Platoon Operations in Iraq: Setting Conditions for Success

The 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division developed a model for success in the city of Ramadi, defeating al Qaeda in Iraq on the field of battle and in the fight for the respect and cooperation of the local national population. At the platoon level, soldiers and leaders must be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. This article demonstrates how tactical-level leaders can implement these three characteristics into every aspect of daily operations to make lasting contributions to the security and stability of their area of operations. Leadership “Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”1 Subordinates will replicate and embody the attitude and demeanor of their leaders. Aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined leaders will develop highly skilled warriors capable of succeeding in the complex, and often undefined, realm of counterinsurgency operations. The counterinsurgency fight is difficult because it demands soldiers

— and leaders to be highly flexible and adaptable throughout full-spectrum operations. In 2005, the Secretary of the Army Transition Team (SATT) began to emphasize “pentathlete leaders.” In Colonel Robert Tipton’s Professional Military Education for the “Pentathlete” of the Future, the SATT defines leaders as “innovative and adaptive, culturally astute professionals that demonstrate character and integrity,” and expresses a desire for “a leader that is well versed in a range of areas and not just one discipline; leaders who have mastered their military or core career field tasks and have developed skills in the broader, more complex, politico-military arena.”2 Based on my experiences in Iraq, the priorities a leader displays will be followed by those they lead and establish the daily operational tempo for success. The daily life of a soldier must be tempered with maintaining good order and discipline based on his military training. Some examples of promoting good order and discipline include:  Daily sensitive-item checks to ensure accountability of all property and enable leaders to inspect the living quarters of soldiers and the condition of their equipment.  Unit leaders ensuring thorough pre-combat inspections are completed prior to each mission. Leaders are obligated to check each small detail of their soldiers and equipment to ensure mission success.  Every mission, no matter how small, receiving a thorough patrol brief from the unit commander. Every soldier must understand all aspects of the operation, contingency plans, and be familiar with adjacent units when applicable. A thorough back brief is a highly effective tool to ensure soldiers have a complete understanding of each mission. Vehicles in a combat zone regularly get abused by rugged terrain and long mission hours. Effective leaders plan maintenance into their patrol schedules in addition to pre- and post-operations preventive maintenance checks and services. Each unit must have a dedicated day for 20-level maintenance and vehicle services to be completed, including quality assurance and quality checks and vehicle dispatching. If this is neglected, leaders will fail their soldiers by not providing them with reliable transportation and may endanger their lives in the event of a vehicle breakdown in hostile locations. Combat requires leaders with great initiative, who work within the commander’s intent, and often with minimal guidance. Leaders must be highly motivated and possess the will to fight and win on the battlefield. It is a platoon leader’s job to create a disciplined environment where subordinate leaders can display these characteristics without destroying the team’s capacity to find, fix, and destroy the enemy, and while providing continual security and a nonthreatening front to the civilian population. The fundamentals of leadership, planning, fire, and maneuver provided by commission-source training and officer basic courses provide a firm platform from which to build a unit’s capacity to fight and win in combat; however, the platoon leader’s flexibility and adaptive nature will be the decisive element in the counterinsurgency environment. Training Soldiers to be Warriors Pre-deployment training is equivalent to the 400-meter dash track-and-field event. Units will cram a year’s worth of training, including small-arms, wheeled-vehicle, tank gunnery, and shoot-house training; battalion- and brigade-level field problems; and a rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) or Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), into a 6-month timeframe. During this 6-month timeframe, units were also required to complete dozens of other mandatory training classes, ranging from combat lifesaver (CLS) to Arabic language and cultural sensitivity training. The Army’s current 12- to 15-month deployments are marathon races, tests of mental and physical endurance, during which individual and collective skills sharpened during the 6-month crash-course training period will deteriorate, making remedial training essential in every warrior task and drill to ensure mission success. Physical training, marksmanship, and medical skills are three vital areas to continually focus training efforts while deployed. Physical training. Physical training is the cornerstone of training success. The modern warrior is required to execute a great variety of tasks such as mounted operations using M1A1 tanks and M1114 high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); dismounted patrols; observation post operations (OP); traffic control points (TCP); training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and many other missions. Each mission requires great strength and agility — carrying individual body armor (IBA), ammunition, water, and mission-specific equipment during all seasons, places excessive strain on the body. Missions are extremely long in duration and soldiers in good physical condition are more likely to stay alert and execute tasks when physically strained: “The benefits to be derived from a good “ ‘Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.’ Subordinates will replicate and embody the attitude and demeanor of their leaders. Aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined leaders will develop highly skilled warriors capable of succeeding in the complex, and often undefined, realm of counterinsurgency operations.”

