Combat Vehicle Crew Reconstitution

itially, in the next war. Given that, it will be necessary to design a system to replace those crews in order to maintain combat effectiveness. "niose problems we faced in strenglitening oiir united forces were far more complicated tlian those of tlie eiientv... Tanks of oiim that had been badly hit iindenvent major repair in worksliops in the rear and were reliinied to active ditty. "More serioiis still was oiir riian-power problerii. As noled over harf of oiir castrallies were inen of the Armored Corps, arid now we bad!), lacked tank crews to operate the tanks that began to acairiiiilate. llie oiil?, way was to train new teants, and fast. Biit how to do this when all of oiir aniior was dispersed over the fronts and on liigli alert?... "I felt that we mist not wa.vte tinie. I had to look at the sihiation not only as a division conimander biit also, again, as conrniander of the Armored Corps, arid find soltitioris for ntarining tlie tanks and restoring oiir, aniiored fomiations... Even tlioiigli we were on Iiigii alert, we had to train omelves and train new crews. Since we coiild spare neither instnicfors nor tanks, I decided that each tank crew woiild take anew crew and train it on the spot... Initial&, they woiild train on oiir tanks, and when we got new tanks, tliq woiild continue 011 those. niere was no clioice. We would train on tanks loaded with ani-nmnitiori arid at tlie saiite tiiiie remain on high alert. llie fighting riiiglit reninie al r+miaily any nio-ntent. "We worked oiit mi 'aiwterity' program and engaged in only llie most essential elentents in each train-ingpliase so as to advance to the fol-lowiiig phase and ameve at the ability to niii a tank as soon as possible. Tnie, the training niiglit be faidp from a professional point of view, bill an eiiiergency sihiafion obligated einetgency training. "So the brigades deployed and spread oiit, seeking fminiitg areas. Tmining tents went iip, aids were itit-provised, and scliool began. " Put yourself in the position of that Israeli division commander. Can you plan a replacement strategy to fill the turrets of your tanks and Bradleys? Are the solutions used in the Sinai in 1973 applicable today? Given vehicle replacements, can a combat unit sustain itself without outside assets for a reasonable amount of time in combat? Assuming for a moment that this is possible, what sacrifices and tradeoffs must be made in ordcr to re-crew combat vehicles? Is it possible to set up a scenario in which the replacements can be found internally? The 2nd Armored Division (Forward), because of its geographical isolation in northern Germany, studied this problem. It appears very likely that crews, not vehicles, will be the limiting factor, at least in-In order to reduce this to a manageable scenario, certain assumptions must be made. As a test case, the study was performed using full MTOE strengths for the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) as it is currently stationed in northern Germany. The unit was committed to a short-notice conventional war in Europe. The logistics base is immature, and little or no deployment preparations have been made in CONUS (i.e., there is no draft, and training centers have not yet begun turning out replacements). 0 The unit will be committed to an arbitrary 10 days of combat. The scenario is as follows: Day I-Transition to war Day 2-Move to occupt TAA Day 3-Deliberate defense Day 4-Deliberate defense Day 5-Relief in place Day 6-Tactical assembly area Day 7-Hasty attack Day 8-Hasty attack Day 9-Hasty defense Day 10-Ddiberate defense 0 Crews will obviously take casualties. Implicit in this is the assumption that many crewmembers will be killed, while their vehicle is either undamaged or repairable. 0 Only qualified personnel will be selected to replace killed or 76 ARMOR - March-April 7989

