Our Need to Develop ... *hhk/& \ e

Our Need to Develop ... *hhk/& \ e, by Colonel Len Hawley / "Initiative and baltlefield aggressiveness come not from some intangible, heroic virtue; but spring forth when soldiers and leaders know what is happening and can anticipate what likely will happen." Today, we rely on "smart" bombs and bullets to do the job on the battlefield and to give us the qualitative edge over our enemy. We also use "intelligent" networks and "expert" systems to do jobs with greater speed, consistency, and precision. Perhaps it is time to explore the concept of "brilliant" battalions - combat maneuver units that get the job done by collecting better information, by making better estimates of the situation, and by minimizing the chaos and confusion on the modern battlefield. This article examines why our current combat maneuver battalions may fail in battle and sugests ways to reduce the chance of failure. This subject is not glamorous: information movement and management. For the muddy boots types, call it C?I and remember all the times that a tactical exercise didn't go right because someone didn't get the word, someone should have reported something but didn't, or someone didn't sufficiently address a critical factor (METI'-T) in planning the operation. We've all been there and learned, but most of us are still in the Dark Ages when it comes to streamlining our c31 processes in combat maneuver battalions. Common Battlefield Failures Our experiences in fighting the OPFOR at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, highlight common battlefield failures of U.S. Army maneuver battalions. The most persistent weaknesses are shown here:' 0Lack of initiative and a failure 0 Failure to see the battlefield. Insufficient analysis of the situation. 0 Failure to plan in detail and use time effectively. 0 Poor coordination of plans between higher, lower, and adjacent units. 0 Poor land navigation. Inaccurate reporting of friendly or enemy locations. 0 Weapons not positioned according to terrain to maximize their lethality and survivability. 0 Fratricide by direct and indirect fire. 0 Lack of information concerning unit status and requirements. to take risks. These serious problems lead to defeat on the battlefield. What is disconcerting is that they don't seem to go away. The fundamental cause of these problems is a failure to manage and move vital information within the maneuver battalion. Look at the weaknesses listed above - they all center on the collection, transmission, analysis, assessment, and communication of information. This assertion drives home one of Sun Tzu's maxims: "The power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating the difficulties, dangers, and distances constitutes the test of a good leader. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not will surely be defeated."2 Information: A Combat Resource As Sun Tzu indicates, you can't get the job done in battle without good information. That is why information must be considered a decisive resource - perhaps more important than bullets, fuel, medical supplies, or repair parts. Moreover, information provides more than just facts, statistics, and intelligence. In S.L.A. Marshall's words, a soldier's spontaneous initiative and fighting spirit for aggressive action depends on keeping him informed with real battle information? All combat is exploratory. Fighting an undefined enemy on unknown terrain without good information is like groping around blindfolded in a room full of vipers - no one would be aggressive. Initiative and battlefield aggressiveness come not from some intangible, heroic virtue; but spring forth when soldiers and leaders know what is happening and can anticipate what likely will happen. Hence, the decisive power of information. Those who manage information best will win. In nature's most fundamental competition of survival of the fittest, man dominates all other species because he uses information better. He collects, he analyzes, he learns, and he reasons. So it is with fighting units - those that acquire and manage information best will dominate an adversary in combat. We see this every day at the National Training Center, where the OPFOR wins about 80 percent of the battles. While American com-ARMOR - March-April 1990 29 manders cite many excuses for repeated OPFOR success, the fundamental advantage the OPFOR enjoys is that it manages battle information better than American units. We've got to turn thk around. Brilliant Battalions Vs. Stupid Legions Historians cite many great battles where smaller, but better trained and more intelligently led forces defeated larger, but