NEOs: The New Mission

The noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is not anew concept for the Armor community. For decades the contingency plans have been rehearsed and refined for the evacuation of U. S. dependents of our forces in Europe had the Russian bear ever come crashing amss the border. Now however, this threat is dissipated and NATO looks in new directions for missions. One of those missions may be peacemaking. For the American forces, another mission may well be the evacuation of United States civilians from an area of unrest. How would the mounted force be integrated into that mission? Armies have conducted NEOs since men rode to war in wicker chariots. Since then, the mission has changed little - basically, get your civilians out of harm'sway. In the past 30 years, however, our nation's ability and need to do so upon occasion have increased dramatically. Traditionally, this has been the province of the U. S. Marine Corps and the Fleet Marine Force. More recently. it has become one of the major contingency missions of the U. S. Army light infantry divisions. Now, perhaps, it will expand to include the armored force as well. The mission in a NE0 is simple: move U. S. civilians and allied personnel out of the area of actual or potential hostilities. The reality can be staggeringly complex, involving Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel in addition to interacting with the civilians themselves. Also, with the whole of the operation coming under State Department control, the potential for miscommunication. misunderstanding, and plain old disagreement is definitely present. On the battlefield, the mounted force is prized for its flexibility, a b i l i to maneuver at high speeds, and to gain and retain a firepower advantage. All of these characteristics can prove instrumental in successful NEOs. In many of the light infantry divisions, the NE0 is now the primary contingency missicn. Liberia, Panama, Grenada, DESERT ONE, Saigon, Operation Eastem Exit, and Son Tay are all examples of the modem NE0 mission. All of these missions, executed by Marines, Special Operations, or line infantry, were dependent most upon the basic light infantry skills of the men who actually hit the ground to contact, collect, process, and evacuate the civilians in the area. Despite this, it hasn't been until recently that the U. S. Army has begun to train for these very complex missions. There is no published doctrine on how the Army will conduct NE0 missions. Very little has been produced at any level on the subject. The 82d Airborne has a NE0 handbook, as does the 7th ID(L). At the time of this writing, the 25th ID(L) had perhaps gone the furthest with a complete NE0 MTP created by its 3d Brigade. Still, all of this thought and work has aimed toward one specific community, the IighVairbome infantry. Lime to no thought has been applied to the issue of how the mounted force might be integrated into these missions. by Captain Robert L. Bateman What Is a NEO? A NE0 mission may loosely be defined as any military operation that has as its primary focus the collection, processing, and movement of civilians out of an actual or potential combat zone or area of civil unrest. Civilians may be U. S. citizens, allied civilians, indigenous personnel, or anyone that the U. S. State Department deems appropriate. In addition, the threat level may vary dramatically. Admittedly, this definition covers a wide range of possible scenarios, which is why NEOs are categorized into three basic types: permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive. NE0 missions happen anytime the U. S. government decides that the lives of U. S. citizens living or working in a foreign country are threatened by activities occurring in or around that country. Additionally, political considerations often dictate that the decision to evacuate not be made until the last possible moment - and possibly after that point. Obviously, this means that a NE0 mission is almost always considered an emergency situation by the government; why else try to extract those Americans? This built-in dichotomy is one factor that can make the NE0 mission especially frustrating to unit commanders and may show its effect even down to the lowest (platoon and squad) levels of the operation. The Permissive NE0 The permissive NE0 is the easiest to execute and the least likely to be encountered in the real world due to the political considerations mentioned above. Its characteristics are that there is no expected resistance to the evacuation operation and that the host nation's military and civil law enforcement agencies have control in the area of operations and have the capability and intent to aid in the evacuation process. Given these highly favorable conditions, the NE0 itself may be conducted at a slower pace to ensure thoroughness in the search for and processing of the evacuating civilians. Of course, if the situation is that good, it is very unlikely that the State Department would recommend evacuation in the first place. The Semi-permissive NE0 As the title suggests, this NE0 is slightly more hazardous. It is characterized by an increased threat to the force and to the civilians, mainly from civil disorders and potential terrorist threat. Additionally, the host nation may be indifferent to the situation, or it may not have the ability to assist even if it wants to. The evacuations of Saigon and Monrovia would be prime examples of this type of NEO. Planning considerations here would require a secure lodgement area and probably an airfield, (possibly co-located) since the host could (or would) not provide them. The Non-Permissive NE0 This is the most difficult and most likely form of NEO. In this type of operation, hostilities are underway (or soon will be) in the A 0 of the evacuation. This type of operation might also arise when the host nation actively opposes the evacuation of the civilians or if the population in the A 0 is controlled by armed forces who have the ability and intent to interfere with the NEO. Non-permissive NE0 operations are obviously going to be the most complex, requiring units to conduct both a complicated civilian-oriented mission as well as be prepared to engage in combat