So You Want to Train An Iraqi Mechanized Brigade?

U. S. Army military transition teams (MiTTs) are preparing and training Iraqi army (IA) units for combat. MiTTs advise Iraqi forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and infantry tactics. Once trained, Iraqi forces will be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, which will enable them to take responsibility for their battlespace. The MiTTs are trained to conquer obstacles, such as foreign language barriers, radically different cultures, lack of resources and doctrine, 40-year-old equipment, and the occasional mortar attack. These obstacles can be overwhelming; however, MiTTs reach varying degrees of success in Iraq every day. This article illustrates how one MiTT team planned to handle these daunting challenges. Background Our team was assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th (3/9) Iraqi Army Division in Taji, Iraq. The 9th Division is the only mechanized division in the Iraqi army. The division is well established and is currently conducting combat operations in Baghdad with elements of the 1st and 2d Brigades. The 3d Brigade had just implemented force generation when our team graduated from the Phoenix Academy in November 2006. The 3d Brigade consists of one T-55 tank battalion and two BMP-1 mechanized infantry battalions, with the standard headquarters and headquarters company, scout platoon, and three line companies in each battalion. The brigade did not have any intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability assigned to its modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE). This deficiency was corrected by taking a small number of scouts, up-armored gun trucks (M1114s), snipers, and motorcycles from each battalion to create a brigade ISR platoon. This is very similar to what the U. S. Army did a few years ago when it reduced the size of battalion scout platoons to create the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT). Each mechanized infantry battalion is equipped with 44 BMP-1s, which were purchased through foreign military sales. The first delivery of BMP-1s from Greece had been “re-conditioned” with a contract from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD). Somewhere along the way, the definition of “re-conditioned” must have been misunderstood; basically, the brigade received newly painted, well used and worn BMP-1s. Just to give an indication of their serviceability, out of the first batch of 64, 28 of them had bad engines. The tank battalion consists of 35 T-55 tanks scavenged from the scrap piles of Saddam’s army. They were also re-conditioned, but in slightly better condition. MOD has a contract with the national tracked maintenance depot at Taji to conduct repairs and overhaul tracked vehicles. Fortunately for us, the supervisor of this facility is a crusty old retired tank master gunner who knows his business. While they certainly were not new, they are all serviceable. The soldiers of the brigade are like any soldiers the world over. If properly trained, equipped, and led, they are capable of doing great things. However, the focus of the article is on how a training plan was crafted for the brigade, so it does not focus on the myriad challenges faced in the areas of basic life support and supplies. 36 —

