Sheridans In Panama

Captain Frank Sherman In their first combat drop, The aging Sheridans of 3-73 Armor added rirepower to Operation JUST CAUSE niis article is a clirorioiogicai accoiint of the eriipioynierit of aniior iri Operation arid provides obseniatioris made tliroiigli-oiit tlie Operation. 14 November to 4 December Just after 3-73 Armor's fall gunnery period, the battalion received a task to deploy four Sheridans, a command and control element, and a support element to Panama. There they would be attached to the 193d Separate Infantry Brigade, specifically 4-6 Infantry (Mech). The alert went to CM-73 Armor on 14 November 1989. On 15 November, the platoon (+) loaded onto one C5A Galaxy. The troops arrived in Panama during the early morning hours of the 16th. The presence of Sheridans and the small armor support team in Panama was classified. The tanks moved from Howard AFT3 to their "motor pool" under cover of darkness and canvas. The Sheridans remained under cover during daylight with access limited to the crews and the command group of 4-6 Infantry. Crews conducted PT and individual training six days a week. They performed maintenance seven days a week. Once each week, they took vehicles out of their concealed locations and drove them around the motor pool, normally between 2200 and 0200. Crews checked and rechecked all vehicles, weapons, equipment and ammunition to ensure that the unit would be ready for any alert. Before the sun came up, the Sheridans were back under cover and guard. For the next few weeks, CPT Frank Sherman and LT Andrew Kozar developed a battle plan for employment of the team. Team Armor, 4-6 INF (Mech) was to consist of four Sheridans and a platoon of Marines equipped with LAV-25s. They conducted reconnaissance of the area of operation and gathered intelligence. They also coordinated with LT Brian Colebaugh, the Marine LAV platoon leader, routes and plans for link-up, frequencies and call signs. Detailed preparations continued. 4 to 16 December On 8 December, CPT Kevin Hammond took command of Team Armor from CPT Sherman, who returned to Ft. Bra= to prepare the remainder of his company for mission responsibilities. In this capacity, C Company was designated as the "armor ready company" in support of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR).

Fort Bragg personnel rigged four Sheridans for low-velocity air delivery (LVAD or heavy drop). The remaining vehicles and all crews in C Company were on standby for no-notice rapid deployment and follow-on missions. In Panama, CPT Hammond finalized a battle book for the vehicle commanders. Due to the nature of the operation and its many "be-prepared missions," leaders conducted tactical exercises without troops and refined their battle plans. The officers, in particular, needed to be completely familiar with the plan because the concept of the operation, routes, objectives, and be-prepared missions were classified above tank commander level. All crews were briefed in a generic manner and taken on day and night "tours" to gain familiarity with the area of operation. A three-man engineer team was also task organized with Team Armor during this time. 16 to 19 December On 16 December 1989, members of the Panama Defense Force killed a U. S. Marine lieutenant and assaulted and abused another officer and his wife. These events initiated a unit recall and increased readiness posture for Task Force 4-6. Soldiers removed the Sheridans from 8! ARMOR - March-April 7990 cover to mount S O caliber machine guns, load Shillelagh missiles, and install antennas. The Sheridans then went back under cover. Task Force 4-6 conducted a show of force by moving across the Canal to predetermined assembly areas. The mechanized infantry companies remained on the east side of the Canal. This left Team Armor as the only combat force in 4-6 Infantry on the west side of the Canal. On Monday, 18 December, team commanders of task force 4-6 learned that they were in the execution phase of their contingency operation. Meanwhile at Ft. Bragg, units of the 82d Airborne Division’s ready brigade (DRB) went on alert at O900 to conduct an emergency deployment readiness exercise. The exercise included all three infantry battalions, with CS and CSS elements in the task organization. The unit activated readiness SOPS, moved vehicles, equipment, supplies, and ammunition to the heavy drop rigging site, and prepared for heavy drop by crews and parachute riggers. All troopers from the DRB task force moved to the personnel holding area for orders, issue of individual troop items and ammunition, manifests, rehearsals, and pre-jump training. At 2000, LTC James Reed, commander of Task Force 4-6, issued his OPORD. H-hour was set for 0100 on 20 December. When CPT Hammond returned to the Sheridans, he found that the LAV platoon had linked up. CPT Hammond briefed the entire team and then gave his OPORD to the leaders. He issued wartime CEOIs and classified overlays. Rules of engagement were very precise. The task force commander had to approve Sheridan main gun fire because Team Armor would be firing over, and in close proximity to friendly forces. Crews were to avoid fratricide at all cost and keep damage to nonmilitary areas to a minimum. 20 December At about 0030, the companies of Task Force 4-6 reported ready at the start point. Team Armor requested and received permission to move to and cross the swing bridge, which happened without incident. There had been radio reports of enemy fire in the vicinity of Albrook Airfield, which we had to pass, but we encountered none. Team Armor moved to and occupied Bull 1 and Bull 2, its two positions on Ancon Hill. The Team’s three engineers immediately began placing demolition charges to clear fields of fire for the vehicles in Bull 1. Vehicles in Bull 2 had adequate fields of fire. However, visibility at both positions was obscured by smoke and flames from the burning buildings in the vicinity of La Commandancia. Occasionally a crew could identify a particular target, but because the crews could not be 100 percent sure that rounds fired would not cause friendly casualties, no fire commands were given. Additonally, since the effort to isolate the headquarters complex was well in hand, Team Armor was advised not to open fie. 0135 The massive airdrop of heavy equipment began as the C-141Bs released hundreds of tons of equip- - Photos of a Sheridan heay rop at Fort Bragg illustratt ie technique used in Panama. ment and supplies onto the drop zone. Cl3-73 Armor established a historical precedent by being the first U. S. unit to heavy drop light armor into combat. The Sheriddns landed somewhat east of their intended points of impact in a swampy area overgrown with elephant grass. Immediately after the heavy drop, 82d Airborne Division troopers began their personnel drop. The concept of the airborne operation was for 2,200 paratroopers, with supplies, to be ARMOR - March-April 7990 9

