Junior Leaders and the Key-Leader Engagement Process

As the drawdown of forces continues in Iraq and may soon begin in Afghanistan, junior Armor leaders will find themselves taking more responsibility in conducting engagements with influential and senior local-national officials. In the final and crucial phase of these conflicts, junior leaders must become adept at cultivating local allies and using personal relationships to influence their commander’s battlespace. Failure to do so may leave junior leaders and their commanders with insufficient ability to secure their areas, and may create tactical challenges at a time when they are least needed. Success in this area, however, will reap dividends in stability at a critical stage of these conflicts. Crazyhorse Troop’s experience During the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation New Dawn, Crazyhorse Troop (1st Squadron, 3rd Armor Cavalry Regiment) took responsibility for a large and diverse area of operation in the northwestern corner of Iess in the area was in no small part due to the effective use of key-leader engagements to engage local officials and build relationships with tribal, Iraqi government and Iraqi Security Forces leaders. These relationships were critical in influencing local leaders to advance our commander’s intent and in realizing this intent with minimal U. S. involvement. Crazyhorse Troop experienced challenges similar to those the Armor community will face in current and upcoming deployments. Junior leaders must actively seek to improve their skills at building and maintaining relationships with local officials in their commander’s AO. We saw limited attempts made to introduce KLE into predeployment training requirements. Current literature focuses on the KLE process relating to targeting or on general KLE tactics, rather than relating to the capabilities and limitations of junior Army leaders. This article explains those capabilities and limitations in the KLE process and provides specific recommendations for junior leaders seek-Junior Leaders and the Key-Leader Engagement Process by 1LT Tom Westphal Junior Leaders and the Key-Leader Engagement Process by 1LT Tom Westphal ing to improve their proficiency at conducting KLEs within the context of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defining a KLE A KLE is the sustained process of building a professional connection with local-national officials to gain their cooperation in fulfilling the commander’s intent. Regardless of the desired outcome, our experience shows that every successfully executed KLE builds a resilient relationship between the junior leader on the ground and their local-national counterparts. However, this was based on our operating environment, which did not force us to meet with large groups or councils often (as seems to be the current norm in Afghanistan), and therefore gave us the opportunity to build rapport with individuals rather than continually be required to address large gatherings. Capabilities and limitations of junior-leader engagement During Crazyhorse Troop’s tour of duty, platoon leaders like myself often took responsibility for meeting relatively high-ranking local Iraqi government, ISF and tribal officials accustomed to meeting with battalion-level leaders (or higher). Engaging such officials presents unique challenges to junior leaders, who must keep in mind their relative advantages and disadvantages to more senior USF leaders to make the most of their strengths. American forces have been in Iraq for more than eight years, and in this time Iraqi officials have learned a lot about the American military. In many cases, this includes a rudimentary knowledge of the U. S. Army rank structure and relative power of each rank. In our experience, local Iraqi government and ISF accustomed to meeting with senior-level Army leaders may have felt slighted if a junior leader attempted to engage them. Also, they may have felt that meeting with junior leaders wasted their time, as they knew junior leaders have less influence over USF actions in the area than a senior leader. One of the greatest challenges to junior leaders is managing the expectations of their counterparts while providing them a reason to maintain interest in continuing the relationship. However, junior leaders should capitalize on their advantages. Senior leaders may only be able to speak in broad terms about problems facing the area. Junior leaders can better grasp local minutiae and give targeted, specific recommendations to their counterparts on fixing local problems. Also, junior leaders are more available over the course of the deployment to invest in KLEs with more of their counterparts. Junior leaders can build stronger relationships with more local officials over the course of a deployment than a senior leader can. Strategies for effective engagement Crazyhorse Troop learned many lessons experiencing the transition from OIF to OND. Following are some strategies for effective engagement at the junior-leader level, from the preparation process to actions on the objective to the post-meeting follow-up. While derived from our experiences, the strategies are broadly appli-Junior leaders must become adept at cultivating local allies and using personal relationships to influence their commander’s battlespace. (U. S. Army photo) 10 cable to other regions in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in future conflicts. The structure assumes a one-year deployment with opportunities for repeatedly engaging the same key local