Enhancing the Recce Troop’s Lethality

It’s no secret that today’s scout platoon conducts a wide array of combat missions to support overseas contingency operations. The scout’s traditional roles of solely relying on stealthy reconnaissance and primarily using indirect fires to destroy the enemy are fading. The technique of sending out a two-man eagle element has become extinct. Today’s contemporary battlefield requires that modern scouts take the fight to the enemy and gather human intelligence (HUMINT) in dense urban environments. Scouts no longer have the luxury of waiting to conduct battle handover with infantry once enemy contact is made due to recce organizations being assigned independent areas of operation. There are no more advancing motorized rifle regiments on a linear battlefield, only deadly targets of opportunity that are presented in the tight confines of downtown. Scouts must rapidly acquire and precisely destroy their adversaries in mere seconds. If the recce platoon fails to meet this standard by limiting factors, we must be prepared to fight that same enemy combatant another day. Next time, he may win! I have read several published articles recommending ways to improve the Stryker recce platoon and troop. These ideas primarily include increasing dismounted capability and creating two platoons of six reconnaissance variant (RV) Strykers per troop. Although, these ideas are interesting, they fail to address the recce platoon’s main flaw — it lacks the edge to bring mounted, lethal combat power to the fight. Enhancing the Recce Platoon’s Mounted Killing Power Simply put, the current recce platoon does not need four RV models equipped with the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3). Although the LRAS3 is a critical tool used to acquire targets at great distances and rapidly report their locations, it is overkill. The LRAS3 loses its benefit in the close fight; more importantly, this platform severely degrades the gunner’s ability to rapidly and precisely kill the enemy in tight confines of an urban environment. More often than not, the platoon is prevented from placing each vehicle in a textbook position within its assigned sector. The reason is simple: terrain limitations and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) will almost always be prohibitive. In today’s unconventional environment, recce platoons are forced to use the wingman concept to provide reciprocal security in the urban setting, which creates redundant coverage of the objective area. A better concept is to replace two of the RV Strykers with two infantry carrier variants (ICVs) equipped with the remote weapons station (RWS). The ICV will provide the platoon with a multifunction gunner’s system that is completely integrated with a laser range finder (LRF). In essence, the new platoon would consist of two RVs and two ICVs; recce sections would each have an RV and ICV for mutual support. This redesign at platoon level would give the recce platoon and troop two awesome capabilities: the ability to accomplish its primary mission of functioning as a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) element; and the capability of operating as a hunter-killer team. The recce platoon would also have the capability to place lethal and highly accurate fires on enemy locations without exposing its gunners to direct fire. Precisely delivering fire has the added benefit of reducing unnecessary ammo expenditures during prolonged enemy engagements, and reduces collateral damage. Most direct-fire engagements fall somewhere between 30 to 300 meters due to the enemy’s limited weapons systems. It is critical to mention that roughly 80 per- 10 — cent of all engagements occurred either mounted or directly near Stryker supporting dismounts. Scouts must be transported to and from the objective by the RV, unless air assaulted. Ironically, most direct-fire engagements are initiated during mounted movement to the objective, regardless of the type of mission. The trend is simple to recognize — we must improve our ability to acquire and engage with precision from the RV platform. The recce platoon’s ability to quickly acquire targets while mounted during simple contact, such as small-arms fire, is reduced due to the gunner’s exposure, which automatically degrades his crew-served weapon as it must be manually operated to acquire and engage the enemy. Platoons commonly suppress suspected enemy locations as they maneuver out of the kill zone and attempt to reacquire and engage targets from safer distances, which is due to the lack of a fire control system in the recce platoon. As a result, some enemy combatants cannot be engaged and are able to successfully withdraw from the ambush. The originally designed Stryker platform, intended to precisely acquire targets, is actually degrading the gunner’s ability to effectively function in the current operating environment. In today’s fight, recce platoons must possess the capability to stand ground during small-arms engagements and engage the enemy. In essence, this concept is no different in theory when compared to other scout organizations comprised of three Bradleys and five HMMWVs. Recce platoons equipped with ICVs would enable leaders to maneuver these killer platforms directly into small-arms engagements and locate and destroy the enemy without exposing the gunner, who would have the ability to scan, lase, and precisely engage from protected positions. These ICVs could be placed in overwatch positions to actively scan and counter the enemy sniper threat. The recce platoon’s direct-fire capabilities and control would be enhanced by both precision and time. This concept will also greatly increase the platoon’s ability to kill the enemy in any operating environment — not just in urban settings. For example, gunners would have the advantage when faced with targets concealed in palm groves engaging their vehicles, or moving targets in the open along Iraq’s borders at roughly 600 meters at 2 a.m. The ICV would vastly improve the mounted element’s role as direct support for dismounted scouts. Current doctrine specifically states that the RV’screw-served weapons lack standoff, lethality, and survivability in terrain lacking cover and concealment. If recce platoons and troops were equipped with ICVs, troop commanders would have six killer platforms to provide massive firepower and dominate the fight in terrain that lacks cover and concealment. RV Technical Limitations For years, scouts have been one of the most flexible and adaptive tools on the battlefield; however, when making primitive alterations to a modern piece of equipment to increase odds of survival, it’s time to reanalyze. Recce gunners developed innovative ideas by constructing duck-hunter blinds with camo nets around their positions to mask their silhouette when in the hatch actively scanning and attempting to locate enemy positions. An active enemy sniper cripples a gunner’s ability to effectively observe his sector. Other common primitive modifications include sandbagging around hatches and securing HMMWV glass to cupolas, often referred as “pope glass.” Our recce gunners are making primitive modifications to increase their odds of survival during enemy direct-fire contact. Besides gunners being exposed, below are a few examples of how the RV might degrade the gunner’s ability to precisely engage targets: Optic challenges. Gunners must acquire targets using the LRAS3, then transition to the M2 or MK19, equipped with a PAS- 13 V1/V2 thermal optic. During limited visibility or extended ranges, time is lost as gunners switch to a different optic, new sight picture, and attempt to reacquire with decreased magnification. Some gunners attempted to mount the ANPEQ-2A