-- --.- -- Pacific Ocean on the ground in one pass. However, a severe ice storm in North Carolina delayed takeoff of some aircraft from Pope AFB. As a result, Sheridan crewmen arrived in the first two of three waves of aircraft. Three separate drops took place on Torrijos DZ. The plan called for the eight Sheridans to be task organized, in pairs, to each of the three infantry battalions. The remaining two Sheridans, a platoon of infantry, and an engineer sapper squad were to establish a blocking position at the Highway 1 entrance to the Tocumen-Torrijos Airport under the control of CPT Sherman. Sheridan ana two L A V - u s, wth other elements of Task Force 4-6, came under the operational control of the S3, 4-6 INF (M). We saw the package again a week later as part of the cordon around the airfield. Shortly after this, LT Kozar’s Sheridan and an LAV-25 were placed OPCON to 10 D/4-6 INF (M). They were to reinforce a mechanized infantry platoon that had sustained a number of casualties. LT Kozar and the LAV- 25 moved to the southeast corner of the Commandancia complex where they destroyed a wall and overwatched a possible PDF escapehein-forcing route. They fired two 152- mm rounds at this location. Both of these linkups were made in darkness and under enemy fire. 0700 As daylight broke, the smoke and fire wcst of La Commandancia cleared enough to allow observation of all buildings in the headquarters complex. The remaining vehicles in I Tank Commander SSG Anthony Woodham, C33, took this photo from his overwatch position at BP Bull 2, on Ancon Hill. The Corn-rnandancia complex is hidden in the smoke in the distance. ARMOR -

At left, the Commandancia complex before Operation JUST

CAUSE.

