The Battle of Perryville, Kentucky: I n it iat ives Lost and Won

Union and Confederate forces tangled at Perqdle, KY, on 8 October 1862, amid blistering 90-degree heat and a plethora of counterproductive and confusing orders on both sides. Neither commander really knew what was going on, and it was up to the subordinates to get the battle going, keep it going, and to try to win. Because the battle offers a number of valuable lessons in command and control that apply to today's AirLand Battle precepts, the U. S. Army Armor School at Ft. Knox, some 50 miles from Perryville, conducts periodic "mff rides" of the battlefield for students of AOAC classes. These day-long excursions take the student officers on walking tours of the rather extensive battle site, and knowledgeable instructors point out the tactical situations as they developed during the battle in which some 7,500 men became casualties. TRADOC recently inaugurated the practice of visiting battle sites near Army service schools to reinforce students' Understanding of current-day battle C&C problems by understanding how those same problems were solved or ignored in previous battles. At Perryville, CLeC problems were mostly ignored, as the students learn on their hikes across the rolling countryside that once shook to the battle's roar. MAJ William Shoup, chief of the leadership branch at the Armor School, said of Perryville: "In addi-ARMOR - March-April1988 I

"... Union cavalry did little better during the battle, again due to lack of reliable intelligence and, in some cases, bull-headed orders that forbade them taking action when the taking was good...." A striking example of initiative, of deceiving the enemy and keeping him off balance long enough to have an influence on the main action, tion to teaching the students the tnc-tical points of the battle, we also try to imbue them with the psychology of the men who fought that battle. That is a very important par1 of their training here at Fort Knox and one that could very easily be over-tion." % \ looked in the usual staff ride opera- *E)L\. It B During the course of the battlefield tour, students study some of the more glaring errors of both Union and Confederate leaders, from generals down to lieutenants. In stressing the modcm day cavalry role of reconnaissance,

Stephen C. Hawkins of the Armor School cavalry branch noted that the Confederate cavalry perlormed no reconnaissance of Union infantry forces as they fought a several-day cavalry delaying action south from Louisville and Frankfort to Pcr-ryville. The cavalry units became separated, each fighting its own battle, during the retrograde movement. As a result, Confederate General Braxton Brag had no reli-route, or intentions of the Union forces he was going to meet in battle. able information on the strength, A Union cavalry did little better during the battle, again due to lack ol reliable intelligence and, in some cases, hull-headed orders that forbade them taking action when the taking was good. I ARMOR - 27 I was the action of CSA COL Joe Wheelcr who, with about 700 men, tied up 21,000 Union troops under MG George Thomas, MG Don Carlos Buell's second in command. Wheeler accomplished this by feint attacks with dismounted cavalry and by rushing his mounted troops back and forth across the field, which caused the Union leaders to greatly overestimate his real strength. Wheeler's excellent deception kept a large part of the Union forces away from the main battle where they could have exerted a profound influence on the action. This was but one example of individual initiative that instructors point out to the students. CPT David L. Anderson, a history instructor at the school, noted that, ttVirtually everything that could happen in a battle today happened at Perryville, including deception, subordinate initiative, logistical problems, even a severe shortage or water for the troops who fought under that blazing October sun." As they walk the battlefield, the students visualize various examples of how hidc-bound orders can affect a battle. A prime example was that of newly-promoted BG Phil Sheridan, (who later won i m e for Today's commanders learn to fight their battles from positions that will enable them to get and keep the clearest overall view of the action. A great many Civil War battle leaders on both sides did just that, directing their men from the very front lines. Generals Buell and Brag, however, did not. Buell was solar from the battlefield he didn't even know there was a major engagement in progress until his his historic ride up the Shenandodh aides told him. And Brag holed up Valley to rally his troops after ain Perryville and relied on such in-deleat), who commanded an incomplete intelligence and scouting fantry division at Perrwille. reports as, "There's a whole bunch Sheridan's division was sited on a of 'em out there, sir." conspicuous terrain feature with orders to stay put and to "Do nothing to bring on a general engagement." A Confederate infantry brigade was forming up on one terrain lea-ture in front of Sheridan's position, and Sheridan requested permission to attack before the enemy could complete his formation and begin an attack. His request was denied. Sheridan had orders to maintain his position, and that was what he would do, period. The opportunity passed for Sheridan's troops to break up the enemy formation and relieve another sector of the Union line before the coming attack. That Confedcrate brigade, however, did not get off scotfree. When it began its advance, another infantry brigade marching under conllicting orders crossed its front. When that mess was sorted out, the attackers found themselves charging a high cliff with Union troops on top firing down on them. The in- 1 structors emphasize the lesson of one commander not knowing what was going on at his flank. Again and again, the instructors stressed the lesson to the students that viwious commanders at Perryville lost vital opportunities to gain the initiative simply because they either did not have accurate and timely intelligence, or they ignored what information they did have and proceeded to fight in accordance with what they could actually see. Instructors exphasized the importance of factual scouting reports at many stages o l the tour. The students divided into manageable groups and toured the bat- 28 ARMOR -

