Death and Destruction in the Desert

Recent experience at the National Training Center (NTC) showed how difficult it is for a task force in the defense to stop an attacking motorized rifle regiment (MRR) moving at high speed. At times, units were unable to properly synchronize close air support (CAS) and field artillery at the brigade level, making it nearly impossible to slow down and break up the attacking regiment's mass of vehicles while fighting the deep battle. This shortfall calls for action by commanders at the task force level. One viable solution is to use one tank and one ITV platoon forward of the main battle area (MBA). Experience shows that a linear defense does not work. The MRR need only succeed in punching one hole in the line, and it will stream through into the rear areas. What does work is a defense in depth - as much as 12 kilometers of it - forcing the MRR to run a gauntlet of engagement areas. Each engagement area presents an ambush of flank and rear shots from "keyhole positions." I "Keyhole positions" are those placed out of the enemy's direct line of sight until he passes, or placed far enough away from his axis of advance that he must look far to his flanks to observe the position. The friendly side of folds in. the terrain, rocky areas, and deadspace provide excellent "keyhole positions." Defense in depth allows the defender additional time to flex a team, if necessary, to cover more than one engagement area. Facing a defense in depth, the attacking MRR has to fight its way through one engagement area and obstacle after another. The defender can add needed depth by employing a special force of tanks and ITVs defending from prepared two-tiered fighting positions forward of the MBA. After being engaged by surprise from hard-to-identify forward positions, the attacking regiment cannot regroup after the deep battle for the assault on the MBA. This acts as a tremendous combat multiplier. The mission of this force - perhaps six tanks and seven ITVs - is to slow down the enemy, create confusion, attrit enemy forces as they pass through the forward engagement area, and ultimately cause them to deploy into assault formation before reaching the task force. The Force's mission is not to stop the enemy dead in his tracks. It is not to establish a blocking position, and it is not to fight the counterreconnaissance battle. At the NTC, we have seen the effect that an element 3-5 kilometers forward of the MBA can have on the enemy when properly employed. The task force organizes the element we call the combat reconnaissance detachment (CRD) into two platoons 3-5 kilometers forward of the MBA. Surprise is the key to the success of this operation, but this depends on attention to detail during the preparation phase, and proper execution of the CRD rue plan. The CRD can only achieve surprise through intense planning, preparation, and outstanding soldier discipline. Crews properly execute the fire plan by adhering to the designated trigger line criteria established for each vehicle position. The preparation phase begins, as always, by determining the possible avenues of approach and deciding where best to kill the enemy. Engagement area size depends on terrain and avenue of approach. Engagement areas of at least 3km by 3km are common. The next step is to determine the "trigger line" criteria. The CRD commander must specifically tailor the criteria to each fighting position, with alternatives to deal with variations in the expected avenues of approach. The CRD commander must determine which TRPs each vehicle can engage. A typical trigger line criteria might be: "Engage when 15 tanks or BMPs pass TRP BLUE." The CRD must allow the lead vehicles to pass almost entirely through the engagement area before engaging. This will provide all weapon systems with multiple targets, increase the number of grill door and flank shots, and greatly enhance surprise. The next step is to choose battle positions. Because the CRD has no organic infantry support, avoid positions near obvious dismounted avenues of approach. Place the counter-reconnaissance screen forward of these positions to protect the CRD during the prep phase and to prevent fratricide. Position the holes no closer than 500 meters apart, and if the terrain allows, 500 to loo0 meters away from the engagement area. This will make in- 42 ARMOR - dividual fighting positions harder to detect, yet still enable both systems to range into the engagement areas. Whenever possible, position all vehicles to achieve flank and rear shots at enemy vehicles. Firing across the engagement area, or back toward friendly lines, will not cause a fratricide problem for other elements. The CRD has its own engagement area, at least three kilometers or a terrain feature away from the MBA. You must position vehicles to avoid frontal assaults. Repositioning the systems will be impossible because they will be in decisive engagement the entire time the MRR passes through the engagement area. Therefore, the engineers will dig only one position per vehicle. The next step is to dig the fighting positions. In an attempt to retain the element of surprise and to prevent the enemy from pinpointing the positions, the engineers must dig the holes during the task force’s first day of preparation and only under cover of darkness. This means that the commander must choose and mark each position during daylight, and mark a route from a hide position back to each hole, with the route known to all in the CRD. To prevent fratricide, it is important that the CRD inform all personnel conducting rehearsals or performing the counter-recon mission when it moves to or from its positions. Once the engineers dig the holes, the crews stretch camouflage nets over them. After they accomplish this step, vehicles are not to occupy the holes again. Final occupation will occur the night before an attack, if possible. Vehicles should rehearse their routes, but not return to the exact fighting position. When rehearsing, try to appear to be part of the counter-recon screen. Do not place any major