RIFLE SQUAD (x 3)

RIFLE PLATOON (x 3)

M203 M249 M4 E6 E5 E3 E3 E3 E5 E3 E3 E4

M4 M4 240 M4 M4 E6 E4 E4 E3 E4 E4 E3 VC

1SG Current SBCT Infantry Company Figure 1 — 11 to engage targets during limited visibility; the drawback — night-vision goggles and infrared beams washout under street lighting in the urban environment. Unstable crew-served mount. The RV crew-served mount is unstable, which allows the weapon to easily transition off target. For direct-fire engagements in urban terrain, the traversing and elevation mechanism is ineffective due to the limited degree of angle allowed during elevation adjustments. RV gunners frequently opt to free gun in dense urban terrain. Also during daytime engagements, all necessary wind and elevation adjustments are manual. Precision is instantly lost with this technique, which usually leads to increased ammo expenditures and collateral damage. Degradation of optic’s zero. PAS-13 optics are consistently removed from crew-served weapons during daylight operations. Gunners remove these thermal devices to counter the possibility of optic loss or damage in case of improvised explosive device (IED) or vehicle-borne IED contact. This will degrade the optic’s zero. Gunners are therefore forced to engage targets without the aid of zeroed sights. No laser range finder. Gunners technically must obtain a range from LRAS3 during engagements to deliver effective fire. During daylight engagements, gunners must use range estimation and adjust fire accordingly. Precision and time are lost on targets of opportunity. During section gunnery, crosstalk is critical between gunners to rapidly determine range and put rounds on target. Modifying the Existing Fleet In addition to an improved concept for the recce platoon, we need to seriously look at modifying the existing fleet of RV Strykers. This modification would include designing a mechanically controlled LRAS3 yoke mount to allow gunners to manipulate the system from inside the Stryker. The design must allow gunners to lase targets, observe the LRAS3 video feed on a separate monitor other than the Force XXI battle command-brigade and below (FBCB2), and control LRAS3 movements within the gunner’s station. This new ability would greatly improve the survivability of RV gunners since they must currently remain exposed. RV gun-MGS Platoon

