Anatomy of Blitzkrieg: What We’ve Learned About the Combined-Arms Battlefield

by CPT Michael S. Ibrahim What We’ve Learned About the Combined-Arms Battlefield What We’ve Learned About the Combined-Arms Battlefield (Editor’s note: Blitzkrieg, a German term meaning “lightning war,” was primarily applied in World War II to swift German military offensives deploying combined-arms teams of tanks, mechanized infantry, artillery and aircraft. The Germans used this type of warfare to devastating effect, concentrating overwhelming force at high speed to break enemy lines and flank enemy forces. Blitzkrieg was highly dependent on terrain and therefore flawed, as the Germans would learn during their invasion of the Soviet Union. Writer CPT Michael Ibrahim looks at the German Panzer units and what we learned from them.) The Panzer division changed the way we look at warfare. Speed, cooperation of arms and teamwork became the cornerstones for all modern armies and still are to this day. The Panzer division, and by extension blitzkrieg, was more than modern equipment – it was anew way of thinking about war. Birth of the Panzer The German army never forgot the lessons-learned from its defeat in World War I. By the 1930s, forward-thinking officers and mechanized-warfare theorists rebuilt the German army into a revolutionary fighting force. These men wanted to create an all-arms armored unit capable of punching through enemy lines. This would allow the infantry divisions, modeled on the 1918 reforms, to follow and quickly encircle enemy formations. MAJ Heinz Guderian and COL Oswald Lutz led Germany’s efforts in mechanized warfare, applying stormtrooper combat principles to the new armored formations to create blitzkrieg. Germany built the first all-arms armored force (the Panzer division) in 1935. The new all-arms armored force was battle-tested within a few years. In fact, in Summer 1940, Panzer divisions won seemingly impossible victories in France. Through speed and coordination of arms, Panzer divisions became the spearhead, breaking all resistance before the German army. The German army’s enthusiastic approach to warfare, coupled with the tank’s qualities, made the Panzer divisions victorious. The German army developed Panzer divisions to be key in decisive victory. Through adept application, the German army earned those victories and prevented the massive loss of life common in more traditional forms of warfare. This article describes how this extremely efficient combined-arms system worked and what the fighting of 1940 in France was actually like for Panzer divisions. Battlefield leadership Stormtroopers found it necessary in 1918 to rely on their own initiative to maintain an attack’s momentum. They learned that small-unit leaders should decide when and where to attack or retreat. German officers and noncommissioned officers were later trained to use their initiative during combat operations. By World War II, this practice had matured to the point where the German army enabled its front-line leaders to accomplish their mission without the hindrance of restrictive orders. Commanders issued guidance in the form of orders called “mission orders.” Since Panzer divisions required flexibility in their operations, the latitude given small-unit leaders allowed them freedom of action. They attacked when and where they decided best, using the weapons they thought were best, and they were very successful. For example, Panzer commander Rolf Penselin said decades after the war that “the great difference between us and other armies was that we were not given specific orders, we were given mission orders.” Penselin explained that a mission order wasn’t a vague mission statement but rather an act of trust between his commander and himself to accomplish the mission. “If we were given the order to attack a village, I could decide when and where to do it,” he said. “It was my decision how I accomplished the mission; the difference was that I could react to constantly changing conditions on the battlefield as long as I achieved my goal.”1 Notably, the Panzer division’s effectiveness stemmed not only from its combination of arms – discussed in the next section – but also from the quality of battlefield leadership from officers and NCOs within the division. German combat leaders led their units from the front, using their own initiative to make on-thespot decisions for their men. This eliminated delay from subordinates calling higher-ups for permission to act. If a German commander saw an opportunity, he had to take decisive action. This freedom of action was the core concept behind German maneuver warfare and was the sole reason freedom was built into how the German army structured its orders process and organized its combat-arms teams. A combined-arms force A Panzer division in 1940 included an armor brigade and an infantry brigade. The division used its two brigades the same way a medieval knight would use his sword and shield. The armor brigade, the sword, primarily engaged in quick and decisive offensive operations. The infantry brigade, the shield, defended the division from enemy