physical fitness program are many. It can reduce the number of soldiers on profile and sick call, invigorate training, and enhance productivity and mental alertness. A good physical fitness program also promotes team cohesion and combat survivability.”3 Additionally, physical training is an excellent way for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to develop individual soldier and unit discipline, when standards are enforced. Marksmanship. Marksmanship is the heart and soul of a soldier — he must be lethal with all weapons systems and weapons platforms. But, as Robert Tomes states, “Mistakes made in the process of waging a counterinsurgency war often reinforce an insurgent’s propaganda.”4 Hitting a target is the easy part, hitting the right target is the difference between widespread insurgency support and killing the enemy. While deployed, units have access to plenty of ammunition; leaders should take advantage of unique training opportunities around them, sometimes requiring creativity and ingenuity, to finely hone warrior skills. For example, our platoon established a joint security station (JSS), approximately 40 kilometers east of Ramadi, with 65 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The JSS was a permanent checkpoint established on a main supply route that served as the primary east-west route between Baghdad, Syria, and Jordan. The checkpoint was established to prevent the shipment of illegal supplies and materials from Syria and Jordan into Baghdad and block vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and illegal materials from entering the city of Ramadi. Our area of operations provided the perfect setup — miles of unpopulated desert, a huge stockpile of ammunition, a supportive chain of command, and creative leaders — to build a smallarms and crew-served range. We built targets from excess HESCO barriers and other construction material, and developed a training plan to shoot small-arms and crew-served weapons weekly. For small arms, we confirmed zero, then executed various scenarios, shooting from the prone, kneeling, and standing positions. We executed reflexive fire drills and “stress tests.” The stress test was designed to provide realistic training by requiring soldiers to sprint, crawl, and buddy rush, or carry their buddy up to a given point and then fire from a pre-designated position (prone, kneel, or stand). This realistic training not only met the train-as-you-fight principle, but also gave great confidence to individual soldiers by building immense trust and unit cohesion. Once weekly, during another training day, we executed crew-served gunnery from both the M1114 and M1A1 platforms. This is a great way to zero the tank’s coaxial machine gun and maintain 19K skill sets, as well as build confidence in truck gunners. Concurrent training must include weekly classes on the rules of engagement (ROE) and escalation of force (EOF). Multinational Force -Iraq (MNFI) has disseminated training slides with specific ROE/EOF guidelines that soldiers should sear into their memory weekly so they will not hesitate to make a correct decision. It will likely come to the point where they can repeat slides verbatim without reading them, when this happens leaders must get creative in their training to continually instill these values. Just like the physical training plan, marksmanship training must be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. If executed properly, leaders will build strong warriors who will not hesitate to pull triggers, when necessary, and will do so with great accuracy and lethality. More importantly, warriors will be disciplined and intelligent enough to know when not to pull a trigger, which in the counterinsurgency fight, may be even more important to winning the trust and respect of the local national population. Medical skills. Medical skills are certainly very important to soldiers at all levels. The platoon-level medic will serve as the primary trainer for medical training, using the combat lifesaver (CLS) skill set as the basis for training. Every soldier must know how to properly apply the hemorrhage control compressing bandage, nasopharyngeal airway device, and tourniquet. After soldiers completely understand the basic procedures, the medic should demonstrate the proper use of the warrior aid and litter kit (WALK), which is in every vehicle, and each item in the medic’said bag in the event the medic is unavailable during an emergency situation. The Army currently requires an annual recertification of CLS training, which is insufficient during combat conditions. Monthly recertification at the platoon level, supervised by the medic, will provide soldiers adequate skill levels and confidence to treat wounds and save lives. Intelligent warriors, who are competent in CLS, are a major combat multiplier because they increase the unit’s capability to continue operations and accomplish the mission. With professional training, leaders ensure soldiers maintain their skills and level of focus through the long and strenuous combat deployment. Conducting physical training, marksmanship, and medical training with routine discipline and increased standards for success will produce aggressive