poorly trained and dogmatically led forces. In recent times, the successive Israeli victories on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai are strong evidence that fighting battalions, using intelligent tactics and highly-trained soldiers, can defeat numerically superior forces. Clearly, there is a strong argument for investing in "brilliant" battalions. What is the potential return on that investment? What is the payoff in investing in "brighter" battalions rather than more battalions or more firepower? What are the relative merits of "intelligence" versus "force?" While such comparisons are hard to measure, one Army Research Institute study provides insights into the potential payoffs: Increasing "force" ratios from low to high increases a unit's chances of success about threefold, while increasing "intelligence" ratios from low to high increases a unit's chance of success about thirty-fold! The payoffs can be significant. The leverage provided by "brilliant" battalions significantly increases our chances of battlefield success! The Path to Brilliance What must we do to field "brilliant" battalions? Obviously, tactical training focused on intelligent tactics and skillful employment of weapons is essential. Moreover, leader development of young officers is critical to provide competent, credible, and caring leadership. Competent battle leaders know the effects of battle information on a unit's initiative and fighting spirit, and they practice good communications as a matter of discipline and routine. However, many units have good communications by virtue of the way they operate, but don't solve the information management problems that cause defeat. We must address the battle information management problems up front, rather than relegating them to one of several issues under the title of command and control. Here is what we need: 0 Solve the intra-unit communications problems. Make "chatter" informative and meaningful, rather than formal, irregular, and unproductive. 0Let commanders "see the battlefield." Narrative descriptions over the radio net don't cut it. They are slow, incomplete, or inaccurate, and probably don't help in making key decisions. 0 Provide comprehensive analysis of the situation as it develops. The data is there; we must find a way to move and display it faster. Help the staff develop better assessments for the commander. Don't rely on guesses or "what the boss wants to hear." 0 Help the battle staff develop detailed plans for air defense coverage, fire support, barriers, or resupply and evacuation. Stubby pencil plans written by exhausted staff officers usually don't work or arrive too late to affect the battle. .Fix the land navigation problems. In rapid maneuver warfare, accurate day and night navigation is absolutely critical for tactical 0 Solve the weapons positioning and fratricide problems. We need to figure out how to tell our crew leaders not to shoot at our own guys. 0Make updates of unit status (fuel, bullets, personnel, sleep) an success. automatic function. Why should an exhausted, frightened tanker have to count and report how many tank rounds he has on board? Whatever he says is probably inaccurate. When we solve these challenges, we will enjoy good battle information management, and we will field "brilliant" battalions. The Technology of Brilliance Technology can pa.rtly solve these challenges. We are on the threshold of an information revolution, and the Army can possess the results of technical progress by bringing that technology to combat maneuver battalions for competitive advantage. Our strategy with regard to battle information management should center on thcse technologies: 0NeuraI Networks: These networks aid in the automatic diagnosis of weapons, vehicles, and systems. The primary uses would be to give automatic updates on combat readiness and status, including ammunition, fuel, maintenance, etc. The same approach can extend to the soldier: we can automatically measure and report fatigue, emotional stability, and physical filness to withstand combat. Commanders no longer have to grope around, wondering, "Is my unit ready to fight?" 