counterattacks and maintained control of key terrain. The two brigades worked closely together on the battlefield. As a rule, the brigades always tried to maneuver together in a two-echelon formation. The first echelon contained the armor brigade plus reconnaissance units, combat engineers (pioneers) and a company of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. The second echelon contained the infantry brigade with the rest of the anti-tank and anti-aircraft, units as well as all the artillery and support units in the division. German forces found the use of combined-arms teams (what they called “battlegroups”) extremely effective. They employed combined-arms teams in larger formations such as brigades and in smaller tactical formations as well. The Luftwaffe, or German air force, also supported the Panzer division. Engaging its reconnaissance and close-air-support assets, the division avoided enemy concentrations and protected its wide-open flanks from the air. The Luftwaffe also dropped heavy ordnance on enemy tanks and enemy positions. These two teams, the Luftwaffe and the Panzer divisions, completed what the Germans saw as the most effective combined-arms team. Together these forces could break through any enemy position and defeat any enemy army set against them. ‘The sword’ The Panzer brigade was the Panzer division’s attack force. Organized for quick, decisive action, the brigade consisted of two Panzer regiments, each with two battalions of three companies. Every battalion had two companies of light tanks, one company of medium tanks and a dedicated light-tank platoon for reconnaissance purposes. The light companies had three platoons of five tanks, while the medium companies usually had two platoons of four tanks. Two more tanks in each company headquarters supported the command element, totaling a battalion strength of about 50 tanks and a division strength of around 200 tanks. It’s important to remember that more than 150 of the tanks in the division were light, while most of the enemy’s (the French in 1940) tanks were medium or heavy.

During combat operations, the Panzer brigade had supporting arms attached to it. This allowed the brigade commander to form a battlegroup around his armor units. The battlegroup primarily helped the tanks conduct reconnaissance and overcome enemy obstacles. The combat-engineer companies, as well as the division’s reconnaissance assets, attached to the armor battlegroup. The motorcycle battalion also attached to the brigade as part of the reconnaissance units. This battalion, often used as infantry, was indispensible to the tanks during close-quarters combat. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft companies were also brought in to give added protection to the tanks. How ‘the sword’ was used The armor battlegroup fought a much more fluid battle than its infantry counterpart. The battlefield the armor battlegroup fought on was wide and deep. (Most battlegroups fought on a front between four to six kilometers long.) On the battlefield itself, the regiments and battalions fought independent actions toward the same goal. The armor battlegroup had two main tactical goals. The first goal was to break through enemy defenses and isolate enemy strongpoints by destroying all enemy support (artillery, supply units, etc.) and command elements (headquarters or their lines of communication). The second goal was that the armor battlegroup would simultaneously be supporting infantry formations in destroying the most difficult isolated enemy positions. To do this, the armor battlegroup organized itself in depth. The two tank regiments positioned in line with each other, and the tank regiments put their battalions in column, making a box formation. The box formation could be between four to six kilometers wide and two to three kilometers deep. It should be noted here that the tank regiment, much like the infantry battalion, was the primary tactical formation for that arm on the battlefield – meaning that while in combat, the tank regiment’s battalions operated within supporting distance of each other. The two regiments usually weren’t close enough to support each other directly. The regiment operated on a frontage of about 1,500 meters, with two regiments fighting on a four- to -six-kilometer front. That meant, on average, there was one to three kilometers between them. The tank regiment, therefore, had to accomplish both tactical goals by itself, so the regiment usually assigned one task to each of its battalions. The lead battalion would be in charge of the initial breakthrough and exploitation. The second battalion was in charge of supporting the infantry in eliminating enemy strongpoints. Both tank battalions would work as closely as possible on the battlefield, and often the second battalion, when not supporting infantry actions, was helping its sister battalion. The support guns of the battlegroup, such as the anti-tank and antiaircraft batteries, would usually be in the rear waiting for an opportunity to be called upon. Both tank battalions organized their companies similarly: attached reconnaissance assets