The Mission Brigade leaders had 3 months to prepare the brigade for counterinsurgency combat operations. Therefore, life support and logistics challenges aside, the MiTTs and their IA counterparts had to develop a plan with limited resources as quickly as possible. The MiTT worked hand in hand with the brigade S3 and brigade commander during this effort. The brigade commander was a dedicated, patriotic, and professional military officer — as the former 9th Division G3 for training, he took the subject of training his brigade very seriously. Most of the tank crewmen had graduated from a 3-week “armor school,” which was taught at Taji. It focused on the very basics of driving a tank, shooting the main gun, and using the old Soviet model high-frequency (HF) radios. There was little hands-on training conducted at the school — soldiers did not fire live rounds and only drove the tanks approximately 200 meters. Except for senior officers at battalion and brigade levels, there were no seasoned tankers to mentor new soldiers. Regarding mechanized battalions, there was no established mechanized infantry training course for the Iraqi army. The MiTT realized it would be necessary to begin training the very basics and build from there. It also acknowledged that the tankers would need to train on basic infantry tasks and drills. In addition, every IA soldier was paid monthly in cash and took at least one full week of leave every month to deliver his pay to his family. The Challenge In a nutshell, the MiTT’s challenge was to get a brigade full of privates, with a sprinkling of experienced officers, from individual training through crew collective training, gunnery, platoon-level training, and a company-level exercise, as well as some multiechelon battalion- and brigade-level training, within 9 weeks. Partnership Concept To help accomplish this mission, we were fortunate to have a U. S. brigade commander and brigade combat team (BCT) that stepped up and made it happen. After training, the plan required our IA brigade to occupy the battlespace controlled by 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Our IA brigade was tactical control (TACON) to 2d Battalion, 8th (2-8) Cavalry, and conducted joint operations at platoon and com pany levels. Understanding the importance of getting the IA in the lead, 2-8 Cavalry viewed this relationship more as a partnership and invested heavily into the training plan. The commander of 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, immediately bought into the concept and provided much-needed professional soldiers from his brigade to make this concept a reality. The 2-8 Cavalry partnered one U. S. Army company with each Iraqi battalion for training and validation. That company would conduct joint combat operations once training was complete. The U. S. Army company immediately felt it had a vested interested in its IA battalion and in the quality of training being conducted. In other words, the MiTT was supported through partnership relationships rather than the more commonly used practice of “augmentation.” Each battalion was training sequentially with the tank battalion in the lead, followed by 1st Mechanized Battalion. The 2d Mechanized Battalion was further behind in fielding personnel and equipment. This arrangement enabled 2-8 Cavalry to conduct combat operations while simultaneously supporting 3/9 IA. In the short term, this loss of combat power severely stretched the resources of 2-8 Cavalry; however, it paid huge benefits in the area of operations once training was complete and the IA battalions occupied battlespace alongside the soldiers of 2-8 Cavalry. Although painful up front, the wisdom of this arrangement is inarguable. The Training Plan The training plan was developed using the tenets of U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, and lessons I learned while serving as the S3, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, in Korea.1 It is particularly important in the Arabic culture to conduct repetitive hands-on training. Classroom training must be avoided whenever possible. The scout platoons were not included in our overall training plan; however, thanks to the 2d Mechanized Battalion MiTT Chief, our team was able to leverage an existing training asset in the form of the Macedonian Special Forces (MSF) to assist with this effort. The 2d Mechanized Battalion had spent most of their tour training a local special troops company (STC) and had a good working relationship with the MSF. Since the 2d Mechanized Battalion would not be training for several weeks, they were tasked with training the brigade’s scout platoons and “For the tankers, this meant a 3-day crash course on the Iraqi T-55, its machine guns, and other equipment. We coordinated with the Iraqi armor school for each U. S. armor trainer to attend the course and learn the technical aspects of the T-55’s driver’s station, gunner’s station, and basic preventive maintenance checks and services.” — 37 used the same training model used very successfully with the STC. The brigade training plan also had to include all of the other low-density military occupational specialties and specialty platoons, which obviously was a resource challenge. In every area, U. S. trainers had to understand not only the basic principles of what they would train, in which they were well versed, but also the Iraqi army system and all technical aspects of the equipment on which they were training. Therefore, we had to “train the trainers.” For the tankers, this meant a 3-day crash course on the Iraqi T-55, its machine guns, and other equipment. We coordinated with the Iraqi armor school for each U. S. armor trainer to attend the course and learn the technical aspects of the T-55’s driver’s station, gunner’s station, and basic preventive maintenance checks and services. The brigade training plan was divided into three distinct week-long phases with 1 week of leave between each phase. Phase one focused on individual skills; phase two focused on crew collective skills and gunnery; and phase three focused on platoon- and company-level training with a refresher on small arms (repetition): Phase-one training. This training phase consisted of 4 blocks of 5 training days and included:

• Rifle marksmanship/infantry skills/ communications included zeroing, qualification, reflexive firing, rules of engagement, escalation of force, urban patrolling, and basic communications using the handheld and base station Motorola radios, which were issued to most IA units.

• Tank crew proficiency course (TCPC)/ maintenance included driver’straining, snake board drills, crew chair drills, tank crew drills, and tank maintenance.

• Tank crew skills training was very similar to our tank crew gunnery skills test (TCGST) and included boresighting the T-55, DiSHKA machine gun training, preparing the gunner’s station, preparing the loader’s station, preparing the driver’s station, loading the 100mm main gun, and mounting the DiSHKA machine gun.

• Combat lifesaver training was modeled after our week-long training event. Phase-two training. This phase was conducted at Besmiyah (Butler) Range, which is a modern multipurpose range complex located east of Baghdad. Training events focused on small arms and tank gunnery and consisted of the following 5-day training blocks:

• Tank driver training/convoy operations.

• Small arms training, including sustainment training with AK-47s and training on the PKC machine gun.

