Falklands Armor

Twenty five years ago, the British armed forces took back the remote Falkland Islands from their Argentine foes. In late May 1982, some 9,000 United Kingdom servicemen descended on the islands to wrest control from a large force of Argentine soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. In the British contingent were 28 officers and men of the “Blues and Royals,” one of Britain’s most distinguished amalgamated cavalry regiments, and one of the two mechanized formations of the British royal household cavalry. The troopers brought with them mounts of metal and tracks — four Scorpions, four Scimitars, and a Samson. They were the only armor troops accompanying the British infantry force, consisting of elite paratroopers, Royal Marine commandos, Welsh and Scots Guardsmen, and Nepalese Gurkhas. There came a time soon after their arrival, however, when these infantrymen earnestly wished for the presence of more than just eight tracked armored fighting vehicles to accompany them into battle. The story has been told before, but on this 25th anniversary of the successful reclaiming of the Falkland Islands it is appropriate to reprise the efforts and impact of the small, but significant, addition of armor to Britain’s land combat power during the campaign. The Call Comes For the armored cavalrymen of the Blues and Royals (a combination of two famous cavalry regiments, the Royal Horse Guards and 1st Dragoons) it all started with a telephone call. It came from an official in the War Office in London to the weekend duty officer on 1 April 1982, at the Windsor barracks of the medium reconnaissance regiment, which is located close to the royal residence at Windsor Castle in Berkshire County. The regiment, equivalent to a U. S. Army battalion, is the closest armor unit stationed near London, has a rapid response mission, and thus was the appropriate unit to contact in case of an emergency requiring armored troops. The caller from the War Office asked the lieutenant on duty, Lieutenant M. Coreth, how long it would take the regiment to mobilize a couple of mechanized cavalry troops — the equivalent of a couple of U. S. Army platoons. Coreth immediately called his colonel, who designated 3 and 4 Troops, B Squadron (the same as a U. S. armored cavalry troop), Blues and Royals, as the two platoon-sized organizations that would deploy to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands as part of the Falkland Island Task Force. Now, in 1982, the British Army and its strong armor component were oriented on potentially conducting combat in Germany against the Soviet forces positioned in East Germany. Armor and armored reconnaissance units rotated from the United Kingdom to stations in the former British occupation zone in northern Germany periodically as part of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The mechanized troops thus trained to meet a massive Warsaw Pact invasion if it should occur, and as a result, the BAOR was on constant alert and highly trained to defend its area of operations in northwest Germany. Armored formations stationed in Great Britain trained to take their place with their counterparts on the European continent. Combat on a group of small islands located thousands of miles from Great Britain, therefore, could hardly have 40 — been expected to be even a secondary mission for the British mounted arm. The Mechanized Steeds Although armored cavalry troops were not expected to fight effectively in the remote Falklands, the deployed tracked fighting vehicles did turn out to be ideal for combat operations on the islands. The medium reconnaissance regiment was equipped with combat vehicles, reconnaissance-tracked (CVR-Ts). There were two configurations of CVR-Ts organized into troops of four vehicles, with two of each configuration per troop. One CVR-T, constructed of steel and aluminum, was named the “Scorpion” and weighed some 8 tons combat loaded. As such, it could be lifted by a CH-47 helicopter, while two could be carried by a C-130 Hercules aircraft. The Scorpion was armed with a 76mm medium velocity gun, which fired high-explosive squash head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), canister, smoke, and illumination rounds. Maximum effective range of the main gun was 5,000 meters. The second CVR-Twas the “Scimitar,” which was built on the same chassis as the Scorpion, weighed about the same, and mounted a high-velocity 30mm Rarden cannon. The 30mm fired armor-piercing, discarding sabot (APDS), high-explosive, and an armor-piercing special-effect (APSE) round, which could easily penetrate an infantry fighting vehicle or armored carrier. Other similarities between the two armored reconnaissance vehicles were a 7.62mm coaxial-mounted machine gun; full nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection; and a second-generation passive sight on the gunner’s position. Each vehicle had a three-man crew made up of a driver, gunner, and vehicle commander. One of the major characteristics of the CVR-T, which proved to be very valuable in traversing the many peat bogs in the Falklands, was the vehicle’s very low ground pressure of 4.9 pounds per square inch. In addition to the eight CVR-Ts, a tracked recovery vehicle, designated the “Samson,” deployed with a crew of two vehicle mechanics, a turret mechanic, and a recovery specialist to provide limited maintenance support to the fighting vehicles. The Samson was a modification of the CVR-T, using