Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations

The 507th Maintenance Company mistakenly entered the city of An Nasiriyah on the morning of 23 March 2003. Iraqi soldiers, al Quds militia, and Saddam Fedayeen fighters would ambush the lost unit, killing and wounding 21 soldiers and taking six prisoners. Over the next week, while Task Force Tarawa continued to fight a determined resistance, the U. S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps prepared to conduct what would be the first successful rescue of an American prisoner of war since World War II. Marine Corps M1A1 tankers contributed to this joint operation by bringing additional shock, awe, and firepower to an already impressive combined arms force. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw tanks exponentially prove their worth in the urban environment, and the role of armor would expand into personnel recovery (PR) operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A defines personnel recovery (PR) as “…the recovery and return of U. S. Military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a U. S. Government-sanctioned military activity or missions in an uncertain or hostile environment, or as determined by the Secretary of Defense.”1 The Army’s PR philosophy is one of leadership and accountability and every command makes every effort to ultimately recover 100 percent of its personnel.2 In April 2003, during the battle for An Nasiriyah, Iraq, I commanded 3d Platoon, Alpha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, Task Force (TF) Tarawa, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This tank platoon, along with Marine artillery, aviation, force reconnaissance, and infantry, participated in a truly joint PR operation alongside special operations forces (SOF) from the U. S. Army, Air Force, and Navy. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw tanks exponentially prove their worth during urban operations and expand their role to include PR. Experience Context During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi military commanders learned that in open land warfare they could not match the technological superiority of the United States military machine. If the Iraqi army wanted a different outcome in a future war, the fighting would have to be waged in the streets of Iraqi cities. If Saddam “We need to focus on Soldiers being able to take care of themselves, then able to take care of their buddies, then able to take care of their larger team…It’s all part of the Warrior Ethos: Place the mission first, never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade.” — General Peter J. Schoomaker

Hussein were to be removed from power, the U. S. military would have to move into Baghdad. Iraqi generals decided that the most logical defense along a southern approach would have to occur in Iraq’s fifth largest city and home of the 11th Infantry Division. An Nasiriyah would provide cover from U. S. air superiority, since Iraqi commanders seriously doubted that Americans would bomb 500,000 Iraqi citizens.3 The city of An Nasiriyah was heavily defended by an entire Iraqi army brigade along its southern portion bordering the Euphrates River. Another brigade dug in inside the city, and a third brigade was located north of the Saddam Canal. Technicals, armored personnel carriers (APCs), mortars, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) guns, and tanks were spread throughout the city in well-planned and well-fortified positions. Arms and ammunition caches were located in strategic locations and included mosques, schools, and hospitals. Five hundred of Uday Hussein’s fanatical henchmen, the Saddam Fedayeen, were sent to the city to ensure the 11th Infantry Division and the local al Quds militia remained loyal and motivated. Members of the Ba’ath party militia also had a great deal at stake in defending the city, since they controlled and lived a luxurious life at the expense of the local Shia population.4 In and around An Nasiriyah, the combined strength of regular and irregular forces was somewhere between 6,000 to 10,000 men. Iraqi commanders had planned a deliberate defense and were ready to draw approximately 2,000 U. S. forces into a deadly urban fight.5 Unfortunately, the first unit to face this defense was a logistics company from Fort Bliss, Texas.6 The 507th Maintenance Company was part of an impressive U. S. Army supply line, and its primary mission was to provide maintenance, supplies, and support to a patriot missile battery that would advance north toward Baghdad with the 3d Infantry Division. The 507th’s company commander entered the Army as a dental assistant and eventually worked his way into commanding mechanics, cooks, computer technicians, and clerks who lacked basic military fighting skills. He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.7 The 507th departed Attack Position (AP) Dawson, just south of the Kuwait-Iraq border, at 0700 hours on 20 March. Due to the rough cross-country travel, the unit only moved 35 kilometers in 4 hours before stopping to rest. The next evening, they traveled 80 kilometers northwest across the barren desert and the convoy soon began to feel the effects of off-road travel in southern Iraq.8 Darkness, disorientation, soft sand, and flat tires mired the convoy causing it to drop farther behind from the rest of the logistics train. On the evening of 22 March, as the 507th drew