Future Army Combat Forces Captain Michael L. Howe Creeping Overwatch

Future Army Combat Forces by’Captain Michael L. Howe Introduction United States military forces are approaching a crossroad in development. Operation DESERT STORM was one of the few wars that did not produce forced development of new weapons, logistic systems, communication systems, or industrial processes; rather it confmed the process of research and development in accordance with a perceived threat. However, the existence of an online, readily identifiable military threat upon which to base military force development may not be a determinant for the foreseeable future. With development and fielding lead-times of up to 15 years for some of the most advanced military hardware, it will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to make prudent decisions based on traditional quantifmble factors associated with the enemies of the past. Entering the 21st century, a small military force must not become a national security vulnerability. The future United States’ military forces must have the capability to deploy, then fight and secure victory while using reduced resources. Inherently, armor/mechanized forces must remain the fighting base of the United States m y.

Gennan Genen Heinz Guderian ai gued in the 1930s ths armored forces shouli be at the core of the new army his natioi was developing.

Fighting Theory Between World War I and 1939, the United States faced a period similar to the decision crossroad the military is facing today. For the United States, national policy, the public mood, and Blitzkreig in Practice: The panzers roll into Poland, 1939. budget constraints brought about war planning based on the concept of limited war in terms of numbers of participants, areas and forces. However, no fighting doctrine was developed to support the strategic theory.’ Many nations faced similar decisions about the focus of their armed forces. The choice for most became one of developing the weapons invented through necessity during World War I and thereby building an army based on mechanized forces of armored vehicles or maintaining an infantry force based on wheel transportation or foot marching. Perhaps no nation faced a rebuilding task as great as Germany during that period. Following a near total disarmament as a consequence of World War I, Germany had to decide on a fighting concept for its army and then build a force capable of executing that concept. One of Germany’s main proponents of armored warfm was General Heinz Guderian. Many of Gudenan’s arguments, used to convince the German military to adopt the tank as its decisive ground combat weapon, remain applicable to the decisions facing the U. S. Army today. Borrowing heavily from the writings and theories of B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, Guderian formed his concepts of the armor force around the principles of protection, fire and movement. These are very similar to Fuller's functions of battle as described in the following passage: When two men fight. whatever the stake may be, they have got to guard, to hit, and to move. Whether they are armed or unarmed, or whether they are fighting on foot, on horseback or from within a machine, these three functions remain constant. Multiply the two men to any number and the result is exactly the same. Therefore, it follows that all organization to be tactically efficient, must express these three ficnctions, and the more readily, rapidly and efectively it does so, the more perfect it is in itsev. The things which enable the soldier to give effect to functions of guarding, hitting and moving -namely means of protec-Mid-1930s hoper of the Panzerwaffe -the early Getman atmomd force -stands on the deck of a Pzkw I in the distinciive uniform of that force, which included a padded beret, later discanied. The Krupp-built light tank was essentially a l@ht/y armored machine gun canier. Although it was obsolete for combat as early as 1940, it was used for training and - with later modifications - as a command tank. tion. weapons and means of movement -I have generally called the physical elements of war, and out of their combined use, tactics, or the art of jight-ing is evolved. 2 As described these functions are unchanging principles of war. The basic concepts remain unchanged even today, providing a means to examine the capabilities of military forces with common considerations. A review of Guderian's principal concepts affms the primacy of armored forces in the Army's ground combat role? Armor Attacks Guderian felt those outside the membership in the mechanized ground combat forces of the m y tended to imagine an mor/mechanized attack as massive numbers of tanks speeding across the battlefield, crushing wire barriers, smashing machine guns and spewing weapons fm. To Guderian, such tactics were one use for armor forces, however, they were not the true function of those forces. He felt the events of uast wars as well as fic-ARMOR - March-April1992 Guderian felt that until anew and better method of making a successful ground attack, other than amass infantry assault, was developed, Germany had to continue to maintain the belief that armor/mechanized forces -properly employed -would become the best means available for ground combat. titious depictions of armor combat were so impressed on the minds of the critics of armored forces that they pictured an armor attack as tanks steadily rolling forward to crush the enemy beneath their lracks whenever and wherever the commander ordered, regardless of the tactical or operational situation. Guderian insisted that the versatility and effectiveness of an armored force was often underestimated. He felt that most military personnel considered armor forces to be blind and deaf, incapable of holding ground they had captured, and completely vulnerable to antiarmor defenses. Guderian’s critics insisted that antiarmor defenses were no longer susceptible to surprise, and that the modem weapons and artillery of the period were always thought to maintain perfect accuracy and reliability. To them, defenses were impervious to the degrading effects of casualties, smoke, fog, trees or other obstacles, and ground contours. Guderian’s critics believed that state of the art detection systems, combined with faultless optical systems, seemed to make the defense of the period all-seeing and all-knowing. This scenario presented a picture in which armor systems had no future. If that had been so, Guderian would have faced a situation where all new tactics for old weapons should have been scrapped, while at the same time allowing the world to continue with the consequences of positional warfare as practiced during World War I. However, Guderian felt that until anew and better method of making a successful ground attack, other than amass infantry assault, was developed, Germany had to continue to maintain the belief that armor/ mechanized forces - properly employed - would become the best means available for ground combat, Guderian ignored the contention that the older a weapon became the less effective it was because of newly developed countermeasures. He stated, Tity the artillery! It is aheady hundreds of years old. Pity the air force! Age is creeping up on it.”4 Guderian insisted that weapon effectiveness was relative to the effectiveness of the countermeasures employed against it, He felt that any weapon was effective only so long as the military was willing to make maximum use of the latest technological developments and thus remain at the peak of performance. His point of view was’that the tank had not been surpassed by other weapon technology and therefore would become the “architect for victory.’’