0 Digital Information: Information can be transferred faster, more securely, and in greater quantity using digital data transfer. Today, we can send not only voice, but also pictures and data using digital systems. The staff no longer has to rely on verbal reports or messengers to say "10,OOO words." .Graphic Display A picture is worth "10,OOO words." TV screens supported by digital information transfer enable commanders and staffs to get the big picture quickly and accurately. With some good thinking, we can provide the com- 30 ARMOR - March-Apri/ 7990 mander just what he needs to know to make good decisions. He can see the battlefield and react quickly. Position Locating Systems: The most vital piece of information on a chaotic battlefield is: "Where am I?" Today, the answer to that question is usually wrong. But now we can provide the answer to the commander automatically, with eight-digit-coordinate accuracy. The benefits are significant: no one gets lost, we reduce fratricide, and the commander knows exactly where his forces are, so he can execute skillful fire and maneuver. Expert Systems: Computer software can take the errors, delays, and incompetence out of detailed planning. Expert systems are accurate, fast, and skillful - why have a fire support plan that is late, or doesn't support the scheme of maneuver? In addition, expert systems can monitor critical task accomplishment during battle preparation, including changes in task organization, movement of supplies, and completion of minefields. Further, they can aid staff officers in resource allocation and scheduling. Every commander wants to go into battle with the best staff support, and expert systems can make a good staff into a great staff. 0 Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI software can provide the commander comprehensive situation assessments of enemy and terrain (METT-T). The commander can save the precious time used for terrain recons by using AI-developed recon plans. Further, AI can produce enemy attack options (or defense options) that integrate enemy capabilities and enemy commanders' styles. An AI system can probably "think like the enemy" better than the S2, to provide the Commander a thorough picture of the enemy's options. An AI system can integrate terrain and weapons capabilities to maximize weapons effects on the enemy. Lastly, an AI system can help the commander anticipate major problems in his distribution, timing, and concentration of combat power, and can focus the commander's attention on the key information he needs to control his units on the battlefield. The technology of battle information management is emerging and being applied within many competitive environments, from professional and college sports, to financial markets, to even illicit drug trafficking. All these competitive environments employ leading-edge information technology at the lowest level - on the front line - to win each "battle." We must do the same: generate informed soldiers led by intelligent officers to fight and win. Obstacles to Brilliance There will be naysayers, and they will be the greatest obstacle to the initiative to field "brilliant" battalions. Here are some common arguments: "You can 't replace the coinrnarider." True, you can't replace the commander, but you sure can help him with accurate and timely information. Napoleon used messengers. Grant used the telegraph. Rommel used the radio. Today, we have much more technology available. Tomorrow's winning general will use the computer, digital commo, and visual displays. "lliis is a substitlife for cohesion arid leadership." Absolutely not! Human cohesion and credible leadership can't be replaced or substituted. But good battle information can enhance cohesion and enable warrior-leaders to be more skillful on the battlefield - thereby enhancing a soldier's fighting spirit. 'Wie Amy's too coinpla alreae." This is a bias against progress and change. The modern battlefield is complex and chaotic. Timing, distances, enemy capabilities, weapons effects, etc. have forced complexity upon us. Good battle information systems can reduce the complexity and focus attention on key variables, making commanders' decisions easier. The important point is to do it right. The warfighter's requirements must be clear and accurate, and the combat development community must give the war-lighter what he wants, rather than what it think he needs. The key to countering the obstacles of brilliant battalions is to overcome our strengths - perceptions of tough, hard-nosed, warriors who beat the enemy with brute force and more firepower. In reality, winning wars is a thinking process - giving our soldiers the best warlighting support (i.e. cohesion, leadership, training, discipline) and good and timely battle information so he can defeat the enemy. Notes 'Samuel C. Endicott and Earl Pence, Leadershir, Lssons Learned, Combined Arms Training Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., July 1986, pp. 0-18. 'James Clavell, ed., The Art of War by Sun Tzu. Delacorte Press: New York, %.LA. Marshall, Men Aaainst Fire, p. 48. 4Fbland J. Hart and Robert H. Sulzen, "Comparing Success Rates in Simulated Combat: Intelligent Tactics vs. Force," Armed Forces and md 1988 Winter, 1983, p. 53. pp. 272-284. Colonel Len Hawley is currently assigned to the Joint Staff. He has sewed in several Armor assignments in CONUS, USAREUR, and RVN, including command of 3-32 Armor at Ft. Hood, Texas. ARMOR - March-April 1990 31

