Templating the NTC OPFOR

By Major David J. Ozolek and Captain Michael T. Pierson Task force operations conducted against the National Training Center’s (NTC) Opposing Force (OPFOR) motorized rifle regiment have shown that a template can be a useful aid in quickly dcterrnining a projected enemy course of action. When properly selected and applied, a template can assist the commander in anticipating the OPFOR’s actions before they occur, thus increasing his available reaction time. Although formations, frontages, and timing are relatively predictable and easily templated, the OPFOR commander has a reasonable degree of flexibility in fitting his concept to the actual conditions of the battlefield. Too often, the task force’s ability to react to the OPFORs mass and speed are seriously handicapped by an initial misunderstanding of the OPFORs intent and an insistence on adhering to an improperly selected template even when battlefield realities indicate that the OPFOR is not following the predicted course of action. A mis-selected template, coupled with insistence on making battlefield realities fit the template, rather than adjusting the ternplate to fit the battlefield realities, can become a deadly lrap; the commander fails to react to OPFOR actions because they do not tit his predetermined concept. One of the main duties of the S2 is to select from the many possibilities the correct template to use. This task has proved to be particularly difficult for many junior intelligence officers. Selection and application of a template require the S2 to have a general knowledge of the conditions under which the OPFOR commander develops a concept of operation. He must have the ability to conduct an accurate METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time available) analysis of the situation, and an operational sense of OPFOR tactical doctrine. These enablc him to read thc battlelicld as the situation develops and to adjust his interpretation of the OPFOR effort as OPFOR actions occur. The OPFOR regiment may begin its attack from a rapid march-to-contact column, deploying for a hasty attack or mecting engagement upon contact with the Blue Force. The march column offers rapid movement and security, but requires considerable time for the massing of sufficient combat power for the attack. It also offers flexibility, allowing the deliberate commitment of combat power to critical locations as the battlefield situation develops. But until sufficicnt combat power arrives, committed elements are subject to counterattack and piccemeal destruction by superior Blue Forces. Alternately, the OPFOR regiment may begin its attack with the rcgi-ment’s reinforced motorized rifle battalions already arrayed in attack echelons at the line of dcparture. Deployed formations move at roughly half the speed of the march column, but offer instantaneously available firepower in the direction of the formation’s orientation. They are, however, relatively inflexible and, once committed, require a major command and control elhrt to reorient as changes in the perception of the Blue situation occur.. Generally, the OPFOR regiment will attcmpt to gain speed by remaining in column as long as possible. When the regiment clearly identifies the Blue forward trace from reconnaissance efforts prior to the attack, it will deliberately build ARMOR - l7 I combat power by developing the battalions forward of Blue positions at the predetermined (and reasonably predictable) lines into assault formations, first to company columns (at roughly six kilometers forward of the line of contact), next to platoon columns (three kilometers), and finally to the assault line (1.5 kilometers). These lines are terrain-dependent norms and not rigidly enforced requirements. If the Blue situation is not clearly defined, the regiment will stay in the march formation, advancing quickly toward the Blue Force until forced to deploy hy significant combat power. The choice of initial formation results from balancing or prioritizing the competing requirements for speed and massed combat power. When discussing OPFOR formations, it is imporlant to be fully aware of the difference in nature between echelons and reserves. Echelons are subunits arrayed in depth, each assigned a specific objective. The first echelon's objective is aline to seize or Blue element to destroy to support the deployment of the next echelon. Upon achieving the initial, or "immediate" objective, the echelon will consolidate and allow the next echelon to pass, and continue the attack to its assigned objective. The relative positions of echelons are predictable and aid in recognizing the formation selected. Reserves, however, are contingency forces taken from subunits of the echelons and used to accommodate unanticipated developments such as counterattacks or undiscovered defending elements that cannot be bypassed without the regiment or a subunit taking unacceptable losses. Reserves are not assigned missions until after an unanticipated development occurs. Reserves may appear almost anywhere in a formation and must be recognized as reserves or they can lead the analyst to a false conclusion about the OPFOR- formation and intent. The same factors of METI'-T that a Blue commander uses in developing a concept of operation the commander uses in developing his assault formation. Even the massive forces of the Soviets cannot attack everywhere at once and still enjoy sufficient combat ratios to ensure success. OPFOR doctrine provides for the concentration of combat power at the critical point of attack, while lesser degrees of combat activity take place elsewhere. For example, within a motorized rille division of four regimcnts (three motorized and one tank), the division commander may designate one of the regimcnts to conduct a divisional supporting attack with a low combat ratio on a wide front, while the bulk of his combat power is echeloned in dcpth on a relatively narrow frontage at the point of the main attack. Mission The particular mission the regiment assigns to the OPFOR regiment is an important factor in determining the type of formation the regiment will use. The Blue brigade S2's analysis of the enemy's courses of actions should indicate to the task force whether it can expect the motorized rifle division's main or supporting attack. If the main attack is anticipated, the task force should expect an atpack in depth, preceded by a massive fire support preparation of the area. The assault will follow in multiple echelons, with each subunit assigncd a specific objective to support the deployment of the following echelon. If the supporting attack is predicted, the OPFOR regiment will have the mission of simultaneously attacking all Blue positions within its extended zone. The primary objective is to fix the ma,jority of the defending force, both by close assault and by denying him knowledge of the location of the main effort. This fixing attack prevents the Blues from moving laterally to reinforce decisively outnumbered forces at the point of the main attack and delays the defending commander's decision of when and where to commit his reserves. The OPFOR regimental commander under these conditions would probably lean toward attacking with all three reinforced MRBs in one echelon, maintaining only a small combined arms rescrve of approximately one motorized rifle company. In this case, the task force must be alert for the probability that no tactical second echelon assault will occur, and that upon defeating the supporting regiment's furing assault, it must be prepared for rapid relocation to reinforce the hard-pressed units subject to the main attack, or to countcrattack to destroy the OPFOR's penetration. Enemy The next ME"-T factor the OPFOR commander considers is the disposition and composition of the Blue Force. Once again, if the Blue situation is not clearly defined or is fluid, the regiment will move initially in the march column and will deploy as the situation develops. However, when a thorough intelligence picture has been developed, the commander will specify an appropriately echeloned formation. An additional consideration of the OPFOR commander is the quantity of lirepower available. Both direct lire capabilities and indirect fire assets, to include possible NBC weapons, must be considered. Sufficient mass for success must be balanced with required dispersion 18 ARMOR - for protection against mass destruction weapons. Generally, the OPFOR follows the rule that a defense in depth must be met by an attack in depth. In other words, the greater the depth of defense, the greater the number of echelons that will be required to overcome the defense. Terrain This METT-T factor also impacts on the choice of formation. The narrower the sector and the fewer the number of MRB corridors, the more likely the deeper echelon of. the attack. Additionally, the commandcr will orient his echelons, or sub-elements of his echelons, on key terrain that must be taken to ensure the continued advance of the regiment. Let's consider some possible mission, enemy, and terrain eombina-tions which would likely lead to a choice of formation. In the first case (Figl), the conditions include Blue forces deployed in a linear formation with considerable firepower forward, but lit-