and lethal soldiers, as well as aid them in preparing to be good will ambassadors to win the trust and respect of the local national population. An intelligent and disciplined warrior will respect the power he controls and will be judicious with the implementation of that power when properly trained and that training is regularly reiterated. This process enables the unit to deal with the dichotomy of counterinsurgency warfare, “to redress the basic social and political issues of a nation while being shot at.”5 “The Army’s current 12- to 15-month deployments are marathon races, tests of mental and physical endurance, during which individual and collective skills sharpened during the 6-month crash-course training period will deteriorate, making remedial training essential in every warrior task and drill to ensure mission success. Physical training, marksmanship, and medical skills are three vital areas to continually focus training efforts while deployed.” — 29

Patrolling Patrolling is the bread and butter of a combat platoon; it requires the warrior to be at his best. As a junior leader, it is the culmination of all the schoolhouse classes, training, and mission planning. Intelligent patrol leaders must understand the motives of their enemy, how they will fight, and the tools they will implement against you: “The insurgent may not seek to do or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a mujahid, earning God’s favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.”6 Another option is, “insurgents act as ‘strategic spoilers,’ seeking to discredit and undermine the government by targeting coalition forces.”7 Political power is the major point of contention during an insurgency. Highly skilled and organized men will try in every way possible to discredit U. S. and coalition forces. The high-level leaders of insurgent organizations will recruit the “mujahid,” who may not fully understand the political details being planned, but are willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause to “earn God’s favor.” Knowing al Qaeda in Iraq’s objectives helped shape U. S. operations to serve multiple purposes. Operations had to be lethal, but disciplined, to eliminate al Qaeda presence and simultaneously develop a positive rapport with the local populace. In a RAND Corporation essay titled, “Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts,” Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe describe counterinsurgency conflicts. Essentially the insurgent problem can be broken down into two forces: the rebels and the authority. Rebels always start with an information advantage over authority (because they almost always start small and on the fringe of society). Authority always starts with a force advantage over rebels. The counterinsurgency fight essentially is the capacity of the rebels to grow fast and thereby overcome its force disadvantage and authority’s capacity to overcome the information disadvantage and bring its force to bear on a comparatively weak insurgency (paraphrase).8 Leaders with high levels of situational awareness help U. S. and Iraqi governments, the authority, overcome the intelligence disadvantage by serving as sensory instruments during combat patrols and submitting patrol debriefs within 24 hours to be assessed by the battalion S2. Gathering timely and accurate intelligence is critical for U. S. and coalition forces to be successful during a counterinsurgency fight; however, protecting the local national population from terrorist violence is just as critical. In Ramadi, al Qaeda had informants in every neighborhood and any local citizen who aided U. S. forces would be captured, tortured, and/or executed. To combat this issue, our company executed large-scale intelligence gathering operations, during which our platoons, partnered with Iraqi army and Iraqi police, conducted soft raids under the cover of darkness. These operations proved to be highly effective: we entered, cleared, and secured homes, then conducted thorough searches for contraband or intelligence; we checked all persons against the high-value target (HVT) list and all vehicles against the be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) list; and finally, we spoke with the male elders of the household, gathering as much intelligence as possible, and then left. During each operation, the company visited 25 or more households and gathered a great amount of intelligence, which was untraceable, thereby protecting the citizens from al Qaeda harassment. We also used this opportunity to create and regularly update our database with pictures, names, ages, occupation, and other information on the occupants of each house. Since personal contact between U. S. forces and Iraqi nationals was minimal at this time, it was a golden opportunity to display our truest intentions to the locals — we were here for their assistance, “The modern warrior is required to execute a great variety of tasks such as mounted operations using M1A1 tanks and M1114 high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); dismounted patrols; observation post operations (OP); traffic control points (TCP); training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and