Evolution of the Plow: Supporting the IED Fight

“Conflict in the future will slide up and down a scale, both in scope or scale and in lethality. And we have to procure the kinds of things that give us — the kinds of equipment and weapons that give us the maximum flexibility, across the widest range of that spectrum of conflict.”1 — Secretary Robert Gates Across the Army, young soldiers are asking about the rusting hunk of metal in the corner of the motor pool and why they have to inventory its components. Inevitably, a young sergeant responds, “it’san old piece of equipment they used to find minefields, but we don’t do that anymore. We look for IEDs, but we don’t use plows or rollers because they tear up roads.” Maneuvering along roads searching for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a tedious and monotonous task. Nevertheless, commanders will, and should, continue to task armor crewmen to conduct counter IED-clearing operations because the M1 Abrams is the most survivable vehicle on the battlefield and has the best trained crews. Unlike the Buffalo or mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, tanks have the ability to maneuver in areas where direct contact is likely and transition to offensive operations once enemy contact is made. The ability of the M1 Abrams to absorb initial contact and then maneuver to destroy the enemy is unmatched. Yet, the full power of the M1 Abrams is not being used on today’s battlefield. The glaring deficiency of the M1 Abrams in urban combat is its lack of an organic IED interrogation device. An IED interrogation device is nothing more than an adaptation of the plow and roller for the current generation of warfare. The armor community must expand its role in counterinsurgency operations and assist the military by honing the experience of armor crewmen and the survivability of the M1 Abrams. The armor community must also adapt to the current and future operating environment and use its tanks, as Secretary Gates said, to “give us the maximum flexibility, across the widest range of that spectrum of conflict.”2 IEDs are the most deadly weapon on today’s battlefield and our enemies continue to refine their lethality. It is common knowledge that to defeat IEDs, we must defeat IED cells. However, this fact does not mitigate the need for counter-IED clearing operations, and during high-intensity operations, establishing the point of penetration to gain and maintain freedom of maneuver. While scientists and developers search for technological systems that neutralize IEDs, we must mount up and hunt them. We cannot overcomplicate the process: “Red 1, Black 6, employ your interrogation tank and report.” Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, mechanized units trained tirelessly on conducting breaching operations. Tanks were expected to use their organic equipment to find minefields and, if possible, create lanes to maintain the freedom of maneuver for follow-on units. The open landscape of the desert floor allowed us to use these organic assets. The terrain changed from open desert to asphalt roads and minefields are now IEDs; however, the need for freedom of maneuver and/or the establishment of a point of penetration has not changed. IED warfare has created an insatiable requirement for counter-IED assets. Fitting the Abrams with an organic IED interrogation device will provide unit leaders with multiple organic IED-detection devices, thus providing unit commanders with the ability to take greater ownership of the counter-IED fight. These organic assets reduce risks, when units are dispersed across large areas, and allow commanders the ability to plan for counter-IED tasks without relying on higher headquarters to provide resources such as explosive ordnance detachments (EOD). EOD and engineer route-clearing teams can quickly become overwhelmed by events on the battlefield. Consequently, suspected IEDs can be cordoned for hours before they are investigated by a specialized team. This delay may lead to unconventional and rudimentary investigation techniques by troops on the ground. Soldiers will not leave a suspected IED, but it just isn’t feasible to cordon every suspected piece of trash or broken curb. Every soldier is a sensor and our armor crewman need equipment to properly conduct these mission types. Not only is this requirement needed for routine operations, but also for high-intensity combat operations. The enemy incorporates IEDs into its defensive scheme of maneuver and conducts overwatch with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and machine gun positions. Buffalo and MRAP vehicles are extremely vulnerable to direct fire and do not have the ability to transition to offensive operations. A tank can absorb the initial contact, engage and destroy overwatch positions, and, with an interrogation device, confirm or deny the disposition of suspected IEDs. The bottom line: we train armor crewmen to complete missions with the equipment they have and not the equipment they want. It is not the fabric of an armor crewman to whine about equipment — they complete missions. Unfortunately, the resulting attitude is that armor crewmen believe an IED clearance mission entails, “drive down the road and if something blows up on you, you are safe inside the tank and should be all right.” We owe our soldiers more than that. Notes 1U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, News Transcript, Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, online at http://www.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx? TranscriptID=4435, 18 June 2009. 2Ibid. Major Bill Coryell is currently an intern, Joints Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon. He received a B. A. from Indiana University and a Master of Policy Management from Georgetown University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and U. S. Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include observer controller, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor (1-64 Armor), 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA; executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-64 Armor, 3ID, Fort Stewart; and platoon leader, C Company, 1-64 Armor, 3ID, Fort Stewart. Evolution of the Plow: Supporting the IED Fight by Major William F. Coryell