The Mi-24 "Hind": A Potent Adversary

Somewhere in West Germany, near the East German border, a US. tank company lies in wait in prepared battle positions. The morning is dreary, overcast, and foggy. A Soviet motorized rifle regiment, augmented with elements from an assault helicopter regiment, has moved across the border and is rapidly closing in on the US. company. Tank commanders have It Alone "Flying Tank'' carefully selected their alternate and supplemental positions and placed their vehicles in hides. Waiting for the last two days, the U. S. soldiers have constantly improved their battle positions. They are well trained; they know their enemy well, and they have performed the myriad of tasks necessary to win the impending fight. The 1st Platoon leader sights the lead scout of the Soviet advance guard at about 0700 and alerts the company commander, who directs the platoon leader to engage the enemy at 1,800 meters. The platoon leader moves his platoon into hull defilade and waits. The young lieutenant begins his platoon fire command when the enemy closes to 2,000 meters. His platoon engages the lead scout section at a range of about 1,825 meters, and soon the Second and Third Platoons begin to fire at the Soviets. When the enemy has closed to 1,000 meters, the U. S. company commander gives the order for a phased withdrawal. Suddenly, two Mig-21s attack. The company'sat- 8 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare tached Stinger team fires at the first Mig and gets a hit, but the other Mig sights down the Stinger’s missile plume and kills the Stinger team with a burst of 23-mm cannon fire. As the tank company team begins to depart, Soviet artillery rains down on the battle position. The American captain knows that he has to get his platoons back to their subsequent battle positions quickly, so that he can cover the withdrawal of the U. S. company team on his flank. As he moves his company down several covered draws and skirts the edge of a small forest, his lead tanks receive Sagger fire from the edge of a nearby village. The tanks’ wingmen return fire quickly and suppress the enemy AT gunners. The young captain realizes that he cannot get bogged down while moving, so he disengages from the skirmish and orders his three platoons down parallel fencerows. His lead tank platoon is only 500 meters short of its subsequent battle position when the leader’s tank takes a direct hit from an AT-6 Spiral guidedmissile fired from one of four Mi-24 Hind Es hovering at tree-top level on his left flank nearly 2,800 meters away. As a tank commander, a platoon leader, or the company team eom-mander, what can you do? The Stinger team - your only air defense asset - is destroyed. The Hinds can outmaneuver you, outrun you, and outgun you. Quite simply, you will do as you have been trained; however, if in your training, aircraft have been conspicuously absent, or the scenario has always conveniently indicated that the air force has given you local air superiority or panty, you and your unit will probably begin to die. That American tank crews will have to fight Soviet Hinds in any future conflict is quite possible. Air defense assets are precious and, at present, quite vulnerable. American tankers may well have to fight the Hind by themselves. The first step in preparing yourself for fighting Soviet attack helicopters is to know your enemy. Versions of the Hind Western defense analysts first observed the Hind in 1973, and controversy concerning its purpose on the battlefield has followed the aircraft ever since. Analysts originally thought the Hind to be a drastically upgraded Mi-8 Hip, but closer analysis showed the aircraft had a completely new fuselage and slightly modified engines, two Iso-tov TV-2s rated at 1,500 hp each.’ The Hind A and B (actually, they were developed in reverse order2) were the first Soviet helicopters designed to operate on the front lines; the aircraft were highly armored and carried a large amount of armament. Earlier helicopters, the Hip and Hound, operated near the front lines, but were primarily for transportation. Some analysts believe that the Soviet design engineering group proposed a pure gunship and received the go-ahead as long as the design incorporated some troop-carrying capability so anew troopcarrying helicopter would not have to be funded.3 The resulting product more closely resembles a flying Merkava than any Western helicopter. Figure 1 illustrates the different models of the Hind. The Hind family is quite technologically advanced among Soviet helicopters. Its five fiberglass rotor blades are more than 55 feet long and produce a considerable ground signature. The all-metal fuselage has retractable landing gear and self-sealing fuel tanks.4 There