The Origins of Torsion Bar Tank Suspensions

Did the U. S. just copy a German design?

Every effort to try and reduce the myths surrounding World War II American tanks, as in the article by Charles

M. Baily (“Tank Myths,” September-October 2001), is to be applauded. A follow-up letter in the November-December issue by George F. Hofmann, however, promotes another myth itself, albeit an official U. S. Army Ordnance Department one. (Editor’s Note: Dr. Hofmann stated, “In fact, it was the Ordnance Department that developed the torsion bar suspension for Army tanks during World War II…”) No torsion bar development program has been uncovered as being proposed, recommended, financed, or approved by the U. S. Ordnance Department. The development histories on the medium tank T20 and light tank T24 merely refer respectively to their torsion bar suspension as being a modification or similar to that designed originally for the M18 Gun Motor Carriage (GMC). One must therefore look to the purpose-designed tracked tank destroyer that evolved for its development. It doesn’t help. It having been decided to utilize the light tank T9 chassis for a proposed 37- mm GMC T42, the original layout drawings were modified in October 1941 to specify individually sprung wheels (Fig. 1). Later proposal drawings, dated 29 December 1941 and 5 January 1942, show the Ordnance department modified Christie suspension developed for the Combat Car T4 (Fig. 2). With the decision to fit a more powerful gun, the designation 57mm GMC T49 was allocated for the two pilots that were authorized to be built by the Buick division of General Motors. Included in the list of recommendations dated April 1942 was independent suspension similar to the Christie type, or that used on the Combat Car T4. What evolved and appeared in July 1942 on the first pilot T49 (USA

6029910) was trailing arm vertical coil spring independent suspension adapted from Christie (Fig. 3). While this was undergoing testing, it was decided to have the second pilot T49 fitted with the 75mm gun M3. As such, in October 1942 this vehicle was redesignated as 75mm GMC T67. The military characteristics merely specified it to be tracklaying with independent suspension. Typical characteristics in the historical record, however, have it defined more specifically as coil spring-individual wheel. In December 1942, the Special Armored Vehicle Board (Palmer Board), in order to reduce the vast number of projects competing for contracts, stated that the 75mm Gun Motor Carriage T67 was capable of development as a satisfactory tank destroyer, but that the engines were unsatisfactory. It recommended suitable standard engines be provided and that other minor changes found necessary be made. No mention was made in the list of changes of any alternative suspension being required, this having been considered highly satisfactory. Following the Palmer board report, it was decided to mount the new 76mm M1 gun in the tank destroyer. Approval was requested on the 4th of January and given on the 27th to build six pilots to be designated 76mm GMC T70. (The photo below, taken 20 February 1943, shows the T67, but mounting the 75mm gun.) Although nothing is mentioned in the recorded discussion, quietly slipped into the military characteristics somehow was torsion bar independent suspension. Quickly following in February were instructions to fit torsion bar suspension to the second pilot medium tank T20 and, in March, for it to be fitted to two pilots each of both the medium tank M4 and light tank T24. The first pilot T70, complete with torsion bar suspension, was completed in early April 1943. For all of the necessary research, development, testing and manufacture of a radically different suspension system to have been completed in such a short time stretches credulity. In July 1945, Captain Joseph E. Canning, the technical information officer from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance at Detroit (OCO), published an article in Army Ordnance, titled “Faster Combat Vehicles,” about the new torsion bar suspension. It stated that in 1933 a torsion bar suspension was designed and patented by the Ordnance 44 ARMOR —

