The Anatomy of an Ambush: Small Kill Teams in the Contemporary Operating Environment

Army commanders and frontline leaders have used skirmishers and snipers since the development of firearms. The armies of Napoleon used Voltiguers (skirmishers) forward of their infantry lines to target enemy personnel, harass opposing formations, and spread general panic among troops long before the French Emperor unleashed his attacking columns to sweep the opponent from the field.1 Conversely, the British army’s green jacketed rifleman, armed with the Baker rifle, performed a similar role on the Iberian Peninsula. Their use of the rifled musket allowed them to kill French artillerymen, skirmishers, and officers without putting themselves in range of French smooth-bore muskets.2 In the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, small kill teams (SKT) are routinely used to destroy improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement teams, conduct counter-mortar and counter-rocket missions, and establish observation posts (OPs). While the pool of snipers in the conventional army is rather small and limited to infantry formations, the U. S. Army has recognized the need for trained marksmen above the normal basic rifle marksmanship and close quarters marksmanship requirements. With designated marksmen and long-range training, many scout and infantry platoons have the ability to employ lethal teams in concealed positions “By eliminating enemy leaders and harassing troops, sniping softens enemy resistance and weakens morale.” — U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 21-75 Scouting, Patrolling, and Sniping, 6 February 1944 on the battlefield. This article highlights the benefits, restrictions, and unavoidable risks when employing small teams to disrupt and destroy the enemy. The Small Kill Team and Doctrinal Parallels SKTs can be employed by a platoon, similar to ambushes, and tasked with gathering intelligence, harassing the enemy, and destroying enemy personnel and equipment. The SKT typically conducts an attack by fire, with the element that closes with and destroys the enemy coming from another patrol. However, there are some important differences. The SKT contains both the assault and security elements contained locally to maximize firepower and use the element of surprise. Because of its small size, the SKT’s deliberate ambushes are usually conducted to maximize standoff from the enemy.3 The SKT has some marked differences from traditional sniper teams:  Snipers are usually employed in two-man teams; the SKT employs a team of soldiers, or larger, providing the team the ability to self-sustain and survive when compromised.  Snipers use more covert techniques when moving to avoid detection; SKTs move more overtly in certain situations.  The SKT carries more firepower than a sniper team, allowing it to ambush vehicles and more enemy personnel.  The SKT’s integrated medics have the ability to perform level-one care; snipers perform buddy aid and combat lifesaving (CLS) until other forces can extract the team.4 Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Lincoln In November 2006, the cavalrymen of B Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry (B/1-7 Cavalry) arrived at Taji, Iraq, and conducted the relief in place of B Troop, 7th Squadron, 10th U. S. Cavalry. B/1-7 Cavalry’s area of responsibility (AO), Saba al Bor, a city of approximately 60,000 Iraqis, was already torn apart by sectarian strife. The troop’s AO included numerous Sunni villages along ASR Lincoln, which ran east-west from Highway 1 into Al Anbar Province and paralleled the Grand Canal, which deposits water from Lake Tharthar into the Tigris River. ASR Lincoln was the only high-speed avenue of approach into the troop’s AO, making it an attractive target for insurgents using IEDs to disrupt coalition operations. The situation was made more difficult by the previous U. S. unit, which emplaced barriers along the southern approaches to Lincoln, preventing civilian vehicle traffic from moving onto the ASR. However, it also prevented U. S. patrols from pursuing insurgents south into the small villages and farmland. Insurgents conducted complex attacks or smallarms ambushes, achieved their effects, and retrograded south without reaction from Blackhawk’s patrols. Pursuit of the enemy was conducted only on foot. Soldiers from the 9th Iraqi Army Division conducted traffic control point (TCP) operations along Lincoln to discourage IED emplacement, but their lack of night-vision devices prevented them from patrolling at night, thus allowing the enemy to emplace mines and other IEDs during hours of limited visibility. Keeping this route free of IEDs was crucial to influencing the population in Saba al Bor. If our forces were unable to get into our AO, the two sides would continue to tear the city apart. After numerous IED incidents — both found and detonated — disrupted coalition and Iraqi patrols and destroyed vehicles, our platoon received the task to destroy IED emplacers and mortar teams along the route to allow the troop freedom of maneuver into Saba al Bor. Attacking the Problem The platoon immediately formed a SKT, made up of six scouts, who would conduct operations along the ASR. Led by a section sergeant, the team was chosen based on dismounted skills and shooting ability. The team included one 19D staff sergeant, four 19D specialists (one of which was a designated marksman), and one medic. During operations, the team was armed with an M14 rifle, an M107 Barrett.50-caliber sniper rifle, and an M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW). Each time the team was inserted, the SKT moved with multiple communications systems, such as the multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR) and a PRC-119 manpack radio system for longer range communications (See Figure 1). From a planning standpoint, the SKT team leader planned his hide sites, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and general scheme of maneuver. As the platoon leader, I helped refine his plan and developed the extraction and quick reaction force (QRF) plan to match his dismounted scheme of maneuver. The QRF remained in sector throughout the operation, either at a fixed site or conducting patrols. The SKT had a standard 2-hour check-in time with the platoon leader — with such a small team, any deviation from this timeline resulted in immediate extraction. The team received priority intelligence requirements (PIR) from the troop commander — IED emplacement teams were top priority, but the SKT could pass on attempts to ambush mortar or rocket teams, which were killing Iraqis in the city. “The troop’s AO included numerous Sunni villages along ASR Lincoln, which ran east-west from Highway 1 into Al Anbar Province and paralleled the Grand Canal, which deposits water from Lake Tharthar into the Tigris River. ASR Lincoln was the only high-speed avenue of approach into the Troop’s AO, making it an attractive target for insurgents using IEDs to disrupt coalition operations.” 6 —

