U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency by Lieutenant Colonel David Fivecoat and Captain Stuart Chapman In April 2009, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command published U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. This unclassified manual stresses a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency operations by tying concepts of security, governance, economics, and information engagement together for brigades, battalions, and companies. The document brings to the forefront five key concepts to the practice of counterinsurgency by identifying counterinsurgency lines of effort (LOE), expanding on clear-hold-build operations, discussing the importance of securing the population during counterinsurgency operations, creating tactical-level planning horizons in counterinsurgency, and helping units better understand the enemy they are fighting through the components and manifestations of an insurgency. It also describes typical offensive, defensive, and stability operations in a counterinsurgency, as well as provides a framework to train and maintain host nation security forces. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, does a superb job of crafting the Army’s and Marine Corps’ approach to counterinsurgency from the strategic to the tactical level. However, by attempting to cover from corps to squad levels, the U.S. Army failed to produce a current, practical manual for small units to use during counterinsurgency operations. Until now, Army and Marine Corps tactical leaders used FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, published in 1986. However, FM 90-8 focuses exclusively on combat operations against guerrilla forces, and does not cover the other LOE, and misses more than 2 decades of doctrinal updates. Created from FM 90-8, FM 3-24, David Gallula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Roger Trin-quier’s Modern Warfare, and the military’s counterinsurgency experiences in Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Philippines, and Iraq, FM 3-24.2 fills the doctrinal gap for tactical leaders and units. As a combined effort, many organizations contributed to the new FM 3-24.2. At the U.S. Army Infantry School, Major (Retired) David Frumerie, Major Jason Enyert, Captain Brad Velotta, Captain Stuart Chapman, and Lieutenant Colonel David Fivecoat wrote and edited the manual. Organizations from across the Army assisted with significant portions of the manual, including Fort Leavenworth’s Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms and Doctrine Division, Fort Leavenworth’s Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, the National Training Center, the U.S. Army Armor Center, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Benning’s Donovan Library, Fort Riley’s transition team trainers, the U.S. Marine Corps, and tactical units both at home station and deployed. Finally, notable counterinsurgency specialists, such as John Nagl, Montgomery McFate, Benjamin Grob-Fitzgib-bons, and Conrad Crane reviewed and provided information for significant portions of the book. Together, this collaborative effort has created a solid addition to the U.S. military’s knowledge of counterinsurgency. One of FM 3-24.2’s foundations is the concept of counterinsurgency LOE. By combining FM 3-24’s, Counterinsurgency, logical lines of operation; FM 3-0’s, Operations, concept of LOE; and FM 3-07’s, Stability Operations, concept of stability LOE, FM 3-24.2 creates a tool for units to link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose — cause and effect — to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. The counterinsurgency LOE, establish civil security, establish civil control, support to host nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct information engagement, help commanders and units prioritize and synchronize actions over extended time, as well as assess the effectiveness of operations. Although each LOE contributes to the defeat of an insurgency, some measure of civil security and civil control must be established prior to fully developing the other LOE. Since each insurgency is unique, FM 3-24.2 retains the flexibility for commanders to tailor LOE to their situation by combining LOE, such as economics and restoring infrastructure, or splitting a LOE, such as dividing rule of law from governance. The LOE provide commanders a means to achieve unity of effort, prioritize assets, balance actions to secure the population, establish a legitimate local government, and defeat the insurgency. Figure 1 depicts seven examples of counterinsurgency LOE. Counterinsurgency Lines of Effort A clear-hold-build operation is a full-spectrum operation that combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees during each phase. This type of operation was used successfully by the French in Algeria and French Indochina, where it was called “tache d’huile” (oil spot); by the British in Malaysia, it was known as the “Briggs Plan;” and by U.S. forces in Tal Afar, Iraq, it was described as a clear-hold-build operation. In the clear phase, offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive operations are stressed; and in the build phase, stability operations are preeminent. However, in each phase the other two operations play complementary roles. For instance, in the hold phase, the unit may focus its defensive operations on securing the population, while also conducting raids on insurgent leaders, as well as restoring a local well to provide water to the village. Figure 2 shows the change in the balance between offense, defense, and stability operations during a clear-hold-build operation. Clear-Hold-Build Framework Finally, FM 3-24.2 stresses the importance of securing the population through living forward in small bases, executing populace and resource control (PRC) operations, and conducting regular patrols to disrupt insurgent actions. Tactics in Counterinsurgency contends that the most important of these is properly locating bases for both U.S. and host nation security forces that provide security to the largest number of people possible, disrupt insurgent activity, and secure key locations and lines of communication. Often, these bases are located among the civilian population, much like a neighborhood police station. PRC operations are government actions that concentrate on protecting the population and its materiel resources from insurgents, and denying insurgents access to the population and its materiel resources, while simultaneously identifying and eliminating insurgents. PRC operations could include enforcing curfews, establishing movement restrictions, maintaining check points, supervising a block or village committee, registering weapons, and rationing critical goods. Finally, reconnaissance or combat patrols collect information and provide security by disrupting insurgent operations. FM 3-24.2 establishes a concept for planning horizons during counterinsurgency by blending the theories of FM 5-0.1, The Operations Process, and FM 7-0, Training the Force. Using long-range, mid-range, and short-range windows, Tactics in Counterinsurgency proposes brigade, battalion, and company planning timelines for each planning horizon. It also suggests a quarterly operations brief as an azimuth check on the progress brigades, battalions, and companies have achieved, as well as a means to encourage learning and adaption Figure 1. Seven counterinsurgency lines of effort.

CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD FRAMEWORK

CLEAR

HOLD

BUILD

TIME

Offense Offense Offense Defense Defense Defense Stability Stability Stability Figure 2. Change in balance between offense, defense, and stability operations during a clear-hold-build operation. July-August 2009 — 45 Establish Civil Security Establish Civil Control Support Host Nation Security Forces Support to Governance Restore Essential Services Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development Conduct Information Engagement

COUNTERINSURGENCY LINES OF EFFORT

Pro-Insurgent Populace Neutral or Passive Populace ProGovernment Populace Pro-Insurgent Populace Neutral or Passive Populace ProGovernment Populace Starting Conditions End State across the unit. For example, a brigade combat team might craft a 1-year long-range plan, a 3- month mid-range plan, and a 1-week short-range plan. Despite 8 years of fighting insurgencies, the military has struggled with lumping the enemy into one large, amorphous group, be it “a few dead-enders,” such as former regime elements, anti-Iraqi forces, al-Qaeda, anti-Afghanistan forces, or the Taliban. Just like politics, all insurgencies are local. Each group possesses its own characteristics and follows certain patterns. Tactics in Counterinsurgency helps soldiers categorize and understand insurgencies by encouraging an analysis of each insurgent group’s components and manifestations. The three components of an insurgency — its five elements, the five groups of people that participate in an insurgency; its eight dynamics, eight categories that define an insurgency; and one of the six insurgent strategies that it is following — help leaders comprehend the organization they are battling. The three manifestations of an insurgency — tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities — are the visible outputs of an insurgency that provide counterinsurgent units a way to develop the insurgency’s patterns. Taken together, the components and manifestations help units reduce the uncertainty around an elusive enemy and defeat it. The Components and Manifestations of an Insurgency In addition to the five key practices, FM 3-24.2 provides a means to understand the operational environment; describes types of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted during a counterinsurgency; and discusses the training and mentoring of host nation security forces. The manual also illustrates the challenges and difficulties of conducting a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield during a counterinsurgency. Furthermore, it explains tactical site exploitation, sniper operations, base defense operations, and company intelligence support teams. A short reading list of other counterinsurgency documents for leaders confronted with significant time constraints is also included in the manual. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, provides brigades, battalions, and companies a practical guide to achieving a comprehensive approach to successfully waging counterinsurgency operations over a significant period of time. For tactical leaders, who may not have time to read the entire manual, focusing on the five key practices — the sections on counterinsurgency LOE, clear-hold-build operations, securing the population, planning horizons, and the components and manifestations of an insurgency, should prove particularly valuable. One reviewer commented, FM 3-24.2 “will be a great benefit to units in the field.” Lieutenant Colonel David G. Fivecoat is an infantry officer who served as the lead writer and editor for FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Previously, he was deployed to Kosovo with the 82d Airborne Division; to Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for Operation Iraqi Freedom I; and to Iraq with the 3d Infantry Division during Operations Iraqi Freedom III and V. He currently commands the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, Fort Campbell, KY. Captain Stuart Chapman is an infantry officer who served as a writer for FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. He was previously deployed to Iraq with the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He is currently attending Ranger School. Insurgency Components Manifestations Tactics (Violent/Nonviolent) Strengths Vulnerabilities Strategy Elements Dynamics Figure 3. Components and manifestations of an insurgency. “Finally, FM 3-24.2 stresses the importance of securing the population through living forward in small bases, executing populace and resource control (PRC) operations, and conducting regular patrols to disrupt insurgent actions. Tactics in Counterinsurgency contends that the most important of these is properly locating bases for both U.S. and host nation security forces that provide security to the largest number of people possible, disrupt insurgent activity, and secure key locations and lines of communication.”