A Missing Link in Support of Light and Heavy Forces

As we approach the 21st century, we need a better approach to destroying massed armor formations - top attack by new ammunitions or smart munitions, and new mines. As 1 have said in previous articles, tank-versus-tank is not the way to solve the problem. That approach should become history. Today, the procurement of one armored vehicle can cost well over a million dollars. That's billions in offensive firepower on the battlefield. In turn, there are also billions of dollars in defensive antitank weaponry out there. Is this a draw? The tank is primarily a direct-fire weapon. It shoots straight at its target. It must see it. Now, if we can attack tanks and supporting vehicles indirectly with smart munitions - and we can - we gain a couple of advantages. One, we gain a psychological edge if the enemy cannot see where the fire is coming from. Second, such an approach is cost-effective. We have made the tank a highly mobile bunker, but the bunker buster is here. The era o l the smart munition is just dawning. The future is obvious; we must think clearly on how we want to engage the other guy's armor threat. With what we know today, certainly, tank-against-tank in a direct-fire mode should not be the primary mode of defeating tanks. Therefore, the author has asked, "Does the U. S. Army have a validated requirement for alight armored, antiarmor, airmobile, indirect fire-support vehicle (LA31DFV) to support light and heavy forces?" The answer is "No". There was a validated requirement for alight armored gun system, a kinetic energy, direct-fire approach... alight tank, so to speak. I've asked, "Is the Army ever going to get an armored gun system

The answer, I'm told, is prohably not, because of budget and policy constraints. But mainly, there seems to be no agreement on the role of such a vehicle. The DA staff, Infantry and Armor branches, and the Marine Corps, do not appear to have a common mission profile for such a system. I ask, "Is the Army working on a LA"1DFV concept to support heavy and light forces?" From what I can determine, not in any depth. The problem again, and always, is, What is the mission profile; what do you want the system to do? Can we make do with what we have?" 1 ask, "Does the Armor Force have an armored, antiarmor, indirect fire-support system for the many contin-gcncies where airborne, airmobile, or light infantry might be committed? Does the infantry? I find the answer is no for armor, except for the 73rd Armor in the 82nd Airborne Division, which is history. Armor is prepared for large land mass, combined arms warfare in Europe and the Middle East. The answer is also no for infantry. Both the light and mech infantry need highly mobile organic indirect lire support to engage armor and infantry targets in a strategic role. It must be armor-protected. Let me ask this: "If there is no large land mass warfare, where might W. S. ground forces have to be dcploycd in the next couple decade.s? Standard answer: Many places where the United States has a national interest. The United States has a worldwide commitment to enforce or support trcaties or strategic interests. Let's ask this question: "Can M1 tank units and M2/3 infantry or cavalry units be deployed worldwide on short notice?" According to general officer briefings, the answer is, not realistically. Many contingencies, especially from a strategic mobility response standpoint, require airmobile or light forces to have a highly mobile organic armored antiarmor capability, to include a medium-range HE capability. IT we were to considcr then that an armored gun system is not the way to go, what is an LA31DFV concept? What is it expected to engage, and what would it weigh? My specifications Tor such a vehicle would require it to engage 40 ARMOR - infantry formations, helicopters, and a variety of armored vehicles, to include tanks. It could weigh as much as 20 tons, and it would be expected to survive some degree of hostile artillery fire. You might ask, "Engage tanks? 1s that not Little League against varsity? Yes, I would agree, if the vehicle were limited to the direct-fire role. Birr what if the system wew equipped with itrdiwct-fiw nvaporrs and printarilv erttplqved in a "hide and figlit' postrrre? You ask, "What is a hide-and-fight posture?" I would describe it as a system that a combat commander can use to engage I rl I developmental initiative (NDI) approach. It is not anew idea, hut it makes sense. Tanks litlist be destmyed at a cheaper cost tlrait tanks-versus-tank in arty inten-sir?, of conflict. 1 call the concept alight armored, antiarmor, airmobile, indirect-fire, support vehicle (LAIDFV). YOU call it what you may, nonsense, or a just require- A u t h o r - b u i l t ment. If it is not considered a just requirement, the United States has a continuing problem in close-in antiarmor and fire support tem, armed with a 120-mm mortar especially for a strategic and guided projec-response requiring light tiles to engage and heavy forces in the enemy vehicles 23st Century. from behind cover. We must think clearly in a direct-fire mode, bit prefers to use in an indirect-fire mode. Its mission would be to support engaged units, reducing threat forces by effective indirect fires that use advanced acquisition technology to cover areas short of available friendly artillery. The idea is to hide to support. You might ask, hey Boudinot, are there chassis and weapons components for such a weapon system available today in the United States? The answer is, of course, yes. And the system and vehicle can be carried in a C-130, a very important criteria. The system would be expected to support both heavy or light forces in a variety of missions, but optimized for airmobile requirements. So what kind of system are we talking about? After years in the R&D field, I foresee a system of about 20 tons, mounting the new 120-mm mortar system and a missile system, with the primary role of engaging infantry and armor targets in an indirect-fire mode - "hide-and-fight." The idea is to survive to support. There are several new systems that would be effective. The chassis and weapons systems are in dcvelop-ment. There is no void in technology in this case, just intcgration, which, while a problem, is not insurmountable. You ask, "Is this an armor or infantry proponency system?" The answer is that at this point, this is not important. Such a system is a missing link to a real problem, an armored, antiarmor, and HE fire-support vehicle for heavy, airmobile, and light forces, even cavalry, in a strategic mobility role. It is anon- I mission requirements, about this matter. Lieutenant Colonel Burton

S. Boudinot retired In 1977 after 26 years in Armor. Commissioned in 1953, he served in cavalry units in CONUS, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. He graduated from the University of Nebraska and completed military schooling up through the Command and General Staff College. After commanding a 'squadron in 1969, he entered the R & D field and served on several task forces before becoming Chief of Armor Test at the Armor and Engineer Board. After serving four years as the Editor-in-Chief of ARMOR Magazine, he retired and went into business as a consultant. ARMOR - March-April1989 41