the same chassis and also having the advantage of making alight imprint on the boggy Falklands terrain. The low ground pressure of the Samson made it valuable for not only recovery operations, but enabled it to serve many other logistics needs when it came to maneuvering cross country. The Samson and its crew were the only maintenance elements capable of keeping the fighting vehicles operational. The Samson carried a limited supply of replacement parts and the skill level of the mechanics was such that they were not expected to perform complicated repair tasks with the tools at hand. If the tracked fighting vehicles selected to deploy to the Falklands turned out to be the proper ones because of their low ground pressure, the main armament initially proved to be a challenge. This was because the weapons had not been test fired or boresighted since November of the previous year. There was no time before the vehicles embarked to accomplish these required tasks, and innovative means had to be sought to remedy the situation. It was not until the task force assembled at Ascension Island off the west coast of Africa, several thousands of miles from the British Isles, that the challenge could be addressed. Complicating the matter was the lack of an established tank gunnery range on Ascension Island where the entire task force had to stop to reposition men and equipment before proceeding on south to the Falkland Islands. On arrival at Ascension Island en route to the Falklands, the Scimitars and Scorpions were off loaded from the roll-on roll-off ship, MV Elk, and married up with the vehicle crews. The troopers, who had embarked on the SS Canberra with paratroopers of the 3d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, disembarked to join their vehicles on the island. This took some doing as there were no beaches to satisfactorily disembark or re-embark the armored vehicles. The senior armor officer present, Lieutenant Coreth, who had received the initial War Office inquiry, had to convince authorities ashore that it was necessary to boresight the vehicles’ weapons, which could not be done at sea. At the same time, the Scimitars had to test fire the 30mm APDS ammunition, which had never before been fired. After boresighting on Ascension, armored cavalry troopers tested the feasibility of firing their main armament from utility landing craft (LCU) by lowering the craft’s ramp enough to clear the cannon’s line of fire over the ramp. This test was to see if the cannons could be employed to support an assault during an opposed beach landing. The tank gunners had a rare opportunity to display their marksmanship as they fired at floating 40-gallon steel drums. The target practice also resulted in some amusement as the gunners had to contend with the antics of the lurching craft. Luckily, the LCUs suffered no damage and it was determined that the vehicles could provide fire support to disembarking infantry, if only tenuously. The Skeptics With the small armored cavalry contingent’s quick mobilization and relative unpreparedness for combat, the outlook “One CVR-T, constructed of steel and aluminum, was named the “Scorpion” and weighed some 8 tons combat loaded. As such, it could be lifted by a CH-47 helicopter, while two could be carried by a C-130 Hercules aircraft. The Scorpion was armed with a 76mm medium velocity gun, which fired high-explosive squash head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), canister, smoke, and illumination rounds. Maximum effective range of the main gun was 5,000 meters.” — 41 for successful employment of even lightweight tracked vehicles looked pretty grim on the Falkland Islands. Indeed, there were many who were skeptical about having any armor at all along for combat operations. The Falklands were not deemed “tank country,” much like terrain in South Vietnam was once considered by many Americans to be inappropriate for ground armor operations. Part of the mindset of British military leaders in the Falklands campaign resulted from deploying the type of combat troops initially involved. The first infantrymen engaged in battle were from 3 Royal Marine Commando Brigade, which consisted of three battalion-sized Royal Marine infantry units (commandos), plus two battalions of paratroopers from the 2d and 3d Battalions of The Parachute Regiment. All five battalion-sized formations were light infantry, which seldom were expected to fight as mounted troops. They might easily fly by helicopter or parachute into battle, but riding in armor-protected vehicles was not their usual modus operandi. Indeed, the mix of Royal Marine commandos and paratroopers proved to be just the type of infantry force best suited for operations in the Falklands, but they were going to fight on foot, not from armored personnel carriers. Since the infantry usually did not fight alongside tanks, higher headquarters initially did not express an appreciation for correct use of the armor. At best, the tracked fighting vehicles would be employed on an ad-hoc basis, at least until they had a chance to prove themselves in battle. At the fight for the building complex of Goose Green/Darwin, initiated a week after 3 Marine Commando had landed on East Falkland Island, the CVR-Ts were not employed in any role. The 2d Battalion of The Parachute Regiment was charged with attacking the Argentine garrison at its location on the southwest tip of East Falkland Island 7 days after it landed on the island 21 May