are distinct differences between the A/B/C models and the D/E/F models. The Amodel has alightlyarmored fuselage and, as a result, has been relegated to convoy escort in Afghanistan. The A model is a likely candidate for transporting “Spetsnaz” or air assault troops into our rear areas.5 The B Model was probably an experimental model, and had no anhedral (downward slant) on its wings. It also never went into actual production. Analysts believe that the C Model is a training version since it has no armament. The later models (D, E, F) are redesigns and upgradings for antitank and attack roles. The anhedral wings of the Hind are one of its distinguishing features. These wings provide lift and stability at cruising speeds and also act as launch stations for weap-Model Armament Nose/Turret Additional Differences A 4 x AT-2 Swatter ATGMs 12 x 57-mm unguided rockets 1 x 12.7-mm MG B Same as A model C None D 4 x AT-2 Swatter ATGMs 128 x 57-mm unguided rockets, 80 x 80-mm rockets, 4 x 12.7-mm MG Same as D model except: 4 x AT-6 Spiral ATGMs, 2x23-mm cannon pod E F Improved Weapons Capability

Height: 14‘0’ Weight: 6000 kg Figure 1: Versions of Hind 3-man crew, relatively unprotected Initial production model. Engines: 2 x TV-2 lsotov @1500hpea No anhedral on wings. Very low production. No armament. Very low production. Used for training. Target acquisition enhancement: Optical LLTV, Laser, IR Engines for D/E/F 2 x lsotov TV-3 @ 2200 hp each. Triple rail missile racks on wing tips. Possible export version w/AT-2. Same a A model Same as A model Redesigned and armored turret. Pilot/gunner seats in line. Bullet-resistant glass. Same as D model Same as D model Length: 55’9” Empty Rotor Diameter: 55‘9” ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 9 ons. But while hovering, the Hind requires a significant increase in power because the wings cause a negative effect on the lift provided by the downward motion of the air from the rotor.6 The Hind D was a major redesigning of the basic aircraft. “he designer added additional armor, particularly in the cockpit area. The cockpit and forward fuselage were completely redesigned, with the gunner and pilot sitting in line rather than side-by-side. The gunner is in the forward position. The D model could also carry additional weapon systems, along with improved targeting devices, such as radar, low-light television (LLTV), and a laser rangefirder. Two improved engines appeared on the D model; each now developed 2,200 hp, and the cargo area was redesigned, probably to carry extra armament and ammunition rather than troops. A four-barreled, 12.7-mm gun replaced an earlier 12.7-mm machine gun. Capabilities All models, except the Band C models, can fire the AT-2 Swatter antitank missile from the weapons points on the wings. A greatly improved version of the aircraft, the Hind E, carries the AT-6 Spiral command-guided AT missile, along with improved targeting devices, such as ahead-up display. The Hind E also carries a two-barreled, 23-mm cannon pod.8 The AT-6 Spiral is of particular interest to us since it has a 5-km range and flies at supersonic speeds. The possible combination of a laser designator and the supersonic speed of the Spiral will reduce the unmasked time for the Hind Ein an engagement. A 5,000-meter-range target can be hit in approximately 11 seconds compared to the 27-second flight time of the Hind D’s Swatter fired at a 4,000-meter target.s Both missiles fly by line-of-sight command guidance, so your best defenses are to place terrain between you and the Hind or to fire directly at the Hind to break the gunner’s concentration. The Hind can also carry free-fall bombs, roekets, and mine pods. Since free-fall bombs require the pilot to fly over enemy positions, they will probably only be used in relatively safe (in terms of air defense) areas.10 The 57-mm rockets are unguided projectiles, similar to the 70-mm rockets carried by the US. Cobra, and are relatively inaccurate. The flat part of the trajectory of the 57-mm rocket only reaches out to 1,200-1,500 meters.” Because of the rockets’ dispersion pattern, gunners normally fire them in salvo against soft targets. However, their hollow-charge warheads are capable of penetrating 230-mm of armor. A newer, 80-mm rocket may appear on the Hind in the future, and with the ability to penetrate 350-400-mm of armor, these rockets could present a potential danger to US armored units.12 Soviet helicopter design philosophy is radically different from US thinking. The US Army has placed its faith in small, highly maneuverable aircraft capable of hiding and flying in the tree lines and possessing precision guidance for night and adverse weather conditions. The Soviets have developed the Hind for a multipurpose role. It more resembles a flying tank than a helicopter. By US standards, the Hind is underpowered and its rotor incorporates a relatively old technology; therefore, it is probably not very agile.’3 Its lack of agility, large rotor blades, and difficulty in hovering will preclude flying napof-the-earth (NOE) under most terrain conditions. Hinds will probably attack at a 100-200 meter altitude and pop up when in the vicinity of the target for better acquisition and target lock-n.’ The Hind’s size and lack of agility will allow US air defenders and tankers to train better and plan to defeat this “flying tank.” 10 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