Cerro Tinajitas, home of the 2d PDF infantry company, the day before. Enroute, the column received sniper and mortar fire. After arriving at Tinajitas, SSG John Troxell, TC for C11, received the mission to pick up 18 soldiers from the 1-504 Infantry who were pinned down by sniper fire at the LZ. When the Sheridan arrived, sniping stopped, and all soldiers mounted the Sheridan and returned to Tinajitas. 0800 C20 and C21, the two M551Als that had moved to Panama Viejo the day before, escorted a gun HMMWV and troop transport vehicles to the Marriott Hotel and participated in the extraction of U. S. civilian personnel. Although they received small arms and sniper fire as they approached the hotel, this soon stopped. 2200 SSG Troxell was again pressed into convoy escort duty. As his Sheridan led the convoy of hard shell and logistics HMMWVs from Tinajitas back to Tocumen airfield, it was ambushed at two different points. SSG Troxell returned fire with his main gun and M2. Other vehicles in the column also returned fire. C11 received f i e but took no casualties. Both ambushes were eliminated or suppressed, and the convoy continued to Tocumen. Convoys moved at high speed (approximately 304 mph) and at an extremely close interval. This provided security and prevented nonmilitary vehicles from entering the column. Sheridans led the column. If there was a second Sheridan available, it was usually the third vehicle in column (behind a gun HMMWV). On 21 December, 4-325 AIR conducted its attack on Ft. Cimarron. Near the Vatican Embassy, where Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega sought refuge, C 23 takes up a blocking position. The two supporting Sheridans fired approximately 30 152-mm HEAT rounds in support of the attack. PSYOPS teams, attached to 4-325, announced on loudspeakers terms of surrender to occupants of the buildings. In accordance with "measured response" criteria, PDF refusal was met by Sheridans firing one or two rounds into each structure to neutralize enemy positions. Dismounted infantry then cleared the building of any remaining resistance. A squad of infantry remained with the tanks to furnish local security. Infantry forces operated two or three buildings ahead of the Sheridans to prevent ambushes and close range attacks. 22 December, 0900 C10 and C12 moved to 4-325's new sector and assisted in clearing Panama City. 23 December, 0800 C12 and C20 provided convoy escort to 4-325 AIR. As the column approached the 2-504 PIR sector, both the stationary and moving forces came under small arms and sniper fie. In the ensuing firefight, the Sheridans received small arms and heavy machine gun fire. In addition, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired at a Sheridan. The round missed. Sheridans took several hits from small arms. This passage of lines reinforced the need to plan all passage of lines operations in detail. Both the stationary and the moving force must under-sttand duties, responsibilities, and control measures. 24 December CIO, 22, 23, and 34 moved to secure the area around the Vatican Embassy, C11 and C12 moved to Cerro Tinajitas and provided support to 1-504 Infantry. C20 moved to the Cuban Embassy to assist in securing that area. During this time, C11 and 12 in the vicinity of Tinajitas took 120-mm mortar fire. It became routine for Sheridans to button up any time Army helicopters approached, because their arrival normally drew enemy mortar fire. These vehicles and crews remained in position until 1 Jan 90. 25 December Team Armor was detached from 4- 6 INF (M) and task organized with 1-9 INF (L), 7th LID (with the exception of LT Kozar's vehicle, 0). 12 ARMOR -