‘I... The Confederate forces withdrew because Bragg mistakenly believed (in view of the inaccurate intelligence he had received) that he was facing a much larger Union force than was actually on the field.... I1 tlefield under the guidance of their instructors. Each instructor carried detailed terrain maps with several acetate overlays marked to show the positions of various units at progressive stages of the battle. By actually walking the battleground, the lieutenants and captains saw for themselves what the maps represented. They saw the hills and the valleys, the water course (hauntingly named Bull Run), and, in the distance, Perryville. The tours are good hands-on training, better than sand tables, for they present the scene as it actually is, and the officers saw for themselves how vision was restrictcd in one direction, open in another; how the folds of ground hampered or helped troop movements; and many other tactical tidbits that would prove useful when they returned to their units. According to CPT Bill Callaghan, one of the instructors, it is the desire of every battlefield commander to put “the masses of his forces against the pieces of the enemy.” This is simple arithmetic: The more firepower you can concentrate against individual enemy units, the more likely you are to win. None of the commanders at Perryville seemed to know or or use this very basic principle of fighting. The regimental and brigade commanders seemed only interested in fighting their own fight without paying attention to what was going on around them. As a result, many regiments suffered heavy casualties in charges against superior forces, charges that could have been assisted by flank movements from neighboring regiments. In one such movement, a Confederate attack was cutting Union regiments apart, one by one, as it advanced inexorably toward the Union left flank. One Union commander saved the day. COL John C. Starkweather, brigade commander on the left-most flank of the Union line, had his brigade positioned in a swale, concealed from Confedcrate sight. He watched the Union regiments being cut to pieces to his front and made ready to receive the enemy. As the remnants of the Union forces fled through his line, Starkweather moved his men to the top of the swale and opened volley tire on the Confederates. Unprepared for such a surprise, the Rebels wavered, then came on again. Starkweather skillfully maneuvered his brigade in a series of controlled retrograde movements from terrain feature to terrain feature until he was established in a position that he could hold. His daring and skillful use of his men protected the Union lcft flank, destroyed the attacker’s initiative, cost him severe casualties, and held the flank. The instructors emphasized how Slarkweather’s quick grasp of the initiative prevented what could have been a Union rout. Neither side won a clearcut victory at Perryville. The Confederate forces withdrew because Brag mistakenly believed (in view of the inaccurate intelligence he had received) that he was facing a much larger Union force than was actually on the field. His withdrawal gave the Union a strategic victory and kcpt Kentucky in the Union. Conversely, Buell did not win the battle by physically defeating the Confederates on the field. He won by default. It was a battle fought at the expense of many lives that could have been saved had the commanders known what was going on, had they paid attention to what little intelligence their scouts brought to them - and had they received reliable information in the first place. The AOAC staff rides to Pcr-ryville illustrate the vital importance of accurate and timely intelligence, the commander’s use of such information, the necessity to keep totally informed about flank actions, the importance of subordinate commanders’ knowledge of their commander’s intent, and the importance of mission-type orders that allow subordinates to fight the battle as they see it from their frontline view. The Perryville staff rides will continue to be a ma.jor part of each Armor Officers Advanced Course at Fort b o x. The lessons learned by the young officers on that 125- year-old battle site are as applicable to today’s AirLand Battle concepts as they were in the days of muzzle-loaders and horse cavalry. I 1 Robert E. Rogge is the Assistant Editor at ARMOR. I ARMOR - March-April1988 29