GEN de Gaulle as Armor-Unit Commander retired BG Raymond Bell

(Editor’s note: As an armor-unit commander, French president GEN Charles A. de Gaulle received mixed reviews, as retired BG Raymond Bell discusses following, but he did have the foresight to write Vers l’Armée de Métier (The Army of the Future, English translations Hutchinson, London-Melbourne, 1940, and Lippincott, New York, 1940) in 1934, which advocated a professional army based on mobile armored divisions. The book sold just 700 copies in France, where de Gaulle’s former commander, Marshal Philippe Pétain – later head of the pro-German Vichy government – advocated an infantry-based, defensive army, but 7,000 copies in Germany, where it was read aloud to Adolf Hitler. Never a friend to the United Kingdom or United States, de Gaulle put France’s interests first. In the words of Jean Monnet, who spent most of his political career at odds with de Gaulle, de Gaulle had a positive role in leading the Free French during World War II’s early years and immediately after the country’s liberation. Speaking in 1965 to a journalist, Monnet said, “Without de Gaulle or against de Gaulle, we could not have liberated or reconstructed France. There was no one but de Gaulle. Whatever his faults, he was a tower of strength and inspiration.”) Former French President Charles A. de Gaulle, an accomplished politician, revived France in World War II and then led his country though a tumultuous post-war period. As a professional army officer, de Gaulle gained notoriety as the author of the provocative book, The Army of the Future. The book advocated the formation of a large mechanized corps of tanks. Active in French political circles even before the war, the French generals considered him more of a renegade than a combat leader, and they largely ignored him. BG de Gaulle commanded both infantry and armor units, but these roles ultimately proved secondary to that of the famous national leader who led France from defeat to final victory and beyond. Early years De Gaulle spent a year in Arras, France, as a soldier in 33rd Infantry Regiment before he entered the French military academy at St. Cyr as a cadet in 1910. He was commissioned as an infantry second lieutenant in 1912. De Gaulle then returned to 33rd Infantry Regiment and anew commander, COL Philippe Petain. Petain served as de Gaulle’s mentor, showing him what de Gaulle called “the meaning of the gift and art of command.” De Gaulle went to war with 33rd Infantry in 1914 and distinguished himself as an officer who led his men from the front. During his battles, de Gaulle sustained multiple wounds. The third wound, de Gaulle’s most serious, occurred at Dounamont March 2, 1916. The French army believed de Gaulle killed in action. Petain cited de Gaulle as a company commander who “at a time when his battalion was decimated by the effects of a frightful bombardment and the enemy had reached his company positions on all side, led his men in a furious assault and hand-to-hand battle. Fallen in the conflict; a peerless officer in every respect.” De Gaulle spent 32 months as a German captive. His captivity kept him from participating in the development of French tanks, therefore he knew little of their initial development and employment during the war. De Gaulle’s next command assignment was 19th Chasseurs a Pied, alight-infantry battalion stationed in Trier, Germany, on the Moselle River. From 1927 to 1929 as a major commander, he distinguished himself as a leader who took care of his men. He gained recognition as an accomplished commander, but he lacked contact with the armored-vehicle community. De Gaulle’s limited knowledge of tanks was their role as participants in methodical battle. At Trier, infantry and tanks were employed in closely controlled maneuvers, but infantry set the pace of attack. Still considered a junior infantry-unit commander, de Gaulle played no part in experiments involving the newly developed armored fighting vehicles. First exposure to armor Theories of mechanization intrigued de Gaulle. From theories he developed ideas about developing a corps of professional soldiers to staff a formation of six armored divisions and one light mechanized division. They would serve as a powerful offensive (or counterattack) force in the context of France’s defense plans. His concept, however, gained little traction among the higher echelons of the military community. GEN Charles de Gaulle as Armor-Unit Commander by retired BG Raymond E. Bell Jr. Armor leader profile: 14