obstacles in the engagement area. However, obstacles at the end of the engagement area closest to the MBA keep the enemy from moving out of the kill sack. Because the enemy can drive through the engagement area freely, and the fighting positions are well dispersed, it is unlikely that the enemy will try to assault the 13 individual fighting positions. This would sacrifice his speed. Crew members must emplace local obstacles - consisting of AP mines, AT mines, and booby traps - to provide some security and protection against direct assaults on individual positions. They must emplace the local obstacles during the night, after final occupation of the position. If the enemy tries to assault, then the CRD accomplished its mission. It forced the enemy to slow down, deploy, and lose momentum. The enemy then becomes a better target for artillery and the other members of the CRD. The CRD commander and the FSO must precisely coordinate the fire support plan. The task force commander must give the CRD priority of fire after the counterrecon force has withdrawn. Because ARMOR - March-April 7990 43 of the vast sue of the engagement area, the CRD must register all target groups for accuracy. Once the attack begins, the CRD commander must be able to have rounds in the air at his command. With effective artillery fire landing on the enemy, and all weapon systems blazing into a different portion of the engagement area simultaneously, the results will be devastating. Once the battle position preparation is complete, all vehicles will move to a consolidated hide position. At this location, crews will accomplish the following activities: 0 Issue a detailed operations order to all members of the CRD. 0Make final coordination, and conduct walk-through rehearsals. 0 Conduct pre-combat checks. 0Complete resupply of classes I, 111, and V.. Perform maintenance, and - time permitting - initiate asleep plan. At EENT on the night before an attack, the CRD will occupy fighting positions. It must maintain a passive posture and practice perfect noise and light discipline. The CRD is not to intercept any reconnaissance efforts by the enemy that pass through the counter-recon screen. No vehicle will engage unless its crew compromises its position, or it is certain that an enemy vehicle is going to pass over the fighting position. Radio listening silence is in effect except to report enemy contact. Thirty minutes before BMNT, all personnel will upgrade their NBC posture to a modified MOPP IV in preparation for the enemy artillery prep. The protective mask will be out and ready to put on when the artillery prep begins. This will help reduce NBC casualties. Because of the dispersion between vehicles, all vehicles should conduct M256 tests once the prep begins. All of the preparation for the battle culminates in the violent and precise execution of the fire plan. The crews properly execute the tire plan through patience, discipline, and effective fire on the enemy, once the enemy meets the trigger line criteria. Vehicles must not open fire prematurely, giving the enemy a chance to move away from the engagement area. The advantages of such an operation greatly outweigh the disadvantages. Even though the enemy knows the engineers did some digging, he does not know how many holes, why, or whete the engineers dug them. The enemy may assume the positions are for the countcr-recon force. Due to the inactivity near the holes during daylight, and the lack of obstacles, the enemy may also assume that all vehicles withdrew with the counter-recon force. Or, as has actually happened, the enemy may expect the small, forward force without obstacle support to be an insignificant threat, and attempt to push through the engagement area. In one situation like this, one tank killed 25 enemy vehicles in August 1988, during 2-77 Armor’s task force defense of the Whale Gap. If even one vehicle is able to effectively engage the enemy, he must slow down and deploy to try to extract that vehicle from its hole. By making the fighting positions difficult to identify, and by placing them off the avenues of approach and well away from the engagement areas, the survivability of vehicles is greatly enhanced. By not engaging until the last possible minute, and by placing well-camouflaged holes in the desert floor, the CRD can achieve a tremendous amount of surprise. The surprise will cause confusion, temporarily rendering enemy weapons ineffective. The major disadvantages are that vehicles can’t be repositioned, and it takes more time to evacuate casualties. Repositioning is a problem every unit faces, no matter where it is located on the battlefield. Once the enemy makes contact, it is nearly impossible for anyone to reposition without being overrun because of the speed of the attack. One must remember that the NTC is an open desert environment, and the repositioning problem is more pronounced when fighting in an MGO than in an M1. Units can reduce their casualies somewhat by having crews combat lifesaver qualified and using self-evacuation techniques. The only other alternative is to await evacuation afer the defenders repel the attack by the MRR. Overall, the use of the combat reconnaissance detachment in the defense is an excellent idea. The survivability of the CRD is as good as anywhere else on the battlefield. The destruction the CRD can inflict on the enemy is only limited by the thoroughness of the preparation, the number of rounds on each vehicle, and the accuracy of the gunners. The surprise achieved is like a hammer striking an anvil with your fingers caught in between. It is devastating. The CRD concept will work. First Lieutenant Mark E. LaDu is a 1986 graduate of the USMA. He sewed as a tank platoon leader, commander of the Combat Reconnaissance Detachment during 2-77 Armor’s August 1988 NTC rotation, and HHC XO. A graduate of AOB and Airborne School, he sewed as commander of HHC, 2-77 Armor at Ft. Carson, Colo. He recently served as the scout platoon leader for 2-77 Armor and is scheduled to attend AOAC in January 1990. 44 ARMOR - March-April 7990