many other missions. Each mission requires great strength and agility…” not to make their lives more miserable. We distributed sugar, stuffed animals to children, and other small goods, encouraging citizens to become active participants in the revival of their city. This combination of maneuver operations and information operations was a highly effective way to defeat insurgent tactics. Through disciplined and respectful treatment of the civilian population, we brought credit to U. S. and coalition forces and discredited al Qaeda, reducing their ability to recruit mujahid. Overall, these operations took away the information advantage shared by al Qaeda (rebels), transferred the initiative to coalition forces, and, in the process, built trust between coalition forces and the civilian population. Another highly effective, but significantly more dangerous, means of gathering intelligence is using a dismounted observation post (OP) or small killer team (SKT) normally consisting of sniper teams. The SKT provides information on traffic patterns (vehicular and pedestrian) and behavioral patterns of citizens; or it can be used as part of an ambush at frequently used mortar-launch sites or locations of multiple improvised explosive device (IED) sites. Incorporating SKT requires serious consideration, including a plan for the infiltration and exfiltration of these teams, and preparing a quick reaction force (QRF) to be ready in the event the team is compromised. Communications is a huge consideration due to the varied reception of urban terrain. SKT leaders must be aggressive and disciplined in scanning their sector for possible threats, and must be intelligent enough to know when they are compromised and must exfiltrate. Dismounted and Mounted Patrol Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures While conducting dismounted operations, the fundamental principles of patrolling, “planning, reconnaissance, security, control, and common sense,” cannot be overstressed.9 I recommend using the Ranger Handbook, even if you are not a Ranger, to assist with planning considerations of dismounted patrols.10 Whether clearing urban terrain in downtown Ramadi, mud hut villages and palm groves along the Euphrates River, or conducting traffic control point (TCP) operations, thorough planning and reconnaissance, followed by a solid operations order, is essential. Maintaining a constant 360-degree security and a forceful presence sends a strong message that your unit is comprised of disciplined warriors. Based on the prevalence of suicide bomber vests in the Ramadi area, we maintained a 50-meter standoff distance from all local nationals when patrolling congested areas. When stopping by market areas, we frequently searched the shop owner and his shop, prior to any discussions, to ensure security. After conducting several patrols in the same area, we became familiar with the people and their typical dress and behaviors, so we would forego searches, which helped build a greater trust and rapport with the citizens. In the United States, competent police departments describe this activity as “community policing.” Our form of community policing led to a greater exchange of information during conversations where Iraqi citizens would regularly voice their likes and dislikes with the current situation and make suggestions for future improvements. This is just one example of how culturally astute leaders, armed with situational awareness and the ability to make adjustments during a patrol, can simultaneously gather information and disperse positive information during a maneuver operation. It was a major turning point for the city of Ramadi when soldiers and citizens had built a rapport familiar enough to engage in verbal exchanges in free and open dialogue. Our actions proved to the citizens that we would listen to them and respect them, and even if they criticized our actions, they would not be punished for their self-expressions. In his article titled, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” David Kilcullen, states “at the operational level counterinsurgency remains a competition between several sides, each seeking to mobilize the population in its cause. The people remain the prize.”11 In short, it is not only what a soldier does, but what he fails to do that the local national population will observe. The daily actions of a patrol will either serve as abridge between the local populace and the desired endstate of a free and democratic Iraq, or will form a wedge further separating the two, making the desired endstate even more difficult to achieve. If a civilian knows a U. S. patrol will make contact with insurgents in their neighborhood, Kilcullen suggests, “far from finding the ‘presence patrol’ reassuring, the population finds them alienating and a source of danger.”12 Our mounted patrols varied greatly during our 15 months in Ramadi, from kinetic use of tanks to patrolling vast stretches of the main supply route in M1114s, but the principles of being aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined never changed. These training principles are critical for a gunner riding in a vehicle at 35 kph, who has only a few seconds to make a