The Hind in Afghanistan Until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, analysts had never been able to assess the Hind’s ability in actual combat. The “Mujahadeen,” the Afghan freedom fighters, have had much experience with the Hind. The Mujahadeen have brought down several Hinds with small, heat-seeking, surface-to-air missiles, such as captured Soviet SA-7 Grails. The Hind’s original design failed to include much in infrared countermeasures, and little has been done to reduce its infrared signature, other than a slight reduction in engine operating temperature.15 In response to their losses of Hinds and other types of helicopters, the Soviets have equipped them with flare dispensers, holding up to 120 flares, along with a missile warning system.16 Nevertheless, the Mujahadeen antiaircraft effort has been effective: for example, eight Mi-8 Hips were lost in 1983 in just one operation. To bring down Hinds by machine gun fire, the Afghan freedom fighters fire down on the rotor, upper fuselage, and the engine/transmission area from higher vantage points on mountaintops as the Hinds fly down the valleys. An Afghan pilot of the Communist Afghan Army, who defected in 1984, disclosed that the Hind A was extremely vunerable to ground fire, especially in the cockpit and the rotor. He said that pilots are routinely warned to avoid heavy rebel concentrations. According to the defector, more Hind As were lost to small arms fire to the cockpit than any other cause, and a steel plate has been installed that can be manually raised to protect the pilot. The report in Auiution Week (October 1984) continued to state that the Hind A was indeed under-powered for most of its combat tasks and had a very weak tail boom. Of extreme interest is that the Mujahadeen also reported that about 30 percent of all munitions used against them failed to detonate. Employment in Europe Judging from Soviet training exercises, battlefield employment of the Hind in Europe will probably be markedly different from its use in Afghanistan. The Soviet helicopter force belongs to the Soviet frontal aviation element (tactical air force) and is usually attached to frontline units at high levels, such as the front or all-arms army. Typically, there is one air assault brigade per front, and one assault helicopter regiment per tankla11 arms army (See Figures 2 and 3). One result of this high level of attachment may well be an inherent inflexibility: Soviet helicopter pilots seldom attack targets of opportunity, as seen in Afghanistan.17 Other factors leading to inflexibility are the organizational absence of forward air controllers (FACs), the poor quality of battle information being transmitted between ground and air units, and an inflexible pre-planned fire support request system.’* However, the Soviets may be learning some valuable lessons in Afghanistan. Recently, helicopter assets have been decentralized down to the division with helicopter squadrons under the tactical control of the division commander. Hinds almost always attack in pairs or in a group of four aircraft (a flight). One reason may be the fear of a defection by a pilot, but tactics also influence this organization. Normally, one aircraft will attack while the other overwatches. The overwatching wingman pinpoints air defense gunners by backtracking the missile plume to its origin and then fires to suppress the air defense gunners or destroy them. One principle of air defense that should minimize this threat is “mutual support”; however, mutual support aroundmaneuver elements (e.g. tank or mech teams) is difficult if the friendly unit is moving. As observed in Soviet propaganda films and TV programs, a typical European mission goes like this: A flight of 4 Hinds, commanded by a senior 1ieutenantJifts off from a forward airfield, 18-20 miles behind the front. The helicopters fly at approximately 150 meters above the ground at about 175 km/hr, using terrain masking whenever possible. The flight descends near the target area, flies to within engagement range, and pops up to about 60 meters of altitude to