C30 was to provide direct fire sup port to Task Force 4-6's attack of the causeway south of Fort Amador. Team Armor refueled and conducted an uneventful link-up with 1-9 INF. A1though.a threat to U. S. forces still existed, sniping and contact in Panama City were now sporadic, and rules of engagement for Team Armor were tightened (fire only if hostile intent and imminent danger were present). The mission of Team Armor was to conduct show-of-force operations; let the PDF, dignity battalions, looters, and Panamanian civilians know that Sheridans were there to establish order. That night and early the next morning, the team conducted night mounted patrols along Luis F. Clement Avenue. The order of march during the patrols was Sheridan, La HMMWV, Sheridan. The Sheridans moved back and forth down the street with searchlights providing white light to control crowds and illuminate possible enemy positions. The patrols coordinated with friendly units along the route. They observed no fire, nor were looters or civilian mobs seen violating curfew. Before the arrival of the Sheridans, troops had dealt with mobs and sniper fire in the area. December 26 As A/]-9 INF began clearing buildings in the vicinity of Luis F. Clement Avenue, the Sheridans were again in a show-of-force role. Crews placed them in position to support the infantry by direct fire and where anyone in the area could see them. 1-9 INF provided a dismounted squad for local, security of the Sheridans. The crews of Team Armor had a tense but uneventful day. That night, they conducted three more mounted patrols, again employing searchlights. C30's mission to support the clearing of the causeway never came to pass. Near sunset, CPT Hammond told LT Kozar to link hack up with Tcam Armor the next morning. 27 December CPT Hammond learned that the Sheridans in Team Armor were to link up with 504th PIR, 82d Airborne Division. Once C30 returned to Team Armor's location, the team (consisting of three Sheridans and two HMMWVs), moved across Panama City to Panama Viejo. After a week of combat, CPT Sherman finally saw the Sheridans and crews that had been predeployed on 16 November. Team Armor was reconligured. CPT Sherman used the CSS HMMWV ror command and control. One Sheridan, C33, would remain at Panama Viejo, and CPT Hammond would take two tanks to Cerro Tinajitas lo augment 1-504 PIR. Later that night, LT Kozar and his wingman were placed OPCON to 1-75th Rangers 15 kilometers northwest of Tocumen airfield. 27 thru 31 December During this period, the disposition of forces remained the same. Sheridans conducted show of force operations and augmented infantry and military police road blocks and checkpoints. There was very little action. However, the crews and leadership remained tense and alert because the vehicles had to sit in exposed positions to conduct the show of force mission. To sit in stationary exposed positions was necessary, but contrary tu training, and crews felt somewhat "naked." During New Year's Eve, all nonessential movement was stopped and checkpoints were pulled in. This prevented soldiers from firing at civilians (who were celebrating by firing weapons and fireworks). %<l January 1990 C/3-73 Armor, minus 1st platoon, moved to Tocumen and began preparations for redeployment. 1/C/3-73 remained at the Vatican Embassy. 2 January The unit prepared for customs inspection and redeployment. 3 January Preparations continued, and at 1700, customs inspected the crews and vehicles. Late that night, crews loaded two CSBs and the majority of C/3-73 Armor for redeployment to Ft. Bragg, N. C. That night, General Noriega surrendered lo American authorities. The 1st platoon and CPT Sherman rcrnained at the Vatican embassy until G January, when they moved to Tocumen airfield and prepared for redeployment. On 9 January, the remainder of' C/3-73 Armor returned from Panama, its mission accomplished with only one crewman slightly wounded by fire.. Observations" Command, Control, and Communications 0 External phones on tanks are invaluable in M O W operations.. They permitted infantry leaders to communicate with the crew and direct fires and movement.. To receive and disseminate orders and information on the move is a must for armor leaders. Informa-. * These are authors' observations, not official lessons learned. ARMOR - 13 tion must flow up and down, left and right, and to the front and rear. 0 Explain "why" whenever you can; but troops must realize that there is not always time for an explanation. 0 Set and follow priorities of work and effort. 0 Focus on the mission, maintain an offensive spirit, don't lose momentum, and don't give the enemy time to react. 0 Encourage troops to become semi-proficient in other languages. There is a lot of real-time information available to those who can converse with the local populace. 0 Use appropriate operational terms and graphics. A common language is very important when operating with different units, branches of service, or in unfamiliar terrain. 0Have a workable plan for prisoners, detainees, and refugees. Without one, command, control, and communications can be severely hampered. 0Have a plan for working through "hot mikes." They exist in combat, too. 0Make good use of maps. Don't cut them to tit your current situation. You may not be in the same area tomorrow. 0Talk with attachments that are not accustomed to working with you (e.g., Marines), make sure you understand each other. Your terms, jargon, and slang may not convey your intent to soldiers who are not familiar with your unit. 0 Learn the capabilities and limitations of supporting and supported units and equipment as well as any special requirements that they might have (e.g. LAV-25s need 25- mm ammunition). 0Make sure everyone is using the appropriate CEO1 (and that they are using it the same way). There is nothing like finding out that the unit you are linking up with "froze" the sigdcounter-sign three days ago and you are using the current ones.

Sheridans were absolutely critical to fighting in built-up areas by providing direct tire support to infantry, as well as surgical fires capable of penetrating reinforced concrete buildings. 0 Strip maps, with individually numbered buildings (all buildings in the area), are a must for operations in built-up areas. Maps do not provide enough detail and may not adequately represent the area.. In built-up areas, the M2 S O caliber machine gun on a flexible mount is superior to the weapons station found on M60- or M1-series tanks. Yes, the TC is exposed, but it is easier for him to acquire targets and bring the S O caliber to bear on those targets. 0The M3A1 submachine gun is useless as a weapon for the loader. The loader needs a pintle-mounted machine gun (or an M16 at a minimum).. Large numbers of refugees will likely be encountered. Be ready for them.. Crews frequently used day sights during night operations because city lights, fires, and background illumination washed out the ANffVS-7As and M44 night sights. They used night sights and night vision devices when the lack of other illumination permitted. Low-Intensity Conflict (UC). Soldiers must know the rules of engagement. 0Soldiers must have enough discipline to apply rules of engagement in the absence of supervision. 0Be prepared to task organize within platoons. It is not unusual to operate in pairs or as single tanks. 0Junior officers and NCOs must know and understand the capabilities and limitations of their troops and vehicles. It is not unusual for a tank commander to be the armor expert and advisor for an infantry battalion. Be assertive; let the infantry know what you have and what you can do for them. Do not forget to let them know your logistical requirements. 0 Dismounted security is extremely important. Let the supported infantry know that you need 360-degree dismounted security.. Be familiar with "show of force" operations. Armor can do a lot without firing around. This goes hand-in-hand with executing rules of engagement. Combat Service Support (CSS) 0 Have someone dedicated to CSS. It is nearly a full-time job for key leaders to sustain an armor force that has been task organized across several sectors.. Effective medical support and evacuation are key in maintaining morale. The combat lifesaver program is invaluable. Every tank should have a school-trained combat lifesaver and medical kit, because of the likelihood of piecemealing Sheridans throughout the sector. Although no serious injuries occurred, medics and lifesavers provided assistance to the combined arms team and civilians. (After medics jumped in to the Tocumen airhead, they had to ride on the back decks of Sheridans. These soldiers displayed tremendous courage under fue and provided on-the-spot care for wounded soldiers.) 14 ARMOR -