32 ARMOR - March-April 7990

Task Force Smith: A Revised Perspective I by Captain Robert J. Kmiecik Foreword I propose to lead yoii on a short journey tlimigli rtty liistorical world. In my world, politiciaris don't make mistakes arid riiilitaly operations always seait to niii sriiootli~v for tiie good guys. The italicized notes explain tiie ac-hial way things ocairred. If a particular everit came solely fioiti one or two soiirces, I've noted that. Otherwise,'tiie irtfomiatioii conies fioni tiie coriiposite of soiirces in tite bibliography. Unless I tell yoii sonietliing different, the events stand as presciited. Congress was not easily lulled into believing the threat of a renewed war did not exist. They had learned from their mistakes and did not dismantle the mighty war machie that had sprung up during World War

11. The military situation of the United States in June 1950 proved far superior to that of December 1941. llie Amied Forces were no better off titan they were befoore World War

11. Tlte goveniment had deriiobi1i:ed 11s once again. Besides, we had nile Bomb. Who needed an amiy? The U.S. Eighth Amy, under the command of General Walton H. Walker, consisted of the 7th, 24th, 25th, and dismounted 1st Cavalry Divisions. These divisions remained at full strength with well-seasoned and highly-motivated troops, and the newest and best equipment the Army had to offer. Although serving constabulary duty in Japan, their level of training remained high, keeping them set for combat at a momcnt's notice. Die reginterits Itad orilv two of the three aii1lton:ed battalions. Artillery battalions had only two of their titree jlring batteries. Only curits in tite Eiiropeari theatre reinained at full strerigtit. As for the combat readiness, the 24th had the lowest cornbat ef-ficieiicy rating 64 percent. Not that the others ranked so Iiigli; tiie 1st Cavalry, rated only 84 percent, scored Iiiglwst. Tlte best equipment arid effort went to Europe. Appleman, Roy E., Soiitli to the Naktoria. North to the Yahi. United States Amiv in tite Korean Wac (Ojjice of the Chief of Militan, Histoy Washington: US. Goveniriiait Printing Oflce, 1961, reprinted 1986). p. 49. Hoyt, Edwiii

P. 7lte Aisan Perimeter. New York: Stein arid Dq, liic., 19S5. p. 48. At approximately O400, 25 June 1950, the North Koreans commenced their attack. U.S. forces, although surprised by the sudden nature of the onslaught, had adequately prepared for such an event. The United States quickly put into effect its well-planned and rehearsed contingency operations to delay the advancing communist hordes. Surprise reigned! nie US. would take days to tirtravel tiie political red tape prior to atteiiipting eveit tiie simplest coordiiiated actions. Task Force Smith, composed primarily of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 241h Infantry Division, commanded by LTC Charles B. Smith, received orders to deploy immediately. COL Stephens, Smith's regimental commander, told Smith to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to ltazuke Air Base. They would fly to Korea immediately. General Dean, newly appointed commander U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), would meet Smith at the airfield to brief him on the mission. At the airbase, General Dean told him: "When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. This packet contains the most current enemy situation we have. General Church will give you further guidance and details once you have landed. That's all I've got. Good luck to you, and God bless you and your men." Appleman, p. 60. Italics acnially read, "Contact General Chitrch. If yoii can't locate Iiirtt, go to Taejoii arid beyond if you cart. Sorry I can't give yoii more infomiation." At the time of departure, Smith's unit consisted of two fully strengthed rifle companies, B and C; the headquarters company; a communications platoon; a 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon of four guns; and four 4.2-inch mortars. The organization of B and C companies included six 3.5-inch rocket launchers and four 60-mm mortars. Each man had 360 rounds of 30 caliber rifle ammunition and three days of C-rations. Both cornparties were iirider-strength; it had only one half each of ARMOR - March-April 1990 33 the headquarters and coniriiiinica-tions