In May 1934, de Gaulle published his book, The Army of the Future. As he admitted, “the book aroused interest at first, but no deep feeling.” De Gaulle’s first experience commanding an armor unit came in 1935 with 507th Tank Regiment in Metz, France. Metz was a key defensive position for the French. Its location near the German border was to thwart foreign armies coming in on the major avenue of approach into the province of Lorraine. Some thought he received this assignment because he served in Trier just north of Metz and on the Moselle River. On the other hand, his posting to Metz distanced him from Paris and his political connections. De Gaulle’s war memoirs noted that, upon assuming command of the 507th, “the distance from Paris deprived me of the opportunities and contacts required for carrying on my great controversy [about my “future army” concept].” In placing de Gaulle away from Paris, the French army kept him under the thumb of generals such as Inspector of Tanks GEN Henri Giraud. Giraud could reign in any “out of the box” activities de Gaulle might try to conduct. Giraud, also de Gaulle’s corps commander, took de Gaulle to task on occasion about practicing his theories to employ armored vehicles. In a set of division maneuvers, de Gaulle proposed launching his tank regiment in an autonomous movement. Giraud stepped in, put a halt to the maneuvers and said to de Gaulle, “So long as I am alive, de Gaulle, you will not impose those theories here.” De Gaulle’s leadership style, rather than his tank-employment theories, earned him some notoriety as “Colonel Motor.” His corps commander congratulated de Gaulle during the traditional July 14, 1938, parade on the turnout of his command. Ostensibly, the compliment was a result of de Gaulle’s inspection techniques. De Gaulle walked through the motor pool wearing white gloves, reprimanding his men for deficiencies he found. De Gaulle “set about the business of shaking up his men – drivers, gunners, mechanics – imposing a regime of rigorous testing of the equipment.” This won him both approval and criticism. His regiment gained also a notable reputation in the tank community. Yet, as an armor-unit commander, he lacked experience conducting comprehensive armor operations. However, he was a demanding leader who had high performance standards. In 1939, de Gaulle, as a colonel, went on to command the tank units in the Fifth Army. Whereas the 507th Tank Regiment consisted of a battalion of tanks, the tank battalions of the Fifth Army were grouped in Group de Bataillon Chars, or tank-battalion groups. Under his command, de Gaulle had the 501st and 508th tank groups, which were composed of the 1st, 2nd and 31st tank battalions and the 21st and 34th tank battalions, respectively. All the tank battalions except the 31st had the light R-35 (Renault 35) infantry-support tanks. The 31st Tank Battalion had obsolete light World War I vintage FT-17 tanks. Although the FT-17 was one of the most revolutionary and influential tank designs in history, the tank didn’t lend itself to the types of maneuver de Gaulle envisioned in his armored division corps. De Gaulle’s headquarters was in the small town of Wangenburg, several miles to the east of Nancy and behind the Maginot Line, the heavily fortified defense barrier facing the German border. Again, stationed far from Paris, he was not in a position to influence the doctrinal employment of large tank units or the newly organized armored divisions. When war came to France in 1939, de Gaulle was also not positioned to take part in the offensive-defensive maneuver, which called for the French army’s best mechanized and motorized units to rush into Belgium and Holland. He was, however, influential enough to be available for the opportunity to command 4th Armored Division, which was organized on the field of battle. 4th Armored Division De Gaulle took command at a most inauspicious moment. In the first months of 1940, the division did not even exist on paper; it was not a division with a previously established order of battle. An author writing about the debacle in France in 1940 refers to the division at first as a “groupement,” an assemblage of different units of different army branches drawn from disparate organizations that happened to be available or near where de Gaulle was to fight his first battle. To be sure, France had also just organized its first three armored divisions, the Division de Cuirassier de Reserve, which was designed to bring a large force of tanks to bear in a rigidly coordinated battle accompanied by infantry and supported by centrally controlled artillery. In the first week of May 1940 in the German attack in the west, the 5th and 7th panzer divisions in Belgium hammered the First DCR while its major tank elements were waiting to be refueled. The Second DCR’s tanks, moving to contact by rail, were separated from their wheeled vehicles by a German armored thrust and ended up deploying in small packets in an unsuccessful attempt to slow the enemy’s juggernaut. The Third DCR actually got to the field of battle south of Sedan but was committed according to the methodical-battle doctrine, and its piecemeal distribution to infantry units conducting setpiece attacks failed to stop the advance of 1st, 2nd and 10th panzer divisions. All these French divisions had a specific authorized configuration. Four battalions of tanks distributed in two “demi-brigades” had a total 52 B-1 bis medium tanks and 84 H-35 light tanks to make up an armored brigade. Only