Department, but limitations in funds made further development impossible. It went on to say that, “as soon as the initial pressure of arming ourselves and our allies was over and funds and engineering personnel were made available, work was renewed on torsion bar suspension development for high-speed vehicles.” Early development tests were stated as being conducted on the medium tank M4E4 with the 76mm GMC M18 being the first production vehicle to be so equipped. As mentioned earlier, the M4 with torsion bar suspension wasn’t even proposed until March 1943. (Studies of independent suspension for the medium M4 series were based firstly on the Ordnance modified Christie suspension, and later the Buick vertical coil spring suspension, thereby paralleling the tank destroyer development.) Included in this article was a copy of the drawings from one of the Barnes/ Preston patents, (although only quoting Maj. Gen. G. M. Barnes as the patentee) granted on November 10, 1936, of a design for a torsion bar suspension for cars. Prior to even the application for this patent being submitted, The Automobile Engineer had published a series of articles titled “Modern Suspension.” Part V, in September 1934, was titled “Independent Suspension on Private Cars,” and included in great detail all of the variations, formula, illustrative drawings, and photographs of the many car torsion bar suspension systems in use up to that date. These included Porsche, Rohr, Mathis and Citroen. The possible original feature with the Barnes/Preston patents, was that their torsion bars described the tube-over-bar (TOB) suspension contemplated for an improved MBT M60A1 35 years later. On this, an outer torsion tube is fitted to the side of the hull nearest the wheel. An inner solid torsion bar runs through this being connected at the far end, thereby doubling the effective length available. In the official history “The Ordnance Department Planning Munitions For War,” it simply states that, in 1942, torsion bar suspension was developed to a point where it could be used in combat vehicles.” The footnote refers to the same patent mentioned previously, also giving the impression that this is what was the basis of development, although stating that French patents were of an earlier date. This could be referring to Dubonnet, who also utilized a combined torsion bar and tube layout. Brig. Gen. J. M. Colby, who as a colonel had been Chief of Development at TAC during the period in question, was promoting himself in the seventies as having designed the first torsion bar suspension in 1933, but stated he was never in a position to get funds for its development until the winter of 1942- 43.

Fig. 1 Fig. 2, above, and Fig. 3, below ARMOR — 45 Continued on Page 51

Organic to each squad is a HUMINT soldier, usually MOS 97B, who is also cross-trained to conduct dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance. Although scouts in this organization are cross-trained in tactical questioning, the HUMINT collectors play a vital role in the platoon by advising the platoon’s leaders, identifying potential sources to be exploited by the squadron’s MI company, and are the primary reporters on the CHATS system, a network system specifically for reporting HUMINT information.12 Although the recce platoon is ideally suited to conduct the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance, support operations, stability operations, and small-scale contingencies, it is the legacy force scouts that are conducting these operations right now, and there is a doctrinal need by all scouts to have information in support of these operations. Developing doctrine also addresses the distance each echelon of reconnaissance is deployed. The BRT now fills the void that existed between the task force scouts and the division cavalry, but now there is a concern for how far they are being deployed. The distance should be based on METT-TC and the capability to support them, support being CASEVAC, indirect fires, communications, and so on. This may, in turn, drive how far forward the division cavalry may operate. There may need to be a designated reconnaissance handover line between each element to prevent confusion and loss of targets in the folds between elements. This line also defines areas of responsibility for direct and indirect fires, and maneuver. There is a need for standardization between the different branches of service to allow digital support of future joint operations. Currently, the different branches of the Army are working closely together to standardize evolving doctrine to ensure true combined arms capability. Emerging reconnaissance doctrine will also address operations for both digital and analog units. Information dominance will become increasingly more difficult. Technology now allows the smallest of threats the ability to communicate and gain intelligence immediately through the use of cell phones, the internet, and CNN. Computer hackers, computer viruses, and worms are now major concerns to U. S. forces. These are threats the Army has not previously faced, threats which must be addressed with minimal, if any, historical precedence.

Notes 1FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance Company, 1 May 1950. 2F. Miller& E. Kureth, Reflections of a Warrior, Presidio Press, 1991, p. 59. 3MAJ G. Athey/SFC F. Belonus, developed for FM 3-20.98 Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordinating Draft, May 2001. 4Defense Science Board, 1996. 5BG R. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The U. S. Army in the Gulf War, 1994. 6FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordinating Draft, May, 2001, Infiltration. 7F. A. Godfrey, War in Peace, War in the Bush, Orbis Publishing, 1981, p. 82. 8FM 3-20.971 Reconnaissance Troop, Coordinating Draft, May 2001. 9FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordinating Draft, May 2001. 10FM 3-20.96, RSTA Squadron, Coordinating Draft, date pending. 11FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon. 12MAJ Petery, RSTA Squadron Armor Conference Brief, 22 May 2001.