decision. Escalation of force must be implemented at all times, but is especially important during mounted operations. Gunners must have both day and night signals that alert drivers of a U. S. patrol to pull to the shoulder of the road. Pen flares are especially effective instruments for this purpose, both day and night; they provide both an auditory and visual signal to civilian traffic and are nonlethal. M1114s have been receiving new gunner protection kits (GPK) with electric turrets and rearview mirrors — there is no excuse for gunners to stand up unless they are engaging a target (audio, signal, or weapon). These kits greatly increase the survivability rate of the gunner in the event of an attack. All vehicles should also be equipped with an electronic countermeasure (ECM) device. The ECM should always be used, but especially in high-density locations. Leaders must ensure all vehicle occupants buckle up — even if it is uncomfortable over all their gear, it will save lives in the event of an IED or vehicle rollover. Mounted patrols should avoid driving against the flow of traffic, if at all possible. This has resulted in numerous vehicular accidents and may increase the need for EOF, and needlessly end in the use of lethal force. Tactical-level leaders in Ramadi demonstrated how to simultaneously gather intelligence while integrating maneuver and information operations into combat patrols. Soldiers in Ramadi proved to be highly flexible and adaptable through a variety of missions, mounted and dismounted. They maintained a balance of lethality and disciplined respect for the local national population, which shaped the battlefield and served to be a catalyst for peace, security, and rebuilding in the city of Ramadi. Integrating Iraqi Security Forces The training and integration of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is without a doubt the most important mission in Iraq. It is through proper training and equipping of the ISF that long-term peace and stability will be established, legitimate governments recognized by the people will take power, and the United States will be able to reduce its force levels in Iraq. If U. S. trainers can teach the aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined philosophy to the ISF, they will be set up for future success. — 31

After establishing JSS Arcala, our tank platoon of 20 soldiers assumed responsibility for Company 1, 2d Battalion Provincial Security Force (PSF 2). Of approximately 65 Iraqi soldiers, we received a mixed bag of young and old, with various previous work experiences from former military to farmers. In many cases, they were desperate men just trying to support their families and the PSF was one of the few good paying jobs. David Kilcullen suggests, “In modern counterinsurgency, victory may need to be redefined as the disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society.”13 Without a doubt, many of the new ISF once worked with al Qaeda for the same reason they joined our ranks — to have an income. Failure was not an option; these men had to succeed in bringing security to their area and set an example of cooperation for a peaceful future. There are a host of unique challenges, such as training, procurement, equipment, and forging an esprit de corps, when creating a military from scratch. Our first priority was to create a positive rapport with the PSF company commander and battalion commander. It was essential to build a trusting relationship and ensure them that all decisions would be firm and fair and they would have every available resource to help them build a ready and relevant security force. Over many cups of chi tea and cigarettes (smoking is an Iraqi custom that garners respect), we came to a mutual understanding of our joint mission. We established JSS Arcala in May 2007, just as “the surge” of five additional brigade combat teams were moving into Baghdad and while 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, was still in the process of “clear, hold, and build” operations in Ramadi. As part of the “holding,” new combat outposts were being built all over the brigade’s area of operations. As a result of both the “surge” and our own demands for increased combat outposts, construction supplies were in great demand and limited in availability. Due to limited engineer assets to construct facilities or housing structures, we lived in the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) DRASH tent for nearly 6 months. PSF 2 had four living containers, 20-foot U. S. MILVAN containers lined with plywood walls, lights, and a heating and air-conditioning unit, which we relocated from a previous site. The containers were transformed into a kitchen, an arms room, officer’s quarters and office space, and one as a living container for PSF soldiers. To create extra living space, we acquired a second DRASH tent from our battalion for the PSF. This proved to be advantageous for building a rapport between the units; it showed that the PSF would have the same accommodations and amenities as U. S. soldiers, or better, since they had the four additional containers. Once the life-support area (LSA) was established, we initiated an aggressive training program with