Iraq and the Young Maneuver Leader

A commonly accepted aphorism heard throughout chow halls and barracks lines in Iraq is “in this theater everybody is an infantryman.” A dismounted tanker will swear he does the same job as his infantry counterpart, which is a true statement, but horribly misunderstood. Throughout Iraq, especially in Baghdad, soldiers from many different military occupational specialties generally do perform the same tasks; however, these are not branch-specific missions. Few of these roles are specific to any single specialty and many, until this war, did not fall within the confines of a combat arms branch. A maneuver leader in Iraq must be a flexible leader, able to fill a multitude of roles, sometimes all within the same patrol or operation. The U. S. Army faces a multitude of training challenges; in particular is the fluidity of the operating environment in Iraq — the type of fight in a single area of operation (AO) can vary from neighborhood to neighborhood and from day to day. Therefore, it is impossible for a basic course or National Training Center rotation to prepare leaders for every challenge they might encounter. It is, however, necessary for Army officers and soldiers to quickly learn and understand their specific fight. If a tank platoon leader cannot understand why mounted tactics do not work well inside the muhallahs of eastern Baghdad, he inevitably will not see progress, or even worse, he will reverse progress in his AO. Leaders must adapt and conduct operations appropriate for the fight at hand, not the fight they want. Young maneuver leaders must possess several skills and work to hone those skills before and during deployments. Realities on the ground might mean that a platoon will conduct dismounted operations, closely coordinating with human intelligence collection teams (HCT) to develop local sources. Other situations might dictate that a platoon leader and his soldiers act as mediators between two feuding neighbors. Another scenario might place the platoon leader and his noncommissioned officers in roles as Iraqi Security Force mentors and trainers. At other times, the same platoon leader might be required to understand problems with local electric services or the economy and make recommendations on ways to fix it. It is quite likely that new platoon leaders will not have experience or training in these types of situations; therefore, it is important that:  Leaders possess a thorough understanding of Iraqi culture and customs, and at least a basic knowledge of the Arabic language. Also, once on the ground, leaders must quickly develop an understanding of the culture and its influences in their specific areas of operation.  Leaders have the knowledge and ability to understand local civil-service related problems and help local governments develop solutions to these problems.  Leaders transition from security operations to civil military operations and Iraqi Security Force training operations. — 39

 Leaders must posses the ability to think critically about what challenges their specific AO is facing and develop tactics that address those specific issues. A leader must also develop metrics to determine if those tactics are in fact ameliorating that problem. Operations and Challenges Like many second lieutenants, my tour in Iraq started on a battalion staff; unlike many armor second lieutenants, I was assigned as an assistant effects coordinator. I focused on nonlethal effects; worked daily as a liaison between our battalion, Iraqi Security Forces, and local Iraqi politicians; and worked with local district and neighborhood council members to facilitate contracting, guide them in developing solutions to district governance problems, and aid them in improving the way that they served their constituents. My formal military training did not provide me with a solid foundation to conduct these operations. During 8 months on staff, I was involved in many combat patrols and operations to assess local infrastructure, visit local dignitaries, and survey damaged areas to assess what was required for rebuilding. At times, I interacted with senior Iraqi military and political leaders. In some instances, this required an inordinate amount of patience and a good understanding of how to interpret the actions and words of our Iraqi partners. It also required a clear understanding of the conditions in the area concerning governance, security, and civil service issues. Again, I had no formal military training on the skills and knowledge necessary to deal with these situations. I quickly realized my responsibility to improve my cultural skills and AO-specific knowledge. I spent a great deal of time researching our AO, building relationships with the local people in our AO, and ultimately conducting duties as a civil-affairs soldier rather than an effects coordinator. After completing my time on staff, I became the battalion scout platoon leader. My scout platoon moved out of the forward operating base and into a coalition outpost located in the middle of one of eastern Baghdad’s densely populated Shiite neighborhoods. Our platoon was part of a combined-arms team, Team Dealer, which included two tank platoons, a mech anized infantry platoon, and my scout platoon. When I arrived, the team’s focus was still on lethal targeting; several nights a week, we conducted raids to capture high-value targets in the AO. At the same time, we used HCTs to develop human intelligence (HUMINT) sources to facilitate future targeting in the area. Our AO was Baghdad Al Jadida, a neighborhood heavily dominated by Shiite Islamic religion, politics, and militias, and was made up of 12 smaller neighborhoods, called “muhallahs.” When our company took over the AO, all the Sunni Muslims had been forced out by Shiite militias and replaced by new Shiite families. Shiite militias heavily influenced the people and the local government against cooperating with us or our predecessors. Security was chaotic; murders and kid-nappings were a daily occurrence. The economy was extreme ly weak because consumers avoided going to markets or stores unless absolutely necessary. A large percentage of the population was unemployed and could only afford the bare necessities for survival. Civil services were also poor because the local public works department was intimidated and directed by narrow militia interests. At first, Team Dealer focused on lethal targeting to reestablish security and break the militia hold on the area. This process was already well underway by the time I arrived. Within a matter of weeks after I arrived, the team had completed disrupting, and then defeating, the extremist cells in the muhallahs. This effort was a culmination of several months of aggressive targeting and I was fortunate enough to arrive for a portion of it. The next 3 months, we worked hard to capitalize on the increased security in the muhallahs. Once again, we were conducting operations on which we had no formal training and we had to quickly gain a working knowledge of civil infrastructure, local economics, and local politics. Scouts, tankers, and infantrymen were all walking the streets, developing friendly and symbiotic relationships with the locals. “Leaders must adapt and conduct operations appropriate for the fight at hand, not the fight they want. Young maneuver leaders must possess several skills and work to hone those skills before and during deployments. Realities on the ground might mean that a platoon will conduct dismounted operations, closely coordinating with human intelligence collection teams (HCT) to develop local sources. Other situations might dictate that a platoon leader and his soldiers act as mediators between two feuding neighbors.” 40 —