Airborne 0 A homing device is needed to find equipment that cannot be seen. 0Everyone must know the assembly and evacuation plans. 0 Sheridans retained their boresight and zero after heavy drop. Other 0 To prevent fratricide, don’t “acquire” POVs or enemy weapons unless they are essential to the mission. Impounded civilian vehicles and troops with strange weapons make target identification difficult for troops with itchy trigger fingers. 0 Pre-positioned Sheridans and the APCs of 4-6 Infantry added sand bags to the exterior of vehicles for additional protection.. Train lroops on what they can expect to see in combat. Actual combat is a lot different than it is depicted in the movies. Soldiers fight the way they train. 0Use PT to build stamina; flak jackets and ammunition-laden web gear are heavy. Rapid deployment troops must also have the stamina to go from winter to summer conditions in a matter of hours. oStocks, pistol grips, and bipods should be available for dismounting the M240 coax machine gun. The loader of one Sheridan fired a dismounted M240 using asbestos mit-tens (to prevent burns). 0 All engagements occurred between 100 and 460 meters. 0The 152-mm HEAT-T rounds penetrated reinforced concrete walls from six to ten inches thick. This round created up to eight-foot holes in walls and caused extensive damage to the interior structure of buildings. 0 Sheridans did not encounter any V300 armored cars although the Sheridans were equipped with Shillelagh missiles, HEAT-T, and 50 caliber APl-T for this eventuality. 0 Once derigged, heavy drop Sheridans had little problem moving off of the swampy drop zone. In ad-diton, they recovered several HMMWVs and other equipment that was stuck on the DZ. Once clear of the drop zone, there was very little cross-country movement. Vehicles in Team Armor traveled 100-150 miles, while those with the 82d Airborne moved 280-350 miles. 0All bridges in the area were rated at 30 tons, with the exception of the Bridge of the Americas, which was rated at 50 tons. oM55lAls were used to drive over or eliminate enemy roadblocks that were constructed of cars, trucks, buses, concertina wire, and rubble. 0 Wheeled vehicles experienced flat tires from glass, jagged metal, wire, downed poles, and bullets. 0 Sheridans completed 100 percent of assigned missions. However, the vehicle is old and has several shortcomings. Even though the Sheridans performed well in this operation, there is an urgent need to develop and field a replacement for the Sheridan. *Establish and maintain a positive mental attitude. ENDEX may be along time coming. Summary While this article focuses on the employment of armor in Operation JUST CAUSE, armor supported infantry in a combined arms effort. The outstanding efforts and achievements of other units have been omitted simply because time and space do not permit a full account of their actions. Without the gallant efforts of the individual infantrymen, combat engineers, and other soldiers working as a team, Sheridan crews would not have successfully accomplished their missions and would certainly have suffered casualties. Units must continue to train as combined arms teams. This operation has also reinforced the importance of combined arms training at the tank crew, section, and platoon level. Operation JUST CAUSE was a success because of the highly-trained soldiers at small-unit level. Captain Frank Sherman is a 1983 graduate of the Citadel. As a lieutenant, he served as a cavalry platoon leader and company executive officer in the 3d Squadron, 11th ACR. Following AOAC, he was assigned to the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 73d Armor, where he served as the S1. He is currently the C Company commander, which participated in Operation JUST CAUSE with the 82d Airborne Division. Captain Kevin Harnmond is a 1981 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. As a lieutenant, he served as a tank platoon leader, executive officer, and scout platoon leader with 4th Battalion, 40th Armor at Ft. Carson. Upon completion of AOAC, he was assigned to the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 73d Armor where he served as the battalion maintenance officer and commander of A Company. In Operation JUST CAUSE, he served as the commander of Team Armor, 4-6 Infantry (Mech). ARMOR - March-April 7990 75

