Joint Security Stations: Transitioning and Closure

When General David Petraeus assumed duties as the commanding general, MultiNational Force-Iraq in February 2007, he initiated a bold new counterinsurgency strategy for the military. Building on his experiences from his previous assignment as commander, 101st Airborne Division, General Petraeus guided U.S. forces in Iraq to focus on counterinsurgency fundamentals. “Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency,” and was one of the primary concerns for General Petraeus.1 In addition to the surge of supplemental combat brigades deployed to secure the populace, coalition forces established multiple joint security stations (JSS) throughout the Baghdad area in February 2007. These security stations were established to eliminate segregation inherent in massing U.S. troops on large forward operating bases (FOBs) located on the outskirts of major population areas in favor of integrating smaller outposts within neighborhoods, which places security stations in a better position to provide security to the local populace. A JSS located within the city and among the populace allows units to develop a rapport with the immediate community, which increases the knowledge of the local terrain, and according to Dr. David Kilcullen, is one of the fundamentals of company-level counterinsurgency operations.2 The location of the JSS not only places U.S. forces at a proximate distance to the local people, but it also allows them closer associations with local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Supporting the resident security forces is absolutely essential to overall victory as the host nation must ultimately win the war. This achievement “requires [the] development of viable local leaders and institutions.”3 Living, patrolling, and working in close coordination with the Iraqi army and Iraqi police enables the development of host nation’s forces, which will eventually allow them to provide security for their own people with little or no external aid, which is the “cornerstone of any [counterinsurgency] effort.”4 Blackfoot Troop, 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry (5-4 CAV), arrived in Baghdad to conduct its relief in place and transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry (1-75 CAV), at the end of the surge period and inherited an area of operations (AO) in which the ISF had recognizably improved. With a relatively stable host nation security force already in place and fewer combat brigades scheduled for deployment, the decision was made to begin the transfer of these security stations to full Iraqi control. Blackfoot Troop began its deployment with the monumental task of transferring control of JSS Ghazaliyah III (Ghaz III) to the ISF within the space of 3 weeks. The U.S. forces in Baghdad had never conducted this type of operation and Ghaz III would be the first of many JSS closures throughout the city over the course of the upcoming months. Blackfoot Troop arrived at Ghaz III on 5 November 2008, and on 21 November 2008, as ordered, handed over complete con-June-August 2010 39 trol of the JSS to the Iraqi army. Blackfoot Troop would validate its experiences and lessons learned in February 2008 when they closed JSS Ghaz II between 14 and 27 February 2009, and JSS Ghaz I between 15 August and 7 September 2009. This article provides an overview of JSS closure and transfer operations during the transfer of Ghaz III to the Iraqi army, as well as discussions of lessons learned during the operation. These assignments are more focused on logistics and security than on offensive combat operations. It is important to keep in mind that these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) should be modified based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), as well as the size and complexity of the JSS involved. The intent is to close a JSS with minimal combat power while simultaneously maximizing logistics support to reduce the duration of the operation to allow resources to be concentrated elsewhere on the battlefield. Manning and Security With decreased combat power and heavy focus on JSS closure operations, there exists a potential to shift focus from necessary duties of external security to internal closure tasks. To mitigate increased threat to the security of the security station, which is attributed to a reduction in overall combat capabilities, the officer in charge (OIC) and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) must immediately assess the current force components and identify the security station’s potential weak points. Security measures deemed unsatisfactory must be modified to improve security and reduce the threat to U.S. forces. While every JSS is different in scale and complexity, a minimum number of personnel are required to run the station and conduct closeout operations. In terms of managing combat power for a JSS scheduled for closure, establishing a proper guard/rest rotation must be paramount. Expecting individual soldiers to repeatedly perform long periods of guard duty commonly results in an overall feeling of complacency, thus sufficient personnel must be maintained as a preventive measure. The unit must also remain flexible to perform patrols that result from fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), which may or may not be received on short notice. There is no set formula to determine how many personnel will satisfy the manning requirements to maintain a secure perimeter. Each JSS will have its own orientation and established battle positions, as well as an entry control point (ECP) to manage. In addition to supplying personnel tasked with preserving physical security from established defensive positions, local national contractors, who provide services at the JSS, must be escorted within the perimeter. Since operations at a JSS