Maintaining an Offensive Mindset During Defensive Operations

The current operating environment demands deployed units to occupy forward operating bases (FOBs), patrol bases (PB), combat outposts (COPs), and fixed-site security locations. All too often, forces securing these sites focus on the defensive aspects. Albeit crucial to success of the overall mission, the defensive preparation is only partial preparation, leaving soldiers and units more susceptible to enemy attacks. General George S. Patton stated clearly, “In war the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of the offense depends upon the warlike souls of those conducting it.”1 Effective defense requires continuous and aggressive offensive security execution, which starts with the basics of engagement area development and transitions to an offensive mindset through patrolling, random antiterrorism measures, and using all available assets. By being more aggressive, we take the fight to the enemy and improve security. Present Shortcomings Two common operational mistakes include a perception that base defense or security missions stop at the perimeter wire and focusing on the defensive nature of the fight, instead of an offensive posture. These two shortcomings translate to a lack of detailed engagement area development and a passive security on the occupation of bases, which severely degrade the defensive posture and security, placing all members of the base at higher-level, unnecessary risk to enemy attacks. When occupying these bases, units too frequently occupy positions held by the outgoing unit and do not confirm or deny the validity of the engagement area. Soldiers and leaders understand the seven steps in developing an engagement area, but fail to see it through. This is usually because the base defense unit does not have terrain or proper equipment, leaving the FOB as a large listening post/observation post (LP/OP), which would be unthinkable during high-intensity conflict. When a unit is given terrain and views the surrounding terrain as an engagement area, the primary shortcomings in engagement area development are enemy analysis, placement of friendly obstacles and weapons systems, and incomplete rehearsals. The unit enemy analysis is generally limited to a generic course of action, whether indirect fire or suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at an entrance control point (ECP). Units frequently limit active defenses with direct and indirect fires by placing security with individual weapons in towers, a crew-served weapon at the ECP, and one or two indirect systems with poor planning and integration of indirect fires. Units usually execute reactionary rehearsals, such as mass casualty (MASCAL) and commitment of the quick-reaction force, but rarely focus rehearsals based on actions outside the FOB. For example, during operations at the National Training Center, FOBs are frequently overrun by a complex attack of 10 to 15 insurgents, resulting in a MAS CAL situation and a command post severely degraded, which is due to ineffective preparation and execution of the FOB defense plan. This example of enemy exploitation not only affects the security of the FOB, but disrupts future combat operations from the base. The second issue is the defensive and passive mindset regarding base security operations. Although our doctrine clearly as-certains that defense is an active and aggressive mission, most units fall short in preparation and execution. Units do not provide additional depth in defense through patrolling, establishing and changing OPs, and using all available assets. The static nature of defense is translating to passive defense and not active aggressive defense. Whether located with a platoon COP high in the mountains of Afghanistan, a company securing a power generation station in Iraq, or a task force in a forward operating base, the highest headquarters has the responsibility for security and the overall fight. The unit or units tasked with security have the primary responsibility for the defense, but higher headquarters’ synchronization increases the aggressive “in-depth” nature of the defense. Coupling synchronization with improved preparation and changing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as enemy and friendly situations change will increase the effectiveness of defense and security. 8 —

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Improvement The two primary areas of improvement for static defense missions are a detailed engagement area development and maintaining an offensive aggressive mindset in the execution of the defense plan. Following the seven steps to engagement area development to confirm or deny the plan as executed by the outgoing unit is the first step in establishing a solid, aggressive defense (see Figure 1). Second is using all available assets to establish and maintain an offensive and an aggressive defense. The TTP are all mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians (METT-TC) dependent, but implementing them based on the mission set can result in a doctrinally aggressive defense. Engagement area development is as applicable to a FOB or COP as it is to stopping an advancing horde during high-intensity conflict. The purpose of an engagement area is to trap and destroy enemy forces using massed fires of all available weapons; the seven steps to engagement area development are:

1. Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.

2. Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.