operations at any point during the NEO. These dual requirements can lead to some very involved rules of engagement (ROE). Execution Generally, non-combatant evacuation operations m r in fwe phases. These phases are based upon the capabilities and limitations of the IighVairbome infantry but the general concept should remain the same for the mounted force. In order, these phases are: alert, deployment to an ISB (initial staging base), evacuation site operations (consisting of marshalling, evacuation control center (ECC) operations, and deployment of the evacuees to the safehaven), safehaven operations, and redeployment. Ideally, the ISB could be eliminated while marshalling and evacuation take place at the same location. Such a location would have to have an airfield capable of accepting C141 aircraft, it should be close to where the majority of the civilians live and work in the host nation, and it should be relatively defendable. Having stated how the light forces plan to execute, the question remains, "If we already have plans for the employment of light forces to execute these missions, why bother planning to use the mounted force?" In other words, Why Armor?" Perhaps the best way to answer this is with a hypothetical example: The time is the near future, the place is Eastern Europe. Since the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, there has been a great movement east. Western investors, after waiting a few years to assess the situation, realized the potential profit to be gained in the east and have begun to develop the east for its economic potential. With the inflow of money, there has also been a flow of western economic advisors and technicians to oversee the employment of the western capital. There is also a second factor at work here though - traditional ethnic rivalries have flared and continued to smolder despite the best efforts of country Xs national government. Finally, things come to ahead and outright civil war erupts. Country X mobilizes the militia, only to find that half of the army defects with all of its equipment. The airfields shut down and the borders close. While no direct threats are made against the United States, more than 3,000 American civilians find themselves trapped by circumstances in a war zone. Over 30 US. civilians have already been wounded or killed in the fighting in the capital. In an emergency session of the Security Council, the following information is provided. The President is advised that there is no way that the 75th Ranger Regiment or the 82d ABN can insert with any hope of success against the air defenses arrayed around the airfield. While the host country's army has not stated that it would destroy the U. S. aircraft attempting to land, it has made clear its intention of stopping all traffic into and out of the nation until the "emergency situation" is resolved. ADA weapons from the former Soviet Union include a large number of shoulder-fired IR-seeking SA-7114s. Short of employing massive airstrikes against prepared defenses in rugged terrain, there is no way to fly into the country. Additionally, the population centers where the Americans live are more than 500 miles from the nearest coast, thus preventing any potential action by the Navy or USMC. Rotary wing insertions look promising initially, but the number of helicopters required for a one-way long distance insertion to secure the airfields against opposition is prohibitive. There simply aren't enough rotary wing lift assets in the entire theater to conduct this type of operation. Finally, it is determined that a force must conduct a NE0 within the next week to two weeks to prevent further US. casualties as the civil war shows no sign of stopping. In this situation and dozens of others like it, the only force that could conduct the mission would be a mechanized/armor task force. The use of mounted forces to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations has already been tested and executed in Bosnia. The evacuation of several Muslim enclaves designated as 'safehavens" by the United Nations but later declared untenable provides an excellent example, albeit a negative one. British mechanized troops attempted to evacuate some of these enclaves with often disastrous results. Many of the problems in those missions can be directly athibuted to the extreme rules of engagement imposed upon the British by the UN. Their inability to return fire resulted in casualties among the civilians placed in their care. In fact, this meant that the combat units were little more than guides since they could not actively provide for the defense of the civilians. However, rules of engagement are the province of our civilian political masters. We can only advise on the probable results which excessive ROES may produce. In either case, either with the UN or unilaterally for U. S. civilians, can there be any doubt that US. forces may soon be placed in a similar situation? The scenario above demonstrated how U. S. armored forces might be needed to evacuate U. S. civilians, but with the UN's expanding role in the world, US. forces may soon be called upon to execute these missions under the auspices of a coalition or world body like the UN. The decision to execute a NE0 is the job of politicians; as professional soldiers it is our job to provide them with options and plan for those contingencies. What then might be the composition of amounted NE0 force? Composition Each NE0 mission would require a tailored force structured to meet the specific potential threat it may face, the number of evacuees projected, and the potential barriers to movement it may encounter. Having said that, here is a generically composed mounted force designed to evacuate up to 3,000 civilians by ground or air. For this scenario the host nation does not have a coherent combat force above the regimental level and the U. S. can achieve air superiority in the immediate area of the task force. 48