leaders. These strategies are common sense. Taken holistically, they may help structure a junior leaders’ approach to KLEs and will save future units from re-learning these lessons. The preparation process Treat every operation like an information operation. When a patrol leaves the wire, junior leaders must emphasize to their soldiers that their behavior will influence the population they encounter. This will shape the attitudes of local nationals you will interact with during KLEs. For example, one tribal leader in our area bitterly recollected a U. S. patrol that refused to apologize for tearing down his power lines before our unit arrived incountry, and he continually used this as a pretext for his refusal to cooperate. Identify and define desired outcomes. A junior leader must have a clear idea of what outcome would best support his commander’s intent before entering into the KLE. Figure out away to frame the desired outcome and any preferred solutions to the problem in away that recon-ciles them with your counterpart’sown goals (or your counterpart’s superior’s goals). Always try to define the outcome in terms of your counterpart’s goals. Present the desired outcome in such away that your counterpart views it as a matter of his own self-interest rather than some sort of command. (For example, “Decreasing violence along this route will significantly contribute to securing your area and prove how effective your soldiers are to your commander” rather than “You need to secure this route.”) Prepare the battlefield and map the conversation. Like all operations, adequate planning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield and rehearsal is critical to the success of KLEs. Review your notes from past KLEs and prepare a list of agreements or discussions that may help achieve your desired outcome. From there, create a “map” for the conversation that will gradually build the framework for your desired outcome. We found this to be a useful process for planning the general flow of conversation and formulating responses to anticipated questions or resistance. Prepare and rehearse with your interpreter. Without the resources afforded to senior leaders, the interpreter is often the junior leader’s only link to the local culture and can usually provide advice on the cultural context surrounding the KLE. Many interpreters have worked with USF for along time and have a great deal of negotiation experience. The value of a good interpreter can hardly be overstated in effectively engaging local leaders. Go over your conversation map and desired outcomes with the interpreter and ask his advice. If time permits, use another interpreter to act as the local-national official and rehearse key elements of the KLE. Actions on the objective: stages of engagement The initial meeting is one of the only times a junior leader should completely avoid specifics. Your priority during the initial meeting is to secure an agreement on at least one broad goal. This provides a starting place for your interactions and creates the foundation for later agreements. The goal is likely to be a vague, easily agreed upon concept such as security, education, prosperity, etc. Ask open-ended questions to try to uncover your counterpart’s priorities and any shared interests you may have. The first month is critical for junior leaders in establishing your professional and personal relationships with your counterparts. Resist the urge to only talk “business” and try to find out if your counterpart shares a common interest with you. This will help differentiate you from other Americans your counterpart has worked with. Junior leaders should also take this month to try to determine their counterpart’s ability to influence his area. This allows junior leaders to provide an accurate report on the power dynamics in the AO to their commanders. During this time, emphasis should remain on the broad goal you and your counterpart first agreed on in the first meeting. Also, acknowledge any small victories that occur. Acknowledgement builds your reputation as someone that not only shares your counterpart’s goals but is also actively working to help him accomplish his mission. Months two through 10 sustain the relationship. By the second month in their AO, junior leaders should have a good idea who in their area has influence and merits their attention. At this point, it may be helpful for junior leaders to compile an engagement schedule of who they need to engage with and how often, based on the power hierarchy in their area. Using cellphone calls when you are unable to meet with your counterparts will help keep your relationship from weakening and can create a culture of communication that isn’t dependent on your ability to meet in person. By the 11th month, junior leaders need to begin preparing for the transition to anew unit occupying their area. Emphasize the professional nature of relationship and list past joint accomplishments with your counterparts to imply that these successes will continue if your counterpart continues to have a strong relationship with USF. When your replacing unit arrives, personally introduce your successor to your key contacts as someone who is interested in continuing this strong relationship. Providing your replacement with the information you collected on each of your counterparts will also ensure that cultivating your relationship did not waste time. Again, this may be common sense, but it’s important for the relationship’s continuity. The previous unit handed us several strong relationships. These