The Future of Battalion Mortars in an Urban Counterinsurgency Fight

The current war in Iraq has forced a high-intensity conflict-focused Army to completely transform the roles and uses of arguably every military occupational skill (MOS) in its inventory. Armor and cavalry soldiers are patrolling the streets of Baghdad in up-armored HMMWVs, rather than M1A1 tanks, and artillery soldiers are not calling for fire, but are instead busy organizing nonlethal projects to clean streets and revitalize businesses while coaching Iraqi governments on how to effectively govern and provide for their people. As a platoon leader for the battalion mortar platoon, this dilemma has been no less challenging. Soldiers trained to place fast, accurate, and lethal indirect fire on the enemy find themselves in an urban environment where indirect fire is not only infeasible, but specifically denied by senior Army leaders due to the significant potential for collateral damage. A combined arms battalion has several available options when using a mortar platoon in the urban counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Specifically, two op tions exist for using the battalion mortar platoon when operating in an environment where indirect fire is not a feasible option. The first option is to attach the mortar platoon to one of the line companies; the second option is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized high-value target (HVT) strike team and a full-time quick reaction force (QRF). Attaching the battalion mortar platoon to one of the maneuver companies can be highly beneficial. Every operational environment (OE) is inevitably going to have one or two key areas that are more tactically vital to the success of the battalion. It is within these areas that the battalion commander often commits the most combat power, as success or failure at this decisive point often influences the entire OE. By attaching the mortar platoon to the company that controls the key terrain within the battalion OE, the company commander gains a much greater capability to influence events within that terrain. In the current operating environment, where company-level coalition outposts (COP) are becoming more and more common, and in most cases, directed by higher headquarters, having the extra platoon can alleviate the force protection strain that can be very taxing on a tank company or a task organized infantry company. Over the course of a 12- to 15-month deployment, every unit must conduct frequent maintenance on vehicles, equipment, and soldiers. For example, a traditionally organized company, with three platoons, would have days when one platoon conducts force protection at their COP, a second platoon conducts maintenance/recovery operations in between patrols, leaving only one platoon for full-time combat operations. Adding a mortar platoon provides the company with the ability to maintain a significant forward presence while conducting all necessary maintenance and force-protection operations. The success of this option was shown during Operation Iraq Freedom V, in the Karada Peninsula of central Baghdad, when our battalion attached a battalion scout platoon to increase the capabilities of the tank company. During this time, the tank company, consisting of two tank platoons and one cross-attached infantry platoon, was attempting to establish anew COP, while simultaneously conducting combat operations in the middle of one of the most densely populated areas of Iraq. The high — 45 number of personnel required to secure the new COP severely disrupted the battle rhythm of the company. This strain was most evident when 16-man tank platoons were forced to draw personnel from the company headquarters section to effectively man force protection positions. Adding the 27-man scout platoon increased the available manpower in the company by a full 30 percent, allowing the company commander to have two to three platoons at a time conducting combat operations, rather than just the one to two platoons that would have otherwise been available. The extra combat power allowed the company commander to maintain a constant focus on the security line of operation, while still having elements available to have a tremendous impact on governance and the other lines of operation. This scenario clearly presents a very significant benefit in attaching a fourth maneuver platoon to aline company. In this situation, the battalion chose to use the scouts in this role, but the battalion mortars could have been used to achieve the same result. The major roadblock to this organization is that attaching the mortars to aline company significantly degrades the battalion’s flexibility in other areas. The mortar platoon is one of only two specialty platoons directly employed by the battalion commander; by attaching the platoon to aline company, he forfeits direct control of this asset. Once they are worked into the company battle rhythm, it is much more difficult to maintain the level of flexibility that having the platoon remain under direct battalion control provides. Tasks that can be accomplished without disrupting a company battle rhythm must instead be tasked to the company to be completed. Rather than this option of attaching the mortar platoon to aline company, there is the option of retaining the mortar platoon under direct battalion control. The COIN environment has driven the military into a much more defensive/reactive tactical posture in Iraq. The insurgency relies almost exclusively on hit-and-run engagements. The primary initiation technique we faced in eastern Baghdad in 2007 to 2008 was explosively formed penetrators (EFP) or improvised explosive devices (IED) frequently followed by small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire. These engagements rarely last more than a few minutes with the insurgents either eliminated or faded back into the dense urban terrain. This choice of tactics by the insurgency makes tactical maneuvers, such as deliberate attacks, less common and the more reactive approach of movement to contact becomes the standard. Success in this type of fight largely depends on a unit’s capability to maintain flexibility. Once contact is initiated, there is frequently a need to push additional combat power to the location of the contact whether it is to help in the fight, exploit the IED/EFP strike, or recover potentially damaged vehicles. By retaining the mortar platoon at the battalion level, the battalion has ensured a consistent asset that can accomplish any of the above tasks without other missions being affected. The second option for the employment of the battalion mortar platoon is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized time-sensitive target (TST) and sensitive-site exploitation (SSE) platoon with a secondary tasking as a full-time battalion QRF; in effect, a battalion reserve. In an ever-changing combat environment, last-second missions frequently arise, elements receive unexpected contact, and “The current war in Iraq has forced a high-intensity conflict-focused Army to completely transform the roles and uses of arguably every military occupational skill (MOS) in its inventory. Armor and cavalry soldiers are patrolling the streets of Baghdad in M1151 up-armored HMMWVs, rather than M1A1 tanks, and artillery soldiers are not calling for fire, but are instead busy organizing nonlethal projects to clean streets and revitalize businesses while coaching Iraqi governments on how to effectively govern and provide for their people.” 