acquire the target. The helicopters fire while in a shallow dive. Hinds normally appear in these films to be supporting an offensive operation, rather than a defensive one as would be expected from Soviet journalism. However, expecting the Hinds to fire from a hover in support of a defensive operation is not unreasonable. l9 About 83 percent of all engagement ranges in European terrain will be 3,000 meters orless, so short range air defense (SHORAD) weapons will be able to defend maneuver elements better than in desert terrain. The European countryside also provides armored units more opportunity for camouflage and concealment.20 General Reznichichenko, a respected Soviet author and tactician, writes “...the correlation between tank and helicopter losses are 12-1 or even 19-1 in the helicopter’s favor, according to practical experiments.’Q1 The use of Hinds in a major armored thrust could affect US. battle plans considerably. Consider the speed and firepower of the Hind in respect to armored movement: an armor battalion could easily become decisively engaged if the enemy combines a number of Hinds with his armored forces. The Hinds will be able to engage and break away quickly from a superior force, conduct pursuit operations efficiently, and block avenues of escape very rapidly without being encumbered by minefields, obstacles, forests, swamps, or urban terrain. Hinds in the Desert In desert operations, the Hind will prove quite a formidable-foe as long as it operates below 1,000 feet, the Hawk missile’s minimum effective altitude. Since targets can be identified in the desert at ranges of tens of kilometers, the Hind will be able to engage at 4-5 kilometers and still remain out of the range of our infrared air defense weapons (see Figure 4). The best air defense weapons in the desert are passive IR and optical countermeasures. One of the best optical/IR countermeasures is the desert wind. If you have trained at the National Training Center, you know how that wind can obscure and hide the enemy. This effect is even greater from a flying craft, and gives the ground soldier a much greater advantage. If the tank commander happens to see a Hind launch a missile at him, he will have between 11 and 30 seconds ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 11

MOBlLlTI

6-barrel 20-mm cannon

4-rail launcher, infrared missile

Shoulder-fired, infrared missile, iTlNGER Shoulder-fired, infrared missile, Twin 40-mm cannon (relatively obsolete) man portable man-portable National Guard 1650m AD US Army 1200m AD US Army 5000m National Guard US Army 3000m National Guard US Army 3000m + National Guard 4500m surf 4500111 surf FIGURE 4. US Army SHORAD Systems Visual Visual (range only radar) Infrared homing Infrared homing Infrared homing Track Track, towed stationary Tracked, stationary Manportable Manportable before impact at 4,000-5,000 meters. The tank driver must immediately begin quick start-and-stop, side-to-side movements, or make a fast dash to cover, if he wants to live to fight another day. However, remember that the dust cloud sent up by a hovering helicopter can often be as unforgiving to him as your own dust trail as you move. A good air guard - seeing the “bad guy” before he sees you - remains the best defense. Defeating the Hind Our most valuable weapons against the Hind are those in the family of air defense weapons. If Hinds fly high enough, the Hawk or Patriot systems can target the Soviet aircraft and destroy it quickly. However, Hinds will usually fly at relatively low altitudes and be masked by terrain and ground clutter. Hence, SHORAD systems will probably play a much greater role in battles with the Hind. SHORAD systems do have their limitations, and soldiers in maneuver battalions should know these limitations in order to make effective decisions on engagements. Figure 4 lists the SHORAD systems available in the heavy division and their capabilities. The following is a breakdown of the SHORAD systems’ limitations: Vulcan - The primary limitation of the Vulcan is its maximum range of 1,200 meters. When compared to the Hind (with its 3-5 km range), the Vulcan appears quite vulnerable. Unless a Hind moves to within 1,200 meters, the Vulcan can do very little to destroy the Soviet helicopter. Chaparral - The Chaparral is a heat-seeking missile (IR) with a range of 5 kilometers. It travels on a tracked carrier capable of firing four missiles before reloading. Since it is a heat-seeking missile, the Chaparral can only fire at the Hind after the helicopter’s gun or missile run, when the Chaparral can lock on to the Hind’s heat source, its engines. In a frontal engagement with the Hind, the Chaparral has very little chance of locking on and hitting the target. Redeye - This missile