were out forward, and the battalion’s two light tank companies formed a wedge or were in line, depending on the terrain’s openness. The medium tank company stayed to the battalion’s rear, waiting to be called upon when needed. The Germans favored their light tanks over their medium tanks because Germany’slight tanks – namely the Pz II and Pz 35/38t, both nine tons and armed with two-centimeter and 3.72-centimeter cannons – proved to be very effective in combat against superior enemy tanks and heavy-caliber antitank guns. By using the one strength they possessed – speed – to their maximum advantage, the light tanks gained the edge over their better-equipped French opponents. CPT Ernst von Jungenfeld, alight-tank company commander, explained how the tactic worked: “In spite of our courage and offensive spirit, we were forced to conclude that the French tanks were thickly armored, and it took many a shot to make them give in. [We] attacked the enemy from the flank, the 2nd Battalion attacked frontally, and forced many hostile crews to leave their tanks. Whenever our projectiles failed to penetrate, the desired effect was obtained by drum fire directed at the tank. Demoralized by the constant hits of our projectiles, the enemy crews abandoned their tanks with arms raised. Moreover, during the first few minutes of this battle, we recognized the enemy’s weakness. Although his armor was thicker than ours and his armament was good, his tanks were slow and difficult to maneuver [making it easier for the faster German tanks to outflank them].”2 By using their speed to quickly maneuver around their enemy’s position, the German light tanks quickly closed the distance required for their weapons to be effective on their opponent’s less-armored flanks. (It was for that same reason the American Sherman tank was an effective weapon when fighting its much more heavily armed and armored enemy, the German Panther and Tiger tanks in 1944.) The speed of the Germans’ tanks allowed them to attack and destroy superior tanks and heavy-caliber anti-tank guns by closing the distance to them and then flanking their opponent. Once the light tank was close enough, their small-caliber guns proved effective enough to destroy any of their opponents except the heaviest of French tanks – namely the Souma and Char B1 bis, which weighed 20 and 32 tons, respectively. The Panzer division’s medium tanks, the Pz III and IV, carried more heavy armor than the light tanks and weighed 19 tons and 17.5 tons, respectively. The Pz IV also carried low-velocity 75mm cannon. Although the Germans used the Pz IV primarily in an infantry-support role rather than an anti-tank role, there were many instances of Pz IVs maneuvering on solitary heavy French tanks and knocking them out. When the entire unit wasn’t used in the support role, the battalion commander tasked his medium-tank company to stay behind and help the infantry eliminate pockets of resistance. The tank platoon was the smallest tactical formation in which tanks maneuvered on the battlefield. Individual tanks received tasking for infantry support or reconnaissance duties, but tanks fought most of their battles in platoons. The platoon generally maneuvered in a wedge or in-line formation with the company. If the platoon was traveling along a road or in restricted terrain, it used a column formation. When in contact, the platoon leader split the formation into two different sections, three tanks to one section if there were five tanks present; the platoon leader and his wing-man tank formed one section, and the other three tanks formed the second section. The sections then took turns bounding past each other while the stationary section provided covering fire. As the tanks maneuvered through enemy-held terrain, they constantly used recon-by-fire tactics. Alight-tank platoon leader explains how a tank platoon worked together on the battlefield: “My driver goes carefully and all the other vehicles creep along, always maintaining their distance in a narrow wedge formation behind me. We cross a road and halt. … Up to the left a woods extends for some distance. Here the enemy must be waiting. However, a burst with the machinegun brings no answer. Quickly we mount the slope and charge up to the edge of the wood. A tank behind me shoots into the trees. I see the tracer and direct my weapons in the same direction. Suddenly enemy fire bursts from countless muzzles. We halt, fire, move forward, halt in a slight depression and fire again. Who is fighting us from the woods we do not know. We can only hear the crack and roar of our weapons, which drown the noise of the motors and the crash of the bursting artillery shells. When someone spots an enemy, his fire indicates the target to the others. So we help each other mutually and are like one tank and one weapon.”3 ‘The shield’ evolves As the Battle of France progressed, French commanders directed their units to build strongpoints around restrictive terrain such as cities, villages, hills and small forests, making themselves inaccessible to large tank formations. They attached large amounts of artillery to their subordinate