Fig. 1 Motorized RMe Regiment Attack in One Echelon tle depth; multiple MRB avenues of approach into the objective area; the regiment assigned a divisional supporting attack mission. In this case, the likely regiment formation would be one echelon with a small combined arms reserve. MRBs would attack either with companies in one echelon or multiple echelons, depending on the specific MRB mission assigncd by the regimental commander, the disposition of the Blue Force, and the terrain considerations of the individual MRB's zone. A number of reasons support this concept. The Blue Force has the capability to concentrate great firepower forward to destroy each echelon as it presents itself without an overwhclming force ratio. Attacking with the entire regiment on line, however, would present more targets that the Blue Force could service before its shallow depth was overrun. Multiple routes into the objective support such a formation. Further, the division commander's stated intent for the regiment to provide the supporting attack implies the requirement of fiing the ARMOR - March-April 7988 Fig. 2 Motorized RMe Regiment Attack In Two Echelons "... The narrower the sector and the fewer the number of MRB corridors, the more likely the deeper echelon of the attack...." bulk of the Blue Force with simultaneous attacks across the entire frontage. In the second example (Fig. 2), a different set of circumstances exists. The Blue Force in zone appears to be arrayed with two company teams forward and one team in depth, approximately 3,000 meters to the rear. The terrain offers multiple MRB routes throughout the zone. The regiment is the main attack force of the division's second echelon MRR, which will be deployed around the first regiment and under its covering fires after the regiment has achieved its objective of the day. With these considerations in mind, the regimental commander would probably order an attack in two echelons. The first echelon's assignment would be to destroy the forward teams and then support the deployment of the second echelon MRB in its attack on the team in depth. A small combined arms reserve of one tank platoon, one motorized rifle platoon, and an antitank platoon would be from the MRB assigned the supporting attack mission and retained by the MRR commander as a reserve. Here, the commander's reasoning focuses on the depth of the defense and the requirement to seize aline of deployment for the follow-on regiment. By passing the second echelon MRB around or through 79 I