• Tank tables IV through VIII, which were similar to our tank tables with fewer targets and more emphasis on machine gun engagements. Phase-three training. This phase included 2 weeks of platoon collective training, which consisted of TCP operations, “snap” TCP operations, and convoy operations. Phase three culminated with a 3-day mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) with battalion and brigade multiechelon involvement. Prior to the start of the MRX, the brigade and battalion staff conducted a military decisionmaking process (MDMP) exercise, which focused on a notional operation in Taji. The battalion staff had command and control (C2) of the operation, requiring each company to conduct multiple platoon missions. Key tasks for the staffs included reporting and battle tracking. For example, 1st Company was required to establish a 4-hour platoon TCP while another platoon conducted a patrol. Intelligence determined how and where the battalion commander would use his scout platoon to help shape the fight and develop the overall picture. He was also introduced to the concept of task organizing for specific missions. Most of the training was conducted on local “training” areas in East Taji. In reality, with the exception of three smallarms ranges, there were no official training areas in Taji, to include tank ranges. With the high frequency of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other insurgent activity surrounding the base, training areas were created on base to support the training. Training Areas Fortunately for 3/9 IA, Taji possesses a large number of areas that have not “One of the properties was a large compound that had been used for storing rockets. It was extensively bombed during the invasion and consisted of two large derelict hangar-type buildings, dirt roads, and smaller bermed areas where rockets were stored. With the exception of the two destroyed hangars (for more of an urban setting), it was an excellent area for tank driver training and a dry fire TCPC range.” 38 — changed since the war began in 2003 and many former Iraqi army compounds remained unchanged after the fall of Saddam. We took advantage of these properties and created training areas, which were used for training phases one and three. Tracked vehicle training range. One of the properties was a large compound that had been used for storing rockets. It was extensively bombed during the invasion and consisted of two large derelict hangar-type buildings, dirt roads, and smaller bermed areas where rockets were stored. With the exception of the two destroyed hangars (for more of an urban setting), it was an excellent area for tank driver training and a dry fire TCPC range. Tank crew proficiency course. With the help of a company of IA engineers attached to 3d Brigade, we transformed one of the desolate areas into a valuable training resource. A dirt road was cut around the outside of the area and weaved in and out of the bombed buildings. Targets were cut from plywood and were raised and lowered by IA soldiers who communicated with the range officer in charge with handheld radios. Only 10 targets were needed to support the range and included two car targets with a sniper signature, two sniper targets, three rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) targets, and three insurgent squad-sized targets. The TCPC included two offensive and defensive engagements. The defensive engagements included one pre-set TCP location for a stationary engagement. The idea was for the tank to support a static TCP with permanently emplaced barriers and wire. The other defensive engagement was a notional hasty or “snap” TCP. The two offensive engagements were conducted while the tank was on a notional patrol. Target signatures for the targets were very simple: blank AK-47 fire for the small-arms targets and hand-grenade simulators for the RPG targets. Driver’straining. Prior to the crew conducting TCPC, the tank drivers used the same area to practice and refine driving skills. While conducting patrols on the narrow streets of Baghdad, the tankers from 1st and 2d IA Brigades shared the common problem of colliding with civilian vehicles. While turns and dips in the road alone made the course challenging, we decided the drivers needed practice on weaving in and out of traffic. To replicate the streets of Baghdad, the engineer company towed several old IA trucks onto a flat stretch of road, forcing the tank drivers to successfully weave their way through “traffic.” Urban lane. We took advantage of a deserted and run-down complex that included along three-story barracks building, a large three-story factory building, and sev eral small buildings that were arranged along a paved road. This was the perfect place to train mounted and dismounted patrolling, raids, traffic control points, and cordon and searches. For more advanced training, we added IEDs, civilian role players, and weapons caches. The Way Forward It is clear that our Nation’s exit strategy out of Iraq depends on a strong and well-trained Iraqi army and police force. One mistake our team realized not long after it arrived in Iraq is that many IA units are pushed into combat before they are ready. To make matters worse, they cease training once they assume battlespace. If the German army of World War II continued training while locked in mortal combat with Russia, then surely we can coach the Iraqi army to do the same. With more partnerships, such as the one between 2-8 Cavalry and 3/9 IA, we will see a more rapid maturing of a professional Iraqi army. At some point in the near future, we will see 3/9 IA successfully take the lead in their shared battlespace and free up combat power for U. S. forces. Note 1U. S. Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 22 October 2002. Major William Nuckols is serving as staff maneuver trainer/executive officer, Military Transition Team, 1st Brigade, 2d Army Division, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the University of Alabama and an M. S. from Troy State University. His military education includes Armor Officer Advanced Course, Air Assault School, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; S3, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry Owen, Korea; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 67th (1-67) Armor, Fort Hood, TX; and commander, C Company, 1-67 Armor, Fort Hood. “While conducting patrols on the narrow streets of Baghdad, the tankers from 1st and 2d IA Brigades shared the common problem of colliding with civilian vehicles. While turns and dips in the road alone made the course challenging, we decided the drivers needed practice on weaving in and out of traffic. To replicate the streets of Baghdad, the engineer company towed several old IA trucks onto a flat stretch of road, forcing the tank drivers to successfully weave their way through ‘traffic.’” — 39