closer to An Nasiriyah, TF Tarawa, 2d MEB, from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was tasked to conduct a relief in place (RIP) with the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) near Talill Air Base at 0430 hours on 23 March. The 3d BCT felt it was unnecessary to move north on Highway 7 and clear the southern end of An Nasiriyah, as had been planned. Instead, it proceeded along Highway 1 to the Euphrates River and turned left on to Highway 8 to continue its move toward the west. The Army had not heard anything about a possible capitulation from the 11th Infantry Division and had no intention of going into the city to seize its eastern bridges. Marine commanders were worried about the condition of the Highway 1 Bridge located north of the Euphrates River, since it was anew highway with some portions still under construction. The 1st Marine Division had recently left the southern Al Luhays oilfields and was charging toward Baghdad on Highway 1. The commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) determined it was critical to develop a second avenue of approach, in the event Saddam Hussein ordered an attack on advancing Marines, and chose Route 7 as the second route.9 TF Tarawa was assigned as the main effort and ordered to seize the bridges along that route by 230700Z (1000 hours local time). The 507th Maintenance Company was to proceed north along Highway 8, “Route Blue,” and turn left at the intersection with Highway 1, “Route Jackson,” avoiding An Nasiriyah altogether. A manned check- “If Saddam Hussein were to be removed from power, the U. S. military would have to move into Baghdad. Iraqi generals decided that the most logical defense along a southern approach would have to occur in Iraq’s fifth largest city and home of the 11th Infantry Division. An Nasiriyah would provide cover from U. S. air superiority, since Iraqi commanders seriously doubted that Americans would bomb 500,000 Iraqi citizens.” 22 — point had been put in place to direct stragglers to the detour, but by the time the 507th arrived, it had been abandoned.10 At approximately 0600 hours, the 507th’s convoy crossed over a railroad and traveled past a company of dug-in Iraqi tanks, and an outlying industrial area composed of oil storage tanks, power lines, a gas station, and a garbage dump. At a significant intersection with clearly marked signs, Highway 8 went off to the west through the southern portion of the city toward the Highway 1 Bridge.11 The 507th missed that turn, drove straight through downtown An Nasiriyah, and was ambushed with a “torrent of fire.”12 Eleven members of the 507th would eventually perish as a result of combat actions that morning. Seven others would become Operation Iraqi Freedom’s first prisoners of war (POWs).13 The PR Operation Within days, a concerned local Iraqi lawyer confirmed that an American POW was being held at the Saddam Hussein Hospital. After 2 days of gathering intelligence, he brought five different and very detailed maps that he and his wife had made. The illustrations pointed out the exact room of the captured soldier. The lawyer also provided the security layout, reaction plan, and times of shift changes. Through his surveillance, he had counted 41 Iraqi soldiers or insurgents at the hospital, with four in civilian clothes guarding the captured soldier’s room. He mentioned that they were armed with Ka-laschnikov AK-47 assault rifles and carried radios. His reconnaissance further determined that the building’s rooftop could support a helicopter landing.14 After all the human intelligence had been received and authorization was granted from the highest military authorities, preparations for a personnel recovery operation were underway. The U. S. Army would take command of the rescue mission, turning TF Tarawa’s command post into a sophisticated reconnaissance operations center.15 A Marine 2d Force Reconnaissance team moved in from the west close enough to observe and listen to activity from the Hussein Hospital grounds, and reconnaissance snipers were positioned to prevent enemy forces from thwarting the rescue. TF Tarawa began relentlessly attacking the enemy with overwhelming artillery and precision air strikes from AV-8B Harriers and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) AC-130 Spectre gunship howitzer rounds.16 By early morning on 1 April, civilian communications equipment, to include satellite phones and computer connections, were blacked out.17 Shortly before midnight, electrical power was cut and only the hospital’s emergency generators provided light. Real-time images of the area were provided by a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) circling overhead, improving the situational awareness of the joint operations center.18 The battlefield had been prepared and the planning stages of the POW rescue operation were nearly complete. While air supremacy and overwhelming reconnaissance was achieved, heavy armored combat power was still lacking. “At 1155 hours, Blue 4, assigned as the platoon’s plow tank for the operation, cleared a route near the Saddam Canal Bridge through cars that had been placed along the northwestern portion of Highway 7 earlier in the week to block enemy vehicles. As the plow tank pushed a disabled vehicle off the road, the remaining two tanks led the convoy across the Saddam Canal Bridge toward the Saddam Hussein Hospital, a distance of approximately 3 kilometers.”