At left, Marine M60A1 with reactive armor array on hull and turret. Closeup, above, shows detail of attachment points for turret side panels.. - - - Marines Add Reactive Armor To M60AIs by Greg Stewart Explosive reactive armor tiles once destined for U. S. Army tanks in Korea have now been fitted to many of the Marine Corps’ M60Als to increase their survivability against shaped-charge (HEAT) warheads. The tiles were purchased to improve the protection of the Army’s M60s in Korea, which do not have the protection of the newer Ml’s special armor. Instead, the Army decided to replace these tanks with Mls. The Ml’s special armor serves much the same purpose as the reactive armor panels; it disrupts the HEAT round’s “slug” before it can form to penetrate the tank‘s armor. Following the lead of the Israelis, who added reactive armor to older tanks before the 1982 Lebanon invasion, many nations have experimented with the reactive armor tiles on cast armor turrets and hulls. While the modem armor of newer MBTs, those with depleted uranium or layered armors like “Chobham,” offer a great degree of protection against shaped-charge warheads, MBTs with homogenous, rolled steel armor are candidates for the reactive armor arrays. This is especially the case as more and more armies field effective Light weapons with HEAT warheads, such as antitank guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. While the battlefield appearance of reactive armor on Israeli MBTs in Lebanon caused some excitement in both civilian and military publications as something new and unique, better-informed individuals were already aware that the United States Army had been working intermittently on reactive armor since the 1950s. When the Soviet Union Fmt equipped its vast fleet of MBTs in Central Europe with reactive armor in 1984-85, many assumed that they had merely copied reactive armor, from Israeli MBTs captured by the Syrians during the 1982 Lebanon conflict. But this would be selling Photo on facing page illustrates how reactive armor tiles are layered on turret front, above gun mantlet. the Soviets short; they had been working on their own reactive armor program for many years. The United States’ efforts in its own reactive armor program are now becoming visible. Since the end of 1988, the U. S. Marine Corps has added reactive armor to M60A1 MBTs. The tiles became available when it was decided to replace the 2nd Infantry Division’s M60A3 MBTs with MlAls. The reactive armor sets that had been earmarked for the 2d ID’S tanks went to the Marines instead. Fifty-seven M60Als of the 1st Tank Battalion/lst Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, were the first to receive the reactive armor sets, in September to December 1988, followed by 58 M60Als of the 2nd Tank Battaliodnd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in February to April 1989. The 34 M60Als of the 1st Armored 16 ARMOR -

Assault Battalion, Okinawa, were equipped in July-August 1989, and the tanks of one of the three squadrons stored on Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) were to be fitted in February. Teams from Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, mounted the hardware and tiles to all MBTs in each battalion, with the exception of tanks due to be rebuilt. They will receive their reactive armor at Marine logistic bases when they are rebuilt. The tiles, which come in only two sizes, do not cover the tank as completely as the Israeli design, which includes many different sizes and shapes, but they do have the advantage of being easier to maintain, replace, and resupply. Each M60A1 MBT has 42 of the larger M-2 tiles (each weighing about 28 pounds and measuring ll-l/2 by 17-V2 by 2 inches thick), and 49 of the smaller M-1 tiles, each weighing 19.9 pounds and measuring 11-112 by 11- 1/2 by 2 inches. The tiles are bolted lo rails, which are bolted to 111 studs welded to the turret and hull. The system adds about 3,000 pounds. Inert (dummy) tiles will be used on a11 MBTs currently fielded, until they are to be deployed in an environment where enemy antitank weapons would necessitate replacement with live tiles. Until needed, these are stored on MPS ships. The dummy tiles weigh much less than the live ones, except the dummy tiles on the main gun mantlet, which must equal the live tile weight to keep the gun in balance. The gun mantlet tiles also have to be removed for installation of any subcaliber device during training. To remove the power pack also requires removal of five turret tiles. - ARMOR - Tanks equipped with dozer blades can’t accommodate 12 of the tiles normally located on the front of the hull. While the Marines will soon start to receive the new MlAl tank, it is likely that the M60Als will supplement the Abrams for some time to come. With the vast array of shapedcharge warhead antitank weapons available today, reactive armor on the M60Als should enhance their survivability and increase their useful life. Greg Stewart is a freelance photographer specializing in U. S. Army and USMC armor and artillery. He contributes photographs to defense-related domestic and foreign publications. 17