I would like to thank LTC James Berg, Chief, Doctrine Division, at Fort Knox, and MAJ David “Gregg” Athey, Chief, Cavalry Branch, for all their help and support in the development of this article.

SFC Frank R. Belonus enlisted in the Army in 1986 as a 19D scout. He has served in both light and mechanized units, to include 5-73rd Armor and 1-10th Cavalry, 194th Armored Brigade, Fort Knox, Ky.; 3/11th ACR, Germany; 2-9th Cavalry, 7th ID (L), Fort Ord, Calif.; 1- 4th Cavalry, 1st ID (M), Fort Riley, Kan.; Seattle Recruiting Battalion; and 1-34th Armor, Fort Riley, Kan. He has attended ANCOC, Master Gunner School, Pathfinder School, and Air Assault School. He is currently senior developer/writer for Cavalry Doctrine, Cavalry Doctrine Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (DTDD), Fort Knox, Ky. 46 ARMOR —

Evolution of Reconnaissance Continued from Page 24 rior operational readiness rate we had enjoyed throughout the rotation.5 The entire turn-in process at Camp Doha is a model for what a recovery and maintenance standard operating procedure should entail. Intrinsic Action is an operational deployment and the units there have a ‘real-world’ mission with many associated tasks on which to focus. At the same time, the desert sands of Kuwait offer an enormous training opportunity that is unlike any other event in the Army today. Just as the National Training Center has increased our ability to perform our wartime mission, Intrinsic Action builds upon that experience and offers a unique challenge in exercising our ability to deploy; conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); train as we fight; and return to home station a confident, trained, and ready outfit. If there was to be a repeat performance of what President Bush called the “final phase,” our task force had truly done the best rehearsal possible to ensure another successful ending. Notes 1Bob Levin, “The ‘Final Phase’,” Maclean’s, March 4, 1991, p. 24. 2J. R. Wilson, “Training to Fight in the Desert,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 23, 1991, p. 257. 3Linda D. Kozaryn quoting MG Charles Campbell, “Kuwaiti Desert Test Soldiers’ Mettle,” American Forces Press Service Defense Link News, November 1998, pp. 1-2. 4The two tank master gunners in TF 1-9 CAV during this rotation were SFC Timothy Clausen and SSG Joseph Weldon. They not only built a tank range from scratch, but also safely and efficiently executed all range operations for the two tank companies. The platoon sergeant who built the TCPC course was SFC Keith Bishop. 5The tanks we drew were in remarkable mechanical condition. However, this in no way detracts from the enormous amount of energy put into the company maintenance program by the executive officer (1LT Jim Neusch) and the team chief (SFC Michael Berthiamue) all the way down to tank crew level.

CPT Jim (JD) Dunivan was commissioned as an armor officer in 1993 and has served in various positions in Korea, at Fort Riley, Fort Knox, and Fort Hood, where he commanded Bravo Company, 3-8 Cav, First Cavalry Division. He is currently a small group instructor for ACCC in Nomad Troop, 3-16 Cav at Fort Knox, Ky. INTRINSIC ACTION from Pg. 37 ter as much where you paint, but how you paint. I have an entire platoon of capable scouts, foaming at the mouth to paint anytime, anywhere. You supply a DTG and a grid, and we will bring the art supplies.

