Mounting the Deep Counterattack

A successful armored force attack into the enemy rear places both sides in unique situations. The attacked side has a need to retract; it experiences disruption of its activities in the target area and suffers the psychological impact of having its physical security compromised. For the attacking force, there is a need to accomplish its mission, secure itself, possibly find away back, and be logistically supported. Depending on the distances and terrain, the attacking force may also be out of communication with its parent unit. One of the most important decisions that must be made early is to determine the objective of the attacking force. Specifically, the force must know whether its target is a terrain objective or an enemy force. That objective must be definite, but the unit must be flexible enough to react to opportunity or diversity. In order to do either, the attacking force must know where the enemy’s combat forces are and what they are doing. It is critical to know whether the enemy is deployed and moving in another direction (ideally toward the main battle area). In many ways the deep attack will resemble a movement to contact as far as getting to the target area is concerned. Ideally, the attacking force will make its penetration quickly through an existing gap or one specially created for it. As the attacking force nears the area where increased enemy contact is likely, it must take increased measures to protect itself. Some of the force might have to peel off to fight enemy forces if a window between enemy echelons has not been hit or if the enemy is defending along the attack route. If the latter situation exists, the attacker must assume that the enemy knows or suspects the attacking force is coming. The attacking force must use its available fire support aggressively along the attack route. Likely enemy combat force positions must be fired on as the attacking force nears them. Areas that create good kill zones must be well obscured with smoke while the force crosses them, especially if the deployment point has not been crossed. Engineers must be available to assist in clearing hastily erected obstacles. As part of his engineer complement, the commander must make an early decision whether or not he wants to take AVLBs with him. If he does, the force will be slowed down when speed is essential. If he does not and they are needed, he may not reach his objective. The commander of deep attacking forces must be willing to accept a lessening of effective communications as he goes deeper and he may lose communication totally with his parent unit. This situation will exist and manifests the need for a definite objective and mission before launching the attack and for a simple plan understood by all leaders in the attacking force. In summary, these are the key tactical considerations for deep attack: Target determination (terrain or enemy); enemy location (offensive or defensive); deployment points (where various battle drills begin); consolidating the force (attack force egress or link-up); logistical support (combat train makeup) and fire support (communications and range) Example During the Field Training Exercise Flinker Igel, September 1984, Task Force 3-35 Armor had the mission to counterattack into the enemy rear. It exercised its mission twice, the first attack was very successful. The second was not because the unit never achieved a satisfactory penetration into the enemy flank. The first attack was performed by a balanced task force of two tank companies and two mechanized infantry companies. There was no cross-attachment below that level. The plan called for a rapid advance through a gap created along the main battle area to an objective 25-30 kilometers away. The attacking force had to travel south approximately 15 kilometers to an intermediate objective before turning east to the main objective. Portions of the attacking force reached the western edge of that objective when controllers caused the action to stop. The plan called for two mechanized companies to lead; each was followed by a tank company. The scouts screened the task force flank. This formation was to be held until a phase line just before the intermediate objective. The force was to go over that objective with the two mechanized companies and a tank company on line. The other tank company had an on-order mission to occupy blocking positions between the objectives and the MBA. Note that we did not plan to assault the objective, merely to go over it deployed. The force was to search for enemy activity - hopefully command and control elements - not retain that piece of ground. Both of the mechanized companies made contact with the enemy on the intermediate objective. They found the enemy in prepared positions. The tank companies were instructed to bypass on either side of the mechanized companies. One mechanized company accepted some losses but was able to break contact and also bypass with the tank company that went around the right flank. Initially, the deployments were made to eliminate the force on the intermediate objective. However, instructions were received from brigade to continue the attack toward the main objective. The scout platoon had the mission to screen the right flank; they were in position. The tank company bypassing to the left ran into the rear of the enemy 34 march-aprill985

I # ”The attacking force will make its penetration quickly. main battle force just on the northern edge of the intermediate objective. That happened to be one of the tank company’son-order blocking positions. Both it and one mechanized company had to accept combat. The two companies bypassing to the right made it unopposed to the main objective before controllers stopped the attack. One important aspect of this deep attack that was not played realistically was the role of artillery. This role was reinforced, by its omission, to all attacking commanders. Although artillery was planned for and played, the control system was sluggish in getting artillery results to the scene of the battle. As a result, the enemy force on the intermediate objective was not affected by the attackers’ indirect fire and smoke missions. Had it been, the second mechanized company would not have been so strongly engaged initially, as its opposition was largely dismounted infantry in the woods. Lessons Learned The attacking force must have a simple plan aggressively carried out, know the enemy situations, orient on either the enemy force or an objective, and pre-plan its movement techniques throughout the counterattack. It should plan to use artillery and smoke as the force moves, and it should begin the attack with full fuel tanks and know how the force will be recovered. Observations The deep attack does not have to be very deep before the attacking TF could be out of communications with its brigade headquarters. Communications between the TF and brigade headquarters is absolutely essential in order for the TF to remain apprised of the enemy disposition and changing situation. Additionally, artillery fire support and TAC air can be lost without FM communications between the attacking TF and brigade. If direct support is brought along with the attacking force, the communication difficulties will be minimized. However, protecting the artillery may present other problems to the force commander. The TF andlor brigade retrans is an option; however, that too could be outdistanced and is very difficult to secure on a fluid battlefield. The solution may rest in the aviation community’s ability K r 3 3 3 3 3 3 to perform aerial retrans. The system is very effective because the aircraft can remain in friendly held territory and MI13 or M2 equipped with three ANI VRC 46 radios (1 battalion command,

FSO).

climb to an altitude which electronically “l00k” over the terrain without exposing the aircraft to enemy fire. The tank is not a suitable command and control vehicle for the TF commander. He needs a vehicle which affords him armor protection, a high degree of mobility and maneuverability, and multiple communications capability. The tank affords the TF commander maximum armor protection; however, maneuverability is limited by crossing bridges, narrow streets, railroad crossings, etc. Additionally, the TF commander needs three radios and three nets for channel communications, which the M60A3 does not possess. To adequately control a TF in the deep attack, the commander needs a

CHARLES J. O’BRIEN was commissioned in Armor from Norwich University in

1963. H e has held various positions in both regimental and divisional cavalry units in the United States, the Republic of Vietnam and Europe. He recently served as the Battalion Commander, 3/35 Armor in Bamberg, Germany. H e is a graduate of t h e Armor Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and t h e National Defense Security Managers Course. march-apriIl985 35