1982. With minimal helicopter and artillery support (limited by the number of aircraft and availability of appropriate ammunition), the paratroopers went into battle on foot. The battalion commander was killed along with 16 of his paratroopers, but after a short stiff fight, the Argentine force, which included a large contingent of their air force personnel, surrendered. No armor was present. Although the battalion commander requested the assistance of the Scorpions and Scimitars, he was told by higher headquarters they were unavailable. Chalk one up to inexperience; the paratroopers considered the misconception about the employment of armor as “an extraordinary piece of misinformation.” Prejudices about employing light armor in the Falklands were primarily based on the terrain encountered. The road network on East Falkland Island, the principal area of operations, was virtually nonexistent except around the capital town, Stanley, on the eastern end of the island. In addition, the overall trafficability on East Falkland was poor. The native population used wheeled tractors and four-wheel drive vehicles to conduct business, but stuck principally to unimproved tracks to move about. They had little need to maneuver cross-country off these tracks. There was a misconception in the United Kingdom that movement by wheeled vehicle was impossible in the Falklands. This misconception was passed along to apply to tracked armored fighting vehicles as well. Not until the expeditionary force got on the ground did commanders come to terms with this misunderstanding. Reality set in after the experiences at Goose Green/Darwin; however, there was no more combat until the final attack on Argentine positions around Stanley in June, so the Blues and Royals had to prove themselves in other ways. Mastering the Terrain In an effort to remove the unjust skepticism placed on the tracked vehicles, the Blues and Royals set out to master the terrain. The area of operations had two key terrain components. The first component was the heights or low mountain ranges. The lower reaches proved to be less of an obstacle to tracked vehicles, except in places where the low water table made the ground soft and large boulders were encountered. The highest reaches were only traversed on foot. The second component was the virtually treeless terrain covered with peat bogs and fields of rocks called “stone runs.” The runs were often hundreds of yards wide and went for several miles with boulders ranging in size from that of a man’s head to that of an automobile. The stone runs could be navigated by the tracked vehicles relatively easily, while the peat bogs provided a special challenge. The tracked vehicle drivers learned that the way to master the bogs was to drive aggressively, always seeking to maintain their forward momentum. They compared the experience to “driving on a large water bed.” The drivers also learned to look well ahead as they moved forward. They watched out for green moss, which they knew covered the softest patches of terrain. When a patch could not be avoided, the driver drove straight ahead, avoiding turns, or as they called it, “sticking” (changing direction with the vehicle’s steering levers). Changing direction on the soft turf caused the CVR-T’s track to tear the fragile ground, which damaged the route for a following tracked vehicle. If the driver was not traveling fast enough, the CVR-T would sink to the top of its road wheels. Recovering the bogged-down vehicles was also a trafficability hazard; however, a simple recovery remedy, not previously tested, was at hand. Each tracked vehicle carried what was called a “kinetic energy tow rope.” The idea was to use the rope, which was made of a highly elastic nylon material that stretched to twice its normal length, to “pop” a sunken vehicle out of the mushy terrain onto firmer “...the “Scimitar,” which was built on the same chassis as the Scorpion, weighed about the same, and mounted a high-velocity 30mm Rarden cannon. The 30mm fired armor-piercing, discarding sabot (APDS), high-explosive, and an armor-piercing special-effect (APSE) round, which could easily penetrate an infantry fighting vehicle or armored carrier.” 42 — ground. The rope was first tested on a civilian tractor that had gotten stuck in a peat bog. Lieutenant Coreth, in testing the rope, had his driver gingerly back up to the sunken tractor until the two vehicles almost touched, while the driver made sure he did not break ground surface and get stuck. The tow rope was coiled on the ground and attached between the two vehicles. Coreth then ordered his vehicle to drive “like a bat out of hell,” which stretched the rope, causing the tractor to leap out of the bog. The rope quickly won many earnest adherents. While the soft ground proved to be a major hazard, especially if a vehicle got stuck and sank in the peat, there was one good feature about operating on such terrain. During the final assault on the port city of Stanley, Coreth’s Scorpion ran over an Argentine mine that was laid in a bog beside a track alongside which the vehicle was traveling. When the tracked reconnaissance vehicle ran over the mine, it exploded, throwing the vehicle into the air and severely damaging its right front running gear. However, the mine also made a big hole in the bog, which absorbed a good part of the shock thus ame-liorating the amount of damage done to the Scorpion. Becoming Believers The two troops of the Blues and Royals quickly made the commandos and paratroopers believe in the armored troopers’ capabilities, and they soon became sought after by various unit commanders. Just before the bitter diversionary fight for Goose Green on 28 May, 3 Marine Commando had begun the trek on foot and by helicopter east toward its final objective, the port and capital of the Falkland Islands, Stanley. The armor, having not been considered appropriate for combat with the 2d Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, went forward with the commandos and other paratroopers on their “yomp” (an extreme foot march) eastward, which they made, packing heavy loads of equipment, ammunition, and weapons. Number 3 Troop with four CVR-Ts moved in support of the 45 Commando unit along the northern route to its final objective jump-off position via the settlement of Douglas, which was located on the bay of Port Salvador. Number 4 Troop accompanied the 3d Battalion of The Parachute Regiment in its yomp along a parallel route to Teal Inlet Settlement, which also lay on a spur of the Port Salvador Bay. Partly, as a result of the prevailing prejudices about the ground mobility of the tracked vehicles, the 2d Battalion of The Parachute Regiment’s advance east from Goose Green was not to be supported by armor. It was on the long trek in the north, however, that the Blues and Royals began to earn their reputation for being a key ingredient in the ground battle campaign. Moving the tracked vehicles across the northern part of East Falkland Island went without incident. The vehicle drivers took advantage of the excellent opportunity to gain experience negotiating the terrain and its vagaries, thereby gaining confidence in their ability to operate with a minimum of difficulty. If there were any doubts about the need for aggressive first-echelon maintenance, they were soon dispelled. At the same time, armored cavalrymen proved to be of great assistance in moving heavier items of equipment for supported units. They also gave lifts to footsore and heavily burdened infantrymen struggling on the long trek. Especially welcome was the heat given off by the vehicles’ engines to dry the wet boots of the slogging foot soldiers and commandos during rest halts. For more senior commanders, proper appreciation for the various capabilities of the accompanying armor was soon achieved. At Teal Inlet Settlement, for example, Lieutenant Coreth was given the additional task of air defense officer in charge. The Scimitar gunners found it relatively easy to track the slower-moving Argentine Skyhawk and Pucara aircraft with their 30mm Rarden guns and coaxial-mounted general purpose machine guns. The combination of main gun and machine gun fire proved effective in not only scoring a number of hits, but also forcing enemy aircraft to fly higher so they would not be engaged by ground-to-air missiles. But the real eye opener to the tracked reconnaissance vehicles’ capabilities on the Falklands Islands terrain came about when the newly arrived 5 Infantry Brigade was established at Fitzroy on the southeast coast of East Falkland. The Blues and Royals were detached from 3 Commando Brigade and moved the tracked reconnaissance vehicles south to bolster the infantry brigade’s position against an Argentine counterattack at Fitzroy, a journey estimated to take approximately 2 days over hardly passable and virtually trackless terrain. The trip, however, took only 6 hours, much to the astonishment of Brigadier Anthony Wilson, commanding 5 Infan- — 43 “Just before the bitter diversionary fight for Goose Green on 28 May, 3 Marine Commando had begun the trek on foot and by helicopter east toward its final objective, the port and capital of the Falkland Islands, Stanley. The armor, having not been considered appropriate for combat with the 2d Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, went forward with the commandos and other paratroopers on their “yomp” (an extreme foot march) eastward, which they made, packing heavy loads of equipment, ammunition, and weapons.”

