Deployment Training: The Battalion S3 Perspective Major Brian E. McCarthy

“If I had the chance to do it again, I certainly would do a few things differently.” Over the past 2 years, I’ve collected an assortment of observations and lessons learned associated with our unit’s deployment. As a battalion S3 managing a unit move, reset, new equipment training, train-up for deployment, and subsequent deployment to Iraq, I learned a number of things. However, this article focuses primarily on training and staff development, with a few final thoughts on time and personnel management. We made mistakes, we learned lessons, and we pressed on; however, this article shares my humble opinions to generate thought and discussion. While I may refer to doctrine occasionally, this article is simply based on opinion and illustrates “one way” to do things. Training Management Training for combat is the critical business we conduct every day and our soldiers deserve the world-class training our Army is capable of delivering. In his guest blog, “Training Full Spectrum — Less is More,” General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states that “Good leaders understand that they cannot train on everything; therefore, they focus on training the most important tasks. Leaders do not accept substandard performance in order to complete all the tasks on the training schedule. Training a few tasks to standard is preferable to training more tasks below the standard.”1 This statement illustrates that the Army understands that it is impossible to train every task on a unit’s mission essential task list (METL) to optimal proficiency, and that doctrine is written to empower lead- 12

The Battalion S3 Perspective by Major Brian E. McCarthy ers. Leaders must first understand and accept, then identify, the training aimpoint, which makes it possible to provide clear tasks, purposes, directions, and resourcing to subordinates. To successfully execute this process, three vital elements are required: a road to war, along-range training calendar (LRTC), and training guidance. The road to war oftentimes is a single slide, which depicts the glide path from a start point (where you are now) to an objective or end point (deployment/rotation), and lays out the sequential steps along the way. The LRTC speaks for itself, but the annual and quarterly training guidance (A/ QTG) binds the plan together. The training guidance must be usable and understandable at the lowest level. To achieve this, it must be clear, succinct, and manageable, but most of all, it must be feasible. As we adhere to the Army’s seven principles of training outlined in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, we must provide subordinates clear guidance without stifling their initiative.2 This is especially important given the type of warfare in which we are engaged today. Leaders at brigade, battalion, and company echelons must identify critical events and establish priorities at all levels, noting that their priorities must, of course, also include the commander’s priorities. Training guidance should not be held at the company commander and first sergeant level; it should be pushed down to platoon and squad leaders (and hopefully individual soldiers). Therefore, our QTG was written in an operations order (OPORD) format and every effort was made to keep the core material in the base order and refrain from using annexes because small-unit annexes are often read as an afterthought, if read at all. It is often said that a company can do only one thing well each week and commanders must set priorities to ensure their training guidance and schedules reflect this approach. Training guidance and schedules should be synchronized across all staffs to ensure time and resources are not conflicted, which guarantees a company’s success. For example, a unit examines existing multiple training requirements, which include Army training/leader development regulatory training, as well as theater-specific training requirements. These multiple requirements must be balanced against each other and prioritized in accordance with training guidance. As a result, throughout the course of our train up for deployment, there were a multitude of competing directives the battalion had to manage to prepare for full-spectrum operations and deployment. Writing guidance in the OPORD format provides the commander’s intent, written in familiar format, to which our leaders, staff, and soldiers could refer for guidance. It’s no secret that time is our most precious training commodity and it must be closely guarded. Yet, all too often, leaders are abruptly forced into “react to contact” mode to field a request for information (RFI) or execute a directive from higher headquarters. This often results when units fail to schedule support/prep time, which is required to conduct training events; synchronizing efforts saves valuable time. With the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycles and systems, it is equally, if not more, important to ensure logistics events, such as equipment issue, scheduled maintenance services, and new equipment training, are all included in the planning process. Writing the QTG as an OPORD also provides an opportunity to conduct a military decisionmaking process (MDMP) exercise for the staff. QTG, calendar, and schedule development must involve all warfighting functions at every echelon; using the orders drill method to create training guidance is an excellent opportunity to ensure all functions are included in QTG, calendars, and schedules. Core Competency Training The Army has identified the need to maintain full-spectrum operations proficiency to remain competitive for current conflicts (counterinsurgency), as well as for any future contingencies (high-intensity