one infantry battalion would transport in half-tracked vehicles. Artillery consisted of an artillery regiment of three battalions of guns, two of which were 75mm and one 105mm for 36 direct-fire weapons. Combat-support and combat-service-support elements were theoretically available. The 4th Armored Division had no structure as its various elements arrived on the battlefield. Into battle While the other armored divisions were organized before the Germans attacked, 4th Armored Division was literally thrown together during the actual fighting as assigned organizations reported to de Gaulle in his area of operations. No sooner had subordinate units arrived in their designated assembly areas than they were committed to battle. With barely time to replenish their basic loads of fuel and food, and lacking sleep after long road marches, de Gaulle ordered them into combat. De Gaulle had to do a quick and desperate dance to carry out the orders assigned him May 15. His higher command directed him to screen the front of the forming French Sixth Army commanded by GEN Robert Touchon. De Gaulle noted his orders stated that “operating alone in advance in the region of Laon, you are to gain the time necessary for this taking-up of positions. GEN Georges, commander-in-chief on the North-East front [sic], leaves it to you to decide on the means to be used.” Starting out the next day for his designated headquarters’ location southeast of the town of Bruyeres, de Gaulle’s members of his new staff joined him. Essentially, he had no headquarters or-De Gaulle distinguished himself as a leader who took care of his men. He gained recognition as an accomplished commander. 15 ganization to make plans, issue orders, evaluate intelligence, coordinate movements or direct supply functions to the diverse units arriving to take part in his first battle. As key staff officers arrived, de Gaulle appointed them to positions to oversee the deployments he had personally specified. He had to assimilate personnel reporting to him for the first time and deal with commanders of subordinate units with whom he had not worked before. There was necessary haste in getting these newly assigned formations into action, so de Gaulle sent these troops into combat piecemeal. There was no time May 17 for him to adhere to methodical battle practices. This was seven days after the German spearheads initially penetrated the Ardennes forests, swept into Holland and continued on their way to the English Channel. The enemy penetrated and bypassed the second line divisions at the hinge around Sedan, throttling the French plan to stop an enemy advance into Belgium. The French First Army advanced rapidly into southern Holland. With the British Expeditionary Force, it was quickly cut off from the main body of French forces and withdrew to Dunkirk, where a massive evacuation by sea later took place. De Gaulle designed his order to advance against the German southern flank along the Serre River to cover the Sixth Army’s deployment and to slow the enemy’s westward progress. De Gaulle entered into a difficult situation, but he was ready to accomplish his nebulous mission. As a colonel commanding a general-officer formation, he received promotion to brigadier general May 25. His assignment seemed a matter of spite by the French high command. For years, he had been at loggerheads with the methodical-battle-doctrine minded military hierarchy principally because of his proponency of a large armored corps. De Gaulle had an opportunity to put his theories into practice. The core of his theories was to attack a foe using overwhelming armor-protected force unfettered by strict control constraints. His critics would later state that while he was against tying tanks to the rate of advance of foot infantry, in actual combat he still adhered to the setpiece-attack tactics of tanks operating in close and inflexible support of infantry units. Yet in accomplishing this particular mission, he was to deploy his units in a manner not envisioned by methodical battle. If de Gaulle’s tactical deployments can be criticized, it is important to note the challenges of the unsettling environment he faced in committing 4th Armored Division May 17. One of the most important difficult circumstances, for example, was the lack of effective signal communications. French tanks were faulted for having insufficient ability to communicate not only between themselves (in some units signal flags were used) but also with higher-level command-and-control elements. Radios were not in wide use, and communications between major commands was principally by telephone or motor messenger. De Gaulle’s sole means of transmitting orders and directing action in battle was by motor messenger. During combat, German aircraft were constantly overhead, making dispatch riders very vulnerable to aerial attack. With masses of refugees and confused retreating French units clogging the roads, messengers were frequently delayed in delivering orders and directives to the appropriate