try Brigade, who was quoted as saying, “I never expected them to make it so quickly over the difficult ground. When I looked and saw them winding down the side of the mountain toward us, their leading troops mud-spattered and rain-soaked and their commanders half-frozen in the turrets of their vehicles, it was one of those moments I am not likely to forget.” Coming from the commander of a brigade composed of two infantry battalions, the newly arrived 1st Welsh Guards and 2d Scots Guards, which normally fought from armored carriers, this was a compliment indeed. Lieutenant Coreth noted that the journey was made under appalling weather and terrain conditions over a route very high and very steep. The contoured map indicated the going was impassable to armored vehicles. Using his initiative, however, Coreth obtained the services of a local citizen who grabbed his motor bike, threw it on the Samson recovery vehicle, and set off to guide them on the “impossible” journey. They arrived at their destination, having traveled through a suspected Argentine minefield and with nothing worse to wear than a thrown track and a broken sprocket. The place of the Blues and Royals in the campaign’s history was now well established. The Final Assault Having successfully transferred to the command of 5 Infantry Brigade, the troopers spent the next few days, until the final assault on Stanley, performing maintenance, escorting Scots Guards reconnaissance soldiers to a forward position, escaping frequent Argentine air attacks, and finally, on 8 June helping to evacuate wounded from the logistics landing ships, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, anchored off Bluff Cove to a battalion aid station following a successful Argentine air strike on the ships. The stay of 3 Troop with 5 Infantry Brigade, however, was short, as on 8 June, the reconnaissance unit was ordered north again to rejoin 3 Royal Marine Commando Brigade for the final showdown with the Argentines around Stanley. At the beginning of the move north, the troop lost the temporary use of a Scimitar when a gearbox broke and the vehicle had to be left behind until a replacement could be obtained. The CVR-T turret, nevertheless, remained operational and the crew fired its 30mm cannon successfully against attacking Argentine Skyhawks at Bluff Cove. The gearbox failure was the only major assembly to malfunction during the entire campaign, attesting to the ruggedness of the vehicle. On 11 June, the three-phase operation to re-take Stanley and defeat the foe was launched. 3 Troop, with its Scimitars loaded to their double capacity with 30mm ammunition and making full use of their night sights, supported the 2d Battalion of The Parachute Regiment’s attack on Wireless Ridge during the last two phases. The troop’s CVR-Ts provided covering fire to paratroopers as they moved toward Stanley, and then joined the battalion, being among the first to enter the town. 4 Troop, similarly stocked with ammunition, provided support to the 2d Battalion of the Scots Guards. The troop first saw action in a diversionary role on 13 June while providing fire support to a Scots Guards night patrol who was probing the Argentine defenses around Tumbledown Mountain. The troop lost a Scorpion to a mine, but during the action, the unit was able to provide effective night fire support to the guardsmen. Once on Tumbledown, the troopers quickly advanced on Sapper Hill overlooking Stanley, leading the infantry to the top of the hill mass. The 2d Battalion of The Parachute Regiment up north was happy to see 3 Troop arrive to support its final attacks. Deprived of armor support at Goose Green/Darwin, the unit was now determined to maximize the capabilities of the Scorpions and Scimitars. This not only meant using the vehicle’s fire power, but also its night-fighting ability. The passive night sights, which the battalion commander referred to as his “eyes,” proved invaluable in locating enemy positions. During the parachute battalion’s attack on Wireless Ridge, the CVR-T guns were particularly effective when using a firing technique called “zapping.” Similar to the technique of reconnaissance by fire, the crews would fire their coaxial machine gun at a suspected enemy position, hoping to elicit a response. The less highly disciplined Argentine defenders usually opened fire, revealing their locations. The reconnaissance vehicle’screw immediately zeroed in on now-exposed enemy positions, hitting them with 76mm gun or 30mm cannons. The 30mm Rarden was favored as a response weapon because of its high velocity and great accuracy. In the final attacks by the Scots Guards, the troopers of 4 Troop in the south had a different battle experience than their compatriots to the north. During the night patrol action, the lead Scorpion, with Lieutenant Coreth on board, encountered a huge crater in the trail on which the troop was advancing. Being impassable and still short of his designated firing position, Coreth decided to maneuver off the road to bypass the obstacle. It was then that the vehicle hit an antitank mine. The CVR-T rose 3 to 4 feet in the air with a blinding flash. Coreth later described the accompanying sensation as “being hit on either side of my helmet with heavy hammers.” His first reaction was to get himself and his crew out of the Scorpion, which they quickly accomplished. Much to the relief of the men, they were not wounded, although there were some ringing heads and jumbled nerves. The remainder of the troop went on to support the infantrymen’s attack. Coreth, who was to be decorated for his part in the campaign, directed his remaining vehicles to continue firing while under heavy Argentine artillery fire. Because the trail on which they were advancing was so narrow and the off-road area was heavily mined, only one vehicle’s weapons could initially be brought to bear on the desig- 44 — “Having successfully transferred to the command of 5 Infantry Brigade, the troopers spent the next few days, until the final assault on Stanley, performing maintenance, escorting Scots Guards reconnaissance soldiers to a forward position, escaping frequent Argentine air attacks, and finally, on 8 June helping to evacuate wounded from the logistics landing ships, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, anchored off Bluff Cove to a battalion air post following a successful Argentine air strike on the ships.”