. Armored Cavalry Regiment Squadron (+): 1 The mixed organization of the armored cavalry regiment squadron is well suited to form the base of the NE0 task force. It has an inherent capability for self-sustaining operations and habitually executes missions which require long movements emphasizing maneuver rather than direct fire. The squadron also should be reinforced with one balanced attack helicopter team from the regiment with its attendant support elements. Key to the success of the movement is avoiding contact with significant forces that may intentionally or unintentionally block the force. Close air reconnaissance is potentially the largest combat multiplier available. Considering how rare the ACR has become recently, this base unit may be replaced by a balanced armor/mechanized battalion task force. This, however, will probably preclude the option of the balanced attack helicopter team, primarily for logistical reasons. Additionally, the TF now loses its indirect firepower. Either option provides the TF commander with combat power to protect the support assets while enroute to the objective AO, and this is his primary mission. Avoiding contact and intimidating by show of force are probably going to be the primary options dictated to the commander by National Command Authority. Additionally, a single squadronhattalion TF could not believably be construed as an invasion by the host nation forces. 0 Engineer Company (-): 1 The engineers assist in crossing natural obstacles. Deliberate obstacles directed against the TF would be bypassed rather than breached. Their task organization reflects this, and is based upon known and suspected obstacles along the TF route. 0 Light Infantry Company: 1 NEOs are infantry-intensive. Personnel are required for reception, screening, search, and security of the civilians. This is assuming the absolute best case scenario - that the civilians have already assembled at one (or several) convenient locations and no house-to-house search in a MOUT environment is required. Additionally, since the actual NE0 will likely take place in a MOUT or MOBA (Military Operations Builtup Area) area the security of the mounted force must also be considered. Light and airborne infantry forces train in the execution of the NE0 marshalling and processing operations and are readily available worldwide within 24 hours of a decision to execute a NE0 via strategic airlift. The normal lightheavy considerations must be accounted for, especially the fact that any IighVaihme contingency force will anive without any organic transportation assets. 0SBT Company(s): 1-? This is the most situationally dependant factor. Will the TF attempt to evacuate the civilians exclusively by ground? Will they secure an airfield and the flight path inbound and outbound to allow for a quicker evacuation of the civilians? Or will a combination of both be used? When a lighvairborne force conducts a NEO, local transportation must be secured to move the civilians to the airhead since sufficient transportation generally cannot be flown in without a prohibitive trade-off in combat power. This obviously also applies to the mounted force. Conceivably, the TF could bring enough vehicles to move all the evacuees by ground. 0 FSB (Forward Support Battalion): 1-? This is another truly situationally dependant element. Planning for one brigade's worth of support for one battalion-level element is probably the best ratio. In the NEO, especially during movement, the primary consideration is not so much maneuver combat power to overwhelm the enemy but to arrive in the NE0 A 0 intact. This implies sufficient support (especially fueling) to move a battalion (+) TF the required distance. (In this case, 500 miles). Host nation refueling capabilities (permissive or otherwise) also should be considered. 0 Military Police Platoon: 1 Key to the processing of the civilians, U. S. or otherwise, is the search. Military Police are the experts in this area, as well as in crowd control techniques and civil-military relations at the individual level. A minimum of one platoon should accompany any NE0 force. I recommend attaching the MPs to the light infantry company since the two work together during the actual marshalling. 0 TranslatordCivil AffaidSS: As required. Invariably, language problems will exist, both with the host nation and the evacuees themselves. Translators are essential and should be requested. Civil Affairs65 will likely be pushed from above and may or may not prove useful. At a minimum, they may act as liaisons to the State Department. 0 Combat Control Team: 1 Used to establish USAF airfields in the absence of friendly host nation support. Given enough time, the proposed task organization could well end up resembling a miniature division. We should resist the tendency to add forces to deal with any and all situations, especially with regards to the mechanized combat units. Keeping in mind the key to successful NE0 operations is avoiding contact helps reduce the numbers required. This proposed task organization still has potential gaps, but could serve as a viable basis for planning the mounted NEO. Conclusion Use of an armored force to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation has several drawbacks. It is a provocative act to enter another country with tanks, no matter how few. Currently, the armored force has no Significant training in this task, nor in the MOUT environment where it will likely take place. Finally, the infantry intensive requirements for the mission almost dictate the inclusion of some IighVairbome element which provides its own coordination and support headaches. Acknowledging all of the above, it is still almost inevitable that the armored force will eventually be called upon to execute or participate in some form of NE0 mission. Recognizing this fact is the first step towards successful execution. The sooner the mounted force begins to address this new mission, the more lives may be saved in the not too distant future. Captain Robert Bateman was commissioned in Infantry in 1989 as a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Delaware. He has served as rifle platoon leader, 0'4-87 Infanfry, 25th ID(L); Operations South Officer, TF Catamount, USBA 7 7, Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt; and 53 (Air), 4-87 Infantry. A graduate of Airborne School, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Air Assault Course, Ranger School, USAF Drop Zone Control, AOAC, and BMOC. he is currently BMO, 2-7 Cavalry, Ist Cavalry Division. 49