the PSF. We began with fundamental military classes, including rank structure and chain of command, military discipline, and drill and ceremony, and quickly integrated the PSF into our platoon physical training program three times a week to increase their physical well being, and over time, trained their sergeants to conduct physical training on their own. Athletic events, such as soccer or ultimate Frisbee, were great cardiovascular workouts that bred newfound respect through competition. Often when playing against each other, both the PSF and U. S. teams seemed to compete for their nations and put in an extra bit of effort for national pride. We taught the PSF property accountability and proper preventive maintenance checks of all vehicles, weapons, communications equipment, and other items. Together, we developed an arms room, established property books, prepared hand receipts for all items issued, and created a daily inventory system. To make certain that PSF soldiers turned in their issued weapons at the end of their shift, they would be docked pay for each missing item per day. This proved to be the perfect discipline motivator, as we very seldom had anything missing from the arms room. JSS Arcala was built along the main supply route and was a permanent vehicle checkpoint to search all east/west traffic between Syria, Jordan, and Baghdad. With most intelligence indicating that VBIEDs and suicide vests entering Ramadi were coming from the east, places such as Fallujah and Samara, the checkpoint served as agate to stop such attacks from occurring in Ramadi. The checkpoint served its purpose well — it received three VBIED attacks, but stopped all related attacks within the city of Ramadi. We did, however, shift our training focus to proper vehicle and personnel search procedures. We taught weekly classes on these topics, which progressed from basic to in-depth and advanced techniques, until the PSF was able to give the class and properly train its new members. We received one Backscatter x-ray van and trained the PSF to use the van, which greatly enhanced their search capabilities, especially for vehicles carrying cargo. The ability to x-ray vehicles allowed for non-evasive searches of spaces such as door panels, ceiling, inside seats, and wheel wells. We obtained a simplified version of Iraqi laws and judicial processes from brigade, which we used as a basis for weekly training sessions on local laws and how they applied to the PSF as law-enforcement officials. We conducted classes on how to properly detain personnel, ensure humane treatment of detainees, and complete forms for processing detainees, as well as provided an overview of trial processes. We repetitively reminded the PSF not to abuse their authority; it was essential for them to win the trust and respect of their fellow citizens as fair and impartial protectors of justice, rather than serving as another force of oppression. Our platoon developed a constant rotation of personnel at the vehicle checkpoint to overwatch operations and ensure thorough searches were conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Additionally, we had a ground-based operational surveillance system (GBOSS) forward-looking infrared (FLIR) camera system with two monitors in our TOC. The system has two cameras, which were connected to the monitors, mounted on a tower. These cameras enabled us to overwatch all aspects of operations, “The training and integration of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is without a doubt the most important mission in Iraq. It is through proper training and equipping of the ISF that long-term peace and stability will be established, legitimate governments recognized by the people will take power, and the United States will be able to reduce its force levels in Iraq. If U. S. trainers can teach the aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined philosophy to the ISF, they will be set up for future success.” 32 — day or night, and under all weather conditions. This major force multiplier not only provided a means of 24-hour observation, but also served as a great tool for teaching and reinforcing behavior. If PSF soldiers did not perform to standard, we invited the PSF company commander to our TOC to show him the below-standard results of his troops, giving him the opportunity to conduct remedial and corrective training for the failing soldiers; if that failed, the threat or actual deduction of pay would always prove its point and immediately correct the below-standard behavior. After our checkpoint operations were fully functional, we began an intensified training effort with our Iraqi partners to include them in all of our weekly training, to include small-arms ranges, reflexive fire drills, medical training, battle drills, patrolling techniques, operating the Backscatter van, and search techniques. It was not long before we had a rigorous weekly cycle with the PSF, which included physical training, technical and tactical classes, professional-development classes, and joint 24/7 checkpoint manning and daily patrolling of the 35- kilometer main supply route. We conducted in-depth after action reviews (AAR) with the PSF to stimulate professional