conflict or otherwise.) To be successful across the full spectrum of operations, each soldier must first be a trained rifleman (able to shoot, move, and communicate on the ground) and then trained for any complex tasks and situations they might encounter. For soldiers, these requirements are primarily core competencies and often highly technical perishable skills; for leaders, they are often counterinsurgency operations with decentralization and ambiguity. For example, during training, a mechanized infantryman conducts across-country movement to attack an enemy position while integrating direct and indirect fires, breaches an obstacle with the aid of attached engineers, and then assaults the objective using Bradleys and tanks in support-by-fire positions while rifle squads clear and secure buildings. If he can perform these tasks to standard, it is safe to assume that he is trained in a wide range of skills and can conduct most any mission across the full spectrum. On the other hand, leader training should focus at the opposite end of the spectrum on stability or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In this environment, not only must leaders still employ and synchronize combined arms, they must also be policemen, diplomats, and oftentimes city “Good leaders understand that they cannot train on everything; therefore, they focus on training the most important tasks. Leaders do not accept substandard performance in order to complete all the tasks on the training schedule. Training a few tasks to standard is preferable to training more tasks below the standard.” 13 planners or managers. Leaders must also be able to think independently, operate decentralized, and be comfortable with ambiguity, as there are few front lines or black and white solutions. The full-spectrum leader must train for extremely challenging situations, and due to the variability of today’s battlefield, he should possess the requisite skills to lead in any environment. Leader Development of Staff Officers/ Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) Developing officers and NCOs to serve as staff associates is often the most overlooked area on any staff. Very few soldiers really want to serve on a staff, and as leaders of staff sections, it is our job to provide these soldiers with purpose, direction, and motivation. Because the primary purpose of the staff is to plan, resource, and orchestrate battalion-level operations, problemsolving is an absolute critical skill all staff associates should possess and leaders should cultivate. During initial planning, we decided to limit the bulk of our staff, the 11, 19, and 21 military occupational specialties, to 12 months time on staff. This meant we would have steady staff transitions; however, it was vital to keep experienced soldiers on the line, and by phasing transitions, it would be manageable. We would have a constant flow of soldiers who needed staff training, and to help develop problemsolving capabilities and staff skills, a continual series of professional-development sessions were conducted. These basic courses taught the roles and responsibilities of staff members, the MDMP, how to lead from a “nontraditional leadership position,” and tactical vignettes. All staff NCOs should be required to attend the battle staff course, and every staff associate should be required to attend courses on all Army battle command systems, such as Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2), command post of the future (CPOF), advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), distributed common ground system-Army (DCGS-A), maneuver control system (MCS), and battle command sustainment support system (BCS3), they employ. The battalion staff is so involved in daily operations of the unit that it rarely gets dedicated training events; however, we executed several staff exercises, in and out of the field, by leveraging time and managing expectations. We had 2 days that we could conduct classes and exercises, which were Mondays and Thursdays, during command maintenance and sergeant’s time. To make the most of our allotted time, we had to manage some expectations, which included ensuring that the companies, battalion, and brigade knew that these times were sacrosanct and we would be maintaining and/or training during these times and not waiting for e-mail traffic or the phone to ring (which was a challenge). Mondays are a great opportunity to train the entire staff, at the motor pool, to maintain vehicles and equipment and set up the tactical operations center (TOC) systems that the battalion will use in the field. We took full advantage of this training, which paid huge dividends when we got to the field for the first time. It is vitally important to have every staff associate not only involved in the physical set up of the TOC, but with the hookup, installation, and set up of digital equipment, which will ensure everyone has the proper equipment to successfully function as part of a team. Thursdays were set aside for sergeant’s time training (STT); however, if I could use a “do-over,” I would dedicate one STT session per month to a staff exercise, not just MDMP exercises, but battle tracking and battle drill refinement. This would allow the headquarters and headquarters company to focus on basic soldier skills “The Army has identified the need to maintain full-spectrum operations proficiency to remain competitive for current conflicts (counterinsurgency) as well as for any future contingencies (high-intensity conflict or otherwise.) To be successful across the full spectrum of operations, each soldier must first be a trained rifleman (able to shoot, move, and communicate on the ground) and then trained for any complex tasks and situations they might encounter.”