authorities. Because French tactical doctrine in the attack called for closely bound formations advancing to phase lines and halting to consolidate on objectives, slow-moving motor and foot messengers sufficed in this doctrine; however, in fast-paced mechanized formations, these messengers did not suffice. The first units to arrive for service under de Gaulle were three tank battalions. One, the 46th, consisted of 35-ton B-1 bis medium tanks with their one-man turrets and 75mm and 37mm cannon. The battalion’s drivers had light-tank training, but unfortunately had never before seen the B-1 bis. The tank gunners had only fired the 75mm cannon once. Two companies in the 46th were present for duty, while 15 D-2 tanks made up a third company. This company was a supplement to the battalion, which provided it with needed additional firepower, mobility and armor protection. The 18-ton D-2 had a four-man crew with two men in the turret, unlike the B-1 bis. The D-2 was armed with a 47mm cannon and two 7.9mm machineguns. It had armor thickness between 25 and 40 millimeters and a speed of 30 kilometers per hour. In contrast to the D-2, the B-1 bis had a maximum armor thickness of 60 millimeters and a speed of 28 kilometers per hour. The other two battalions, the 2nd and 24th, were equipped with the two-man 11-ton Renault 35 (R-35) light tanks. De Gaulle claimed these tanks were “of the 1935 type, modern of their kind, but heavy, slow, armed with short-range guns, made for cooperation in the infantry battle, but not at all for forming an autonomous whole with large-scale units.” The R-35s, with their 37mm gun and 7.5mm machinegun, were the same type of tanks which de Gaulle previously had in his units when he commanded the Fifth Army’s tanks. He therefore knew well their characteristics and probably some of the crew personnel since he had had the 2nd Tank Battalion as a component of the 508th Tank Group. Combat May 17, 1940 De Gaulle sent the three battalions forward May 17 with Montcornet on the Serre River as their objective. He described them as “[s]weeping away on their path the enemy units which were already invading that piece of country, they reached Montcornet. Till evening they fought on the outskirts of the place and within it, reducing many nests of snipers and shelling the German convoys that tried to pass. But on the Serre [River,] the enemy was in force. Obviously our tanks, with nothing to support them, could not cross it.” This was not an advance where tank accompanied infantry, supported by artillery. It was not methodical-battle attack. The infantry did arrive, but not until the tanks had started by themselves. The 4th Battalion of Chasseurs had no sooner reported to de Gaulle than it was also committed to battle. The battalion’s objective was the enemy advance guard, reported to be near the hamlet of Chivres, which had let the French tanks go past them on their way to Montcornet only for the Germans to reveal themselves later. De Gaulle claims defeat of the foe short of the town but north of the Serre River where German artillery delivered accurate fire on his troops. There was no response from the French artillery, which was not yet in position. Simultaneously, the German aerial artillery – the Stuka dive bombers – swept down on the French tanks and the vehicles carrying the infantry. There was no counter-air response to the effective German bombing. By sundown, increasing numbers of enemy armored units inserted themselves in the French rear and began to skirmish the strung-out French tanks and infantry. Suffering losses, de Gaulle pulled his troops back to their assembly areas around Chivres using the 10th Cuirassiers, a reconnaissance regiment, equivalent to the former U. S. armored cavalry squadron, as the force in contact with the enemy. The 10th Cuirassiers, as a reconnaissance unit, was not included in the armored division’stables of organization and equipment. They were but an ad hoc addition to 4th Armored Division, evidently because they just happened to be available and close by. So what was de Gaulle doing when his tanks and infantry were making their disjointed advances? He was not in a lead tank or with the infantry forward elements. Philippe Barres, who at that time was a faithful Gaullist, described de Gaulle under the try- 16 ing circumstances as standing fearlessly “beneath an apple tree, smoking like a locomotive, calm, utterly calm, dressed like his mechanic, in an old leather vest with no insignia.” LT Lucien Henri Galimand, a member of de Gaulle’s staff, judged him brave enough but a “ham actor.” Galimand also noted that de Gaulle’s departure from the division had little impact; the organization performed equally well without him later on the Loire River. Certainly, these were uneven views of de Gaulle as an effective major armored-unit commander. At the same time, it is difficult to judge de Gaulle’s competence based on this relatively minor action. Battle May 19, 1940 De Gaulle had another day before he launched his next foray, again