“Casualties will obviously be taken among crews. Implicit in this is the assumption that many crewmembers will be killed while their vehicle is either undamaged or repairable. It wounded erews. No noncombatants nor personnel with disqualifying profiles will be used. Critical logistics personnel also will not be used (e.g., no mechanics or support platoon drivers.) While this is, of course, a judgement call, certain MOSS are more critical to sustaining the fight over a short period than others. The basic approach is five-fold. First, it is necessary to identify the available pool of resources from which replacements can be trained. Next, we must determine the essential skills, by position, that must be trained in order to replace a lost crewmember. A training test will verify the time required to train replacements. After determining a replacement strategy, the final stcp is to estimate the losses and to match them to the available crews. Identify Resources Without yet determining an actual strategy for replacing losses, first estimate the available resource pool. Make the eslimatc as broad as possible to maximize options. As most tankers know, almost anybody can be trained as a loader. Therefore, anyone physically capable of lifring and handling around is probably eligible. More specifically, 11-series, lZseries, 13- series, 19-series, clerks, and cooks are all capable of being trained. For drivers, both tank and Bradley, previous track driving experience is desired. The available pool, however, looks almost exactly like that for loaders, Le., virtually anyone who meets the standards in our basic assumptions. In contrast, a gunner should already have some basic turret experience. Tank units can choose excess 19-series within the unit or possibly find a Bradley gunner somewhere and cross-train him. Bradley-equipped units can use assistant squad leaders, who should already possess some basic turret training, or pull a tanker or a TOW gunner. Both units could probably use Combat Engineer Vehicle gunners or some 13-series men. One would only replace a track commander from outside the unit as a last resort. While some will maintain that the TC is not as important as the gunner, the TC has to light and employ the entire tank as a system integrated into a platoon. He must have some basic leadership and command and control experience. The pool here begins with tank and Bradley gunners and assistant squad leaders. In most units, there are avilable infantry and armor officers and NCOs in staff positions, from company master gunners to brigade and division primary and assistant staff officers. It is also probably possible to train other combat arms officers and NCOs to fill the turret. Determine Essential Skills Because the basic concern is to lield a quick and dirty crew in order to return a vehicle to the fight, the emphasis here is only on the basic and essential skills necessary to put a soldier into a position where he can function. The Army has set training standards for a combat-ready crew. These can be summarized as the completion of a qualification gunnery (Table VIII), and a maneuver training exercise to ARTEP standards focused on the unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL). A reasonable assessment of the training time required is 3-4 days for the ARTEP, and 3-4 days for the crew to fire Tables VI-VIII. The focus of this study, however, is on the reconstitution of crewmembers while in combat. It is unlikely that the training time or resources will be available while in combat, so the emphasis in this study will be on the minimum essential skills required. The crew, of course, will need collective training to function effectively, but this would be necessary even if a fully qualified crewmember was available. This is precisely the approach taken by Gencral Adan in 1073. A loader’s basic job in combat is to keep the main gun loaded at all times. All other duties - target acquisition, manning the loader’s M240, PMCS, etc. - take second priority. Therefore, the essential skill to train is to load the gun. This, of course, also requires that he be able to identify and perform basic maintenance on ammunition. He must be familiar enough with the breechblock to be able to do simple maintenance and emergency actions. Finally, he should be able to operate his M240 for local security. The initial estimate of the time required for this training is a half day. Drivers must be able to start and operate the vehicle. They need to know the gauges at least well enough to warn the TC of any malfunctions and to keep an eye on the fuel level. They need to be familiar with tactical driving (although the ARMOR - 17

TC can direct them a lot on this). Finally, they need a basic knowledge of crew drills so they understand exactly what is meant by "Sager!" or "Driver, move out! Gunner take over." Again, a half day is probably not an unreasonable estimate for this training. To train a gunner is more difficult. First, he must be able to prepare and operate the gunner's station. Drills must reinforce this until he can find the switches without taking his eyes from the sight, or both hands off the cadillacs. He must know fire commands and crew drills. He must receive training on the doctrinal specifics of his weapon system (i.e., Bradleys shoot burst-on-target gunnery, while tanks do not). He must be able to perform the gunner's portion of boresighting, and he should have some familiarity with degraded gunnery techniques, especially if he is to shoot from a battle-damaged vehicle. The training estimate for a gunner is two days. TCs need to be knowledgeable in command, control, and communications (CT), and leadership. To look at the available resources pool, however, one can assume he will already possess these qualifications. As to his specific duties, he will have to be trained or retrained on crew drills, fire commands, and degraded (3-man) gunnery. The estimate for a TC is two days, putting him through essentially the same training as the gunner.

FIGURE 1.

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Validate Training To validate the training estimates. two hybrid crews were preparcd and trained at Grafenwoehr. The MlAl was crewed by two 1tMIOs (driver and loader), a 19K10 with no turret experience (gunner), and a 13B40 TC. The M2 crew consisted of two llMlOs with no previous ex-pcrience (gunner and driver), and one llH30 vehicle commander. The normal vehicle crews conducted the training. At the conclusion of the training, actual rounds were fired in a modified Table VI. The validation test led to these conclusions: Drivers (Ml/M2) and loadcrs (Ml) can be trained by experienced crew members in a half day. The level of proficiency is slightly below that of a school-trained soldier. An M1 gunner can be trained to maintain and operate the primary weapon system within two days if he is an M1 crew member moved to the gunner's slot. 0 You cannot train a Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunner within two days due to the limited turret experience of the resource pool. A man can learn the basics to put steel on target in three days, but 18 ARMOR - March-April1989

FIGURE 2.