Motorlzed Rifle Regiment Attack in Three Echelons the first echelon as it conducts its assault on its immediate objectives, continuity of the attack can be maintained and the time available to the Blue Force for movement of reserves is drastically reduced. Once again, the multiple routes into the objective support such a concept. A third example (Fig. 3), denies the maneuver freedom discussed in examples 1 and 2. A narrow defilade, such as a mountain pass, rcstricts movement to one MRB at a time. The Blue Force is deployed in depth throughout the defilade. The OPFOR regiment is a forward element of the division in a divisional advance to contact. A main and supporting attack has not yet been designated. The division is advancing initially with two regiments forward on separate axes, and two regiments in the second echelon. The considerable depth of the defense and the terrain restrictions here require a three-echeloned attack. Each MRB would be assigned responsibility for destroying the Blue company teams one at a time to clear the way for the deployment of the next echelon. "... A carefully developed, highly sophisticated maneuver system that complements both the hardware available and the social perspective that permeates Soviet society has replaced the WWll massive frontal assaults.... " Troops Another major METT-T factor the OPFOR rcgimental commandcr considers is the status of his own troops. Important items he must evaluate include the number of tanks available per MRB, other equipment shortages, ammunition constraints, the availability of fire support, condition of the troops and equipment, morale, etc. These considerations serve as a final check that the concept is viable, and the existing force structure can support it. In addition to understanding the OPFOR's application of METT-T, the Blue S2 must understand the OPFOR's forms of maneuver. A carefully developed, highly sophisticated maneuver system that complements both the hardware available and the social perspective that permeates Soviet society has replaced the WWIl massive frontal assaults. Although the commander displays little hesitancy in the conscious decision to accept the attrition of a designated portion of the force to ensure the success and survival of the larger body, he will employ a relatively high-cost maneuver such as the frontal attack only when more favorable forms of maneuver are not practical (Fig. 4). Much more likely than a frontal assault is an envelopment or double envelopment, in which forces move quickly through gaps in forward defensive positions and attack the defender's rear. Double Envelopment ng. 4 O 4 0

Flank Attack Single Envelopment Penetration OPFOR MRR- Offensive Forms of Maneuver I 20 ARMOR - I

3d MRB Flg. 5 MRR Two-Echelon Attack with 2d Echelon Conducting Exploltation Flank attacks are also a preferred maneuver. When flanks are not exposed and gaps do not exist or cannot be created by nuclear, chemical, or conventional fires, a frontal attack to achicve a penetration may he a last resort. When given the opportunity, he will always employ the principles of fix, bypass, and conduct a deep attack, which lead to final refinements in the formations. If the S2 recognizes these, they can help in the early determination of the OPFOR’s intcnt. A few examples illustrate this idea. The first example (Fig. 5), is that of a first echelon regiment on the divisional main attack axis that has located a gap in a boundary between defending divisions. The regimenpal commander has decided to attack in two echelons with the 2d MRB conducting a fixing attack against the lead teams, and the 1st MRB passing through the gap between divisions and conducting an exploitation in march column deep into the Blue rear. In the next example (Fig. 6), a first echelon regiment has the mission to exploit a gap in forward defenses created by a fire strike. To gain as much ground as possible before the Blue Force can reorganize and commit reserves, the regimental commander has decided to begin his advance in the march column. After having advanced a considerable distance, the combat r e c o n n a i s s a n c e patrol has located a Blue task force which has occupied hasty defense positions, blocking the regiment’s route of advance. The division commander feels this force must be eliminatcd and orders the regiment to conduct an attack. Reacting to a fluid situation this deep in the defensive sector, and with the bulk of its forces still in contact in the lonvdrd defen-ARMOR - March-April1988 Advance Guard 2d MRB

‘ 8 3dMRB Fig. 6 Envelopment from the March Column 21 sive positions, the defenders have neithcr the assets nor the time to tie together a well-establishcd, concentrated defense. The flanks of task forces occupying such hasty defensive positions will be wide open, and the OPFOR will be quick to exploit such an opportunity. The regimental commander in this situation would order his advanced guard battalion to fm the defender with its forward security company and conduct a flank attack on the defender’s right flank, occupying and attriting him until the regimental main body can deploy. His concept is to complete the destruction of the task force with an envelopment of its left flank by the 2d MRB. The regimental reserve, consisting of one tank platoon, one infantry platoon, and one antitank platoon, will bypass the second MRB and establish a blocking position behind the Blue Force to prevent its withdrawal and to isolate it from any reinforcements. The 3d MRB will bypass and continue the exploitation in march column. Upon completion of this battle, the regiment will reorganize and continue to exploit. These OPFOR tactical principles show that there is considerable flexibility and complexity in OPFOR doctrine when outnumbered and outgunned. Our own tactical doctrine, however, offers battleficld advantagcs that can result in victory, hut only if we dominate the battle by anticipating the enemy’s actions, seizing the initiative, and forcing him to react to our pressures, rather than vice versa. The template is a valuable tool that can assist in exploiting an encmy weakness, but it is only as effective as the insight of its user. Thorough knowledge of the enemy and his combat philosophy can give us the edge, thc rapidity of action, necessary to win. Major David J. Ozolek served at the NTC as the S3 of the motorized rifle regiment, a mechanized infantry battalion S3, and as an S3 observer-controller. Other assignments include mechanized infantry platoon leader and company commander, advisor in RVN, assistant professor of English at and analyst at the SHAPE, Europe. He is a graduate of John Carroll University, the Infantry Officer’s Advanced Course, and the Armed Forces Staff College. He is presently assigned to 7 ATC, Germany. Captain Michael T. Pierson served at the NTC as the commander of the OPFOR EW/REC detachment, S2 of the OPFOR motorized rifle regiment, and as a scout platoon leader. He graduated from Carson-Newman College, East Tennessee University, Military Intelligence Advanced Course, and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has been S2, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, and is currently S2, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Germany. I ________ ARMOR - March-April1988