towards Montcornet. On the night of May 18-19, he moved his tanks, now reinforced by two squadrons (two companies) of Souma tanks in position, into position on the northern outskirts of Laon. In addition, the 7th Regiment of Dragoons, a motorized formation made up of two battalions consisting mostly of reservists, joined de Gaulle. The 322nd Artillery Regiment with two groups (battalions) of 75mm guns – 24 pieces at full strength – was also attached, along with elements of 3rd Light Cavalry Division’s artillery. The reinforcing 22-ton Souma S-35 medium tanks were among the best in the French army. Part of the cavalry infrastructure, these modern, fast (40 kilometers an hour) tanks with three-man crews were armed with a 47mm cannon and a 7.9mm machinegun. The tank had up to 40 millimeters of armor. According to de Gaulle, however, the tanks arrived with inexperienced gunners and drivers – obviously not the same quality of tank soldiers de Gaulle had trained in the previous decade. The May 19 attack from north of Laon towards Crecy-sur-Serre, Pouilly and Barenton-sur-Serre began well. Again, this was a raid type of operation with an imbalance of tanks and infantry. The tanks went it alone while 10th Cuirassiers, 7th Dragoons and 4th Chasseurs screened the right flank and made a feint towards Marle on the Serre River. De Gaulle claims they put to flight various enemy elements which had succeeded in infiltrating into his area of operations as the French approached the Serre River. North of the river, however, the Germans held strong defensive positions at the crossings. They were there in force, backed up by powerful artillery support; they destroyed de Gaulle’s tanks, which attempted to dislodge the dug-in foe. The lack of infantry and adequate artillery support made trying to force a crossing of the Serre River unfeasible. By noon, the attack stalled and the commanding general of the Northwest Front ordered de Gaulle to cease advancing. The French Sixth Army had enough time to move into position. Mixed results De Gaulle’s 4th Armored Division gained time for the Sixth Army’s deployment in spite of its failure to slow the German advance. The division failed its mission because the Germans were not making their major effort in a southerly direction. Theoretically, de Gaulle should have been able to slice into the German southern flank. However, he lacked the organization, doctrine and strength to do so. A glancing and ineffectual blow was 4th Armored Division’s tactical contribution, but, on the other hand, it provided a psychological break in the dark, foreboding cloud cover enveloping France’s efforts to stem the overwhelming German tide. The French press lauded the division’s performance and limited success, even though it was minuscule and fleeting. Temporarily, de Gaulle was the man of the hour. A severe critic, Guy Chapman, however, observed, “[COL] de Gaulle had appeared, reappeared and most disconcertingly disappeared at intervals, thus giving a false air to what in fact was little more coherent than a succession of uncoordinated armed scuffles with flank guards.” Upon disengagement, 4th Armored Division enjoyed a degree of respite for a week as it deployed toward the French coast and the city of Abbeville, which was north of Laon. This time, however, they had orders to throw the German westward advance back across the Somme River. The division motor marched 180 kilometers in five days, which had a significant deleterious impact on the tanks’ condition. As a result, they left 30 tanks behind. All the while, elements of the division had frequent encounters and skirmishes at German-held strong points, where enemy armored cars roamed the area to attack division motor columns. At the town of Festieux, for example, the 10th Chasseurs and a battalion of tanks disengaged with difficulty from the enemy, while the division faced attack on the Craonne Plateau. Deployment for combat at Abbeville The 4th Armored Division arrived before Abbeville May 27 with the specific mission of destroying the German bridgehead across the Somme River. During the division’s movement, it received significant reinforcements – unfortunately, all were improvised units. Another B-1 bis tank battalion, the 47th, joined the other three tank battalions. The 7th Regiment of Dragoons, along with the 22nd Colonial Infantry Regiment, brought the division’s infantry complement up to six battalions. For artillery, a battalion of 12 105mm guns, an anti-aircraft artillery battery and five batteries of 47mm anti-tank guns, plus the 2nd Cavalry Division’s artillery, joined 4th Armored Division. De Gaulle now had six battalions of infantry, six battalions of artillery and 140 tanks in operable condition with which to conduct his next operation. However, 4th Armored Division was not ready for combat. A staff under constant enemy pressure while still getting its feet on the ground hampered de Gaulle. Also, the units joining the division had to learn operating procedures that were evolving. The