Toward an Old Way of Thinking

It is time to place “maneuver warfare” in its proper perspective. In their eagerness to talk about a “new” approach to war, casting aside the rigid methods of the firepower-attrition approach, the new prophets of maneuver warfare are on the verge of falling into the same trap as the adve cates of firepower-attrition.

Firepower and maneuver are not separate entities. In defining these concepts as such, we have essentially separated the soul from the man. Neither firepower alone nor maneuver alone can win wars. The two must be integrated to provide the most flexibility to the commanders. One must maneuver his force in such away as to gain an advantage over the enemy and then to bring overwhelming firepower on the enemy at that point which is deemed to be the focus of his combat efforts. Thus, firepower and maneuver work together, not separately. Hence, firepower is the handmaiden of maneuver. One does not exist without the other.

Firepower is essentially a unit’s ability to punish and kill an enemy. One maneuver-warfare enthusiast describes firepower as basically a “fear producer.” He says that artillery, for example, spreads a disruptive fear effect through enemy infantry. Wrong! Fear is apart of it, but only a small part. We must remember that firepower kills and punishes. Major General Trainer was right when he said, “war is a killing game.” Killing, whether we like it or not, is apart of the struggle.

Effective maneuver can usually be generalized as striking enemy weak points in order to capitalize on the enemy’s situation, exploiting the effect of surprise to disrupt and ultimately defeat him.

Because the current notion of maneuver warfare has often been likened to a game of chess, it may be misinterpreted. The maneuver of forces to take advantage of one’s enemy is necessary. The goal is to assault into his rear and cut his lines of communication, sending him reeling back more quickly than he can respond to an attacker’s thrusts, and ultimately resulting in his defeat. In Patterns of Conflict, Colonel John P. Boyd, USAF (Ret.), stressed that combat is basically a series of decision “loops” focusing on observation of an opponent, orientation toward that opponent, the decision to act, and, finally, the action against him. Colonel Boyd argues that in effective combat, one closes the loop more quickly than his enemy. Hence, an opponent would be beaten when he became disoriented.

The Boyd Cycle emphasized that defeat occurs at that point when an enemy realizes that he can no longer &ectively respond to the rapidly changing situation. In other words, when the opponent psychologically believes he cannot respond, then he is defeated. Yet, more must be read into this process of defeat than disorientation. Because of the sheer rationality of the Boyd model, one might assume that a battle is a situation in which rational men decide that defeat is imminent because they have been strategically outmaneuvered and, therefore, must surrender. Men surrender when their means to resist are negated. The goal of tactics, then, is to diminish the enemy’s ability to resist by presenting him with the clear perception that to fight on would mean futile death before an overwhelming situation.

But, what does one do when the enemy sees that his situation may be hopeless, by our standards, and still persists in fighting? Common sense and rationality should tell him he has been outmaneuvered and that further resistance is futile. But, sometimes men stand and fight willingly to the death in the face of certain defeat. If maneuver warfare is not then integrated into an overall concept of combat, including firepower, it will break down hopelessly.

Integration of Firepower and Maneuver During July 1942, the 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions advanced to the Ressetta River in western Russia. They were preceded by two infantry divisions that were to make the breach through which the mechanized forces would Pass-As the lead elements of the 19th Panzer attacked northwestward out of Khalmiskchi, they ran into well-placed Soviet antitank defenses that were constxucted in depth, often using dummy positions between points of concealed and covered antitank guns. During the early phases of the attack, elements of the 19th Panzer Division would 24 i turn their tanks to decoys and expose theii L I C K I I U lateral armor to fire. Finally, the armor moved out of the PAK (antitank) front and neared the forest area north of Nikitskoye. The Soviets used small groups of five to seven tanks to assault out of the forest on the German left flank and disrupt the racing German armor. Because his tanks were older models, the Soviet commander maneuvered his forces to strike the German wheeled supply and troopcarrying vehicles following the tanks. The Soviet technique was effective in slowing the German’s rush because the German commander was forced to commit a panzer battalion to cover his left flank. The panzer battalion was echeloned in depth and sup ported by armored engineers. This movement of the armored firepower to the German left flank was necessary to keep the division’s attack moving. The German commander used a large part of his firepower to protect his left flank rather than letting the tanks race ahead and leave the still effective Soviet troops intact and in his rear. The 19th Panzer Division used the integration of its armored firepower and maneuver capability to continue its drive unimpeded north to Glinnaya.

On the other side of the sector, the 11th Panzer Division attacked northeastward from Wyanova and encountered heavy flanking fires from roaming groups of Soviet T-34s and also from heavy KVtanks which were in hull defilade positions. The Russian tanks were positioned in, or moved through, the gullies on the flanks of the German attack. The excellent use of terrain by the Soviets delayed the armored assault and forced the 11th Panzer’s commander to employ concentrations of antitank and artillery fire to disrupt the hit-and-run operations of the Russians. The available fire support failed to disrupt the Russian attacks so the division commander asked for air support and received reconnaissance aircraft supported by fighters. This enabled the German forces to regain their momentum, because the aerial observers radioed Soviet armor positions directly to the German tank commanders. Because of this move, the Germans were able to react more quickly to the situation, disorient the Russians, and cause them heavy losses.

At this point, the Germans had employed maneuver in the form of increased reconnaissance in order to better concentrate their firepower on the Soviet tanks. Later, when the 11th Panzer Division neared Kilosovo, the lead elements came under intense counterattack from about 20 T-34s in the forest on the German’s left. The bulk of the German armor swung left toward the forest. As it did so, ail eiiiie urigaue ui 1-54s uruw UUL ui ruiymia wem vi Kilosovo, assaulting the German flank and rear. Excellent Soviet operational coordination caused the Seesaw battle over Kilosovo to continue until the German commander massed all of his artillery and antitank guns to secure a hold on the town. He relied on firepower to tip the balance because the maneuver effort of his armor had been effectively countered by the Soviet armored brigade. The Soviet maneuver took advantage of the lack of German reconnaissance in most sectors in order to place concentrations of tanks in various positions along the German axis of advance.

The battle for the Ressetta River gives lie to the doctri-naire approach of much maneuver theorizing. Both the German and Russian commanders had balanced forces and were consequently able to integrate fire and maneuver. In fact, the Germans ultimately found that they had to rely on their firepower more than on their maneuver capability to consolidate their gains, especially outside Kilosovo. This action, like many of the yet-unlearned lessons from WW 11, shows that there is more to fluid combat then moving troops and guns about the battlefield. Like the Germans at Ressetta, modern day commanders will have to use every available asset to strike a balance between the two, a balance that best suits the focus of the operation. In the long run, it is wrong to say that war should be exclusively maneuver-oriented or firepower-oriented. What maneuver ought to be defined as is more of away of thinking than as a “doctrine.” The principal that dominates successful doctrine is the proper integration of firepower and maneuver, based on capabilities and perceptions of a given situation, in order to accomplish a mission. FIRST LIEUTENANT

GEOFFREY C. DAVIS graduated from the USMA in 1981. He is a graduate of the AOB at Ft. Knox, the Motor Officer Course, the Airborne and Ranger Schools, the British Armv Parachute Course and was-XO of D Co.. 5th Bn.

3d BT Bde. He has completed flight training at Ft. Rucker, Alabama. 25