To fill this void, a tank platoon from Alpha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, was needed to escort a convoy of 18 vehicles carrying elite forces from the U. S. Army and Navy into the center of the city. Due to a shortage of readily available parts and continuous combat operations, the maintenance status of tracked vehicles in theater was less than desirable; however, with three tanks, Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon (Blue) was provided enormous combat power and shock effect. As soon as the tank platoon received its warning order to conduct a POW mission, the tankers began preparing their vehicles. Marines immediately performed track maintenance and refueled their vehicles. Tow bars were already in place and ammunition was evenly cross-leveled, but nonessential items, such as rucksacks, meals ready to eat (MRE) boxes, and fuel cans were unloaded to avoid any accidental losses or fire hazards. Special operations commanders coordinated with tank platoon commanders to seek advice on how to position vehicles to effectively block enemy avenues of approach from the center of the city. Satellite imagery aided the tank platoon in identifying possible individual vehicle positions and gave direction on where to place target reference points to properly control direct fire. Accurate imagery and thorough map rehearsals allowed all three tanks to share a common operating picture. As soon as the Marine tank platoon was attached to the SOF unit, the tank commanders ensured they had positive communications with each other and the rest of the rescue team. Loading radio frequencies onto three tanks would take approximately 45 minutes, since the Army Ranger radio operators were unfamiliar with the Marine PRC119. Once radio checks were performed, the tankers were ready to lead the convoy. Around 1130 hours on 1 April, a convoy of three M1A1s and four Pandar SOF vehicles, 12 M1114s, and two Marine seven-ton trucks carrying soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment, departed for the northwest Saddam Canal Bridge near the intersections of Highways 7 and 16. Alpha Company from 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, was ready to assist the main effort as a quick reaction force (QRF) to avoid a repeat of the Mogadishu disaster or the aborted rescue attempt in Tehran.19 At 1155 hours, Blue 4, assigned as the platoon’s plow tank for the operation, cleared a route near the Saddam Canal Bridge through cars that had been placed along the northwestern portion of Highway 7 earlier in the week to block enemy vehicles. As the plow tank pushed a disabled vehicle off the road, the remaining two tanks led the convoy across the Saddam Canal Bridge toward the Saddam Hussein Hospital, a distance of approximately 3 kilometers. The plow tank commander counted the vehicles as they passed by and quickly followed in trace to provide rear area security for the convoy.20 Near simultaneously in the southwest portion of the city, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted a diversionary attack, along with Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, on the headquarters of Saddam’s Ba’ath party. This massive eruption of firepower was used to deceive enemy fighters, causing them to think that an attack would occur along the western Euphrates Bridge, while the main effort maneuvered from the northwest. Marine and Air Force aircraft provided close air support (CAS) while UAVs circled above the hospital, providing real-time data back to the joint command center. Marine CH-46s ferrying a company of Army Rangers, Army CH-47s, and MH-6 Little Bird helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment rushed to their target. After dropping their personnel, the Little Birds and Black Hawks stood ready to provide additional CAS and evacuate personnel. A dozen Navy sea, air, and land (SEAL) sailors assaulted the six-story hospital, encountering limited resistance from Iraqi guards.21 Using explosive charges to dis-orient any occupants, the SEALs moved quickly through the hospital and found the captured soldier.22 Within a matter of minutes, the soldier was quickly loaded “Armor is a force protection asset clearly feared by the insurgents. Tactically, tanks in sector signify a powerful deterrent and provide additional ground combat elements the freedom of maneuver they need to conduct missions.” 24 — onto the helicopter waiting on the rooftop and lifted into the sky. As the aerial assault developed, vehicles from the ground combat element raced to their assigned positions, traveling at approximately 45 kilometers per hour. Three tanks immediately secured the south west, southeast, and northeast corners of the Saddam Hussein complex. Gunners scanned assigned sectors of fire and even picked up their wingman’s scan when thermal receiver units (TRUs) overheated. Loaders and tank commanders used night-vision goggles (PVS-7s and 14s) to scan for potential targets. Once the perimeter was secured, SEALs and Rangers spread throughout the complex to search for more American soldiers. The hospital’s staff informed the search team that several Americans had been buried on the hospital grounds.23 As the intelligence was shared on the command net, Blue 2 identified large mounds of dirt and immediately relayed the information to the search team. The Marine tankers directed the Rangers to the location of what appeared to be freshly dug graves. The soldiers dug up the area using their hands and a large shovel given to them by Blue 2. Once their task was complete, SOF returned to their vehicles and aircraft, and the tanks pulled out in reverse order, escorting ground forces north of the Saddam Canal. The