commands and ensured these forces were adequately stocked with infantry and anti-tank weapons. Sometimes this meant taking indirect-fire weapons, such as the French 75mm field gun, and employing them in a direct-fire role. These defensive tactics forced a change in Panzer-division operations. The Panzer divisions modified their tactics from strictly “sword and shield” to incorporate an ever-increasing role for infantry. The need for more infantry became so apparent that Hitler himself directed a change in the composition of all Panzer divisions after the Battle for France ended – Hitler changed the Panzer division’s composition from two Panzer regiments and one infantry regiment to one Panzer regiment and two infantry regiments. Infantry-support tactics To overcome French strongpoints, supporting arms – including tanks and artillery – reinforced the infantry brigade commander. The commander formed a battlegroup and used his headquarters to command-and-control his formations. These battles were more systematic than the fast-paced cavalry-type battles the armor battlegroups fought. The infantry battlegroup attacked as a combined-arms team. Each team member worked in unison with the other so they all made progress together. Such attacks resembled ancient Greek warriors who, as a team, broke their enemy’s formation by pushing at them with their hoplite shield. The French sited their strongpoints to deny the Panzer division freedom to maneuver. By situating themselves along supply routes, the French blocked supply trucks from reaching the division’s armor formations. For the Panzer division to continue its attack into France, its infantry brigade had to batter enemy defenses to reopen tank supply routes. The German infantry accomplished the task of clearing enemy strongpoints because of close cooperation with its supporting arms. The infantry moved among or close to the armor battlegroup’s tanks. It was ready to dismount into action whenever enemy positions held up the tanks. The infantry attacked these positions by infiltrating from one or more flanks. Mortars, directly observed tank fire, air-artillery fire and other immediately available fire helped them forward.4 The infantry brigade consisted of a motorized infantry regiment, a few anti-tank guns and few infantry guns. To this the division added its anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions, minus the guns already attached to the armor battlegroup. They also added the division’s artillery regiment, bringing three artillery battalions to the infantry and a lifeline of indirect-fire support. The infantry battlegroup, therefore, had the agility and firepower to seize key terrain. When called upon, it could defend it as well. The motorized infantry regiment consisted of three infantry battalions and a cannon company. Each infantry battalion consisted of three companies, a machinegun company with mortars and a heavy weapons company.5 Like with the armor battlegroup, the infantry regiment’s headquarters didn’t concern itself with a lengthy orders process for its battalions when issuing battlefield orders, but concentrated on coordinating fires for its subordinate battalions. Regimental infantry headquarters played a major part in leading the regiment’s men, but when it came to the actual fighting, history accounts show that the infantry regiment’s headquarters became more of a combat coordinator than an actual combat leader. For example, when the infantry regiment received a mission, its headquarters immediately started task-organizing its three subordinate battalions for their specific missions. By assigning anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, plus artillery, etc., to their subordinate battalions, the regiment gave battalion commanders the tools they needed to accomplish their assigned tasks. By not detailing an attack plan, the regiment also saved time. The regiment used the extra time to coordinate fires for the upcoming battle and give the battalion commanders the liberty to see the mission complete in the manner they thought best. This exercise in mission-type orders allowed the regimental staff to concentrate on coordinating close-air, direct- and indirect-fire sup- 29 port for their battalions. When the battle commenced, the regimental staff concentrated on directing supporting fires over the battlefield while the battalions did their work. The Germans trained a motorized infantry battalion to mount a strong attack directly off the line of march. This attack occurred on a 600-yard front about 40 minutes after the moment the leading Panzers struck the obstacle of the assault. The three phases of the infantry attack all took place, dismounting their trucks several hundred meters to the rear from the point of contact. The first phase of the assault was gaining fire superiority. The first company in contact established one large frontal base of fire and crew weapons. They used the support weapons attached to the battalion in their direct-fire role. The 37mm anti-tank gun, the dreaded 88mm anti-tank/anti-aircraft gun and tank guns, of course – in addition to the battalion’s