Protection One of the primary advantages Guderian stressed was the protection gained from armd vehicles against enemy weapons fire. He felt the struggle of men to overcdme the effects of enemy weapons fire had existed throughout military history; insisting the contest between armor and missile had and would result in advantages and disadvantages for each contender, Guderian felt that for each type of armor developed a missile had been developed in order to defeat that armor. The constant struggle between armor and missile did not detract from the value of armor forces. He believed that if it did, armies could do no better than to send soldiers into battle with no other protection than their cloth uniforms. Guderian held that in armored warfare, if an army could equip a force with reasonably protective armor, then commit that force against an enemy defense in an area avoiding the mass of the enemy antiarmor weapons, then that force would inevitably be successful. He further contended that if an army could equip a force with armor invulnerable to enemy fm, success was almost guaranteed. Guderian emphasized that once an attacking force passed the enemy main defensive belt, the armor forces would fight and destroy the enemy’s unarmored forces in unprotected rear areas resulting in decisive victory.

Movement To Guderian, only movement brought victory. He felt armor forces provided the best means to bring troops into contact with the enemy. Guderian stressed that the ability to move faster than the enemy was the key to military success. For him, armor forces had that capability. Movement established the conditions for combat and enabled an army to achieve decisive results. Guderian realized armor forces could not successfully attack in all situations. They could not storm fortifications, nor could they operate well in obstruction-filed terrain. However, Guderian insisted annor forces could only be looked upon as having even more attacking power than other arms of the military and was not considered to be the answer for all operational situa- tions. He stressed that the ability to fm and move, as o p posed to firing from fixed psitions, would enable armor forces to prevent an enemy from reestablishing a defensive position and finally to overcome the enemy defense.

Fire

Guderian felt the main advantage of armor fmes was the ability to bring firepower to bear while actually advancing against and through the enemy. He saw armor's weapons fire as intended to destroy specific enemy vehicles, personnel, and equipment, not merely to sup press or pound an enemy into MG J. F. C. Fuller, British military theoretician, inspired the German doctrine of mobile warfare. submission. For Guderii, the ability to actually advance against an enemy while bringing firepower to bear was a quality unique to the armor force. He felt that armor forces were the fm-est weapon for the attack. Basing his beliefs in opposition to proponents of infantry, who felt that tanks were created in order to enable the infantry to attack, Guderian concluded that it followed that a weapon that allowed others to advance had to be the primary weapon of the army.

Armor Today Today, many of those same advantages stressed by Guderian remain characteristics of modern armor forces. Most significant, annor forces continue to fulfill the primary elements of war as described by Fuller -protection, fire, and movement -and are therefore best suited to constitute the basis for a fighting doctrine for the future. The armor/mechanized forces provide more protection against direct and indirect fire weapons than any other weapon capable of movement and attack. Armor/mechanized forces provide superior firepower, with capability to destroy all land based conventional weapons as well as equipment and personnel.

Armor/mechanized forces provide unmatched crosscountry, all-weather mobility while maintaining excellent on-road movement capability. By examining the other branches of the Army using the same considerations one comes to the same conclusions.

As J. F. C. Fuller stated in his lectures on armred warfare?

As the present age is largely a mechanical one so will the wars of this age take on a similar complexion, because military organization follows civil organization... as industry is the base of mechanization, it logically follows that in the future only industrialized countries will be able to wage organized warfare with success. When war depended on horsejlesh, as it did during the Middle Ages, a country which possessed few good horses stood a poor chance against a country possessing a plentifil supply. Similarly in those distant days, a country which could produce armour was all powerful when compared to a country which could not. So also today, a country which possesses few industries and manufactures few will be virtually impotent to resist invasion. Armor forces of today incorporate the computer, as well as advanced electronics, as basic equipment. As shessed by Guderian, the effectiveness of armor/mechanized forces will only decline when the military no longer invests in maintaining upto-date equipment.

Notes 'Maorice Matloff. "The American Theory und Practice of Wur, cd. Michael Howad, (Bloanington. Ind.: In-Approach to Wa, 1919-1945," in Indiana University Press. 1975). p. 5 9 ) ' J. P. C. Funer, Machine Wurfme. (washington D. C.: Infantry Journal Inc. 1943). p. 55. 3Closcly adapted from. General Heinz mer -im, Pumer Lccldcr. (Washington D. C.: Zengcr Publishing Co., 1952). p. 39. 41bid. p. 42. 'J. F. C. Fuller. h r d Wurfure. (Westpat, Cum.: Greenwood Press. 1983). p. 5. Captain Michael L. Howe was commissioned in Armor from OCS, Ft. Benning, Ga., in 1984. He sewed as a tank platoon leader in 4th ID, Ft. Carson, Colo.; support platoon leader and S4 in 2-68 Armor, Baumholder, Germany; and company commander of Troop F, 1-12 Cav, and as a force design officer at Ft. Knox, Ky. He is currently attending Georgetown University in graduate studies in national security. He will be assigned as an ROTC instructor at Georgetown in September 1992. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and CAS3.