In early December, we began the SKT operations in earnest, but quickly ran into difficulties. Initial coordination with the Iraqi army (IA) company patrolling Lincoln during the day was poor, which resulted from a lack of trust between the two units — B Troop was new to the AO and we were unsure how the predominantly Sunni IA tank company would respond to our troop targeting Sunni insurgents. We used the IA tank company’s static checkpoints along ASR Lincoln as a shaping operation for the SKT. The SKT team leader and I both believed that the insurgents would not emplace IEDs close to the IA checkpoints, which allowed us to overlay their positions with historical IED data to determine where to develop our engagement areas. However, during one operation, one of the IA BMPs fired in the direction of the team’s hide site. We immediately changed our tactics to have the SKT observe the engagement area during night hours or use structures and berms south of ASR Lincoln to prevent detection by friendly forces. Over the next several weeks, we continued to conduct SKT operations oriented on ASR Lincoln, but achieved few results. However, the SKT did use hours of limited visibility to move undetected among houses and villages south of the route, giving them an opportunity to make friends with some of the villagers. For example, our team spent the night with a family we had befriended from the village. With limited language skills, the man of the house provided information on which days the IED team came into the area, its composition, its weapons systems, and how it conducted attacks. The informant described these insurgent attacks as complex ambushes similar to conventional U. S. Army ambushes — the cell established security teams to protect the triggerman and IED emplacers. After IED detonation, these security teams would also provide direct fire. The emplacer would drop the IED along the route and the trigger man initiated the ambush. Following the engagement, the cell would exfiltrate to the south in civilian vehicles. The informant’s information corresponded with our own experiences along the route. Our team even received assurance from a few citizens that they would contact us via cell phone on days they saw insurgents operating near their homes. A Successful SKT Ambush Over the next few days, we decreased SKT operations to judge the reliability of the intelligence we received and give the team refit time. Our informant called us on two occasions reporting anti-Iraqi force (AIF) activity in the area; on both occasions, either a U. S. or Iraqi patrol found the IED. Through pattern analysis and human intelligence (HUMINT), we determined the emplacement cycle was twice a week, on the same days each week. We determined the intelligence was actionable and we inserted the team the night before the next day’s attack was expected. Using our informant’s house, the SKT team leader oriented his “The platoon immediately formed a SKT, made up of six scouts, who would conduct operations along the ASR. Led by a section sergeant, the team was chosen based on dismounted skills and shooting ability. The team included one 19D staff sergeant, four 19D specialists (one of which was a designated marksman), and one medic.” — 7 Example SKT Team DM

