The Deep Attack Helicopter Raid

The Deep Today’s military planner views the attack helicopter as his predecessor viewed the tank 50 years ago: it is recognized as having great potential, but no one really knows how to use it. It is seen as an add-on to proven formations and it seems to be prohibitively expensive. Our peacetime training emphasizes the attack helicopter’s ill-.conceived deficiencies rather than exploiting its capabilities. They are massed for ease of maintenance, training and administration rather than to intensify their combat effect. And, because they are relatively scarce, commanders tend to use them as piecemeal additions to their ground forces. This practice of piecemeal commitment of our attack helicopter assets is similar to the Allied use of armor in the 1940 campaign in France, where the Germans massed their armor and won with dramatic ease. Fortunately, a few commanders are seeing the light. They are experimenting with boldness and commit their attack helicopter assets en masse to blunt enemy armor penetrations. These same assets, however, have a viable potential as division or corps fire brigades - an antitank reserve capable of swift and devastating reaction. A balance, therefore, must be struck between the two functions, a balance predicated on the tactical situation. In any event, the attack helicopter’s aggressive maneuverability must not be overlooked. The greatest perceived threat to massed, cross-FLOT (forward line of troops) attack helicopter operations is the Soviet abundance of air defense weapons systems. These systems are not infallible. They have shown shocking failures in recent encounters, from the strategic (Korean airliner) to the tactical (recent Middle East) conflicts. They have been successful only against unprepared enemies. Attack Helicopter Raid by Captain Ralph Peters Further, in using these massed air defense weapons systems, the Soviets would be saddled with massive Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) problems. These problems are currently compounded by personnel rotations and their attendant training problems. Finally, the Soviets would have to create air corridors for their own aircraft and to put their weapons along these corridors on “hold.” When such lanes are identified, they become corridors for our attack helicopters. There remains the threat of air fighting. However, by reason of his training and indoctrination, the Soviet pilot is less likely to turn from his assigned mission to engage targets of opportunity than is his American counterpart. Herein may lie a problem for U.S. commanders; our attack helicopters, launched on a deep strike raid, must not dissipate their force with individual air battles. There is no room for helicopter “aces” in AirLand Battle. Every military operation entails high risk but we must not allow our perceptions (right or wrong) of the attack helicopter’s vulnerabilities to influence our use of this weapons system. There is a valuable lesson to be learned from the German thinking on armor at the onset of WW 11. Had they seen the tank as a mechanically unreliable, expensive, weapon, offering little individual firepower, limited by terrain, difficult to synchronize with the other combat arms and a pure headache to refuel and rearm, they never would have attempted the blitzkrieg. But they could see beyond the immediate problems and their use of massed armor was classic. Today’s attack helicopter reflects many of the difficulties and problems of early armor: it is vulnerable to small arms fire, it demands incessant maintenance and its flying and fighting capabilities are limited. It presents a good target in the air and its optimum employment relies on timely intelligence of a standard that neither analysts nor communications can yet provide. Furthermore, it is as useless as it is defenseless when on the ground. Yet this unlikely collection of nuts and bolts literally alters the dimensions of tactical combat. Surface-to-surface missiles and fixed-wing attack aircraft serve only to extend the range of ground-based fires. The attack helicopter breaks down earlier restrictions on maneuver. The attack helicopter must not be viewed, or used, primarily as a fire support weapon. It maneuvers, and that asset must be exploited. The attack helicopter is an expensive machine and has its vulnerabilities. The dismounted infantryman, too, is terribly vulnerable and more precious than any machine. Attack helicopter vulnerability is not the critical issue. Effect on the enemy is the critical issue. Combat rearming and refueling of helicopters are real and pressing problems. The attack helicopter’s fuel and ammunition services must be made more mobile and more survivable. Expecting helicopters to rely on trucked resources is as ridiculous as expecting tanks to rely on horses and wagons and five-gallon cans. Fuel and ammunition must be transported in a manner as mobile and protected as the system they support. Attack helicopter formations must be able to penetrate deeply and conduct repeated operations without having to overfly enemy air defenses again and again as they retire to refuel and rearm and repenetrate enemy air. They must take their fuel and ammunition with them - in helicopters anonymous enough not to stand out as critical targets. Attack helicopter operations can be classed in two areas: ( 1) massed formations attacking maneuver units, artillery clusters or forward trains and, (2) 36 march-aprill985

