through adverse training and other circumstances. It is the commander’s job to not only ensure his troops are well trained, but that he serves as a morale compass to his subordinates and fosters in them a sense of team so committed to one another that they will refuse to let one another down.”

hilarated after killing the enemy. It is not because he is blood thirsty, it is because he is still alive, he has affirmed that he can do his job as a warrior and has erased some of the uncertainty he experienced prior to his first battle. Finally, by killing the enemy, he has insured that his friends will not be killed. The warrior must also know about the immediate and often deep remorse he will feel after he kills and must realize that this is a normal reaction. The need for this understanding is not only for personal well-being, but is instrumental to mission accomplishment. Just as an attacking force can reach its culminating point, so too can the human body. Following the immense “high,” associated with surviving a firefight, comes an equally intense “down.” Fatigue sets in as the body goes from being extremely tense to relaxed. The euphoria of survival is often overtaken by the remorse and realization of what happened. During this time, the warrior and his unit are most vulnerable to a counterattack. Warriors must be aware of this phenomenon and be prepared to fight through the natural reaction to focus inward. By identifying that this occurs prior to going into battle, you have taken the first step as a commander to protect your men from making the same mistake. Finally, a leader must never forget the positive effect he can have on his men by ensuring them that they did the right thing after engaging and killing the enemy. The affirmation of what they did, “you did well today, you saved a lot of lives,” will serve young men well as they begin to justify their actions. It is this positive reinforcement that just may be what a warrior needs to come to terms with the harsh realities of combat, taking ground, and killing the enemy. Mission First; Warriors Always “Killing comes with a price, and society must learn that their soldiers will have to spend the rest of their lives living with what they have done.”9 Countless dollars are spent and military schools are devoted to engrain the skill to kill. Statistics from Vietnam regarding the number of infantrymen who engaged the enemy while in contact, and the results of our most recent military engagements show the U. S. military is in fact very well indoctrinated with the skills to kill. Regardless of our most recent military successes, we cannot rest on our laurels. There is a higher price to be paid for military victory than dying or being wounded — the effects of combat will change those that waged it forever. It is our job as combat arms officers to accomplish the mission regardless of our losses. Mission undoubtedly comes first. However, a close second is ensuring the welfare of those we lead and the task of making sure they are trained to not only win the battle, but also survive it. Our doctrine, technology, and tactics, techniques, and procedures provide us with superiority over our enemies that is unmatched in warfare’s history. This superiority ensures the ultimate in troop welfare leading up to and through the battle — the training and opportunity to survive. In today’s environment, the officer corps must understand the human factors involved in killing the enemy and taking ground. We must stiffen our resolve to make tough and bold choices that may cost men their lives, but will ultimately accomplish the mission and ensure the survival of the rest of the unit. Finally, we must take the time to pass this information to the men who will do the preponderance of killing. Talking about killing is not politically correct. It is a brutal subject that encompasses topics that have been labeled taboo by our society. However, as warriors who defend our society, we must not only talk about these emotions and topics, we must understand them and teach our subordinates to understand them as well. Through this process, we will not only arm and instill the warrior with the skill and will to kill, we will arm him with the support and tools needed to deal with the emotions he will “Ideally, to familiarize a warrior with the sights, sounds, and confusion of combat, you would place him in that environment and force him to experience these factors. Those who prove psychologically predisposed to excel under such rigorous circumstances would be retained in combat arms related military operational specialties (MOS). Until the Global War on Terrorism was launched, this type of trial by fire was the exception vice the norm. Even with conflicts waging in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of U. S. forces who have not experienced combat still outnumbers those who have.” experience when the battle is over and reflections begin. Notes 1Brigadier General Downing, “The Dark Side of Command,” The Washington Post, 16 August 1987, pp. D1-D2. 2William Manchester, Goodbye Darkness; A Memoir of the Pacific War, Back Bay Books, 12 April 2002. 3David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Little, Brown and Company, 1 November 1996. 4Ibid. 5Ibid; Richard Holmes, Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle, Free Press, 4 August 1989; and John Keegan, The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, Reprint Edition, 1 July 1995. 6Grossman, On Killing. 7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Ibid. CPT Michael Nakonieczny is currently serving as commanding officer, A Company, 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Al Anbar, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the University of California at Davis. His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Platoon Leaders Course, Infantry Officer Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, and Light Armored Vehicle Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, Company H, Marine Security Guard Battalion, Frankfurt, Germany; commanding officer, Weapons Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Pendleton, CA; and platoon commander, Company C, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Pendleton. — 17