mortars – would also come into action immediately. In the second phase, or blinding phase, the battalion’s support weapons poured smoke and fire upon the enemy’s position. This suppressed the enemy, making it impossible for them to observe the battlefield. At this time, the Germans began to add more fire support to the battle, causing further damage to the enemy position. These fires included the regimental cannon company, division artillery and even close air support if the opposition was great enough. The regimental staff coordinated these fires when the battalion reported it was preparing for an assault. This phase blinded the enemy, keeping them from observing the battalion’s second company as it infiltrated the objective’s flank. From there, the second company established flanking fires as well as jumping-off positions for the assault’s third phase. Collapsing the enemy’s defense was the final phase’s purpose. The battalion headquarters coordinated for mortars and direct-fire weapons to hit the front and flanks of the enemy position, while the regimental staff directed artillery and close-air support to the rear of the enemy position. This effectively isolated the enemy position from the rest of the battlefield. Squads and platoons then assaulted the objective’s heart, eliminating their selected targets. With fires encompassing their sector completely and the centerpieces of their position either seized or destroyed by fire, the defender’s capability to form an an organized defense collapsed. This collapse ended the assault phase. What we learned Blitzkrieg, with the Panzer division as its centerpiece, shaped the U. S. Army’s conception of infantry and armor working together as combined-arms teams. Blitzkrieg’s coordinated effort of ground- and airpower is another concept we see today on the Joint battlefield. Most effective when war is conducted as a series of quick, short, decisive battles that deliver a knockout blow to an enemy before it can fully mobilize, the concept of blitzkrieg was evident as recently as the Army’s invasion of Iraq. Perhaps most importantly, the Panzer division’s style of battlefield leadership laid the foundation for our own leadership practices. The flexibility inherent in “mission orders” only increased the need for adaptable, agile leaders and mission command. The battlefield of tomorrow will be just as fluid – maybe more so – as the one the Panzers faced in 1940, and the need to overmatch our adversaries just as great. CPT Michael Ibrahim is a student in the Military Intelligence Career Course, Company A, 304th Military Intelligence Battalion. He has served in various positions in the United States and Iraq, including intelligence adviser on the Iraq Border Transition Team in 2009-10; squadron S-2, 1st Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA; and assistant regimental S-2, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin. His military schooling includes commissioning via Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech)’s ROTC and the Military Intelligence Basic Officers Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree from Virginia Tech and a master’s of arts from American Military University. Notes 1Interview with Rolf Penselin, Modern Marvels “Panzers” episode, airdate Oct. 22, 2003. 2Von Jungenfeld, Ernst CPT. “German Panzers vs. French Light Mechanized Divisions,” Field Artillery Journal, October 1941. 3“Armored Attack South of A-,” Field Artillery Journal, August 1941. 4Farrar-Hockley, A. H. Infantry Tactics 1939-1945. London: Al-mark, 1976. 5Mueller-Hillebrand, B. Das Heer 1933-1945. Frankfurt: Volumes I and II, Verband der Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939-1945, http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/ nafziger/940GEAG. PDF. Sources for more reading Bance, Alan Dr., translator. Blitzkrieg In Their Own Words: First Hand Accounts from German Soldiers 1939-1940. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2005. Bidwell, Shelford. Artillery Tactics 1939-1945. London: Almark, 1976. Bull, Stephen and Rottman, Gordon. Infantry Tactics of the Second World War. Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2008. Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg. London: Pimlico Publishers, 2007. Dupont, Jean 1LT. “Fighting the Panzers,” Field Artillery Journal, August 1941. Lehmann, David. “Battle South of Amiens,” Axis History Forum, April 1, 2002. http://forum.axishistory.com/, accessed April 2010. Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1981. Mackesy, Kenneth MAJ. Panzer Division: the Mailed Fist. New York: Ballantine Books, 1968. Unattributed. “The German Armored Division,” Information Bulletin No. 18, June 15, 1942. War Department, Washington: Military Intelligence Service. Unattributed. Special Bulletin No. 27, Nov. 28, 1940. War Department, Washington: Military Intelligence Division. 30 German combat leaders led their units from the front, using their own initiative to make on-the-spot decisions for their men. This eliminated delay from subordinates calling higher-ups for permission to act. (illustration by Jody Harmon)