platoons; lie brought on& two of tlie 75-r?ir?i recoilless rifles arid only two out of the four 4.2-inch mortars; tlie bazookas were the outdated 2.36-incli version; each nian had on& 120 roiinds of animo and two days’ rations. The airlift occurred with no problems. The remainder of Smith’s battalion, principally A and D Companies, would travel by ship to Korea and link up on the perimeter if time permitted. Upon landing in Pusan, Smith’s contingent quickly boarded trains and traveled to its staging area in Taejon. Tnnvel to his forward positions becanie one of Smith’s greatest problems. nie aid@ proved inadequate and slow diie to weather and availability of C-54s. On tlie hip nortli tliroiigli Korea along rail and roQd Sniitli had to contend with refiigees freeing soiitli, and Soiitli Korean dn‘vers who refirsed to go nortli toward tlie figliting. With his men in bivouac, Smith and his principal officers got into jeeps and proceeded forward to recon their position near Osan. They found a highly defensible position about three miles north of Osan, where the main road ran through a low saddle, with hills that commanded both the approaches on the road and on the railroad tracks to the east. From this position, Smith could see the highway and the railroad almost the entire distance to the town of Suwon, eight miles to the north. Having returned from the recon, Smith moved his task force initially to P’yongt’aek where it united with part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion, consisting of A Battery with six 105-mm howitzers, and one-half of each the Headquarters and Service Batteries. LTC Miller 0. Perry commanded this contingent of 73 vehicles and 108 men. Task Force Smith arrived at its defensive positions north of Osan at approximately 0300 on 4 July. The highly-trained soldiers quickly began moving their supplies up the hills from the roadway. By the next evening, the soldiers completed excellent fighting positions with overhead cover and communication trenches. Task Fame Sniitli pulled into its positions at 0300 on tlie 5th. jiist four lioiirs before the start of the North Korean attack. Work began simultaneously on the barrier plan to aid in delaying and destroying the expected armored force. Task Force Smith had received a large portion of the antitank mines the government had so wisely stockpiled in the event of an armor-heavy attack From North Korea. They placed these in a series of close belts to the rear of the saddle, forming a kill sack between the infantry and the artillery. Smith also placed a minefield approximately 1500 meters to the front of the infantry and had the artillery, 2000 meters behind the infantry, register their guns out to 4OOO meters, giving him a 500-meter kill zone. Sniitli had no mines. He sure@ needed them tlioiigli. He did, however, register liis artilley. Perry placed two of his 105-mm howitzers in overwatch, covering the fire sack to the rear of the saddle. Of his 1,200 rounds of ammunition, 200 consisted of high explosive antitank and the remaining 1,OOO high explosive. Perry gave 25 rounds of antitank munition to each of the two overwatching howitzers for use in the direct fire mode. The remaining ammunition went to the rest of the firing battery set up about a kilometer farther down the road. On& sir of his 1,200 roiinds were antitank. He placed one howitzer, instead of two, to the rear of tlie infantry, and gave the sir A T roiinds to that gin. Smith placed one platoon of B Company on the high ground to the west of the road with the remaining two platoons immediately to the right of the road. C Company occupied the remainder of the high ground to the right of the road over to a position where they could cover the railroad tracks to the east. Each company placed one 75-mm recoilless rifle toward the forward engagement area and one to the rear covering the southern kill sack. They dug alternate positions for each to allow Smith the option of using all four at one time. Smith placed the 4.2-inch mortars on the reverse slope of the ridge about 400 meters behind the center of B Company’s position. Because lie had on@ two 75-IiiIii rifles, Sniitli chose to employ titent both to the froit of the task fome. The grinners diig no alternate positions. The communications platoon established redundant wire connections to all the fighting positions. Positive communication with both wire and radio existed between Smith and Perry. The forward observers with each company had little problem communicating with the field artillery and mortars. In achiality, conrmiinications remained poor. Die wire, old and spliced frorii past irse, wotked inter-inittent@ at best. llte radios, wet from tlie constant drizzle, proved ineffective. Later in tlie battle, the enemy tanks blew tlinnigli tlie initial defen- 34 ARMOR - March-April 7990 ses arid cut all wire coriirtiiirticatiori to tlte artillery. With the preparation for the defense complete, Task Force Smith had only to wait for the enemy, if he dared to come its way, and make small improvements on its excellent defensive positions. Within a day, the remainder of the battalion should arrive to strengthen the line. Fm~ii the tiiiie Task Force Sinitlt pulled into its positioris, there were on[v foiir Itoiirs of preparation before tlte Nortlt Korean attack co~iuitertced. “In the early gray dawn of July 5, SGT Loren Chambers yelled, ‘Hey, look over there, lieutenant. Can you believe!’ Looking down the road toward Suwon, I made out a column of tanks. Seems like there were eight of them. I couldn’t believe my eyes. ‘What are those?’ I asked. Chambers answered, ‘Those are T34 tanks, sir, and I don’t think they’re going to be friendly towards us.’ The company commander was called. Everybody got really excited about them. The day was beginning in earnest.” Quote f r o i t 1LT Pliilip Day, Jr. Kitox, Donald, llte Korean War. An Oral Histom Aisart to Cltosin. New York: Harcoim Brace Jovarioricli Piiblislien, 1985. P. 19. The T34s, the first eight only the spearhead for the main body, rolled up and ground to a halt at the first minefield. Although only surface laid and easily spotted by the enemy tankers, the mines produced the desired effect. The tanks stopped in the open. This served as the signal for the artillery to begin firing. No niines. nie tanks kept rolling. The combination of both HE and AT rounds worked well. The mass of HE artillery dramatically slowed the dismounted attempts to clear the minefield although it had little effect on the armored vehicles. The AT rounds, however, took their toll of T34s, resulting in five kills before the enemy breached the obstacle and continued to advance. Altltoiiglt massive aMler?, fire rained iii OII the eitetnv tanks, tlie standard HE round had little effect, even wirlt direct hits. No eneiiiy losses repofled. llte tanks kept rolling. The 75-mm recoilless rifle teams held their fire, as ordered by Smith, until , the advancing tanks were within 700 meters. The chance of missing the T34s at this range proved slim, and the rifles immediately scored direct hits. These frontal shots produced little damage though, and the T34s continued to roll toward the American defenses. Seeing the situation rapidly getting out of hand, Lieutenant Philip Day and one of the 75-mm recoilless rifle teams moved its piece to a predetermined alternate position that afforded good flanking shots on the T34s as they approached. The team fired two well-placed killing shots before falling farther back to another position covering the southern engagement area. ILT Pliilip Day - “We picked tip the gin and moved it to where we could get a clean shot. I don’t know if we were poorly trained, weren’t tliinkiiig, or if it slipped otir ntirtds, but we set the gin on the forward slope of the Itill. When we fired, tlie recoilless blew a Itole in the hill wlticlt instantly covered tis irt ritiid arid dirt. nte effect wasn’t nearly as bad on 11s as it was on tlte girt. It jamrned arid woiildrt ’t fire ...“ fitox, p. 20. As the T34s crested the road through the saddle and began down the other side, the two 105-mm howitzers greeted them with direct AT fire from the front. In the saddle, Lieutenant Ollie Conners effectively used the Army‘s new 3.5-inch rocket launcher on the grill doors of the T34s. Conners fired 22 rounds, single-handedly killing 15 enemy tanks. The howitzers firing the AT rounds accounted for six kills, and the remainder of the T34s became targets of opportunity for the bazooka teams of Task Force Smith. As rioted earlier, there was one Itowiker placed to the rear of the infantry. nte 2.36-inclt rockets proved useless even against the rear amtor of tlte T34s. Cortrters jired 22 roiinds within fi’een meters without scoring even a ritobility kill. nte Itowiker killed one tank with tlte direct fire A T rounds and succeeded in stopping one other. TIte third T34 tltroiigli the saddle knocked oiit the antbiishiitg howitzer. Appleman, p. 69-70. Alaander, Beriit, Korea, The First War We Lost. New York: Hippocrene Books, h.,