nated targets. Coreth, sitting on the outside of his remaining CVR-Ts, alternatively brought each vehicle forward to fire its onboard weapons. In his personal diary, Coreth described his activity as participating in “a crazy shoot from one vehicle, sitting on the outside, reverse him, climb onto another, bring him forward, fire him, and so on till the last.” Victory The overall performance of the Scimitars and Scorpions was considered one of the real success stories of the Falklands campaign. Not only were they valued members of the combat team, their presence proved to be a major educational experience for the light infantry units they fought beside. For instance, it was the first time the Royal Marine commandos had the opportunity to see how effective light armor could be used in future operations. Because 3 Royal Marine Commando Brigade had a NATO mission in northern Norway where tracked vehicles were employed extensively on snow and ice, gaining an appreciation for fighting with similar vehicles armed with powerful cannons proved to be a valuable lesson. The Blues and Royals added the bright laurels of the Falklands campaign to their illustrious history. Not only was their participation an important part of the British task force’s victory, it was also a personal victory for the troopers, corporals of “The Blues and Royals added the bright laurels of the Falklands campaign to their illustrious history. Not only was their participation an important part of the British task force’s victory, it was also a personal victory for the troopers, corporals of horse, and lieutenants who were part of the fighting. These armored cavalrymen fully proved their ability to effectively do battle under the worst combat conditions.” horse, and lieutenants who were part of the fighting. These armored cavalrymen fully proved their ability to effectively do battle under the worst com bat conditions. Perhaps more importantly, they proved the naysayers wrong on the subject of employing armor effectively on the Falkland Islands. For 28 junior officers and men, this was, in itself, a major accomplishment of which their armored cavalry peers and superiors, as well as the entire British Army, could rightfully be very proud. Bibliography Mark Adkin, Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to be Won, London, L. Cooper, 1992. Editor, “Armour in the Falklands,” Guards Magazine, Winter 1982/1983, pp. 164-172. William Fowler, Battle for the Falklands (I) Land Forces, London, Osprey Publishing, 1982. Andrew Jones, “British Armor in the Falklands,” ARMOR, March-April 1983, pp. 26-30. Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr., U. S. Army, Retired, is a 1957 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He received an M. A. from Middlebury College and a Ph. D. from New York University. His military education includes the U. S. Army War College and the National War College. As an armor officer, he served in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 32d Armor, 15th Armor in Korea, and 5th Cavalry in Vietnam. His last two assignments included the U. S. Army Reserve’s 5th Psychological Operations Group and its 220th Military Police Brigade. — 45