1LT, Infantry

Germany

OPFOR Defends Itself Against Gamesmanship Charge

Dear Sir: As a platoon sergeant in D Troop, 1-509th IN (ABN) serving as the OPFOR at the JRTC, I was disturbed by the comments made by CPT T. J. Johnson in “Letters” in the Jan-Feb 2002 issue. First, we don’t play a game. We face every rotational unit that trains here as if it was real and the stakes are high. In essence, we are afraid to “die,” so we train everyday to survive in simulated, and by extension, real combat. That training includes battle drills, marksmanship, field craft, and for us in D Troop, armor-related tasks. It doesn’t include how to beat the system, or play the “game.” I wouldn’t tolerate any form of cheating in my platoon or troop. In fact, not only is it punish-able under the UCMJ, but anyone doing so will leave the OPFOR and find a job elsewhere. I do agree that we have advantages. We are in the field two-plus weeks a month, which allows us to hone our SOPs and techniques. We fight in our “box,” so we know the terrain and where the most logical places are to find BLUFOR. However, these advantages are enjoyed by most guerrilla armies; generally they’ve been at war long before the U. S. Army got there, and operate in their own country. Also, OPFOR does face units on neutral ground in some cases, and even sometimes on the BLUFOR ground. I have been deployed to face active duty BLUFOR units at several National Guard camps, and even at Fort Bragg. Still, the results are the same; the amount of time that we train is our greatest advantage. The reason any unit deploys to the JRTC is to see where they stand on their METL and SOPs. We work hard to provide a thinking OPFOR, that — given the opportunity — will demonstrate where the opposing unit needs to focus their training. If your unit leaves home station with the attitude that OPFOR cheats, or that OPFOR will win no matter what you do, you are wasting your trip. Which means you have wasted the time of every soldier in your command over the last year.

Fort Polk, La. Claims of an Army “Malaise” More Conjured Than Real

Dear Sir: I would like to thank LTC (Ret.) Harold Raugh, Jr. for his very thoughtful and provocative review of Leadership: The Warrior’s Art. He did mention in the review that he would have liked to see solutions to the “current malaise” in the U. S. Army addressed in the book. While I did address on p. xxiv the fact that high-quality leadership was the only real solution to the supposed morale crisis in the Army, his point has inspired me to consider the general “malaise” argument that has seemed to enjoy popular acclaim over the past several years. Quite simply, the existence of a malaise that has infected the entire Army is more conjured than real. The Army is too big, too complex, and too diverse to be “of one” about morale. In fact, as many of us have seen, within the same company one well-led platoon will have high morale, while the one right next to it that is poorly led will have low morale. The difference is leadership. To be sure, there are plenty of poor leaders in the ranks that reek of the problems identified by LTC Raugh, and those types certainly do cause morale crises within their organizations. At the same time, the Army has a vast number of outstanding leaders that create excellent organizations that possess high morale. Those soldiers in those units do not have malaise or any other form of morale affliction. I know, because I was a soldier in such a unit from 1999-2001. The Second Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk is a superb organization. Located in the backwoods of Louisiana, the leaders of the regiment would have every right to complain that the odds of creating high morale are stacked against them due to the remote nature of the installation. The regiment, however, is an outstanding unit because of the high quality of its leadership…. They do not have malaise, nor do their units. To be sure, there are some poor leaders within the regiment and their units do have morale problems. Nevertheless, one visit to the regiment in garrison or in the field will convince anyone that the 2nd Regiment of Dragoons is, with very few exceptions, a proud organization of high morale from top to bottom. Morale is local, by and large. The difference is in the leadership. The 2nd ACR is certainly not alone in that regard. The argument by so many pundits and self-appointed experts that the entire Army is afflicted with malaise is way overdrawn, perhaps even nonsensical. What is troubling about the argument is that it obscures the real issue: morale problems are caused by poor leadership. Universal “malaise” gives dysfunctional leaders an escape hatch — they are not held accountable if “everyone” has morale problems. It is time to take poor leaders to task. We must avoid blaming the symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem. There simply is no excuse for poor leadership. Perhaps part of the problem is that we have not, as an organization, articulated a coherent standard for what we mean by leadership. If “getting results” or “accomplishing the mission” is the only standard, then we open ourselves to all sorts of dysfunctional behavior on the way to getting the job done. The screaming, zero-defect, self-serving, and ethically challenged prima-donna is therefore just as good as the person we admire as a true leader as long as they both get results. The problems that occur from this mentality are obvious, and will continue to manifest themselves as long as some senior leaders tolerate poor leadership on the part of their subordinates. We need to do a better job of distinguishing between merely getting results and getting results the right way. A person that merely gets good results is nothing special. We have plenty of people who can do that. A leader who gets good results the right way, through character and competence, who inspires the best in others and creates high performing teams of great morale along the way, and who leaves a lasting, positive impact on the lives of others, is someone special. Great leaders leave a legacy of excellence. We need to grow more of those people. Perhaps the war on terrorism will provide the impetus to fix some nagging problems, such as training budgets, quality of life issues, and stability. Solving those structural problems, however, will not cure the low morale in some units any more than the problems themselves created the low morale. The real solution is in our own hands and in our own gardens. Cure poor leadership and you will cure poor morale. To begin, we need look no further than the mirror and our subordinate leaders. The great leaders have already figured this out. Their organizations are wonderful ones in which to serve, and there are plenty of them throughout the Army. The best way to increase and sustain morale is to promote and develop high-quality leadership and to reform or get rid of poor leaders. To do so requires seniors with the wisdom and courage to look beneath the surface of mere results. We wrote Leadership: The Warrior’s Art to help identify, understand, and develop such high-quality leadership.