Figure 2 “Recce platoons equipped with ICVs would enable leaders to maneuver these killer platforms directly into small-arms engagements and locate and destroy the enemy without exposing the gunner, who would have the ability to scan, lase, and precisely engage from protected positions. These ICVs could be placed in overwatch positions to actively scan and counter the enemy sniper threat.” 12 — ners were constantly at great risk when stationary from precision small-arms fire and small-arms fire. Immediately identifying the exact location of a small-arms shooter is a challenge for the RV gunner, considering engine noise and other external audio distractions, which is why each platoon should be immediately retrofitted with the boomerang shooter detection and location system. This system rapidly analyzes the muzzle blast and shockwave of around to locate the direction of the sniper. This system will aid in closing the gap between guesswork and verification of the sniper’s location. The MGS Platoon and the Recce Troop The recce troop suffers in another crucial aspect; it lacks the ability to deliver fires lethal enough to penetrate buildings or fortifications. The reason is no mystery — the recce troop lacks organic mobile gun system (MGS) or antitank guided missile (ATGM) assets. Recce troops are typically supplied with AT4s and, on average, one to two javelins per troop. The AT4 failed to penetrate the most common constructed buildings in Iraq. This fact is based on personal experience. To attempt to deploy either system would require exposing scouts, once again, thereby making them vulnerable to small-arms fire in the close fight. Some leaders would argue the fact that the answer would be aviation or close air support (CAS) assets. In my opinion, it depends on the distance between your ground forces and the target and what phase of the operation you are executing. Keep in mind that it takes time to pull back and confirm dismounted element locations and place them at the appropriate minimum safe distance, depending on the type of air munitions requested. Also, the complexity of the target will determine if a joint tactical air controller is required to initiate the mission. The current recce troop modified table of organization and equipment leaves the task of suppressing enemy locations with devastating effects to the troop’s mortars; herein lies the main issue. The mortar platoon is restricted from firing rounds into an urban environment; the risk of collateral damage outweighs the reward of using mortar systems. Time is also lost while waiting for clearance of fires from higher echelon’s deconflicting airspace. Due to restrictions on mortar sections, infantrymen are routinely used to make up additional dismount squads. Based on my previous assessment, recce organizations occupy and maintain control of their own sector; therefore, each recce troop should have one MGS platoon. Currently, each Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) infantry battalion operates with three MGS platoons. Each infantry company is assigned one MGS platoon, which is equipped with three MGS Strykers. Recce troops would have the flexibility to attach one MGS Stryker per recce platoon or keep it as a pure element, depending on the type of operation. The ability to devastate the enemy with overwhelming violent fires has always been, and should remain, the core of armor. I will close with the recommendation to gain critically needed combat power organic to recce troops. SBCT infantry battalions are currently being fielded with new MGS platforms; many of these infantry battalions owned ATGMs prior. Each recce troop could be assigned a platoon of three ATGMs, which still provides the ability to move into direct fire engagement areas and deploy the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile to knock out hardened positions. ATGM gunners are afforded the protection and time to locate enemy targets using the modified improved target acquisition system (MITAS). Incorporating either the MGS or ATGM variants would provide troop commanders with a fully integrated fire-control system that would be available immediately at any given time. The Bottom Line The notion that scouts have different roles in combat than those of their SBCT counterparts couldn’t be any farther from the truth. This specifically means that a scout should not be expected to operate with degraded Strykers based on the past pretense that we only reconnoiter objectives using the LRAS3 outside the objective — we now operate inside the objective. Scouts require the same assets as infantrymen do to accomplish their mission. Our current RV platforms are maneuvering in the tight confines downtown under extreme conditions. We need the capacity to support ourselves as we execute clearing operations, cordon and searches, convoy security, and targeted raids. During combat operations, the enemy equally engages scouts and infantry — he uses the same tactics and techniques without regard to branch. Not only must our mounted element decisively control the engagement before we drop 9 to 20 dismounts from the ramp, but we must possess the capability to move in and effectively support those dismounts. By enhancing the recce troop’s lethality, we will effectively dominate the fight by significantly reducing exposure and improving target acquisition and precision.

SCOUTS OUT!

Sergeant First Class James L. Gentile is a senior observer controller trainer, 2d Battalion, 358th Armor, 191st Infantry Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. His military education includes Joint Firepower Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Primary Leadership Development Course, and Battle Staff Course. He has served in various positions, to include platoon sergeant and senior scout, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry, Fort Lewis, WA; and team leader and gunner, 1-14 Cavalry, Fort Lewis. “An active enemy sniper cripples a gunner’s ability to effectively observe his sector. Other common primitive modifications include sandbagging around hatches and securing HMMWV glass to cupolas, often referred as “pope glass.” Our recce gunners are making primitive modifications to increase their odds of survival during enemy direct-fire contact.” — 13