are conducted as joint maneuvers with the local ISF, it is necessary to augment U.S. forces with contract personnel. During closeout operations at both Ghaz II and III, Blackfoot Troop was tasked to produce combat patrols in response to enemy activity in sector and support an operation that required additional security measures. At Ghaz III, Blackfoot Troop operated with three maneuver sections, comprised of four vehicles and approximately 15 personnel each. These proportions supported a strong and alert work force while sustaining a security force that maintained the plasticity to conduct patrols and other operations. To maintain perimeter security, Blackfoot Troop occupied all preexisting battle positions and towers for a total of five positions, as well as the ECP. Two additional soldiers were tasked to conduct escort duty for the local national contractors operating in and around the JSS. An ISF soldier was always present at the ECP to provide linguistic support. To accomplish various guard and patrol duties necessary during closeout procedures, each section within the troop operated on a 12-hour rotation, completing two cycles within every 24-hour period. Each of the three sections rotated through three 4-hour shifts consisting of rest, JSS security operations, and work details. The “The location of the JSS not only places U.S. forces at a proximate distance to the local people, but it also allows them closer associations with local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Supporting the resident security forces is absolutely essential to overall victory as the host nation must ultimately win the war.” 40 June-August 2010 section on work detail rotation was also tasked with responsibility for providing a quick reaction force (QRF), as needed. This schedule had to be maintained for 2 to 3 weeks and was sufficient to avoid complacency while preserving the requisite flexibility. Logistics and Support Logistics support in its myriad forms is possibly the most critical element in JSS closure operations. Over time, the JSS accumulates a vast quantity of materiel, which requires removal from the JSS prior to the ISF transfer. Items such as theater provided equipment (TPE), morale equipment, supplies, construction materials, and personal effects are only a few examples of the property stored on a JSS. A combination of palletized loading system (PLS) truck support from the forward support company (FSC); high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) cargo trailers; multiple 20- foot shipping containers; and a light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) for cargo transportation can accommodate most equipment that must be moved. Integrating lessons learned from closing Ghaz III, a PLS was dedicated specifically for container transportation and proved an invaluable resource when closing Ghaz II, as it allowed for a systematic removal of all property containers at the closing unit’s pace instead of relying solely on the traditional logistics resupply patrol. As a JSS is disassembled, trash and garbage normally tends to accumulate. A plethora of items, from simple trash to used construction materials and force protection items, appear as barriers are removed and buildings are vacated. This trash cannot be left, as it is disrespectful to the host nation and homeowners. While closing Ghaz I, Blackfoot Troop required the FSC to provide the sideboards for the PLS to transport piles of trash to the city dump. Without the sideboards in place, it would have taken many more trips to properly remove the trash from the site. A JSS closure is not a heavy offensive procedure and does not have a high operational tempo. Despite the comparatively low volume of combat patrols being conducted out of the JSS during closure operations, vehicles will inevitably suffer mechanical issues requiring maintenance support, in addition to normal preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). As a remedy to this situation, Blackfoot Troop established a contingent of the troop-level maintenance team, which was tasked to provide maintenance support to the sections responsible for JSS closeout. The team was physically located at the JSS 3 days a week to assist in maintenance operations. Additionally, each section on the JSS was allocated time once a week to conduct PMCS during their normal off time. A company-level organization is authorized one communications specialist; however, during closeout procedures at Ghaz II and Ghaz III, Blackfoot Troop was allotted an additional signal expert from the squadron’s S6 shop. Considering the troop was still operating a tactical operations center (TOC) and the abundance of communications equipment required to properly provision the TOC, the skills and knowledge of a signal expert are absolutely necessary to safely unin-stall and remove all sensitive property from the security station while meeting the transfer deadline. Perimeter Wall and Towers Depending on how many assets are located at the JSS and its ultimate end state, repositioning of perimeter concrete barriers and concrete guard towers may be necessary. Allowing for the requisite METT-TC considerations, planning and execution of this task can be complex. Blackfoot Troop was tasked with reducing the overall perimeter at Ghaz III in the course of closure operations. The FSC provided an equal number of PLS and cranes through the squadron’s S4 shop. This balance of movement assets permitted a faster transfer and relocation of concrete barriers. When conducting actual repositioning, perimeter security was maintained through coordination with the ISF, which added personnel to the formation of an outer cordon, while Blackfoot Troop provided the inner cordon. Moving concrete towers is one of the less difficult operations involved in the closure of a JSS. The type of support required