Correction The photo on Page 10 of the January-February 2002 issue was misidentified as an Israeli M113. The vehicle is actually an Israeli Nagmachon APC (a Centurion modification).

LETTERS continued from Page 5 ARMOR — 47 with the first torsion bar tank suspension on Model D versions of the PzKpw II, in 1938, and E versions of the PzKpw III.)

D. P. Dyer, who lives near Falmouth, England, has contributed articles, letters, and technical drawings to military publications and modeling magazines. ARMOR readers may be most familiar with his detailed line drawings of armored vehicles which helped illustrate Richard Hunnicutt's series of references on American armor. ARMOR — 51

Torsion Bar from Page 45 books and so discovered the tales of Wellington’s army in the Peninsula.” Cornwell’s historical fiction and depiction of Sharpe function as excellent sources of small unit leadership at its finest. Sharpe molds a lethal, loyal fighting team. Cornwell is superb in his descriptions of bloody battle scenes and his compelling fiction is well researched. Sharpe a consummate warrior and soldiers’ soldier is also blessed with a certain appeal to the ladies, a fact he employs to his advantage. Strangely, this appeal to the ladies extends beyond the pages of the text as my wife quickly became addicted to the video versions chronicling Sharpe’s adventures. There are 17 volumes in the best-selling Richard Sharpe Napoleonic War series, the latest titled, Trafalgar. I recommend Sharpe and suggest joining him early in his adventures, either in Spain or India, give Sharpe’s Rifles or Sharpe’s Tiger a ride.

ARMOR Staff

Briefly Noted Although the nation is currently involved in a very different kind of war, interest still continues about the victory in the Gulf War over Iraq’s occupation force in Kuwait. A useful building block for detailed study of this conflict is Thomas Dinackus’s highly focused Order of Battle: Allied Ground Forces of Operation Desert Storm, which is now available in paperback, published by Hellgate Press. Dinackus, a retired cavalryman now serving as a trial attorney for the federal government, covers all U. S. Army, Marine Corps, and allied combat arms units down to their smallest entities, and non-combat units to the brigade/group level. But beyond that, this inch-thick research goldmine includes many, many additional charts and appendices, down to full-color reproductions of unit shoulder patches. $17.95. Another reprint worth having is The American Arsenal, a large-format reference book that was originally published during WWII as the official standard Ordnance catalog of U. S. equipment used in the war. The descriptions cover the obvious — like tanks, small arms, armored cars, and artillery pieces — along with artillery fuzes, mines, and shells. Each one- or two-page description accompanies photographs reproduced in that distinctive, highly air-brushed style popular in technical publications of this period. Former British Army master gunner Ian Hogg’s introduction leads it off, followed by pages of facts, figures, weights, speeds, you name it. This would seem to be an invaluable aid to anyone studying the war who may not be not familiar with the equipment, and even to modelers who want every detail to be correct. This $30 paperback is published in the U. S. by Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa.