Sab’ al Bor, The City of Peace: A Case Study Using the Principles of Clear, Hold, Build to Reverse Insurgency

“We should do a case study on Sab’ al Bor to resolve why it’s working there. We need to know what conditions allowed it to work there.… Might be some lessons learned we can apply elsewhere.”1 — General Ray Odierno General Odierno saw the city of Sab’ al Bor at its worst during sectarian fighting in 2006-2007. As the population of the urban area was driven out, the city became a ghost town as extremist groups targeted the civilian populace, murdering hundreds and terrorizing thousands.2 Throughout 2008, things changed as security was reestablished and the local government began delivering services to the people. Displaced families returned to Sab’ al Bor by the tens of thousands. On his return to the city in late 2008, General Odierno saw a completely different environment from that of 2006-2007: a growing population, a thriving market economy, a low number of violent attacks, children attending overpopulated schools, a functioning local government, public services supporting the population, and hope for the future. It was easy to see what changed, but the question was “how?” In the summer of 2006, Sab’ al Bor was the largest urbanized community in the al Taji area just north of Baghdad. It was a secure city and appeared to be the model of success for stability in a post-conflict operational environment. Less than 3 months later, that thriving, nonsectarian example deteriorated into a cauldron of sectarian violence, resulting in the mass exodus of nearly all its residents. The explanation for reversing this upheaval resides in the manner in which coalition forces implemented the principle of “clear, hold, and build” and how they successfully “isolated” the enemy as a precondition to conducting operations designed along that model. Coalition forces carried out these measures using the network-targeting application: simultaneously massing effects against enemy networks through the erosion of resources, dislocation of support, and disintegration of capabilities, while enabling friendly networks by supplying resources, associating support, and integrating capabilities. This case study uses Sab’ al Bor as an example of how the principles of isolate, clear, hold, and build led to concrete security gains and allowed government initiative, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) development, and essential services delivery. It also demonstrates how coalition forces have the ability to adapt to environmental challenges and accomplish their missions at battalion, company, and platoon levels. Sab’ al Bor’s History and Significance Although Sab’ al Boris located in the fertile farm basins north of Baghdad, the name Sab’ al Bor stands for “seven infertile fields,” due to high salt contents in the land on which the city was built. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Sab’ al Bor was a diversified city with a population of more than 65,000 people. Saddam Hussein used the city as a retirement community for former Iraqi army (IA) officers. The city was not heavily tribal due to its beginnings as a housing community of Iraqi army veterans and retirees. In fact, Sab’ al Bor bears the hallmarks of a planned city with an interlocking grid system of roads that divide it into 16 distinct residential areas. From 2003 through 2007, as extremists sought to control key areas in Baghdad, create sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas, Sab’ al Bor became a support zone for al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to plan and launch attacks against Baghdad. Historical reporting indicated that Sab’ al Bor suffered some of the highest attack levels throughout the Baghdad metropolitan area in 2006 due to enemy activity. The violence that resulted from AQI’s use of Sab’ al Bor as a launch pad for attacks in Baghdad drove the residents from Sab’ al Bor and turned it into a virtual ghost town. By 2007, the population of Sab’ al Bor was reduced to just 2,000 people, which was a 95 percent reduction in the overall population when compared to pre-war levels. Initial Assessment of Sab’ al Bor Task force 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry (TF 2-14), inherited the city of Sab’ al Bor in the “On his return to the city in late 2008, General Odierno saw a completely different environment from that of 2006-2007: a growing population, a thriving market economy, a low number of violent attacks, children attending overpopulated schools, a functioning local government, public services supporting the population, and hope for the future. It was easy to see what changed, but the question was ‘how?’ ” by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Mackey, Major Leonard Lira, and Captain Chad Fitzgerald winter of 2007 as part of the operational environment (OE) for 2d Battalion, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The city’s population, along with its existing infrastructure, was just emerging from a viscous conflagration of sectarian hate. Indirect fire attacks, launched from AQI-controlled areas outside of the city into Shia populated areas, killed hundreds of civilians. The AQI offensive resulted in the Jayshe-al Medhi (JAM) coming to Sab’ al Bor to protect the Shia population from sectarian onslaught. Local city leaders felt they had no choice but to accept militias for the safety of the local populace. This choice later proved detrimental to the population as JAM militia turned on the population and began extorting them for resources in late 2007. Previous coalition forces, Task Force 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry (TF 7-10 CAV), and Task Force 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry (TF 1-7 CAV), specifically conducted lethal targeting against AQI, indirect fire cells, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) networks that built VBIEDs in Sab’ al Bor and launched them toward Baghdad. The lethal targeting conducted by TF 7-10 and TF 1-7 CAV, and later the events created by the Sunni tribal “awakening,” which was embodied in the creation of the Sons of Iraq (SOI), eventually stopped much of the AQI violence in Sab’ al Bor.3 However, other Sunni extremist groups (SEGs) continued efforts to offset JAM activities, target coalition forces, and make Sab’ al Bor ungovernable. Simultaneously, JAM continued its intimidation of Sunni families who stayed in Sab’ al Bor. JAM intended to physically remove Sunnis from their houses and replace them with Shia families who AQI and other SEG forced out of Baghdad. The attempted redistribution of homes by JAM and the continued activity of the SEG caused the housing blocks in Sab’ al Bor to polarize along sectarian lines, which enforced a strong belief that Sunnis and Shia could not coexist inside of the city. Along with continued extremist subversive actions, essential services in the city turned abysmal. The city received less than 3 hours of power a day, suffered from a lack of potable water, and open sewage flowed in the streets. The Iraqi police (IP) were viewed as corrupt agents of JAM. The IA battalion responsible for Sab’ al Bor, which had multiple checkpoint responsibilities outside of Sab’ al Bor on Highway 1, could only post a company-minus sized element for joint security operations with coalition forces. The local government, while operational in concept, still lacked the resources or organization to take effective control. Within 48 hours into its relief mission with TF 1-7 CAV, TF 2-14 CAV incurred its first attack. On the second day of the relief in place, a joint patrol from both task forces sustained an attack initiated by an explosively formed projectile and followed by direct fire. The squadrons’ intelligence staffs correctly concluded that JAM had formed a battalion-type organization in the city. This JAM battalion became the primary enemy order of battle encountered by TF 2-14 CAV during its first 6 months in the city. TF 2-14 CAV quickly began planning several synergistic operations across multiple lines of effort as part of a full-spectrum operation that would deny extremist networks access to Sab’ al Bor and set conditions to restore the city. The task force staff developed a template of problem sets in the city through the application of network targeting. For example, JAM and SEGs were prevalent in population centers and they intimidated and threatened the populace with criminal operations. Second, essential services, most notably water and electricity, were substandard and nearly nonexistent. Finally, governance was lacking; the only source of order came from existing tribal sheiks of the area. The population did not consider the local government legitimate because it lacked the capacity to establish and improve essential services. Additionally, the population was still deeply resentful of the sectarian divide that existed and viewed any restoration of services as favoritism of one sect over the other, thus effectively neutralizing local government attempts to act. The local government’s ability to communicate with its populace was nonexistent, so it could not effectively counter this view. Organizationally, the local government could not manage, plan, or execute budget priorities, which enabled delivery of services to the people. What the people needed from their government was security, essential services, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. The staff recognized that the legitimacy of the Sab’ al Bor city government was directly linked to its ability to deliver services to its people. “Task force 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry (TF 2-14), inherited the city of Sab’ al Bor in the winter of 2007 as part of the operational environment (OE) for 2d Battalion, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).” 6

What resulted from this analysis was a problem set situational template, which outlined a tailored network of issues that affected the security and stabilization of Sab’ al Bor. The creation of this tool allowed the staff to plan and synchronize operations across all lines of operations to achieve its end state. See Figure 1. Once the problem was clearly defined, the commander instructed the staff to build a plan for Sab’ al Bor, which would first isolate the city from extremist groups, allowing the task force to effectively clear remaining extremists from the city. The plan would then focus on sustaining security gains by increasing local security forces’ capacity to conduct operations and local government’s capacity to govern. In addition, the task force would provide an infusion of microgrants and other economic stimuli. The infusion of microgrants would supplement restoration of essential-services initiatives, focusing on electricity and water availability for residents as they began returning to the city. During initial operations, the task force isolated Sab’ al Bor from insurgent networks, and then cleared remaining extremists from the town. The task force commander charged security responsibility to the task force’s B Troop, which was supported by other task force elements outside the city. The first operation was a framework operation, Operation Strykehorse Sentinel, and the second was a surge operation, Operation Ku Lanakila Kūè [stand victorious in opposition]. 4 Before the disintegration of JAM elements inside the city began, the task force had to ensure the isolation of Sab’ al Bor. Operation Strykehorse Sentinel accomplished this effort for the task force. This framework operation secured our internal lines of communications by providing increased fixed-site protection for coalition forces and ISF at key checkpoints along major avenues of approach into the city and throughout the major lines of communications within the task force’s area of operations. In addition, the operation hardened the main entry point and all surrounding access points into the city of Sab’ al Bor with joint ISF and SOI checkpoints created from concrete barriers and triple-strand concertina wire. B Troop conducted day-to-day compliance checks to spot-check ISF and teach proper checkpoint procedures and vehicle search techniques. Once extremists were cleared from the city, the task force isolated the city, making it extremely difficult for extremists to return. Inside the city of Sab’ al Bor, Strykehorse Sentinel called for the establishment of joint Sunni and Shia SOI checkpoints. The task force used these checkpoints as key aspects of its information operations. The checkpoints increased the perception of healing between the Sunni and Shia tribes by sending visible messages Figure 1 7 BDW: Baghdad Directorate of Water Resources CERP: Commander’s Emergency Response Program CF: Coalition Forces I-CERP: Iraqi CERP JRPC: Joint Rural Planning Committee MoEd: Ministry of Education CWTU: Compact Water Treatment Unit GOI: Government of Iraq ICDD: Iraqi Civil Defense Directorate Sab’ al Bor Network Campaign Primary Tasks H CP CP CP CP CP CP CP CP H

Sab’ al Bor Nahia Tailored Network Sewer Water Electricity Academic Trash Health ISSUE: No current sewage system, other than personal septic systems, exists. GOI: JRPC FY09 has approved the proposal to run sewer networks throughout the city. CF: Support MMPW and GOI endeavors with the reduction of personal drainage canals. ISSUE: Water networks continue to be a problem for the southern portion of the city. GOI: GOI & IA removal of illegal taps. CF: Completion of 11KV, 33KV, and substation will increase power to pumping capabilities. ISSUE: Average power for the entirety of the city is 6-8 hours per day. GOI: GOI & IA removal of illegal taps. CF: Completion of 11KV, 33KV, and substation will increase power to pumping capabilities. ISSUE: School supplies (desks) and teacher certifications for official MoEd salaries. GOI: Establish a teacher academy to save the cost of going to school in Baghdad. CF: School refurbishments / CERP supply projects. ISSUE: The local populace does not have the necessary containers centrally locate trash. GOI: MMPW 250 employee trash collection program has begun, plan to further establish more permanent dumpsite. CF: Potential CERP project for collection bins. ISSUE: Clinics 1 and 2 are in need of refurbishments for doctors. GOI: Nahia and qada are pushing for 200-bed hospital in Sab’ al Bor JRPC strategic plan. CF: Submit CERP project for Clinic 1 and 2 refurbishments to support town until 200-bed hospital comes. Completion of substation and electricity network Plan for future CERP education refurbishment and supply projects Confirm security plan covers high pilfer construction sites ICDD SaB fire station w/MoI for hiring orders approval

1 2 3 4 SS PS1 Oversee CWTU manning and PS1 repairs CP Facilitate manning and chlorine for SaB CWTUs CP CP Support BWD checks on water network, ID breaks and shortages CP CP Enhance public perception of the GOI by associating the completion of large projects with GOI successes. Electrical Sub Station IP Station Fire Station Hospital/PHC Markets

School Facility Landfill/Trash Issues SS H Water Line Water Reservoir/Storage

CWTU in progress Water Line (Proposed) W W  Trash Project

Sab’ al Bor proposed projects presented to JRPC Land deeds obtained, project approved MMPW rehires 250 workers for 4-month extension Primary water line from Taji reservoir complete Sab al Bor dump site is approved for use Ground breaking begins for sewage system CWTUs are fully staffed by BDW I-CERP funds Fire station project and recruitment begins 33KV network feeders are complete, substation fully commissioned of harmony between the two, which also allowed both groups to “keep each other honest.” Before long, locals began referring to Sab’ al Bor as the “city of peace” on their own. Joint checkpoints were essential to decreasing the sectarian tension that had held in the city. As respite of normalcy began returning, residents who had remained became more willing to share information with the ISF and the task force’s tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams. Reinforcing the information operations (IO) theme and the “city of peace” message helped eliminate the insurgents’ freedom of maneuver, which they had previously enjoyed, to get in, out, and around the city. These conditions made JAM members ripe for the surge operation that would target and clear them from the town. That surge came with Operation Ku Lanakila Kūè, during which TF 2-14 CAV continued to conduct precision targeting set in motion by 1-7 CAV against SEGs. However, the operation’s objectives expanded beyond targeting AQI and SEG operating around town to JAM high-value individuals operating inside the town. Initially, a low number of HUMINT sources were available because of JAM intimidating the population. Nonetheless, the bits and pieces of HUMINT that did materialize gave the task force enough intelligence to conduct targeted cordon and searches of areas in town for caches and houses suspected to be hideouts for extremists. This methodical targeting initially proved slow, as not much turned up, and the population continued its passive existence, content to allow extremists to hide in its midst. However, with the constant application of IO themes and messages by troop and task force commanders at key leader engagements, through security meetings with the SOI, and the continued development of a human source network, successful penetration finally occurred. The tipping point came after the assassination of an influential and moderate Sunni community leader and an SOI contractor, Abbas Jassim. Abbas Jassim’s assassination by magnetic IED led to multiple tips on caches and safe houses. One tip led to B Troop’s attached Estonian infantry platoon, during a clear and search mission on a suspected insurgent safe house, finding a pivotal piece of intelligence — a financial ledger for the JAM battalion operating in the area. From that ledger, the task force accumulated a wealth of intelligence that led to the rapid disintegration of JAM in the city. The task force established the JAM hierarchy and order of battle. When combined with additional HUMINT and signal intelligence (SIG INT) confirmation, the task force developed a clear situational template of the JAM organizations in the task force area of responsibility and areas of interest. The task force expedited the out-of-sector target handoff by passing targets to the Iraqi special operations forces (ISOF) through the U. S. Special Forces Detachment that was advising them. The task force discovered that ISOF was effective in offensive operations aimed at capturing JAM targets. This type of target handoff seriously disrupted communications between Sab’ al Bor JAM cells and their chain of command in Northern Baghdad, which contributed to their isolation. Reducing Enemy Presence (Clear) While Operation Strykehorse Sentinel helped establish conditions necessary to facilitate the isolation of Sab’ al Bor JAM elements, it was the effective targeted clearance operations from Operation Ku Lanakila Kūè that eventually led to JAM’s tactical defeat. This operation, which was executed throughout the task force’s OE, consisted of a series of precision-targeted engagements carried out by B Troop and the ISF in Sab’ al Bor to reduce JAM’s presence. The operation’s overall success was apparent in March 2008 during JAM’s uprising in Sadr City. Despite increased significant activities (SIGACTs) within Baghdad proper, the people of Sab’ al Bor saw little to no increased violence from known JAM elements in their neighborhood. Offensive operations from February to July 2008 resulted in the detention of 45 JAM members, several of which were key leaders. The overwhelming capacity of offensive targeting and key detainments effectively neutralized Shia extremist groups in the city. Consolidating Security Gains in Sab’ al Bor (Hold) To consolidate gains made by security operations in Sab’ al Bor, the task force quickly began executing several nonlethal operations across multiple lines of effort. Initially, the task force executed partnership operations and conducted transition of tactical security tasks to the IA and IP in the city. These partnership operations became known as “Operation Strykehorse Ohana [family]” and focused on training the ISF on critical security skill sets associated with operations in Sab’ al Bor. The ISF trained on military tasks, such as patrolling, checkpoint procedures, reaction to contact, and small unit targeting and planning; and police tasks such as evidence collection, reporting procedures, emergency management, and detainee handling. The task force worked daily on these skills with the IA and IP to increase their abilities in specific areas.5 The task force aided ISF’s recruiting efforts through processing and identifying potential ISF recruits during recruiting drives held at joint service stations. The task force also assisted the ISF in negotiations with local representatives of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to hire IP from the ranks of SOI members. Eventually, the IP grew in number and capacity. The increased recruiting of Sunnis, along with the joint security skills training, eventually led to the ISF conducting targeting and security operations unilaterally with good effect. TF 2-14 CAV built on this success “…governance was lacking; the only source of order came from existing tribal sheiks of the area. The population did not consider the local government legitimate because it lacked the capacity to establish and improve essential services. Additionally, the population was still deeply resentful of the sectarian divide that existed and viewed any restoration of services as favoritism of one sect over the other, thus effectively neutralizing local government attempts to act.” 8 and turned the Sab’ al Bor Joint Coordination Center (JCC), previously operating in name only, into an effective JCC that could better coordinate, track, and enable both IA and IP actions within the town. The JCC was a 24-hour operations center manned by coalition forces, IA, IP, and SOI representation, which provided quick response to security situations and civil policing matters within the city. The effect of this operation enabled B Troop to hold joint security meetings, which included SOI leaders, ISF leaders, and local governance officials, and fostered a sense of responsibility and ownership among city leaders. They also created a hierarchy, with the local government on top, and a sense of responsibility to that hierarchy to which SOI leaders felt compelled to answer if an attack occurred in their area of responsibility. Furthermore, the enforcers of this concept were the IA, not the task force. Task Force 2-14 CAV then launched the first named nonlethal operation that did not directly work any aspect of security. Operation Kala Nalu (money wave) was a 21-day operation designed to initiate key infrastructure reconstruction and enhance the local government’s ability to provide services. We used funds from the commander’s emergency response program (CERP) and the Iraqi CERP (I-CERP).6 The operation’s concept was to coordinate project proposals with the local government in a public forum, which would allow the people to see their government reviewing and approving projects. The troop collected raw data on project proposals at the nahia level, and then sent them to the task force’s fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) where they were developed into a detailed scope of work projects in line with government of Iraq (GOI) specifications. The task force then interfaced with the next level of government to ensure Sab’ al Bor’s issues received attention.7 The FECC would obtain authorization from the local government before submitting the project to higher echelons. Projects that required operational and maintenance budgets after completion were coordinated through the appropriate ministry for approval before the project started. The FECC aided the project development process by providing teams to conduct training sessions with platoon leaders and troop fire support officers on the proper procedures of project submission under CERP and I- CERP guidelines. Due to the timely process of requesting and obtaining approval, a delay of up to 6 weeks could occur before projects began. The task force used microgrants during the lag time, along with targeted economic revitalization, to inject capital to small businesses throughout markets in the city. As projects were approved and builders began to “turn dirt,” the task force capitalized on the gains through more IO, such as posting signs that announced the project was produced by the GOI. In addition, the task force worked with local media to publish articles and stories about improved services. However, the most effective means of IO was face-to-face engagements between the local populace and local government leaders at opening ceremonies for key projects. In the eyes of the populace, Operation Kala Nalu increased legitimacy of both the Taji qada and Sab’ al Bor nahia governments. Planning for projects with local and ministerial levels of government also increased legitimacy because these efforts ensured economic opportunity crossed sectarian boundaries and created an equal distribution of benefits. It also verified that coalition force efforts were not undermining GOI activities in an attempt to provide the services themselves. By the summer of 2008, TF 2-14 CAV had consolidated security gains in Sab’ al Bor and influenced the populace to support its government. Coupled with the partnership efforts of Operation Ohana, Operation Kala Nalu, along with its mass expenditure of funds inside the city, successfully denied passive support for local extremist groups who had been isolated and cleared from the city. The continued massing of nonlethal effects in terms of economic gains and provided services, along with the physical isolation of the city by checkpoints, made the city inhospitable to extremists. Building Sustainable Security in Sab’ al Bor By early fall, the task force shifted its focus to maintaining sustainable security in Sab’ al Bor. The task force staff understood that sustainable security would have to come from the increased capacity of the local government. The staff assessed that to achieve increased governance capacity the task force would have to establish and nurture linkages between Sab’ al Bor’s government and the next higher levels in the GOI.8 Government connections ran both vertical and horizontal. Strengthening the vertical linkages with Baghdad province would ensure that the deputy ministries at the provincial level understood the requirements and were actively working to get services to the city. Strengthening horizontal linkages required the city council and office of the city manager to provide local governance and coordination with the Belaydiya (ministerial) representative, who carried out provisions for ministerial services among the local population. Even with connections made, the local government still needed the ability to administer the GOI budgetary process to improve and maintain essential services. In response, the task force launched a major education effort, which worked with the local government to help it understand the GOI budgetary process. “To consolidate gains made by security operations in Sab’ al Bor, the task force quickly began executing several nonlethal operations across multiple lines of effort. Initially, the task force executed partnership operations and conducted transition of tactical security tasks to the IA and IP in the city. These partnership operations became known as ‘Operation Strykehorse Ohana [family]’ and focused on training the ISF on critical security skill sets associated with operations in Sab’ al Bor.” 9

To accomplish this, TF 2-14 CAV launched two more named nonlethal operations, Kala Nalu II and Operation Kau Inoa (to build a nation). Whereas, Kala Nalu I focused on project planning, project nomination, and scope of work development, Kala Nalu II’s overall purpose was to solidify the horizontal connections between local legislative, executive, and ministerial government bodies. This required the task force to dedicate combat power for quality control and quality checks on projects implemented during Kalu Nalu I, and ensure the presence of all three governing bodies. The intent of Operation Kau Inoa was to further solidify the vertical link between Sab’ al Bor and the ministries in Baghdad by helping the local government understand and manage its budgetary process. The process required outlying districts (qadas) to submit proposals for funding, which would be reviewed for approval by the Baghdad provincial government during its joint rural planning committee (JRPC) meetings. The proposals, if approved, were then included in the provincial government’s budget plan. The operation’s concept required B Troop commander to mentor and coach Sab’ al Bor’s city manager and legislative council chairman on budgetary processes of the GOI. The troop commander ensured that the city council and city services committee held meetings on a regular basis and could correctly identify issues that residents of the city were facing. The task force executive officer and staff primarily mentored and coached the qada-level government on budgetary processes and sent representatives to city-level meetings to mentor and assist the local government with construction budgets. These representatives included the task force executive officer, technical experts from the task force FECC, and a government specialist from the embedded provincial reconstruction team, which was headquartered at the brigade. The task force also monitored the local nahia government as it identified and prioritized issues at its level and submitted funding requests to the next level of government. The task force staff attended every qada meeting to ensure issues identified by the Sab’ al Bor city council not only made it to the qada, but were aptly addressed by the qada. Even if the qada decided not to request resources for a particular issue, the task force considered it a quantifiable success when the connection occurred. The task force staff assisted the Taji qada with talking points, helped refine the draft brief, and prepare to brief their requests to the provincial-level government prior to the JRPC conference. It is important to note that while the coalition forces representative attended all city- and qada-level meetings, they did not run them. The majority of the task force’s work with the local government occurred during conversation either before or after formal meeting sessions and sometimes during late-night phone calls. For the actual meetings themselves, the coalition representation always took a “back seat.” The 2008 JRPC was significant success. The meeting resulted in more than 30 projects planned for Sab’ al Bor.9 More importantly, the work accomplished through collaboration of coalition forces and city council members resulted in Sab’ al Bor’s essential services committee authorizing management of the national-level funds that were budgeted for the 30 projects, and the JRPC released the funds early for project initiation. The first sign of the local government’s success occurred during the winter months when the Baghdad governor, key officials from Baghdad ministries, leaders from the Taji qada, and council members from Sab’ al Bor celebrated the grand opening of the Sab’ al Bor electric substation with local residents. The opening of the substation brought an increase of nearly 22 hours of electricity to the city. A week later, the local government, along with coalition forces, organized a grand opening of the GOI-built compact water treatment unit (CWTU), located north of Sab’ al Bor. The CWTU produced potable water for the city. The increased power and potable water resulted in second-order effects, which included increasing the ability for small businesses to thrive, improving local schools, and providing better irrigation for outlying agrarian communities. The local population now had substantial examples of the local government’s ability to meet its expectations. They readily observed improved security in the city and soon realized the local government could effectively coordinate with the provincial government for services. This provided a third-order effect — an influx of approximately 25,000 internally displaced residents, both Sunni and Shia, returned home to Sab’ al Bor as word spread throughout central Iraq that security and services had increased in Sab’ al Bor and it was safe to return. Lessons Learned Remarkably, TF 2-14 CAV’s experiences in Sab’ al Bor created an in-depth understanding of the tools necessary to win decisively in the counterinsurgency fight. First and foremost, it is essential to disrupt the enemy with effective isolation. Isolation can be physical and based on terrain; however, more importantly, it should be psychological. Isolation should also include separating extremists and their ideology from the population through visual indications of life returning to normal. As the population gains confidence in local security forces and receipt of services in its area, due to local government actions, it realizes how much it stands to lose by having extremists in its midst. Thus, true isolation of the enemy occurs when the population denies passive support for extremist networks, which allows aggressive precision targeting. Once the task force gained the support of the local population, it was able to penetrate extremist groups operating in the city. Once that initial penetration occurred, tips from the local population, combined with other intelligence resources, allowed us to aggressively pursue and tactically defeat the enemy. 10 “Task Force 2-14 CAV then launched the first named nonlethal operation that did not directly work any aspect of security. Operation Kala Nalu (money wave) was a 21-day operation designed to initiate key infrastructure reconstruction and enhance the local government’s ability to provide services.”

The task force also learned that targeted resource expenditure during nonlethal operations is necessary to sustain security gains. The best way to gain these resources is to name nonlethal operations just as lethal operations are named. The name resonates with higher echelons and makes it easier to obtain required resources, which is usually money, but can also include time. By using the concept of operations (CONOP) format used in theater for lethal operations, the task force nominated nonlethal targets for task force execution or higher echelon to resource and action. Markets, essential service initiatives, checkpoint improvements, and government coordination are just a few of the type of targets identified as nonlethal operations. For example, increased agriculture capability was a desired result for the task force. The task force achieved this desired result by engaging in actions that addressed the problems that plagued the electrical network, which affected the irrigation pump stations, thus increasing the crop yield in the area. Such actions included facilitating interaction with key leaders from various interests related to the issue such as the local government, essential services committee members, tribal leaders, and the ISF. The squadron’s most valuable lesson learned in Sab’ al Bor was the reality of reorganizing its staff and elements to meet requirements in the new environment. To account for nonlethal efforts, the staff and maneuver elements of the task force needed to reorganize to manage cultural settings, both tribal and between the institutes of the state; manage the economics of the reconstruction programs that were being implemented; and oversee the processes of negotiations and expected outcomes. This was not something the unit arrived prepared to do; in fact, the unit was more prepared to engage in lethal operations. However, due to the adaptability of leaders and members of the organization, every Task Force Strykehorse soldier saw the bigger picture and how it fit with the higher headquarter’s campaign plan, which made it easier to adjust our thinking and actions to succeed. In summary, the primary variable that brought stability in Sab’ al Bor was security. Security resulted from the effective isolation of the enemy, which was followed by a deliberate clearance operation. However, it was the additional “hold and build” operations that proved decisive and allowed the task force to truly solidify security and ultimately achieve stability. The task force effectively isolated enemy networks in Sab’ al Bor through improved site security and checkpoint operations, and an effective information campaign convinced the population to trust its local government and police more than insurgents. The squadron then stood up a targeted clearance operation of viable insurgent targets and held on to these security gains by developing the security skills of the ISF and governance skills of local government. Finally, TF 2-14 CAV developed sustainable security through targeted civil capacity initiatives, which legitimized the local government through critical infrastructure project completion and contributions to the local population. Once the local government was back in operation and in control of local security forces, there was no turning back. These successful operations resulted in life returning to normal for citizens of the city — tens of thousands of displaced persons returned, services from the local government kept pace, and local security forces managed civil matters in such a manner that no violent attacks on the population occurred in the city for the remainder of TF 2-14 CAV’s assignment. Isolate, clear, hold, build, in conjunction with precision targeting of both friendly and enemy networks, proved effective in this defined problem set. The task force executed variables of concepts and lessons learned from Sab’ al Bor in other areas of TF 2-14 CAV’s operating environment with degrees of success. However, when task force soldiers, local Iraqis, and GOI institutions worked together toward the same objectives, they were able to mass effects that effectively put extremists out of business. Notes 1After his visit to Sab’ al Bor in December 2008, General Ray Odierno ordered his staff to conduct a case study of the counterinsurgency (COIN) practices used by TF 2-14 CAV in the city and capture what was working to bridge a large sectarian divide in the population and forward stability and security. A staff member from the COIN academy at Camp Taji embedded with TF 2-14 CAV’s staff and Bravo Troop for a few weeks to capture best practices and lessons learned. This resulted in the development of a case study, which has since been taught to leaders of incoming brigade combat teams at the COIN academy, as well as the Battle Command Training Program to teach division and brigade combat team leaders. 2Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, Penguin Press, 2009, p. 170. 3The creation of the Sons of Iraq led to the legitimizing of both Sunni and Shia militia groups. It was the physical symbol of reconciliation and became the centerpiece of Multinational Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) reconciliation line of effort. 4See Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Yale University Press, 2008, p. 34, for a good description of framework and surge operations in a COIN environment. 5This is where being a task force, paid off; we conducted partnership operations in tandem with the police and military transition teams, both of which did not have a specified command or support relationship to the squadron, other than to conduct their missions “in coordination with.” 6I-CERP and CERP were one in the same, except I-CERP used money from the Iraqi treasury, instead of the U. S. treasury. 7The government levels that affected Sab’ al Bor started at the local (nahia) level, then went through the district (qada) level, and ended with the Baghdad provincial government (state-level government). 8Due to the multiple layers of district, provincial, and national government that effected the local government, Sab’ al Bor had three connections to its higher government. The first, the legislative connection, ran from its council chairman, through the qada legislative body, to the provincial council, and on to the council of representatives at the national level. The second was the executive connections that ran from its city manager (the mudeer), at the nahia level, through the district level executive head at the qada, called the Qa’im Makam, to the governor of the province. The third connection was through the technical experts on the essential services committee that connected through the qada essential services committee to the provincial ministries and on to the Iraqi national ministries. 9Projects, such as the completion of the 11KV and 33KV electric networks, the refurbishment of the Sab’ al Bor 11KV substation, the refurbishment of the Taji power plant, the restoration of several transformers throughout the city, and the dedicated electrical line feeders to critical service sites, such as major potable water distribution pump stations and irrigation pump stations, were incorporated into the GOI rural service budget plan. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Mackey is currently the senior task force observer controller, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B. A. from California State University and an M. A. from Webster University. His military education includes Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI; XO, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division (ID), Fort Lewis, WA, and Operation Iraqi Freedom III; S3 and XO, 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, Fort Lewis; and commander, A Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood TX. Major Leonard L. Lira is currently an instructor, Department of Joint, Interagency Multinational Operations, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A. from Sam Houston State University and an M. A. and M. P. A from Syracuse University. His military education includes CGSC, Cavalry Leaders Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Armor Officer Advanced Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO and S3, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks, HI; assistant professor, Department of Social Sciences, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; and commander, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX. Captain Chad Fitzgerald is currently a student at the Field Artillery Captain Career Course, Fort Sill, OK. He received a B. A. from Texas Christian University. His military education includes Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Tactical Information Operations Course, Anti-Terrorism Level II Certification, and Joint Fires Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include fire support and targeting officer, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks, HI; and target acquisition platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, Schofield Barracks, HI. 11