division showed a healthy strength on paper; however, its poorly constructed formations, acquired from various locations, were a disadvantage. Each operated under commanders with different leadership styles. The units’ soldiers were weary of relentless contact with the enemy during their rough transit to 4th Armored Division’s assembly areas south of Abbeville. The foe was also ready for 4th Armored Division’s attacks. The German bridgehead had been in place for a week and reinforced with their effective 88mm anti-air/anti-tank guns. The Germans fortified the many small hamlets south of Abbeville and zeroed in their artillery. The 4th Armored Division was up against a well-established defense that might have lent itself to attack using the methodical-battle doctrine. Battle plans De Gaulle marked out three successive objectives for his attack. The first objective was the towns of Huppy, Limeux, Bray and the Bailleul Woods located from a few hundred yards to three miles in advance of de Gaulle’s front lines. The second objective was aline of villages running through Moyenneville, Bienfay, Huchenneville, Villers and Mareuil. The distance from Huppy to Moyenneville and Bienfray was four miles, while that from Limeux to Huchenneville was three miles and that from Bray to Mareuil, a mile and a half. The third objective was Mont de Caubert, which dominated the crossing at Abbeville. It was three miles from Moyenneville and less than half a mile from Villers and Mareuil. The attack from Villers and Mareuil towards Mont de Caubert required an uphill advance against a strongly held enemy position. It was questionable, considering the distances to be covered and the urgency of accomplishing 17 the mission, whether or not 4th Armored Division could effectively use the standard French methodical-battle doctrine. On the left, de Gaulle planned to send 6th Half Brigade consisting of 46th and 47th B-1 bis tank battalions, accompanied by the infantry of 4th Chasseurs, against Huppy, Moyenneville, then behind the enemy located to the east at Bienfray and thence on to Mont de Caubert. This was an armor heavy thrust with a 2-to- 1 tank-to-infantry ratio. In the center, 8th Half Brigade – made up of 2nd and 24th R-35 tank battalions – along with the battalions of 22nd Colonial Infantry Regiment, were to advance against Limeux, Huchenneville, Villers and then Mont de Caubert. The formation closely reflected a methodical battle doctrinal tank-to-infantry ratio, where the infantry-support R-35 light tanks advanced in close coordination with the foot soldiers. On the right, 3rd Cuirassiers (two companies of Souma S-35 tanks) and 7th Dragoons (two infantry battalions) were to attack Bray, then Mareuil and finally Mont de Caubert. The ratio of infantry battalions to tank companies also more closely fit the doctrinal tank-support-of-infantry ratio. De Gaulle sent his two infantry heavy thrusts the shortest distance to the final objective. On the other hand, the tank heavy attack on the left was to go the longest distance to the final objective. Did de Gaulle thus plan to use a mix of tactical doctrine to attempt to accomplish his mission? While his most mobile formation used its major tank strength to attack the enemy’s right flank, he employed his infantry heavy attacks to make ahead-on assault at the foe’s center and left, and then up a steep slope against the enemy’s most heavily fortified position. His artillery was located so that it could deliver its heaviest weight to support the center thrust while at the same time being able to shift fire to either flank attack. Plan execution So what were the results? On the French left flank, by the evening of May 27, the first night of the attack by 6th Half-Brigade on Huppy had resulted in the capture of the German battalion occupying the town. Before dawn on the next day, the B-1 bis tank battalions, with the accompanying 4th Chasseurs, struck Moyenneville and Bienfay. De Gaulle said later that the day was a very hard one, as the reinforced Germans and their artillery was particularly effective. The German anti-tank batteries, however, were unable to stop the French armor from breaking through their positions between Huppy and Caumont. Overrun, the German gunners were unable to knock out the heavily armored French B-1 bis tanks. The enemy infantry supporting the anti-tank guns withdrew; the German division commander led the troops to new defensive positions some distance behind their original lines. On the third day, May 29, the French main effort was to be made on this left flank. The 6th Half-Brigade, reinforced with infantry and tanks, launched its attack on the western slope of Mont de Caubert, but the assault was stopped short of the hill’s crest. The half-strength 4th Chasseurs, a battalion of 7th Dragoons and 3rd Cuirassiers – with their Souma tanks reduced by two-thirds – followed the B-1 bis tanks up the slope, but to no avail. The German defenders dug in with zeroed-in heavy-artillery support from the right bank of the Somme