3. Determine where to kill the enemy.

4. Plan and integrate obstacles.

5. Emplace weapons systems.

6. Plan and integrate indirect fires.

7. Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.2 Although we are accustomed to a linear or L-shaped defense, the FOB is 360-degree security, where understanding the terrain (to include urban and human terrain), understanding the enemy, and correctly positioning weapons systems are critical. During the identification of all likely enemy avenues of approach, the enemy task and local terrain are the key factors. Roads and trails are obvious avenues of approach for suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs). The key task in identifying likely enemy avenues of approach is ensuring all avenues are identified. Once accomplished, this can be refined through the enemy scheme of maneuver. Understanding the local enemy’s equipment, capabilities, and TTP will help determine the scheme of maneuver. Determining the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action will help to properly develop the base defense plan. If SVBIEDs predominate in the area, focus defense on maintaining standoff and protection; on the other hand, if it is a predominately indirect fire area, the focus is on the counter-indirect fight. Additionally, if units receive reports of lost or missing Iraqi security force or Afghanistan security force equipment, the preparation and defense should shift to a swarm-type attack. The enemy analysis is continuous and requires refinements in the base defense plan. Determining where to kill the enemy in a base defense is more difficult than a standard high-intensity conflict defense. The area in which to kill the enemy differs between ECPs (outside the entrance) and perimeters of FOBs. Closely tied to determining where to kill the enemy is the integration of obstacles. Whether it is a berm, a triple strand of concertina wire, a wall at the perimeter, or obstacles integrated in the surrounding terrain to deny or canalize enemy movement, these measures allow units to engage outside the wire. Placement of proper weapons systems greatly improves the success of the defense. Two key points are ensuring overlapping fields of fire for primary and secondary sectors of fire and use of proper weapons systems. Using dismounted machine guns is better than an individual weapon; and an Abrams tank or Bradley is better than a dismounted crew-served weapon. The more combat power dedicated to securing the perimeter, the better; and understanding the forces available will always be an issue. Planning and integrating indirect fires is no different than a high-intensity defense. Again, the priority and focus lies with the enemy threat. A good way of integrating indirect fires is against known or likely mortar and rocket points of origin. Additional-Figure 1. Company defense sector sketch “Determining where to kill the enemy in a base defense is more difficult than a standard high-intensity conflict defense. The area in which to kill the enemy differs between ECPs (outside the entrance) and perimeters of FOBs. Closely tied to determining where to kill the enemy is the integration of obstacles. Whether it is a berm, a triple strand of concertina wire, a wall at the perimeter, or obstacles integrated in the surrounding terrain to deny or canalize enemy movement, these measures allow units to engage outside the wire.” — 9 ly, harassing and interdicting (H&I) fires, when authorized, work well to deny enemy movement or terrain for observation. Observation for H&I fires can be achieved in a number of ways, whether OPs, lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), or unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Base defense rehearsals need to include reactions to friendly and enemy activities in the engagement area. To be more successful, units should prioritize and then execute rehearsals, which include actions at triggers, MASCAL, react to contact, and commitment of the reserve. Although not a comprehensive list, soldiers will be better prepared to defend by rehearsing. Engagement area development is a complex series of tasks requiring parallel planning and a clear priority of work. With the priority of work issued, units can continually improve the engagement area and work toward establishing the defense. Units can do this by either allocating the base defense unit terrain 5 to 7 kilometers from the FOB or by treating it as a task force defense. In completing the engagement area development to trap and destroy enemy forces, bases are prepared for the most dangerous course of action and can easily transition to defeating or deterring the enemy on a more likely course of action (see Figure 2). With the defense established, it is time to transition to a more aggressive and offensive defense. The offensive mindset extends the fight from the perimeter of the base and disrupts the reconnaissance, surveillance, and direct or indirect fire attacks on the base. The TTP for an aggressive defense includes patrolling, establishing and changing observation posts, and using available assets, to include aviation. As outlined in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230, Special Forces Base Camp Operations, “The overall defense posture of a base camp is enhanced by continuous aggressive operations conducted by the base camp personnel. These are patrolling, ambushes, observation…”3 Patrolling the area outside the base provides information and security and disrupts enemy movement. Reconnaissance patrols are dispatched to confirm or deny any suspected enemy activity. Recon patrols and OPs work well in identifying enemy movement into and out of historic points of origin, which help in the counter-indirect firefight. Additionally, reconnaissance patrols can attempt to identify and track enemy forces, whether indirect fire related or as part of the counterreconnaissance fight. On the other hand, security patrols are sent out to make contact with, and then destroy, the enemy within the capabilities of the patrol. In doing so, patrols prevent the enemy from infiltrating, disrupt enemy reconnaissance, and deny or desync enemy attacks. Internal security patrols, especially when securing fixed sites with local workers, assist in preventing sabotage of those sites. For example, while securing a power generation facility in Iraq, our company dispatched daily internal security patrols of a fire team to prevent the sabotage of the turbines, power conduits, and control room. An additional security patrol, outside the doctrine of a tank company, was the boat security patrols on the lakeside of the dam. Using a boat, a trained crew, and amounted machine gun, the company conducted limited patrols of the water, which ensured fishermen did not approach the earthen or cement portions of the dam walls. At the very least, patrolling, whether or not continuous, prevents or disrupts enemy attacks. Continuous observation from differing positions aids in defense by providing early warning. Maintaining multiple primary and alternate positions and frequently changing OP locations prevents enemy knowledge of which sites are occupied, thereby making it more difficult to exploit a seam. Additionally, building and manning deception OPs adds to the perceived security level of a facility. Using the power generation plant example “Supporting aviation assets provide extended range and are not frequently used in base defense, but can be easily integrated. For instance, in Iraq an operational control (OPCON) OH-58D troop provided frequent overflights and reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAI), both at the FOB and forward security sites. Upon their approach, the OH58s flew around the FOB 3 to 4 kilometers from the wire, reconning NAI and likely points of origin.” Figure 2 1 2 T3 T4