invaluable relation-Junior leaders can build stronger relationships with more local officials over the course of a deployment than a senior leader can. (U. S. Army photo) 11 ships helped us navigate the complex dynamics of our AO in the initial months. Tactics, techniques and procedures for effective engagement Own the room. This can sometimes be a challenge for junior leaders, who are culturally disadvantaged in Iraq and Afghanistan by their relatively low rank and youth in cultures that place a great deal of weight on seniority and authority. Minimizing the number of soldiers who speak during KLEs will avoid confusion over who is in charge. Try to sit in a central, dominant location. Although most local officials will not be able to understand you, speaking with a commanding voice is still important in establishing your authority. Establish credibility. By now, most Afghan and Iraqi officials have dealt with American soldiers in some capacity or another, so junior leaders need to be proactive in defining themselves as a reliable partner or risk being tarred with whatever perception their counterparts hold of American soldiers. Consistently and explicitly describing yourself as an honest and reliable person will go far in accomplishing this. Do your best to keep your word. Don’t make promises unless they are easily and immediately kept. When you keep a promise, use it as an example of why you are a trustworthy partner. Being proactive in defining yourself will help preempt your counterpart’s negative perceptions. Use the recorder. The recorder may be the only other USF soldier present with you in the room, and, as such, may fill a variety of roles. On our patrols, the recorder took notes on the proceedings and maintained contact with the security element by monitoring the radio, allowing the platoon leadership to focus solely on the KLE. During large meetings, the recorder sometimes gauged specific individuals’ reactions to particular topics. The recorder also kept the leader from going past the time allotted for the meeting by signaling when the KLE was 15 minutes, then five minutes, from completion. In spite of the recorder’s presence, the leader might also find it useful to make notes of his counterpart’s requests, as it conveys the impression of attentiveness and concern. Start with small talk. Even though Iraqi and Afghani cultural norms are well known among USF leaders, many Americans are still tempted to launch straight into “business” at the very start of a KLE. Start instead with open-ended questions or a conversation about a shared interest established at a previous meeting. As a junior leader, you will probably meet with your counterpart repeatedly. In most cases, securing an abrupt agreement to your desired outcome isn’t worth setting your relationship back a few steps. Avoid conflict and defuse tension. A certain degree of tension is probably unavoidable in the current operating environment, but for the most part, junior leaders will be the ones on the ground ensuring that small conflicts don’t turn into larger ones. There are many ways to approach conflict, as there will be varying specifics in each situation. The junior leader’s personal style will probably dictate which approach to use in each situation. One tactic we had great success with was turning complaints from local nationals into compliments. For example, one Iraqi-police counterpart constantly complained that his police officers were underequipped and used this as an excuse to decrease the number of patrols in his AO. Our response to his complaints became, “We have a lot of respect for all the hardships that you and your policemen have overcome – it takes a lot of courage to do a policeman’s job here in Iraq, and even more courage to do the job without advanced equipment.” The police official appreciated the praise and ceased his complaints. In the following weeks and months, he began to brag about how much his police officers could accomplish despite their difficulties. Snowball agreements. Small agreements lead to big ones. During the IPB process, you should make a list of relevant past discussions and agreements. Use past agreements, as well as your initial broad agreement on shared values, to slowly build toward your desired outcome and develop the impression that you and your counterpart already agree. (For example, “During our first meeting, we both agreed that creating new economic opportunities was a top priority for this area. Working together, we need to find away to make this area more secure for businesses.”) Know when to call in the “big guns.” To establish your authority as the only source of contact with USF and avoid muddling your command’s message, you should be the only USF leader to engage with your local-national counterparts. However, there are several situations where a visit from a senior leader may be productive. Junior leaders can use visits from your superiors (or, more ideally, from high-ranking local-national government and military officials) to reward your counterparts for their cooperation and success. During these meetings, praise the successes of your counterpart in such away that down-When your replacing unit arrives, personally introduce your successor to your key contacts as someone who is interested in continuing this strong relationship. Providing your replacement with the information you collected on each of your counterparts will also ensure that cultivating your relationship did not waste time. (U. S. Army photo) 12 plays any role you may have played in his