The enemy was no longer our main focus; it became setting the conditions inside the AO that would prohibit the enemy from reconstituting and conducting future operations. Setting these conditions meant a tactical shift that emphasized building trust and cooperation between local nationals, Iraqi Security Forces, and Team Dealer. It was not unusual for us to sip chai (Iraqi tea) with an Iraqi army major and several local nationals in a courtyard or living room while a combined section of Iraqi army soldiers and our scouts cleared the local national’s home. On some occasions, we discussed ways to improve profits with local businessmen in the market; and at other times, we conducted impromptu surveys of local civil services so that we could take raw data and recommendations to the local government. By the time we left Baghdad Al Jadida, the economy was steadily improving, jobs had been added to the area, local national perceptions of security were high, and Sunnis were returning to the area. Lessons Learned Our platoon was required to fill many unusual roles and was ill-prepared to handle city planning, economic stimulus, and civil security operations, and we had no in-depth formal training in Arabic culture and language. Although military basics, such as the fundamentals of patrolling and reconnaissance, were always relevant, they were insufficient to accomplish the mission. All of Team Dealer’s platoon leaders spent the bulk of their time learning and understanding the local culture and conditions that shaped our AO. Many of our soldiers learned Arabic and local customs so they could interact with the local nationals they lived and worked around, which enabled us to develop useful relationships that benefited both parties. We also learned that our tasks to destroy or defeat the enemy reduced once we got past the lethal-targeting portion of the deployment. Eventually, we moved from Baghdad Al Jadidad and assumed new missions. Even during those missions, which often included more combined arms team-specific tasks, such as disrupting improvised explosive device (IED) activity on major main supply routes, our team never stopped using the skills we learned in Baghdad Al Jadida. Those skills, which are not emphasized during military training, were just as important to route security and reconnaissance as they were to rebuilding a neighborhood. The most valuable lesson learned from my experiences, both as a staff officer and as a platoon leader in Iraq, is that a leader must always remain flexible and adaptable. Learning how to be an effect flexible and adaptable leader requires intense study, research, and a desire to learn about your surroundings. Our platoon focused on the skills discussed in this article and constantly sought to improve the conditions in our AO. Our patrols were never just presence patrols; there was always something to be learned about the people and places around us. We constantly debriefed each other, discussed the changes that we saw in our AO, and shared lessons learned. We never let the fact that we were not pulling triggers and destroying the enemy get in the way of accomplishing our mission. Our mindset was not to kill, it was to win. We constantly evaluated our situation and made certain we were fighting the war we had and not necessarily the one we wanted. First Lieutenant John P. Burns is currently a scout platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Basic Officer Leadership Course, and Maneuver Officer Basic Course. His assignments include, assistant effects coordinator, HHC, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning, and assistant S1, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning. “Our platoon was required to fill many unusual roles and was ill-prepared to handle city planning, economic stimulus, and civil security operations, and we had no in-depth formal training in Arabic culture and language. Although military basics, such as the fundamentals of patrolling and reconnaissance, were always relevant, they were insufficient to accomplish the mission.” — 41