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INOmCEROR INOmCERS 12 must have additional manipulation training. e Vehicle commanders can get familiarized with the commander’s station and the vehicle’s capabilities within a half day. Additional requirements, such as fire control and distribution, are resource-pool dictated. If a gunner moves to the commander’s station, training can be accomplished in one day. If anon-experienced commander is in that position, training takes take two days with additional manipulation training. e Training time, of course, will increase rapidly as the pool of trainers is attritted. Determine Replacement Strategy Figure 1 shows some possibilities to replace injured or killed crewmen. The table includes the personnel pool, required training, and the trainers. This table is not intended to be all-inclusive; rather, there are many possible methods to replace soldiers. Given this basic strategy as a starting point, it is now necessary to estimate the numbers of available crews to replace those lost in combat. Figure 2 shows one estimate, staying within the guidelines stated above (Le., no noncombatants). Again, this table illustrates only some of the many possible courses of action to replace injured or killed crewmen. Estimate Losses The next step is to estimate the losses and match them with the available replacements. Data from Table 7-7, FM 101-10-1 were modified in order to make those estimates. Because the manual does not address all of the information required, we make certain assumptions: e M2 losses will be the same as tank losses for a similar scenario. e Attack attrition rates are the mean between delay and defense rates. e The rate of maintenance returns will be lower than the 80 percent shown in the manual. The actual return rate was estimated at 60 percent, due to the immature log base. The attrition rates are all-inclusive; they include maintenance failures, crew failures, and losses due to combat. Figure 3 gives a summary of the modified attrition rates. Conclusions When one compares projected losses with available crews, one finds that there is a minimum of 116 available tank crews and 50 Bradley crews. The limiting factor in both cases is gunner replacement. It is ARMOR -

AlTACK

13% 1890 8% 12% 14% 1590 11%

6% 11% 6% 690 10% 8.5% 8% Using these estimates, the cumulative loss estimates are: 16 16 16 28 35 45 51 11 11 11 20 25 32 36

1 0 0 2 0 0 3 10 7 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 I Figure 3 shows projected loss rates in delay, defend, and attack scenarios, broken out for difFerent levels of fighting. not hard to visualize a scenario in which replacement or repaired vehicles are available, while trained crews are not. While not addressing every possible circumstance, the study shows - on a gross scale - that it is possible to re-crew vehicles to sustain combat for a limited period. The factors of METT-T must dictate whether a certain soldier is more valuable to the mission in his MOS or as a tank or Bradley crewman. A commander could decide, for example, that he needs Bradleys more in a defense in the desert than he needs dismounted infantry, or that his dismounts are more valuable in a MOUT scenario than a few additional tanks might be. ample, one brigade in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War lost more than 90 percent of its commanders and platoon leaders. None of the company commanders survived the first day.2* The next war will reaffirm that commanders and platoon leaders are cspecially hard hit, and that staff officers and NCOs at all levels are potential replacements. In addition, the study reinforces a rule of thumb long known to the armor community, that cross-training of all crew members in all positions is a key individual skill on which to build combat-ready crews and platoons. The bottom line in most units in combat probably will be a compromise between a full replacement program, as outlined here, and merely accepting losses. Those vehicles that can be recrewed without seriously degrading other capabilities will be, while others will lack soldiers to fill repaired vehicles. Additionally, history and lessons learned at the National Training Center both show that the largest number of casualties will be among commanders and leaders. For ex- A strong cross-training program increases the commander’s options in war and builds professional excellence in peace. It deserves to be a vital part of a unit’straining program to support its Mission Essential Task List. Notes

1. Adan, MG Avraharn, On the Banks of the Suez, Presidio Press, 1980, pp. 442- 443. ** H e o g, MG Chaim, The War of Atonement: October 1973, Little, Brown and Co., 1975, p. 130. Captain Russell Shumway was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1983 from the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as a tank platoon leader, company XO, support platoon leader, S3Air, and assistant G3 training officer in the 2nd Armored Division (Forward), Garlstedt, West Germany. He is currently attending the Armor Officer Advanced Course. 20 ARMOR - March-April1989