is also a heat-seeker employed similarly to the Chaparral. The Redeye, though, is shoulder-fired and has a shorter range, 3 kilometers. Obviously all of the problems associated with the Chaparral also occur with this weapon and are accentuated by the Red-eye’seven shorter range and lack of a multiple firing capability. Stinger - This is an improved shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missile, similar to the Redeye but with much improved performance. This missile does possess a limited head-on attack capability, but it is man-carried and lacks any sort of protection from indirect or direct fires. Under current air defense doctrine the commander will allocate these systems differently for offensive and defensive operations. In an offensive operation, the brigade or task force commander will probably designate his maneuver elements as his priority assets in his air defense plan. The Redeye/ Stinger or Vulcan teams will probably be attached to the mechanized elements since they are more mobile. The Chaparral systems will defend more static targets such as bridges, supply routes, TOCs, etc. In the defense, most air defense systems will probably be distributed to critical logistical and command centers. The brigade support area (BSA), TOCs, field trains, supply and ammunition depots, and indirect fire assets may all be priority assets in the air defense plan. Our air defense doctrine calls for the placing of missile systems well ahead of the defended asset so that the missiles can acquire an IR lock-on when the aircraft passes by. But if your defending company team is the defended asset, it is not likely that the missile system will be to your front because it would be between you and the enemy. This situation leaves only the Vulcan to protect you from the threat of Hinds. Its limited ranges means that a flight of Hinds can engage you anywhere from 1,200 to 5,000 meters away without fear of Vulcan retaliation. The Sgt. York Divisional Air Defense Gun (DIVAD) was supposed to fill this gap in coverage, but that project has been cancelled. Moreover, the Air Force will find it difficult to locate and acquire the Hind amid battlefield clutter while its high performance aircraft attempt to avoid the many Soviet air defense systems on the ground. Possible exceptions to this situation are the A-10 Thunderbolt I1 and the 12 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

Army’s Cobra and Apache attack helicopters. The Aviation branch of the Army has realized the deadliness of the Hind and is experimenting with air-to-air missiles and tactics for the Cobra and Apache. The 30-mm tank-busting rotary cannon on the A-10 (the GAU-8/A) is also an excellent weapon for engaging the Hind. If these aircraft are on station in your area, the Hinds will definitely be at risk, but A-10s have a limited time-on-station, and have broad sectors of responsibility. Hence, you will not be able to rely upon them or the Army’s attack helicopters in all instances. With our limited air defense assets, and the Soviet field artillery and frontal aviation placing a very high priority on destroying our air defenses, we in the maneuver battalion task forces and company teams may well find ourselves without dedicated air defense weapons systems to protect us. In essence, the front-line tanker and mech infantryman may eventually face a tank/IFV-versus-Hind engagement. In this type of engagement, the vehicle commander must decide quickly whether to hide or fight. Even if the Hind formation is bypassing your position, it still may be carrying Spetsnaz troops to your own rear areas. If you decide to fire, quickly engage with the heavy machine gun or cannon (on the M2/3). This will alert other friendly forces of the presence of the Hind and give the gunner time to bring the turret (in the case of a tank) to bear on the target so that he may engage with coax or main gun. Passive Defense Measures Cover and concealment are critical in evading the Hind. Use natural vegetation as much as possible, and keep your unit well-dispersed. Try to stay away from fields of high vegetation (corn, small trees, etc.) because your vehicles’ tracks will give away your position to the Hinds. Natural cover, such as hills and depressions, may be useful when concealing your vehicles from enemy tanks, but the Hind can rise to acquire you, so try to use treelines as much as is possible and feasible. In the desert, try to move down draws and arroyos to maintain cover. If a Hind spots you and fires, use quick changes to speed and erratic direction changes to mislead the gunner, and try to head for cover. The late-model Hinds could be equipped with thermal vision devices that could easily pick out hot tank exhausts from a cool background of a