• Soldiers should rest before and in between strenuous exercise.

• Soldiers should loosen clothing while resting.

• Soldiers should report when they are not feeling well, especially before, during, or after strenuous exercise.

• Soldiers should wear light clothing whenever possible.

• Soldiers should not be allowed to wear unnecessary layers of clothing. First Aid Heat-related illnesses can usually be reversed in the early stages by following these steps:

• Get the victim out of the heat.

• Loosen any tight clothing and apply cool, wet clothes.

• Give cool water if the victim is conscious, about one glass every 15 minutes.

• If the victim refuses water, vomits, or loses consciousness, call 9-1-1. Immediate first aid and evacuation of a soldier suffering from a heat injury is critical. Leaders must know his soldiers’ weaknesses to minimize their risk of heat injury. The key to preventing heat injury is knowledge and education on the risks, causes, and preventive measures. When training in a hot and humid environment, leaders are reminded:

• Soldiers should rest in a cool or shady environment.

• Concurrent hydration is critical.

• High air temperature, high relative humidity, and exposure to the sun make it difficult for soldiers to regulate their body temperature.

• Excessive clothing prevents heat from being lost to the environment.

• Heat injuries are commonly associated with hard work in hot weather; how ever, they can also occur in relatively cool conditions when soldiers are dressed in heavy protective clothing.

• These same principles apply at night. If there is inadequate cooling of the body during physical exertion at night, heat injuries can occur. Again, when heat injury occurs, it is an indication of failure of one or more components of the prevention system. Responsibility for soldiers’ health and well being depends heavily on vigilant and instinctive leaders; however, safety is everyone’s job. “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think.” Driver’s Seat from Page 5