REPORT FROM KOREA

1st Armored Division Highlights c

EARLY

DAYS AT

FT. KWOX

ROLLING

-

ASEORE

AT AN210

CLIMBING

lNT0 TEE

NORTH

APENNINES

AR--A@,

1951 L I

REPORT

FROM KOREA

by COLOML WlwAM P. WITHERS Armor omcer, N g M Anny N the NWemba-Decemkt issue of .m- MOR there appeared an article titled Tanks in Korea,” in which the autha stated that the MA3 tank was inferior to the T-M Wan-made tant I would lik to submit the fol-bwing data which must be somewhat sketchy ih view of the fact that d t y regulations +bit extracrsfr0msarerLks. The earliest M A 3 tank were d n e d on tbe south 9ank. T h e were no M4A3’s in aaion befone ing 75mm guns. and ?rmored cars were the on$- armaed vehiclesin Korra. In August, one M4H3 was destroyed by three rounds o€ 105mm HEAT. d l hitting the vertjcal side armoc in the same place. The range was 200 yards. Another M4A3 was hit in the right final drive by an AP pmjede, probably 76mm, at a very ohaa range, under 500 yards. It was ucntly recovered and repaired. Two M4A3’s were t bv AP jectiles at short range. One of these was $ x t the junctitm of the dek plate with &e side armor, Qcactlp at the w 3 n e enemy gun wasm positim on a hi& hill, m a w was apximately downward, 45 to 60 degrres fran horizontal. These tanks were committed to save a surrounM battalion, and the mission was accomplished SUCC+- Farther to the north of the perimeta, at least m e h14A3 was hit by a omcealed T-34, at 40 !ads range. Another M4A3 tank, 25 yards distant. was I&ewisehit,intherightspansoa. Inthisaction. 10 tanks. The cause ot our loss may be attributed to the fact that there was no gmmd or air recoma& same. Personnel casualties were three men killed in the second d and one man wounded superficially when he was b h out of the rurref. Near Waegwan, an M A 3 tank was hit on the deck, 8 inch behind the driver’s hatch. which was open,byaI#bnmma*ushell. Thedeckvmor was broken, with a Swap crack r d i a t i q from the cenmandpushedintoadepthof3incbes. This A U p . In J ~ n e and J+ M24 light tank. m o ~ n t - fully. T-34’s ww d-d. Our loo was two same bettalion had three 514.43 tank hit by 8Smm guns twoom the fmnt plate at a range of 5Opuds. ~ T d d e s i n t b e s t h r e e t a n k s w e r e o n e killed and no wounded. I have witnessed many Lillr of T-34 tanks b. ThetllilddwashitmthespoowmuDdcrthe M4A3 tanb. In ow day, Friday. 13 October, ope t d m p a 1 1 y m d d + d 8 Russian-maBeT-34tanks. M ~ o f t b e s e ~ ~ ~ M4A3 tanks mounting 76mm guns. On115 one of the eight T-34s is known to have been dear0r;eb by of dour I#)mm bowitzas, one 4Smm AT gun and two heas? machine guns. One tank ran aver a its d shield. liltions l#knm howitzer, teams d atpem and the greatest number o€ &terminable kills have been credited to lirplanes. It is * thevalueofairntppw,. unwise to underrrtrmate The reason for the anall number credited to tanks is that the RaLdonotexpose theT-34 tow tanks if they can hdp it. These arethedusiomof the=tmorssCtion of theEi & A m p : 9omm guns. At the same timt, the fanL kilkdcrews werelmcoveredkrhe sepemberoctober advance ofthe United x Form. O v e r h a f o f ~ l l a v e b e a r a a m i n e d ~ %- someMo6ooRed a. It e M4A3E8 tank has prove?n i d superior -%E- CanbeconrecbedbVpropa6lIpbpmenSd maintmarre, and i n s p e u h before conunit-totheT-34 in evap tank-action. lent CornpaTed to other medium b. Logisfical @itis of rhc M4-m -1- chanicafaihucswhi!dlarumdhpvc d e d and man? are due to d ,W merrt.

c. 114A3ES clews like thir tanks.

d. United Nations Air Forces have done a 6ne e. I\ta~enauytankba&dwith~mmrmmon. have nurrndaed, due to lack ot fud a pprt~ The b e smements are mark fnrm prsoarl pbagainnanmypnk. .. f.OurpnLgunwsarearpabmortsmee. obserPations-andagrialrccardr

!