mission concluded just before daybreak, with the convoy returning safely across friendly lines. That morning, seven Americans were un covered and two more were found in the hospital’s morgue. In the building’s basement, SOF found rifles, ammunition, mortars, maps, and a detailed sandbox illustrating the exact locations of Iraqi defenses. There was clear evidence to suggest the building had been used to shield insurgents from American attacks.24 Armor is a force protection asset clearly feared by the insurgents. Tactically, tanks in sector signify a powerful deterrent and provide additional ground combat elements the freedom of maneuver they need to conduct missions. At the operational level, tanks are a reflection of serious combat power; their presence resonates across military lines, allowing human intelligence teams and civil affairs units to shape and stabilize areas of responsibility. Personnel recovery is not a task normally assigned to a tank platoon.25 However, tank, infantry, and air integration, especially in the joint environment, has improved and is continually evolving. These changes are built on doctrine and enhance each branch’s capabilities. Regardless of the technological supremacy of the U. S. military, it is ultimately the disciplined, innovative, and flexible nature of its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that instills fear in the enemy. Lessons Learned The personnel recovery operation had the added benefit of lessons learned. When shared with comrades in arms, these lessons are invaluable, especially when they save lives. Breaching obstacles in an urban environment: Observation: A plow tank is an excellent piece of equipment to breach through obstacles and move vehicles. Discussion: A plow tank moved vehicles into position as part of an obstacle plan to prevent insurgents from running through blockades. When conducting the personnel recovery mission, a plow tank was used to create a lane for SOF vehicles to travel through en route to Saddam Hussein Hospital. Recommendation: In an urban environment, every tank platoon should have a minimum of one tank plow to emplace or breach obstacles. Personnel recovery: Observation: When conducting a PR mission, it is beneficial to carry equipment to potentially dig up the remains of soldiers. Discussion: In An Nasiriyah, U. S. Army Rangers had to use their hands to dig up the remains of soldiers outside the Saddam Hussein Hospital. Recommendation: When preparing for a PR mission, SOF should carry shovels in their vehicles or tankers should bring extra shovels since they have room to carry more equipment. Scanning at night with defective thermal receiving units (TRU): Observation: When a tank commander’s TRU overheated, his wingman expanded his sector of fire while the tank commander’s TRU cooled down. Discussion: Loaders and tank commanders used their NVGs to provide additional observation. As expected, drivers also continued to use their enhanced night-vision sights to scan the tank’s frontage. After continuous night operations, TRUs would eventually overheat and require a minimum of 5 minutes “cool down” time to once again receive a clear image. Recommendation: Thermal receiving units should be inspected and tested prior to any type of night operation. Critical items, such as TRUs, should be readily available rather than waiting for a tank to be deadlined before the part is ordered. The supply system is not being circumvented to expedite delivery times; instead, having readily available critical fire system components, prevents cannibalization, and ultimately saves lives. Notes 1Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 1 July 2003. 2U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery, GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996. 3Richard S. Lowry, Marines in the Garden of Eden: The True Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq, Berkley Publishing, New York, 2006, p. 94. 4Ibid., p. 97. 5Ibid., p. 98. 6Rick Bragg, I am a Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story, Knopf, New York, 2003, p. 9. 7Lowry, p. 88. 8Ibid., p. 107. 9Ibid., pp. 113-14. 10Bragg, p. 66. 11Lowry, p. 130. 12Bragg, p. 12. 13Lowry, pp. 391-93. 14“Leave No Comrades Behind,” article available online at http://gipsverband.free.fr/jlyncheg.htm. 15Lowry, p. 371. 16Ibid., p. 374. 17Bragg, p. 129. 18“Leave No Comrades Behind.” 19Lowry, p. 379. 20Ibid., p. 377. 21Ibid., pp. 378-80. 22“Leave No Comrades Behind.” 23Lowry, p. 380. 24Bragg, pp. 133-34. 25Department of the Army, Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 17-237-10, Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon, GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996. Captain Romeo Paolo Cubas is currently serving as logistics officer, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC. He received a B. S. from the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. His military education includes the Maneuver Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Ground Supply Officers Course, and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fire Support Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include headquarters company commander, logistics officer, and supply officer, Weapons Training Battalion, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune; platoon commander, 3d Platoon, A Company, 8th Tank Battalion, Task Force Tarawa, Iraq; aide de camp to the assistant division commander, 2d Marine Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; executive officer, D Company, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; and platoon commander, 3d Platoon, B Company, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune. — 25