The Three Tank Platoon, A Consideration For Army XXI

by Major Kevin D. Stringer and Major D. André Hall

With the advent of the new Army XXI heavy division and General Shinseki’slighter brigade initiative, the U. S. Army takes a major step toward the creation of smaller, but more lethal and flexible formations for achieving victory on the battlefields of the 21st century. This new design is intended to yield a force that is better suited to responding to a wider spectrum of conflict than today’s existing formations. This trend in force restructuring creates other opportunities for re-engineering divisional sub-formations while enhancing overall combat effectiveness. One such opportunity would be a shift from a four-vehicle armored platoon to one founded on three armored vehicles. This transformation offers a force package design which, although revolutionary in nature, hones the application of the armored force on the battlefield, strengthens combat leadership roles, and realizes training and cost efficiencies. This radical change in force structure and employment doctrine would have a dramatic effect, both on the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) armored forces. The current family of M1 main battle tanks provides a combat platform unmatched in the history of the U. S. armored corps and is a catalyst for this force structure change. This combat system, combined within a three-tank platoon structure, offers the U. S. Army the chance to refine the armor platoon into an organization that operates and trains aggressively with a high degree of firepower and mobility, while at the same time reducing operational and logistical costs. Ultimately, the three-tank platoon offers the Army the opportunity to concentrate on the development of junior armor leaders and optimizes limited training time. These advantages enable the Army to build cohesive units ready to face the battlefield challenges of today and tomorrow. The most critical component of any combat organization and its underpinning technology is its method of employment. By definition and doctrinally, “the tank platoon is organized to fight as one maneuver element, not as two separate sections. The tank platoon moves, attacks, defends and performs other essential tasks to support the company team’s mission.” Command and control of the three-vehicle M1A2 tank platoon flattens the leadership challenge for the platoon’s leaders and focuses leadership at the critical point within a unitary organization. Platoon gunnery, tactical training, logistics functions, and manning requirements are examples of issues that can be simplified by the adoption of the three-vehicle tank platoon. Recent experiments conducted by the PLT/CO/TM Branch, Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (DTDD), at the U. S. Army Armor Center have shown that the M1A2 is capable of operating on wider frontages at a faster pace than previous main battle vehicles. This wider battlespace offers the armor leader new challenges in command and control that could be overcome by reorganization into three-vehicle platoons. With three tanks, the armor platoon leader could better control the movement and fire of his unit while maintaining full observation in his platoon battlespace. The DTDD experiments showed that although “digitized units will communicate digitally before the direct fire fight, once close combat with the enemy begins, voice communications rule.” We can infer from this statement that, despite the advent of faster paced situations catalyzed by the M1A2’s capabilities and digitization, reliance on tried and true visual and formation techniques of command and control will be employed in future operations. The three-tank platoon enhances the combination of digitization and currently applied techniques of command and control by demanding less of the platoon leadership while still supporting the advancement in systems through simplification of the battlespace. Simply stated, during the heat of a direct fire engagement, in rough terrain, or under conditions of reduced visibility, the platoon leader is better able to see and direct the efforts of his unit. Conversely, his subordinate vehicles can better orient on his direction of travel or main effort. Gunnery and tactical employment are enhanced by the systems that the M1A2 fields. With the M1A2, direct fire engagements may be acquired and served faster and more effectively then ever before. Based on these refinements, the withdrawal of the fourth vehicle from the tank platoon speeds individual, crew, and platoon level gunnery and tactical training without reducing firepower. This advantage is especially useful for RC formations that have limited amounts of collective training time throughout the year. This lack of sufficient collective training time is a major weakness of Reserve Component armor combat units and has the resultant negative impact on leader development. Changing to three-vehicle platoons would alleviate this shortfall in collective combat training opportunities by simplifying gunnery and optimizing use of training time. The three-vehicle concept places the platoon leader at the spearhead of his platoon for gunnery and collective training, leading from the position of greatest maneuver and fire opportunity. He becomes the main focus of the platoon’s efforts. Logistically, support of the three-vehicle unit provides the platoon-through-division-level structure with a ARMOR — 23 Art by SGT Benjamin S. Ormand