1986. p. 58-59. In all, 33 enemy tanks were destroyed. Task Force Smith suffered few killed or wounded and retained its key defensive position along the saddle. Morale rose to new heights as the soldiers realized the war had actually begun and the first victory belonged to them. Tlie final tally stood at four tanks killed (iiicliidirtg mobility kills) and three tanks damaged but operational. Twerthwtine T34s made it tiiroiiglt Task Force Siiiitlt 3 position and colt-timed soiitli. Antericait morale sank to a new low. Appleittart, p. 72. The North Koreans, stunned by what they thought would !x an easy victory, delayed six hours before pressing the offensive. This allowed time for a quick resupply of Task Force Smith and, at 1100, the sol- ~~ ARMOR - March-April 1990 35

“Several important lessons jump out. First, as long as the United States remains a democratic nation, politicians will make decisions not necessarily militarily sound. Second, never underestimate your enemy. Third, if you don’t have the necessary equipment to kill your enemy, or it’s broken from lack of maintenance, don’t expect to win.“ diers of A and D Companies arrived. Although tired from the long journey, this new addition of fresh manpower to the Task Force Smith defense helped in the next battle. 71ie No~tli Korean infamy followed about an liotir after tlie tanks liad passed. A and D Conipanies never made it forward in time for this battle. At about 1500, LTC Smith o b served a long enemy column moving south out of Suwon. The column consisted of three tanks followed by trucks loaded with soldiers, then columns of marching men stretching back several miles. In total, two full regiments of Korean infantry, the 16 and the 18th, steadily approached the American forces. short on men, Task Force Sniitli became overwlielnied by the advancing Korean iirfarity. Its defense quick& hinied into a disorganized roiit. Task Force Snritli siiffered over 150 nien killed, woiinded, or inissing, arid failed even to slow the advance of the North Korean Aniiy. The North Koreans had little chance now of gaining passage down the road. Task Force Smith, defending in nearly equal numbers at this point, occupied easily defensible terrain from well dug in and prepared positions. The North Koreans, having faced h e most determined foe they had ever seen, already began formulating doubts as to their continuance of the war. We got kicked all the way back to Pusan. Adjust tinie to approXiniateIy 1100. Afterword Smith patiently awaited the approach of the enemy, holding fire until they reached within 1,OOO meters of the friendly positions. Smith attacked with every weapon he had. Machine guns raked the dismounted enemy. Mortar rounds rained down upon them as they tried to exit their trucks. The HE fired from the 105-mm battery caused the most damage, landing in the closely-knit columns of marching infantry. By the time the North Koreans could reassemble their forces, the artillery and direct fire had killed nearly 50 percent of their force. Sniitli had no contntiinication with the field artillery at this point. Witlioiit tlie liowitlers in slipport and Hopefully you have learned something from this little peek into history. Several important lessons jump out. First, as long as the United States remains a democratic nation, politicians will make decisions not necessarily militarily sound. Second, never underestimate your enemy. Third, if you don’t have the necessary equipment to kill your enemy, or it’s broken from lack of maintenance, don’t expect to win. This includes both weapons and support equipment, such as radios and wire. To the fighting men of Task Force Smith, although this essay may appear at times a bit irreverent, you have my deepest respect for at least attempting to accomplish an impossible mission. Bibliography Alexander, W i n . Korea. First War We pocrene Books, Inc., 1986. New York Hip- --- Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong &&I the yalu. united States Army in the Korean War. Office of the Chief of Military History: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, reprinted 1986. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York Simon and Schuster, 1987. Hoyt, Edwin P. The Pusan Perimeter. New York: Stein and Day, Inc., 1985. Knox. Donald. The Korean War, An Oral Histow. Pusan to Chosin. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985. Leckie, Robert. $bnfllct. The His- t o j of the Korean War. 1950-53 New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sans, 1962. Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. Captain Robert J. Kmiecik is a 1985 graduate of Davidson College, N.C. Currently assigned as S3 Air of 2-10 Cavalry, he previously served in l/llth ACR as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, S3 plans officer, and troop XO. He received the

AOAC

4-89 Award for Writing Excellence for this article. 36 ARMOR - March-April 7990