growth and development. The checkpoint operations at JSS Arcala also proved to be a rich tool for gathering accurate intelligence and dissemination of positive information operations. Within the first month, regular traffic patterns became obvious through the checkpoint. Certain vehicles and personnel regularly passed through as part of their daily or weekly routine, especially vans loaded with students who attended Al Anbar University and truckers carrying commerce between Jordan, Syria, and Baghdad. When local citizens noticed the PSF were treating them with respect and dignity in the execution of their searches, they began to provide small bits of information that, when put together, would paint a clear picture of al Qaeda operations in our area of operations. Oftentimes, the intelligence we received would be from an adjacent unit’s area of operations, and when units cross-talked, it helped narrow the safe zone along unit boarders that al Qaeda would exploit as safe havens. Further expanding our intelligence-gathering capabilities, our battalion put up large billboards with pro-Iraqi propaganda, and tip hotline numbers and e-mail addresses to report anonymous tips. The battalion also printed thousands of flyers, which the PSF handed to citizens as they traveled through the checkpoint. This was a powerful tool for positive change and gave frightened citizens a voice in their pursuit for a secure country. In counterinsurgency operations, the people are the objective; whichever side makes the most convincing argument that their ruling of the region/country will best serve the general population’s interest will ultimately win. Mobilizing the population is political power; if the U. S. and PSF successfully work together, it will mobilize the local citizens, who will join forces with us, and thereby deny safe haven to insurgents, who would otherwise seamlessly blend into the local populace. In his classic, Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency, Roger Trinquier concludes “that the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants.”14 To counter this, the U. S. must recognize that, “his total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla’s weak point.”15 This is why it was so important for PSF to become a “Once the life-support area (LSA) was established, we initiated an aggressive training program with the PSF. We began with fundamental military classes, including rank structure and chain of command, military discipline, and drill and ceremony, and quickly integrated the PSF into our platoon physical training program three times a week to increase their physical well being, and over time, trained their sergeants to conduct physical training on their own.” “The checkpoint served its purpose well — it received three VBIED attacks, but stopped all related attacks within the city of Ramadi. We did, however, shift our training focus to proper vehicle and personnel search procedures. We taught weekly classes on these topics, which progressed from basic to in-depth and advanced techniques, until the PSF was able to give the class and properly train its new members. We received one Backscatter x-ray van and trained the PSF to use the van, which greatly enhanced their search capabilities, especially for vehicles carrying cargo.” — 33 ready and relevant security force; they speak the language, they know the locals, and, if motivated, they could do a more effective job in gathering intelligence to shape operations and deny insurgents the ability to control terrain or the hearts and minds of the local population. Through aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined efforts, even soldiers without official military transition team (MTT) training can turn a group of ordinary men into a ready and relevant security force. If this force is disciplined and respects the people whom they are paid to protect, they will become a catalyst for incredible change within their area of operations. Iraqi forces with purpose, direction, and motivation are capable of defeating insurgent elements and serve as the key component to deny them safe terrain. Aggressive pursuit of intelligence, in conjunction with the spread of positive information, has the potential to persuade citizens to align themselves with coalition views and turn away from the oppressive restraints of insurgents. Local Interactions: A Critical Element in Counterinsurgency The simple fact that Iraqi Security Forces are working with your unit is an indicator of local cooperation. The powerbrokers in a tribal society, especially in Al Anbar, are the sheiks. If thousands of men are volunteering to join the ranks of Iraqi police and other city workers, it is through the approval of their tribal leaders, which is a good example of why it is mandatory for U. S. leaders to make frequent visits to the homes of local sheiks and show respect for their tribal society. However, only a quick learner with good interpersonal skills will be successful in this arena. The common Iraqi greeting tradition of handshakes, hugs, and kisses on the cheek is a bit overbearing for the “personal space” of most sensitive Americans, but is required. Soldiers of all ranks must quickly become adept at the “man kiss” and realize it is a cultural act demonstrating respect. When meeting with tribal leaders, you should schedule at least 6 to 8 hours to respect their cultural norms of long conversations and lengthy meals. These events usually begin by discussing business matters, then progress to a lengthy meal, and end with multiple cups of chi tea and cigarettes. Soldiers must understand the Iraqi mannerisms of eating with their hands and not show signs of disgust at what Americans would normally consider unsanitary. The sheik will want to get to know his American partners in depth, and usually at the end of the meal, will discuss personal matters over chi in an attempt to forge a strong friendship. These are great opportunities for Americans and Iraqis to find shared interests and similarities and understand one another at a higher level. It is through this process that tribal leaders will realize that we have a lot in common and our joint partnership will be more advantageous to success in their area than through an alliance with insurgents. By early July 2007, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, completed a massive clear-and-hold operation, which encompassed the entire area of operations and set the conditions for major reconstruction operations. The heart of this endeavor was a unified effort from the sheiks of Ramadi — together an amazing transformation unfolded. From the rural outskirts of the city to its downtown area, a massive renewal project began, which included removing trash and rubble, repaving streets and sidewalks, installing solar-powered street lights, rebuilding damaged buildings, filling in potholes and craters, filling bullet holes in buildings, and repainting streets, walls, bridges, overpasses, and homes. Brigade-level efforts to renew city services, such as police, fire, ambulance and hospital services; developing a small-business bureau; and repairing sewer, water, and power lines, all slowly progressed, and within 6 months, anew city was reborn. Markets and restaurants were thriving again; museums, banks, and schools were operational; and U. S. forces were freely patrolling areas on foot, which was previously unsafe. Unified efforts always result in a win-win situation for all participants — by January 2007, the city of Ramadi had four major operating bases and dozens of company outposts. By creating conditions for peace, 1st Brigade Combat Team proved that it is possible to reduce the United States’ footprint in Iraq. By March 2008, three of the four major operating bases in Ramadi were closed and operations and logistics consolidated into one facility, Camp Ramadi. Numerous company outposts were demilitarized and turned over to Iraqi control, further reiterating to the locals the U. S is in Iraq as a force for positive change, not oppression or colonial control. At the platoon level, soldiers and leaders need to be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. Soldiers in Ramadi applied these fundamentals to all their operations to transform a city into an example of success in Iraq. If future platoon leaders continue to provide purpose, direction, and motivation, emphasize continual training, and apply the fundamentals learned at the schoolhouse, they will be successful. Future leaders in Iraq must be “pentathletes,” capable of wide-spectrum operations — they must be flexible and adaptable to mission changes, but always cognizant of political and cultural implications of their actions. Our behaviors represent the desires of an entire country and must be carefully guided. Ramadi is an example that this war is heading in a positive direction. With intelligently sustained operations at the platoon level and up the chain of command, the desired endstate of a free and stable Iraq is possible. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington D. C., 31 August 1999, p. 1-4. 2Colonel Robert A. Tipton, Professional Military Education for the “Pentathlete” of the Future, Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, U. S. Army War College, 15 March 2006, pp. 2-5. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Training, GPO, Washington D. C., 1 October 1998, p. iii. 4Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Spring 2004, p. 22. 5David Kilcullen, “Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php, p. 8. 6Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php. 7Ibid. 8Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, RAND Corporation, February 1970, pp. 8-12. 9Headquarters, Department of the Army, Ranger Handbook, Student Handbook 21-76, GPO, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 5-1. 10Ibid. 11Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux.” 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee, Praeger, New York, 1964, p. 6. 15Ibid. First Lieutenant Kyle T. Trottier is currently serving as XO, Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA. He received a B. S. from Texas Christian University. His military education includes the Mounted Maneuver Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and Northern Warfare School. He also served as a platoon leader, Company C, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart. 34 —