to reposition a tower heavily depends on the distance to where the tower must be moved. For example, if the unit is moving the tower only a short distance, a 20-ton crane can accommodate the task easily; however, should the tower be moved a greater distance, PLS support from the FSC will be required. Additionally, plan to mark the concrete tower pieces to ensure correct reassembly by the crane operators to avoid delays. As a security precaution during tower repositioning, Blackfoot Troop assumed a supplementary battle position on the roof of one of the JSS buildings to guard the area, which is normally overseen by the tower. ISF and Civilian Interaction Consolidating the JSS footprint will almost certainly be required as a result of transfer of control from U.S. forces to ISF (or permanent closure). The reduction in personnel will mean that not only are fewer living quarters now required, but fewer soldiers will necessitate a smaller perimeter to maintain an equal level of security. Coordination and planning to this end will involve cooperation from both the Iraqi army and nearby civilians. In the case of Ghaz III, control of the JSS was being transferred to the Iraqi “Logistics support in its myriad forms is possibly the most critical element in JSS closure operations. Over time, the JSS accumulates a vast quantity of materiel, which requires removal from the JSS prior to the ISF transfer. Items such as theater provided equipment (TPE), morale equipment, supplies, construction materials, and personal effects are only a few examples of the property stored on a JSS.” June-August 2010 41 army, thus it was imperative to incorporate them into the closure process. The unit’s OIC and NCOIC engaged ISF leaders early and continuously based on the critical need for ISF to be well informed on future plans, especially since they are also residents. Engagement and interaction with Iraqi army leaders proved to be very successful during an effort to incorporate them in reconnaissance patrols for perimeter movement and house consolidation, which resulted when the JSS footprint was decreased. This further facilitated the eventual transfer of all security positions to the Iraqi army. The leaders of Blackfoot Troop repeatedly engaged in dialogue with its Iraqi army counterparts to ensure everyone understood the timeline/status for each building, for example, which buildings Iraqi army personnel could move into once they were vacated by U.S. forces. The superior level of cooperation was manifested when the Iraqi army moved into its newly reduced footprint within the allotted time. Footprint reduction commonly results from private homes, which the JSS use as buildings, being returned to respective owners. Based on the ISF’s apathy toward the homes they occupied, coupled with alterations, such as force protection measures and additional sleeping rooms, U.S. forces made during its residence, the homes will likely have suffered some degree of modification or even damage. To protect U.S. forces from liability, take photographs of the interior and exterior of the homes prior to withdrawing from the JSS, which provides evidence of the condition of the home at the time of its return to the homeowner. Proprietors seem to be readily aware of when their homes are being returned and quickly come forward to make claims for damage compensation. At Ghaz III, Blackfoot Troop was able to schedule a walkthrough with homeowners to determine the extent of damages and begin the claims process. Primary goals of a successful counterinsurgency strategy is establishing the host nation’s “institutions that can sustain government legitimacy;” while the last stage is “movement to self-sufficiency” and “transition responsibility for [counterinsurgency] operations to [host nation] HN leadership.”5 Transferring JSS Ghaz I, II, and III to full Iraqi control marked a major milestone in the buildup of the ISF in Baghdad and demonstrated faith and confidence in the Iraqi army, enabling it to secure its own people without U.S. support. Since the transfer of Ghaz III from Blackfoot Troop to the Iraqi army in November 2008, 5-4 CAV has overseen an additional six JSS closures and transfers within its operating area. As U.S. military presence continues to draw down in Iraq, as a result of the positive developments in Iraqi Security Forces, more security stations will close. Deploying units must be aware of the improving situation in Iraq and be prepared to conduct closure or transfer operations at their individual joint security stations. It is important for units to maintain flexibility, be prepared to move, and maintain close interaction with the ISF to allow for a smooth transfer of authority. Notes 1The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2007, xix. 2 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles; Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May-June 2006, p. 2. 3The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. 47. 4Ibid., p. 42. 5Ibid., p. 235; and 154, respectively. Captain Patrick C. Howlett is currently a student at the Maneuver Captain Career Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and his military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, B Troop, 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry (5-4 CAV), 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Fort Riley, KS; and platoon leader, 1st platoon, Charlie Troop, 5-4 CAV, 2BCT, 1ID, Fort Riley. “Footprint reduction commonly results from private homes, which the JSS use as buildings, being returned to respective owners. Based on the ISF’s apathy toward the homes they occupied, coupled with alterations, such as force protection measures and additional sleeping rooms, U.S. forces made during its residence, the homes will likely have suffered some degree of modification or even damage.” 42 June-August 2010