M4 or M14

TM Member

TM Medic team on the roof, facing east in the general direction of where our informant said the insurgents parked their car. At 0600 hours the following morning, the insurgent team arrived on time and parked their car approximately 300 meters from the SKT. As the insurgents left their car and began to move toward Lincoln, the SKT initiated fires with the M14 and SAW, killing one insurgent and scattering the rest. The M107 was used in an attempt to disable the car, but from the rooftop’s vantage point, another building to the east prevented the designated marksman from disabling the car. As the team leader initiated fires, a patrol from our sister platoon moved from the west to the location of the SKT. My platoon, refitting on Camp Taji, quickly left the forward operating base (FOB) and maneuvered down ASR Lincoln from the east. Dismounts from both patrols linked up with the SKT and began to clear the engagement area from west to east. As we moved along an overgrown canal, our scouts found one of the wounded insurgents. Instead of surrendering, the insurgent pulled the grenade pin, attempting to either throw it at the patrol or kill himself. He was engaged with small arms fire and killed, his grenade slightly wounding one of my soldiers. Later that day, a taxi driver turned over the body of one of the other insurgents who had expired in the back of his taxi as he attempted to flee the area following the ambush. Three of the five insurgents in the team were killed. The ambush achieved its effect. While attacks along ASR Lincoln continued, no IEDs or small-arms fire attacks occurred on the route for the next 11 days. When the AIF did return, their attacks were less frequent and disjointed. The Benefits of a Small Kill Team The SKT had a number of unique characteristics that gave it a distinct advantage in low-intensity conflict. The low silhouette and firepower of the SKT gave us an advantage in the rural areas and urban terrain of our AO. The SKT allowed us to observe and engage the enemy in areas where the enemy did not expect an attack and was ill prepared to maneuver against our team. The low profile of the SKT made night and urban infiltrations possible without much noise or disturbance. The SKT also assisted the commander in bridging the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gap between ground and sensor surveillance. Operating from the FOB or combat outpost, a scout troop is usually limited by either fuel or class I during its screen line or counter-IED operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and air weapons teams (AWT) coverage is usually rare and oriented on battalion named areas of interests (NAI), which limits its effectiveness at the troop level. The SKT conducted surveillance for the troop commander, orienting on NAIs of his choosing and performed continuous reconnaissance for days at a time. An enemy who knows that U. S. forces are employing SKTs to destroy his mortar teams or IED emplacers will exercise caution to protect his assets. He will increase the size of his teams to combat the SKT threat, which makes the enemy’s activities easier to detect by other ISR assets. The insurgent is forced to change his tactics or move his operations altogether to prevent the loss of his teams. Finally, SKTs gathered intelligence and gained support among the local population. In our area, as with many areas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the populace tends to avoid engaging U. S. forces in conversation or passing on information for fear of reprisal from members of the insurgency. The SKT, during hours of limited visibility, conducted HUMINT gathering without detection and the small number of soldiers made informants more comfortable during meetings. For a scout platoon or troop, establishing OPs and gathering intelligence is already an important skill set for the cavalry scout. Employing the Small Kill Team Following the success of the SKT in late December, the platoon continued to use its team tactics to effect counterinsurgency operations, such as destroying Sunni and Shi’a teams inside the city limits, and countering enemy attacks such as mortar and rocket teams shelling Saba al Bor. The success was minimal. One problem was that the center of gravity for Saba al Bor was the people — killing one or two insurgents in the city had little or no effect on the flow of refugees out of the area or the violence that was occurring inside the city limits. Also, information gathered on mortar and rocket teams was so sparse that we had to devote countless manhours, which could have been used to patrol the city and engage the population, to observing NAIs. Removing five to six soldiers from a 30-man scout platoon to perform an SKT mission left the platoon without enough dismounts in the vehicles to conduct urban mounted and dismounted patrols. During continuous operations, the entire troop was almost solely devoted to providing QRF for the SKT and fixed-site security, which meant fewer mounted patrols and little time and manpower for key leader engagements. We learned that at the team level, site selection is critical to mitigate risk; we never deployed back to a location we had used during previous operations. After a number of SKT operations in our AO, we received reliable reports from locals of abandoned houses being rigged with explosives by AIF in the villages around the city to prevent future SKTs in the area. Any location where a team is compromised should never be used again. “…SKTs gathered intelligence and gained support among the local population. In our area, as with many areas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the populace tends to avoid engaging U. S. forces in conversation or passing on information for fear of reprisal from members of the insurgency.” 8 —

It is important to understand from a tactical standpoint that the use of SKTs is a shaping operation, not a decisive operation. By nature, IED emplacers, mortar teams, and enemy patrols constitute the lowest-ranking members of an insurgent cell. While the SKT may prevent IEDs or indirect fire attacks for a limited time, an enemy entrenched in the population can always recruit new emplacers or mortar teams for a small price. In a counterinsurgency environment, tactical success achieves little — high-ranking insurgents are rarely killed and insurgents, in general, are rarely alienated from the population. A commander, at any level, who chooses to employ SKTs to target low-level insurgents, must understand that this tactic cannot become the decisive operation for the company or battalion. While scouts are trained to conduct dismounted infiltration and exfiltration, establish observation posts, and report enemy activity, training SKTs at home station is not available. Pre-deployment training of long-range marksmanship and sniper emplacement courses have assisted units without trained snipers to develop these teams. Forward thinking in infantry and reconnaissance organizations should focus training time at the platoon level to develop these teams. The more time these teams spend together working on the fundamentals before they reach theater, the better they will be prepared. Our SKT stayed mainly in rural areas during the early portion of the deployment; they had to first gain experience as a working team to prepare for operations in the city. The SKT required tactical knowledge of its battlefield before it was employed in the city of Saba al Bor. Also, very few reconnaissance formations have trained snipers who can train marksmen and develop skills needed to survive and achieve results. The SKT is an excellent choice for commanders to shape their AOs. SKTs can gather and exploit critical intelligence, which can lead to the capture of key leaders and the destruction of the enemy’s ability to mount a successful insurgency. Conditions in the AO must be set prior to the execution of the SKT, an enemy pattern of life must be firmly established, and care must be taken to prevent SKTs from becoming the decisive operation. With proper planning and a well-trained team, the SKT can achieve results and affect the battlefield in ways most mounted and dismounted formations cannot. The commander must ensure his SKT is well trained and adaptive enough to fight and win against an adaptive enemy in difficult terrain. Notes 1Gunther E Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1980, p. 116. 2Ibid, pp. 66-67. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 28 March 2007, pp. 7-27 to 7-29. 4Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 23-10, Sniper Training, GPO, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994, pp. 1-1 to 1-3. Captain William C. Baker is currently assigned to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; XO, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Hood; and scout platoon leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry. “With proper planning and a well-trained team, the SKT can achieve results and affect the battlefield in ways most mounted and dismounted formations cannot. The commander must ensure his SKT is well trained and adaptive enough to fight and win against an adaptive enemy in difficult terrain.” — 9