River; they maintained their sector of the bridgehead on Mont de Caubert’s western slope. That evening the Germans counterattacked French troops in Moyenneville and Bienfay but were unable to throw the French out of the villages. The French middle thrust, composed of 8th Half-Brigade and 22nd Colonial Infantry Regiment, was also successful the first day. Near Limeux, the light R-35 tank battalions succeeded in defeating a number of German anti-tank batteries that had dealt a deadly blow to British armor just a few days earlier. The next day, May 28, the attack resumed, with the objectives being Huchenneville and Villers. The enemy admitted to heavy losses as the French tanks delivered “profound terror … into the bones of our [German] soldiers.” The French also suffered significant losses. In a final effort May 29, the remaining R-35 tanks of 8th Half-Brigade, supported by the colonial infantrymen, left their line of departure at Villers and attacked up the east slope of Mont de Caubert. Again, the stubborn German defenders, supported by effective artillery, held off the French. On May 27, the right thrust by 3rd Cuirassiers’ two Souma tank companies and 7th Dragoons’ battalions was successful in driving the Germans out of Bray, the task force’s first objective. The next day the attack continued to Mareuil, where the Soumas and infantry drove off the German defenders. This attack placed the French task force in position to attack up Mont de Caubert May

28. De Gaulle, however, greatly weakened this flank May 29 when he switched the heavily reduced 3rd Cuirassiers and a battalion of 7th Dragoons to the left flank, thus strengthening the After Abbeville de Gaulle experimented with a deep-armor thrust in deploying his theoretical ‘army of the future’ formations. main attack. The remaining infantry battalion of 7th Dragoons was no more successful in gaining the summit of Mont de Caubert than the other task forces making up the attacks on the final objective. Success or failure? Although de Gaulle’s attacks reduced the German bridgehead at Abbeville by three quarters, he could not call them successful. First, the attacks had little overall impact on the German advance. Second, even though his troops inflicted significant losses on his foe, de Gaulle also suffered heavy losses. When de Gaulle’s final futile attacks concluded, the Germans wanted to launch an attack from their smaller bridgehead. By the time they could, the British 51st Scottish Highland Division arrived at Abbeville as the French attack stalled. To find a positive result of the action was difficult, but French propaganda hailed de Gaulle for his efforts. As commander of 4th Armored Division, de Gaulle considered his tactical dispositions for his attack on the German Abbeville bridgehead to be sound, yet insufficient to conquer a tenacious enemy. On Day One, he concentrated on the left flank with his most powerful tanks, the B-1 bis – however, with a shortage of infantry. Adhering to the methodical-battle doctrine also gained the objectives of the other thrusts on the first day. De Gaulle, on the second day, bent his main thrust from west to northeast to advance behind the German defenders in the towns below Mont de Caubert, the assaults on which succeeded. The German division commander personally intervened to stabilize his front after losing several anti-tank batteries and infantry-held positions. 18

To gain the summit of Mont de Caubert, De Gaulle needed to reinforce his left flank, which he did by sending more tanks and infantry to support 6th Half-Brigade May 29. However, the Germans’ strong position and powerful artillery support prevented de Gaulle from throwing them back across the Somme River. This resulted in a reduction of the German bridgehead, but hardly dented the enemy’s front. Performance evaluation Two battles does not offer enough evidence to properly judge the adequacy of de Gaulle’s tactical performance as 4th Armored Division commander. One military historian, Alastair Horne, attributes de Gaulle’s actions as commander as being executed with “customary courage and dash.” On the other hand, Chapman calls him a failure because of his division’s inability to have a salutary impact on the German flanks north of Laon and at Abbeville. Looking back in time, however, as an infantry-company commander in World War I, he had demonstrated great courage and decisiveness in attacking at Dounamont before being wounded (for a third time) and captured. He evidently brought some of these attributes to his command of 4th Armored Division. Looking closer, in commanding a large armor formation, de Gaulle was only equipped to launch tank raids May 17 against the panzers on the German left flank. He did this while providing time for Sixth Army’s deployment south of the Serre River and north of Laon. He had to use expedient means in an environment where he encountered many hindrances. In the attack on the Abbeville bridgehead, he employed a combination of methodical-battle and deep-attack tactics. As