T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 190 o 170 o 200 o

01 02 AB1001 05 04 06 BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 FOB Defense- “A-Way” AB1002 AB1003 AB1004 03 10 —

Figure 3 Fixed Site Security of Hydroelectric Dam 1 2 10 9 5 3 8 6 7 4 11 12 Waterborne Security Patrols Reconnaissance Security Patrols Reconnaissance Security Patrols above, we developed numerous alternate and deception OP locations along the top and sides of the dam. Throughout the day, we would randomly change OP locations and move personnel to and from deception positions (see Figure 3). In an urban environment, securing and operating from a border check point, we frequently changed mounted vehicle OP locations to observe the most likely enemy avenues of approach (see Figure 4). The dismounted positions rotated between hard-stand towers and buildings. In addition to the random antiterrorism measures (RAM) outlined in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 07-19, Base Defense, these RAM are simple techniques to improve security.4 Using all available assets extends the range and depth of the defense and is often overlooked. Combat patrols and units executing missions in town can be integrated into the base defense’s patrol schedule. Depending on its mission, the outgoing patrol could conduct a security patrol along a designated route or conduct reconnaissance of a known point of origin. Additionally, on return, they could conduct a reconnaissance or security patrol around the FOB. Supporting aviation assets provide extended range and are not frequently used in base defense, but can be easily integrated. For instance, in Iraq an operational control (OPCON) OH-58D troop provided frequent overflights and reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAI), both at the FOB and forward security sites. Upon their approach, the OH58s flew around the FOB 3 to 4 kilometers from the wire, reconning NAI and likely points of origin. For this TTP to be successful, supporting aviation must understand the reconnaissance requirement around any base and the ground unit providing the ground unit graphics. Using UAS also increases the “in-depth” nature of the defense. Incorporating these additional assets into the base defense plan improves the overall security posture. Detailed planning, preparation, and maintaining an offensive mindset while executing these defensive tasks can be effective in destroying, deterring, or denying the enemy attackers. In doing so, we will be taking the fight to the enemy on our terms, instead of sitting back and allowing him to bring the fight to us on his terms. We all know the capabilities of the armor and cavalry troopers in the formations around the Army, and with their “warlike souls,” they will superbly accomplish any mission asked of them. As leaders, we owe it to them to properly plan and prepare, so they can execute the offensive-minded security missions. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington DC, 14 June 2001, p. 7-2. 2FM 3-90.1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, HQDA, GPO, Washington DC, 9 December 2002, p. 6-16. 3FM 3-05.230, Special Forces Base Camp Operations, HQDA, GPO, Washington DC, 30 July 2003, p. 3-58. 4CALL Handbook 07-19, Base Defense, U. S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2007, pp. 31–32. Major Chad Roehrman is currently serving as a senior analyst, Light (Airborne) Infantry Training Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Infantry Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Jumpmaster School, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include observer controller, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; squadron rear detachment commander, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Carson, CO; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and D Company, 1st Squadron, 3d ACR, Fort Carson; and S3 (air) 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry (RSTA), Fort Lewis, WA. Figure 4 Combat Outpost at Border Check Point 1 13 3 6 10 11 8 9 4 7 Reconnaissance Security Patrols 2 12 5 Reconnaissance Security Patrols Reconnaissance Security Patrols International Boundary — 11