46 — there are a variety of other instances where having an uncommitted platoon available can ensure the success of a mission. In the Karada peninsula in central Baghdad, we achieved a level of security that allowed a large portion of our missions to be directed at nonlethal effects. By retaining the mortar platoon at the battalion level, it will relieve requirements on companies for missions such as securing barrier emplacement, escorting staff to governance meetings, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) escort, and other late-notice missions. Using the mortar platoon in this manner allows line companies to maintain their established battle rhythm while still accomplishing peripheral missions. As mentioned previously, major threats to coalition forces in the current operating environment are IEDs and EFPs. These attacks on combat patrols require the battalion to maintain at least one platoon as a QRF at all times. This is a tasking for which the mortar platoon, as the battalion reserve, can bear the majority of the burden, allowing companies to focus on operations within their respective OE. If the mortars were attached to aline company, they would likely have plenty of other taskings and would not be available as “Specifically, two options exist for using the battalion mortar platoon when operating in an environment where indirect fire is not a feasible option. The first option is to attach the mortar platoon to one of the line companies; the second option is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized high-value target (HVT) strike team and a full-time quick reaction force (QRF).” frequently to serve as the battalion QRF, and a greater burden would be placed on the line companies and would overall degrade the battalion’s flexibility. The greatest benefit of maintaining the mortar platoon under battalion control is its employment as a specialized HVT/ SSE platoon. In the COIN environment, as it has developed in Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, primary offensive operations conducted by coalition forces have become point raids driven by a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT). There are numerous benefits to having a single platoon specialize in these operations and two main reasons that the battalion mortar platoon is the most logical choice to serve in this capacity. The first, and most important, reason is that with the technological advances in gathering SIGINT, the approach to point raids has changed. The level of classification of SIGINT assets demands a specialized training that must be completed by any platoon that will use these assets. By maintaining one platoon as the HVT/ SSE platoon, the battalion can focus necessary specialized training on one group, rather than spreading out across the battalion. The ability to understand the capabilities and limitations of this equipment can and will determine the level of success achieved during operations. Repeatedly conducting operations allows the mortar platoon to sharpen their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and can lead to a higher success rate when targeting elusive HVTs. If the operations were instead spread throughout line companies, it would be much more difficult to implement lessons learned and improve mission success rates. All points detailed above were evident during our combat operations throughout central and eastern Baghdad during 2007 and 2008. Upon our arrival in theatre, none of our companies or platoons had any experience working with SIGINT assets. After speaking with other battalions within the division, our battalion commander opted to have the mortar platoon serve as a dedicated HVT/SSE platoon and operate throughout the OE. In preparation for this tasking, we conducted 3 consecutive days of training on how to effectively use SIGINT assets. This training provided the platoon with a basic understanding of the capabilities of SIGINT assets, but it was not until the fourth or fifth operation that we became comfort- — 47 able with the capabilities and limitations of these assets. Understanding these assets set off a 3-month period during the summer of 2007 when our battalion captured seven of our top-ten HVTs, to include four members of the brigade’stop-ten target list. The key to our success in the capture of these HVTs was the relationship we developed with the SIGINT asset operators. By continually working with the same platoon, the operators were able to understand how we approached the TST operations and the SSE that followed, which enabled them to better communicate vital information to us during the missions. The benefits of this partnership became readily apparent in the fall of 2007 when the SIGINT teams rotated and the number of HVTs detained dropped sharply until new working relationships were formed. The development of these partnerships is not possible if there is a different platoon executing each TST mission, as the TTP and leadership personalities are constantly changing for each mission. The second significant reason to maintain mortar platoons as HVT/SSE teams is that HVTs do not drive their movement patterns based on our internal company boundaries. In our OE, targets often moved between Zone 23 and Zone 14W, which were controlled by two different companies, but several of our targets moved freely between the two zones. This movement pattern meant that when we planned operations targeting these HVTs, we had to prepare for the target to potentially be located in either company OE. By maintaining the mortar platoon as the unit conducting the operation, we did not have to worry about which company zone the HVT appeared in. With the mortars maintaining the tasking as the search element, the company was only tasked with providing an outer cordon for clearance. The last-minute notification about which OE the HVT was located in did not disrupt the operation because it was easier for the company to react and provide an outer cordon element, a task that does not require any specialized preparation, than it was to react and conduct the point raid. Overall, the key to success in the COIN environment in Iraq is flexibility. By maintaining the battalion mortars as a specialized HVT strike team and full-time QRF, the battalion maintains a high level of flexibility, while allowing line companies to establish and maintain a relatively steady battle rhythm. Identifying the mortar platoon’s role while still at home station better allows leaders within the mortar platoon to begin training on successful TTP well before their arrival in theater. Simply understanding the capabilities and limitations of SIGINT assets greatly increases the early success rate of TST operations during the first months in theater. Building necessary partnerships with SIGINT operators will progress at a much faster rate if the technical specifics are already understood. Captain Daniel Redman is currently serving as the S3 plans officer, 2d Battalion, 69th (2-69) Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and the Infantry Mortar Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include battalion mortar platoon leader, 2-69 Armor, Fort Benning; and tank platoon leader, C Company, 2-69 Armor, Fort Benning. “…choice of tactics by the insurgency makes tactical maneuvers, such as deliberate attacks, less common and the more reactive approach of movement to contact becomes the standard. Success in this type of fight largely depends on a unit’s capability to maintain flexibility.”