forest or ground. Hence, keep your thermal signature in mind and take measures to deflect hot exhausts (from M113-type vehicles, especially). Active Air Defense Measures When you encounter the Hind, the tank commander or even the platoon leader will have to make the decision on when to engage. In the act of firing on the Hind, your objective is one of the following four, in this order: Destroy the helicopter. Force the helicopter out of your area of operations. Force the helicopter to fly higher so that long-range air defense weapons or air force attack aircraft can shoot the Hind down. Spoil the Hind’s aim and/or disrupt his attacking run. Try to engage primarily with machine guns, but do not rule’out the use of your tank’s main gun. If within range, use the 25-mm cannon on your M2/3s. When you engage with machine guns, use the doctrine set down for small arms air defense.22 The primary principle of that doctrine is to put a heavy volume of fire into the path of the helicopters. Pick a point 50 meters in front of the helicopter, and fire continuously into that point as the helicopter flies toward and, hopefully, into it.23 If possible, the platoon leader should give a platoon fire command since one platoon, if deployed properly with mutual fields of fire, will probably be able to engage with at least two tanks. The platoon leader should select and communicate the firing point over the platoon net; preplanned target reference points can be useful in this communication. Each firing weapon should fire at the selected point; do not try to lead the Hind. Instead, put up a wall of steel and let the Hind fly through it; you’ll have a higher probability of hitting the target that way. Aim high with your machine guns; use the highest rate of fire, and fire continuously at your aiming point. At longer ranges, the tracers may appear to strike the target, but may actually be striking under it. The Hind’s most vulnerable areas are its rotor, tail boom, and its engine/transmission area, so the platoon leader should adjust the platoon’s fire to hit those vulnerable areas. For a Hind crossing to your front within 2,000 meters, you should use the heavy machine guns and the automatic cannons in your unit. If possible, track with the main gun/ coax on the tanks. Tracking will allow you to fire quickly with your main gun on the helicopter if it comes within range and remains clear of terrain. On a crossing target, the chance of hitting a fast moving helicopter with one round from the main gun is so slim, and main gun ammo is of such critical importance, that it could be too high a risk to take. However, main gun rounds fired at aircraft that are ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 13 hovering or in a shallow dive toward you will have a good probability of destroying the aircraft (depending, of course, on your gunner’s ability). Even if you don’t hit the helicopter, you will probably “shake him up” severely. Additionally, an upgrade to our main gun ammo is being studied which would provide a proximity-fuzed anti-helicopter round and, possibly, a modified fire-control system for aerial targets.24 If the range to the helicopter is in excess of 2,500-2,700 meters, your wisest course of action is not to engage. However, if the Hind is attacking (from a hover or a shallow dive), the TC would probably choose to fire in self-defense. A skilled gunner may hit the helicopter at 3,000 meters, and it takes only 2.2 seconds for a sabot round to travel that far.25 If the Hind is relatively near, in a hover facing toward you, or in a shallow dive coming towards your position, then you must act quickly and fire everything you have at the aircraft - main gun, coax, heavy machine guns, and automatic cannon. That Hind is probably about to fire at you - or it may have already fired - and you must disrupt the gunner’s aim as much as possible and as quickly as you can. This might mean firing whatever you have in the main gun’s breech, Footnotes ’Soviet Military Aircraft, Bill Sweetman, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, p. 134. ZMilitary Helicopters of the World, N. Pamar & F. D. Kennedy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, p. 135. 31bid. ‘“The Soviet Mi-28 Combat Helicopter,” W. Cherikov, Znternational Defense Review, 1011984, p. 1457. 51bid, p. 1455. 6Soviet Helicopters - Design, Development, and Tactics, J. Everett-Heath, Jane’s Publishing Co., 1983, p. 90. 71bid. 8“The Soviet Armed Helicopter Threat,” MAJ Richard Armour, Air Defense Artillery, Fall 1983, p. 33. g“Helicopter Air Combat,” J. Everett-Heath, InternationalDefense Review, 5/1983, p. 605. lo“Soviet Armed Helicopters,” MAJ Henry Shields, Military Review, Feb 1984, p. 62. “UB-16 or UB-32 57mm rocket...,” Everett-Heath, pp. 93-94. 