& 4RMOR IN THE AIRBORNE DIVISION

not indude e i k tank or heat? mor-latter two units are combined into a support comfyry which includes two each and an antitank platmn of six w e d 9Omm -AT guns. The additional a d and antitank support taIcompanicsTbefunctionsdchese hca,?: morurplaoooasoffourmorivs needed is supplied by two organic di-ri!3id rankbanalions, m lieuot the ooe f d in the &try divisim. ius0 a qarate antitaok pbtoocl of fourttmed 9omm guns is fami at dividanbdqmrm. The two tank bpttalions are agan-id urder T/O & E 17-35N a~ T d Batrahms (h.Iedium) and arc identi-caltothosefoundinstandard infanay dhisiom and the armored cavalry groupatcorpslevel. T h e y u t ~ p a - rate adminka tiveandtauicalunits withthenonnalsupply maintenance, aodepgcultioa CapBbilihS Eachcoa-sists of Headquartets Headquarters and !kxvice Company and three tank campanies of four platoons. n=* Division Artillery consists of Division Headquarters three towed 105mm Howitzer Battalions, one d 155mm Howiaer Battalion and one rM (AW) Banalion. The t and organitation closely ?xr pa retained and the M (AG b a d n is condderably smaller than standard. In otganization for an airborne op eration the division is normally divided into an assault echelon. a followup &, and a rear echelon. The assault echelon is usually further teams ?ad divisional units and is a- parachute. The follow-up echelon c~ntaia~ both seryice and heavy c ~ m - bat elements and is air landed rn re joins th division as soon as tains4Yhninidra tive k t s and pinr the divitioIl when th situation dmbion the medium artillag .+talion and the two tank bodions ARMOR--Mac)l-ApdI, 1951 that of the groand division exceptthattheoldfour banervk 0’8aniZed for combat into combat pble of being entirely landed b. permisAudemenouqpictothe .re capable of being, in whde or in .on. Tbese exceptions must, k u s e , f the present limited capacities of ;he foU0w-u echelon either by sea or Iiterlaud. tremely vulnerable &e assault to echelon enemy armor is ex-prior to the arrival of the fdlowu ccshelon with the organic tank bad ~ms and medium artillery. Therefore, *art, cammitred in the assault =be airuaft, join tk division with .t has bem necessarp to greatly increase the antitank potential of the JlrbOrW bhe that of ground units who oprate T’his antitank potential is a matter a t f constant study and currently it is provide four antitank cornpanis each of twelve guns. One of these cam-pan& would be organic to each in- f m q Fegiment and ane would be at division kvel. The present antirank capability, 3nd particularly the contemphtcd undastood that propored changes will creatly i l l m a d antitank strength, Loupled with the pt”rnceof an addi-pl0Vide.s tbe airborne divisioo commander with much greater aexibilily lecessarily devoting any large portion lecessrp forthedivisionor regimen- :id tank battalion h e a d q m If command He is innnediatelp better .>an antitank mission. It map not be -il CDmmanderS to break down tad .inits that might otbawise be em-AIMOI--Mach-W, 1951 ployed in mass solely for the purpose of antitank ddense. +hc v e q bad practice of diyiding the number of tanks available tbe number of units to be supponed is readily avoided. Thus, with thik added 6aiWtv, the tions for combat out-Tank Battalion. can be multiplied many times. M a n y of the additions, in the opinion of the writer, being sounder, for command and tactical reasons, chan thore available in the infantry division. I.

I in front of one regiment 'and the &vision comm?nder decides to make the main ffin in this regiment'szone he can: --one barralian to &as- t making the main ef- ;EI2rze other banaion, lea a company, a pan OE the Divirion Re swc, and attach the remaining com-Two. when a Iarger portion of the tank and infanap a~ngth must be kept in division reserve to provide flexibility for tbe stack and enwe retention of the initiative; he can: theDivid0nResM;aaaChtksec-ond bettllion, ks a company, to one assault infanap t; and attach pany tothed.ier assault regiment. Keep one bo& intact as part of the company to the . . O k Z & i U i e D L . .-. -. * 4 oBGAM;Mno#poBccmm~ -opIcQIIoQ.. T& PinCipIes of ddepdve cunbat andthecechniq~ofeioht ot on a wir2 which are peaiwnt to the employment of the tank battalion with the infanay dnision are equally a plica-bk to thetank baaaiollJ with &e airborne divirion. The tank be& a smallainclude!d units, must be assigned ddensne missiam in which they can use thir mobility and shock aaion to the greatest possible extent. Such missions would include adding sacngth to thecountaanack, adding depch to the antitank defrmseLand acting as a d g force a outpost far tbe dmirioa. Again, bowever, as in theotfensive, any tendency to om- W u thesamebattalion men6 must be resined firmly. It is equally essential to have flexibility of command in the defense; and there-fixe both battalions must be trained and called u p to perform either smaU or large unit deferise missions. m "%g attacRmrn tstotheregi. In the &me divkion, utilizing the dded hibility derived Lrom the existmceoftwotankbottaljollsd a* avoiding tk imposition a€ ooc tankelement qnmprotba, thereme at larathrrep~sitiafortheem-ploymeat of uma in thisrype divi-sioninthe&knse Akmgwithtbeir general plrpora, these are: ooe, to - the Countcraaack srrngrh of tbe divkion in ader to ,trike and destroy aby enemy which may penecrate the bttk positian; the DivisiimGnnman&arn:Anrhow company of the fint tank botlion to each of the three regiments; put this banalion. &us unda divish con-rd; and aaach the second battalion intact to the Divisicm Resme.

TWO,

to iaaease tbe antitank =pabilities of ozw regiment and concur-rentlv to maintain a strong Counter- a d force under Division, he can: .ittach the first battalion less one company to tbe regiment having the most difficult sector to defend; attach the Rmaining c0mplll)r of this batral-ion to the otber rrgiment on the MLR; and make t h e d tank battalion a part d the Division Reseme. Three, for a defense on a wide front against any to each of the three regimen= put one tank company hom one battalion this battalion, minus, under division conml; and designate the second tank battalion, reinforced, the Division Re =.e. zations both &she and defensive I t is mident in these task organi-that IIO tank unit bas b r - posedonanother. Thus corn-port. to include a R n e c e r s a r y a s ~ i d b e ~ c u e mandchannek havebeen maintained and responsibility for Iopacal sup nance,is6xed. oporalldehaunels when two tank unat are involved in the support of the same infantry ele-meat. AirbaawTQIL. In any dixussKn ' oftheairborne division there is an inherent obligation to answer the question regarding the develapment of hea\y aircraft for the dtPlkandthecon-ions, or elements thereof, in a purely airborne lic4l.Thisquestfonis swaedbydkCUSSh.Prrsart?irbome Fb ~ = * k J p e l l t of the b a d - r m d c r r - and can only be an- A h O R 4 d + d I , 1-1 * *

ARYED

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FORCES

B A I

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FREEDOM

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