a former infantryman and commander of an infantry formation after World War I, he was familiar with the methodical-battle doctrine. As commander of 507th Tank Regiment and Fifth Army’s tank groups prior to his accession to command 4th Armored Division, de Gaulle employed tanks using methodical-battle techniques in various division and corps maneuvers. On the other hand, after a trend at Abbeville, he was experimenting with a deep-armor thrust in a favorable manner in deploying his theoretical “army of the future” formations. Reinforcing his main attack on the third day of the Abbeville action showed his appreciation for weighing the principal effort in accordance with large-scale combined mechanized-arms attack doctrine. From the beginning to the end of de Gaulle’s command of 4th Armored Division, he worked under the severest of constraints. Imagine having to commit to battle against a powerful and experienced foe with a formation thrown together as its component units arrived on the battlefield. Unfortunately, his staff and subordinate commanders had no prior experience working with him. The French army was in a tailspin at the time of de Gaulle’s assumption of command and the morale of its soldiers was fragile at best. Many negative factors compounded de Gaulle’s command challenges; his tenure as commanding general of 4th Armored Division was very short. On the night of June 5-6, he was relieved of command. He was appointed to the political post of undersecretary of state for national defense in the reshuffled government of Prime Minister M. Paul Reynaud, who was one of de Gaulle’s patrons. De Gaulle had been a major armor-unit commander in combat as a colonel and brigadier general for only 20 days, hardly enough time to judge his competency in battle. Yet the short timeframe gives a snapshot of his potential, which in light of the complete collapse of the French Army in 1940 and the path his career took him in, could never be realized. One cannot be an apologist for de Gaulle’s failure to win his very few battles conclusively. On the other hand, he can hardly be condemned for his efforts because of his perceived leadership idiosyncrasies. De Gaulle’s performance as an armor-unit commander in combat also raises the question of whether or not another commander could have done better under the same conditions. De Gaulle’s war memoirs, which are the basis for describing his battlefield performance, are self-serving. However, he showed, as a minimum, the potential for becoming a competent major armor-unit commander in combat over the long haul. His bravery in World War I, his previous peacetime experience with tanks and his limited time in combat commanding a major armor formation under desperate circumstances all pointed to a future that never happened. Instead, he found himself thrust into a political situation that resulted in him leading France to its place in the defeat of Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Retired BG Raymond Bell is a consultant, writer and tour leader living in Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY. BG Bell served in various leadership and staff positions, including commanding general, 220th Military Police Brigade, Gaithersburg, MD; commander, 5th Psychological Operations Group, Camp Springs, MD; chief of operations and intelligence, 97th Army Reserve Command, Fort Meade, MD; state recruiting officer, New York Army National Guard, Albany, NY; assistant professor of History, United States Military Academy; executive officer, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, Republic of Vietnam; joint operations staff officer, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam; assistant professor of German, USMA; commander, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 15th Armor, Republic of Korea; S-3 Air, Combat Command, Company C, 3rd Armored Division, Federal Republic of Germany; platoon leader and executive officer; Company A, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 32nd Armor, Federal Republic of Germany; and platoon leader, Company I, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Meade. His military education includes the National War College, U. S. Army War College, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Advance Course and Armor Basic Course. He received a bachelor’s of science degree from USMA, a master’s of arts degree from Middlebury College and a doctorate from New York University. Acronym Quick-Scan DCR – Division de Cuirassier de Reserve USMA – U. S. Military Academy Recommended reading Benoist-Mechin, Jacques, Sixty Days That Shook the West, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, NY, 1963. Chapman, Guy, Why France Fell, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, NY, 1968. De Gaulle, Charles A., The Call to Honour, The Viking Press, NY, 1955. Horne, Alastair, To Lose A Battle, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1969. Lacoutur, Jean, De Gaulle, Avon Book Division, The Hearst Corporation, NY, 1968. 19