“The raid force must be kept mobile. That is its salvation ... R r smaller formations on deep penetration raids. We have accepted these packages and now we must accept that the potential to use ground maneuver elements to complement or to interact with helicopter operations is both logical and desirable. Such thinking may lead to the shifting of priorities. Let us consider the deep helicopter raid. A fighting commander faces two questions: (1) where can I hurt the enemy most and (2) how can I best use my assets to achieve that hurt? The least effective way is strength-against-strength. The most effective is strength-against-weakness. The latter poses problems. It is often impossible to detect a weakness at any given time. Even when identified, that weakness is usually too hard to reach. Also, the enemy may have shielded that weakness, and often it is out of range of the systems at hand. Finally, although intelligence may have identified a weakness, it cannot pinpoint it accurately enough to target it. We now have the attack helicopter’s maneuverability at hand. First, however, we must recognize that Soviet air defense systems will be densest at the battle line and, second, his armies are most vulnerable in their depths. The next step is to realize that the attack helicopter is ideally suited for transient basing behind the enemy’s committed forces. The Soviet concept of the Operational Maneuver Group already points this way. (See “Tatsins-kaya and Soviet OMG Doctrine,” Jan-Feb 1985, ARMOR. Ed.) Once an air corridor through the Soviet air defense system has been identified and put to use, speed will translate into heightened security for the attack helicopters. Such a force could consist of eight attack helicopters (two sub-commands of four), four helicopters to carry fuel and ammunition (two of each), four helicopters each with an infantry squad to provide perimeter defense during refuelhearm situations, and two scout helicopters. These eighteen aircraft would be divided into two flights of nine each. In practice, the attack helicopters strike pre-indentified targets in depth and the scouts select landing zones for the refuel/rearm situations. Even if these strikes are not materially destructive, they immediately present the Soviet commander with an active enemy force in his rear. His problem is compounded because helicopters, especially and because of their maneuverability, tend to multiply in the reporting chain. In effect, he doesn’t know exactly what he does have attacking his rear areas. He must react and his every reaction detracts from his committed forces. He had committed his attack helicopters to programmed missions, and his fixed-wing air assets as well. Withdrawing any or all of these assets from the FLOT denigrates his power at that point. Also, fixed-wing aircraft may not be maneuverable enough to fight helicopters. This leaves him with his maneuver force air defense systems and they, too, have been heavily committed to the FLOT. Should he ignore the attack helicopter strike and continue with his planned battle, he will do so at great risk to himself - and to our final benefit. The raid force must be kept mobile; that is its salvation - and its effectiveness. If the deep raid strike is also conducted in conjunction with a ground force counterattack, each increases the other’s chances of success. The Soviet Army has many strengths, but, historically, performs best in relatively clear-cut situations and is at its worst when confused. Upon its return to friendly air, the raiding force must be protected and supported as fully as possible. The best approach would be to identify those enemy air corridors presenting the least threat and then laying on suppressive artillery and/or air strikes. The fact remains that such a deep strike is a high-risk operation. Although it offers great opportunities for devastating success, it can go all wrong. The battle was never won by the faint-hearted. Virgil, the Greek classicist, wrote centuries ago that “fortune rewards the bold.”

had his first contact with the Army in 1975 as a volunteer English language teacher of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. Shortly afterward, he enlisted and later was a distinguished graduate of the 7th Army NCO Academy and a winner of the MacArthur Award and the Patton Award for leadership. He is a professional-level German linguist and has served with the 8th ID (MI, and 1st Bn. 46th Inf, 2d Bde, 1 st AD. He is the author of Bravo Romeo. march-aprill985 37