for the other three sessions (given a 4- week month), while the XO and S3 conduct officer professional development sessions with staff officers, if they are not involved in STT. By setting up the TOC on Monday and leaving it in the motor pool, it allows the staff to conduct exercises on Thursday in a “field environment,” while other exercises are conducted in a more sterile location such as the battalion conference room. During training, staffs must ensure they train on both analog and digital systems. As discussed earlier, we oftentimes expend so much time and effort training on and maintaining our digital systems that our acetate and alcohol marker skills erode. On aside note: the MCS is often overlooked, but we found that once operators were fully trained, we saved a great amount of time and effort. Since the staff member is not a “green tab” leader, he has no official leadership position; therefore, he must lead and influence others to assist him by leveraging his disposition. This makes establishing relationships as the second key ingredient to being a solid staff member. Some of these relationships are obvious; battalion staff members need to link up with counterparts at the brigade and company levels. Additionally, the S2 and S3 need to link up and work together early and often to construct the mechanism that will drive operations during a deployment. The S4 and S3 often pass each other like ships in the night, which causes problems when the battalion plans a training event that conflicts with another event such as a fielding or equipment turn in. A solid relationship should be built in garrison between the S3 and S4 involved in staff training exercises, so they learn to synchronize efforts and not work in a vacuum, which helps prevent paragraph 4 from becoming an afterthought. Vital to success are the relationships between the S6 and the operations sergeant major (SGM)/S3 NCO in charge (NCOIC); and the S2 and battalion scout platoon. With the first relationship, the operations SGM, along with the battalion XO, is responsible for establishing the battalion’s command and control (C2) nodes, and while the S3 has communications personnel, the S6 should be linked with the S3 so everyone is involved in planning, establishing, and jumping C2 nodes. Often overlooked is the S2 and scout platoon relationship. The scouts are tasked to gather information on the enemy or the terrain on which the battalion will be fighting. Linking the scouts with the S2 early and often will enable certain synchronization between the two elements, thereby offsetting any probable gaps. The S2 and scout platoons can create training scenarios and better refine their reciprocal RFIs. The S2 can provide the scouts a clearer picture of his intent; in turn, the scouts can provide the S2 with guidance and products on what he can realistically expect the scouts to deliver. Given all this, the key element to staff development is counseling. Top chief executive officers (CEO) of Fortune 500 companies report that they spend 50 percent of their time on people issues, which is the largest single time commitment they have. A typical S3 does not have much time available either, but because we are in the business of developing leaders, counseling needs to be a priority. Like any counseling, it should be conducted regularly, be detailed, and include leadership preparation for future assignments. It is good practice to conduct and recommend quarterly counseling for everyone in your rating chain (to include the SGM) and include things that apply directly to the staff member’s job, as well as personal and professional goals. Closing Thoughts While we were a successful organization, both as a staff section and as a battalion, there are always things that can be improved. Hopefully, some of the ideas in this article will generate discussion and help other units across the force. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the Army is about people and I have been extremely lucky to have had an outstanding crew of junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. As people are integral to our profession, I will close by thanking them for their hard work and share some musings on personnel matters. Leadership. Something that often gets overlooked is the leadership role of staff officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, in the battalion. Staff time is the time for young soldiers to make a reputation for themselves, which oftentimes lays the groundwork before moving to aline platoon. These soldiers are in unique positions to better the performance of not only their staff sections, but of the unit as a whole. They can do this by observing the unit and their section, identifying existing gaps, and then applying their unique strengths and attributes to potentially fill some of those gaps. Relationships with company commanders. As the S3, it was our role to support the battalion commander and company commanders; in effect, we were there to support the company, as well as the battalion. As one of three field grade officers in the battalion, I had a responsibility to coach and mentor them as well. For example, I captured many opportunities to provide counsel on how to present information, such as courses of action, to the battalion commander to influence his decisionmaking process. Relationship with the SGM. As has been the case throughout my career, I was blessed with an outstanding noncommissioned officer as a battle buddy. An outstanding leader, he took on many missions and ran with them, allowing me to focus on the myriad of tasks at hand. The most important thing we did was counseling; I conducted quarterly counseling with my SGM and actually got it down on paper a few times. The most important thing that came out of our counseling sessions was a shared expectation of each other and the division of labor. Since the SGM was also an accomplished master gunner, he ran point on gunnery and master gunner training, as well as schools, tasking, land, and ammunition. We had junior officers and NCOs responsible for all of these areas as well, but had no issues dividing, conquering, and managing them at our level. I recommend you sit down early with your NCOIC and decide how to divvy up tasks and take advantage of each other’s strengths. Time management. As a deployed S3, you cannot do everything, so why attempt to handle everything while in garrison? The most important thing I learned as an S3 was the value of delegation; not only does it allow you to focus on the current decisive operation, but it is a great way to develop subordinates. Assigning subordinates tasks and missions, and holding them responsible for execution is empowering and oftentimes helps them commit to the organization. However, the noticeable long-term value of delegation is junior leader empowerment and development; on the other hand, the immediate effect allows senior leaders to focus on the big picture, the overall tasks, and manage quality assurance on multiple efforts; and manage current, as well as future, operations in both garrison and full-spectrum environments. Conducting physical training (PT) in an intense training environment is difficult, to say the least. However, there exists an infinite number of ways to overcome time constraints, which are limited only by the unit’s creativity. For example, we 15 had four mandated PT requirements per week; we conducted PT every morning from 0630-0730 hours (0800 hours, in some cases) with the exception of Thursday, due to STT. Often, PT was delayed due to range requirements or field events; however, to make up lost training, we had the standard first call, moved to the range, shot all day, and then conducted PT in afield environment between late afternoon and early evening until it was dark enough to conduct night fire. Another method we used to make-up PT was to incorporate it into STT by conducting a ruck march or buddy run from the company area, to and from the training site, or in between training sites. Leaders at all levels are committed to taking care of soldiers; a staff leader is no exception. Given the tempo of the environment, soldiers work late hours and extra days. There are many creative ways for leaders to compensate soldiers for hard work; for example, giving soldiers a day, or a partial day, off whenever possible is rewarding and appreciative. Brigadier General Buchanan, then deputy commanding general for 10th Mountain Division, shared a very interesting time-management technique with our unit leaders during our deployment to Iraq. For the first quarter following a recent deployment, one of the division’s brigade combat teams conducted 4-day work weeks, making up lost time on Fridays by phasing soldiers through lunch each day, as well as shortening the 90-minute time allotted between PT and duty time for personal hygiene and breakfast. In closing, this has been an incredibly rewarding and challenging experience. While being a staff officer is not nearly as much fun as being a commander, it’s just as important; I was lucky to have a great group of soldiers, NCOs, and officers to work alongside. Again, these are merely musings and I hope my comrades across the force will find something useful (to do or not to do) in them. Notes 1General Peter W. Chiarelli, “Training Full Spectrum – Less is More,” U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Guest Blog, available at blog site http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/ guestblog/archive/2009/06/30/training-full-spectrum-less-is-more.aspx. 2Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, December 2008. Major Brian E. McCarthy is currently a student at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A from Virginia Military Institute and his military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Infantry Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3, 2d Squadron, 8th Infantry, Fort Carson, CO, and Operation Iraqi Freedom; commander, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX, and Operation Iraqi Freedom; S3 (Air), 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Fort Hood; reconnaissance platoon leader and XO, E Troop, 9th Cavalry, Fort Stewart, GA; and scout platoon leader, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry Owen, Korea. “…leader training should focus at the opposite end of the spectrum on stability or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In this environment, not only must leaders still employ and synchronize combined arms, they must also be policemen, diplomats, and oftentimes city planners or managers. Leaders must also be able to think independently, operate decentralized, and be comfortable with ambiguity, as there are few front lines or black and white solutions.” 16