accomplishments. This is an especially useful tactic with military personnel, who will usually have a very good understanding of the implications of being in a senior leader’s good graces. Junior leaders can also use senior-leader visits to emphasize particularly important themes or to convince undecided individuals. In all cases, tactful preparation with the senior leader before the meeting is critical to ensure that he doesn’t contradict an established agreement. Win the end game. The meeting’send is one of the most critical times. Because of cultural barriers and the sometimes-mediocre abilities of interpreters provided to junior leaders, it’s necessary to repeat the agreed-on outcome several times to ensure that everyone has actually agreed to what they think they have agreed to. Another effective method is to have the interpreter provide a written list to the opposite party in their own language that lists any agreements reached. Post-meeting follow-up Be proactive in the follow-up. Lack of follow-up can result in seeing your hard-won agreements put on your counterpart’s back burner. If your agreement involved actions on your part, make sure that your counterpart knows you are holding up your end of the bargain, too. A cellphone call can ensure action on the agreement. Conduct a post-meeting after-action review. Conducting an AAR after KLEs is just as important as it is with any other operation. Doing a quick AAR with your interpreter may help you identify any cultural missteps you committed and capture lessons-learned for next time. As American forces continue to reduce their presence in Iraq and may soon begin the same process in Afghanistan, junior Armor leaders fill roles previously held by senior officers. In many cases, this will include the responsibility to conduct KLEs with local-national government, tribal and security-force leaders. At the same time, junior leaders will be responsible for engaging senior-level local-national officials. The importance of strong relationships and “soft power” influence with local leaders will exponentially increase as fewer American troops and resources stretch commanders’ abilities to directly affect conditions on the ground. 1LT Tom Westphal is a tank platoon leader with Crazyhorse Troop, 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Hood, TX, and is deployed to Babil Province, Iraq. His military education includes Basic Officer Leader’s Course II, Armor Officer Basic Course, Army Reconnaissance Course and Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in global politics from Washington State University. AAR – after-action review AO – area of operation IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield Acronym Quick-Scan ISF – Iraqi Security Forces KLE – key-leader engagement OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom OND – Operation New Dawn TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures USF – U. S. forces Annotated bibliography for junior-leader reading Curtis, Joe. “An Important Weapon in COIN Operations: The Key Leader’s Engagement.” Infantry magazine, July-August

2008. This article focuses on the experience of an infantry company conducting KLEs over the course of a year in Afghanistan. The author incorporates specific TTPs for conducting KLEs within the Pastun cultural context, with great step-by-step advice that can be applied to any operating environment. Cummings, Michael. “Influencing the Population: Using Interpreters, Conducting KLEs and Executing IO in Afghanistan.” Infantry magazine, May-August 2010. This is another article from Infantry about effective TTPs for KLEs in Afghanistan. However, this author provides solid, in-depth advice for junior leaders on best using their interpreters, which should be extremely useful for leaders in all combat theaters. FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, July 5, 2007. This FM lists a step-by-step approach in preparing for and executing KLEs. While it’s focused on the specific operating requirements of the Civil Affairs Branch and tactics for mediating between two opposing parties, it still contains information useful to junior combat-arms leaders. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, April 21, 2009. Appendixes A through D of this FM contain a lot of great information for junior leaders, including the distilled wisdom of counterinsurgency experts David Kilcullen and T. E. Lawrence, as well as suggestions for more reading. In particular, Lawrence’s “Twenty-Seven Articles” are still as useful as they were 100 years ago to small-unit leaders interacting with people in the Arab world. Hammervik, Jenny L. “Challenges and Pitfalls in Key Leader Engagement.” Swedish Defense Research Agency, September 2010. http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir3034.pdf. The terms of this research paper are too broad to provide specific advice to junior officers, but it’s useful for the purpose of learning how one of our partners in Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces, approaches the issue. Tressler, David M. “Negotiation in the New Strategic Context.” The Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, August 2007. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/tressler-iraq-negot.pdf. This paper is an academic approach to explaining the science of negotiation and publishes recommendations for improving the Army’s predeployment training in the KLE and negotiation process. It provides an academic foundation for junior leaders interested in improving their negotiating skills. 13