12Armour, p. 34. 13Sweetman, p. 136. “Red Armor, R. Simpkin, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1984, p. 77, and “...at perhaps 150m (500 ft)...,” Everett-Heath, p. 95. I5‘‘Both TV-2 and TV-3 are... rather heavier and less fuel efficient than comparable Western engines, run at lower temperatures. Ex-but if you’re successful, you’ll live to fire again. Aim high on the nose of the fuselage for the best ballistic trajectory. Again, the rule to follow is to put a heavy volume of fire in the air. Use a platoon fire command, and if you have sufficient sabot, use it. It’s a more accurate round and gets there faster. If your company team has TOWS with it, they can fire at a HIND too. Of course, the TOW is relatively slow, and this lack of velocity is its major limitation when fired against the Hind. If the pilot observes the launch, he’ll probably be able to outrun the missile or outmaneuver it. Plan artillery fires behind hills and in treelines where enemy helicopters are likely to hide. Use artillery at night also. If you should be attacked by Hinds at night, return the fire, using your tank thermal sight (TTS). You can also fire air burst artillery rounds into the area and mortar flares. Nothing can be so devastating to a helicopter pilot flying at night than an artillery illumination round popping beside him and taking away all his night vision for many minutes. Summary The Hind is an extremely formidable foe, and we must take it into account for mission planning. The Hind is faster, more maneuverable, haust gas temperatures are therefore lower with a consequently reduced IR signature.”, Soviet Helicopters - Design, Development, and Tactics, p. 91. IeEverett-Heath, p. 88. ”“Afghanistan 1982, the war continues,”

D. C. Isby, International Defense Review, 11/1982, p. 1526. ‘8“The Transformation of Soviet Frontal Aviation,” CPT Greg Parlier, Air Defense Artillery, Winter 1984, p. 41. 19Everett-Heath, p. 95. 20“Fifty percent of all targets (on the European Battlefield) are under 1,000 meters, 30 percent between 1,000 and 2,000m. and 20 percent at 3,00Om, 8 percent are 3,000-4,000m, 4 percent are 4,000-5,000m, and 5 percent are over 5,000m.” “The Modem Battle Tank, Part 2 Firepower,” F. Schreir, International Defense Review, 1/1972, p. 16. ZIParlier, p. 40. Z2TC 23-44, Small Arms Air Defense Against Air Attack, U. S. Army. 2 3 F r further reading on tank engagements of aircraft see FM 17-12, Tank Gunnery, Chapter 16, andTC 17-15-5, Handbook for the M48A5, M60A1 Tank Platoon. pp. 144-149. 24“Army Develops Five-Part Plan to Meet Air Defense Needs After DIVAD Cancellation, Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 7, 1986. 25“105mm APDS” - 1,380 m/second, Schreir, p. 16. 26“Bradley Gunners Go for the Planes,” ARMOR, Sep-Oct 1985, p. 51. and more agile than our armored vehicles. Its armament has a greater range than our air defense weapons. Additionally, the Hind can carry a squad of air assault troops who can wreak havoc in our rear areas. However, the Hind is a very large aircraft, and you can see and hear it at considerable distances because of its large rotor and loud engines. Our air defense systems have the capability to destroy the Hind, but as most of us realize, there will be times when the maneuver units must “go it alone.” The main rule of thumb in these cases is to put a high volume of fire in the air with every available weapon brought to bear on the target or an aiming point through which the helicopter will pass. The first step toward winning the tank/IFV-versus-Hind fight is learning the Hind’s capabilities and weaknesses; the next step is training. Perhaps the best training available is a Small Arms for Air Defense Range. Contact your divisional air defense battalion for information on these ranges. The professional air defenders of your unit will probably be glad to give you further instructions. You can read about one unit that trained on a similar range as it was reported in the September-October 1985 issue of ARMOR.26 is a 1980 graduate of the Air Defense Officer Basic Course and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served as a platoon leader to a Vulcan platoon, XO to a Redeye battery and an armor company, and a company commander to an armor company in the Texas Army National Guard. He is currently the S1 of 2-152 Armor, Alabama National Guard. He works for Schneider Services International as project coordinator for the building of a rocket test cell at Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee. Previously, he worked for VkDonnell Douglason Spaceshuttle integration and at Texas Instruments in Dallas, Texas, building tank thermal sights for the M60A3 Tank. 14 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare