“King of the Killing Zone,” How Well Has It Held Up?

In 1989, Orr Kelly published the story of the evolution of the Abrams tank, King of the Killing Zone.1 More than 18 years have passed since its publication, and it seems appropriate to evaluate the Abrams program, review its progress, and see how far it deviated from the original plans first started in 1972. It may seem unusual that 2007 is a significant milestone to conduct this analysis, but the Armor Center is conducting a major Abrams requirement analysis, for only the third time in the Abrams 30-plus years of development, to set the plans for the next 30 years! The first major upgrade to the Abrams in the mid-1980s included a 120mm cannon upgrade; a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) system; and armor enhancements. The second major upgrade in the mid-1990s added another armor up grade, a digital architecture, a commander’s integrated display for tactical situational awareness, and an independent sight for “hunter-killer” capability. The Armor Center’s current task is to determine critical technologies required for the Abrams in 2016 and beyond. Similar to the 1972 initiative by Lieutenant General DePuy, assistant vice chief of staff of the Army, to establish the big five, in September 2005, Lieutenant General Curran, director, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Futures Center, directed the Armor and Infantry Centers to begin the process of sustaining and modernizing Abrams and Bradley vehicles for the next 20 years and beyond.2 Today’s initiative is called “the joint capabilities integration and development process.” To begin the new process, however, it is critical to analyze the required capabilities and shortfalls much like the 1972 team. Surprisingly, the composition of the team today is quite similar, just a bit smaller.3 Key personnel at the Armor Center, which includes the TRADOC Capability Manager for the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (TCM HBCT) and Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Developments (DTDCD), are assisted by acquisition officers with masters degrees and doctorates. The process is part science and part art. In 1972, the team realized they needed a better tank, with specific weight restrictions, at an affordable price. Those same constraints still exist, so how much progress have we made since the 1972 analysis? Most believe the Abrams is a very capable tank; results from Operation Iraqi Freedom validate those opinions. The vulnerabilities of the Abrams are com-How Well Has It Held Up? by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris 18 — mon to most modern tanks throughout the world. Two recently upgraded and modernized tanks, the Merkava and Leopard 2, have added belly armor and improved top-attack protection. But adding armor comes with a sustainability penalty. In the United States, heavy equipment transporters and tactical assault bridges are limited to 70 tons. So what should these limits be in 2016; in 2026? Major General Desobry first imposed a weight limit for the tank of 46 to 52 tons; later, General Abrams set the upper weight limit at 58 tons based on his personal experience during World War II and analysis of Chobham armor effectiveness provided by Lieutenant General Depuy.4 The added weight made it difficult to meet the $507,790 price tag in 1972 dollars.5 The weight also made it difficult to meet the 25-to-1 horsepower ratio established by Major General Desobry.6 Today, the tank weighs nearly 70 tons when fully combat loaded. Recent survivability upgrades, such as the tank urban survivability kit and contemplated mine-protection kits, could push the Abrams’ weight close to 74 tons. These upgrades only improve protection for specific areas and are projected to be required future key capabilities. The argument in 1972 was that speed and power saves lives equivalent to armor protection. Today, situational awareness is paramount and speed sometimes creates confusion. The challenge now is that the larger threat formations and systems common during World War II have been replaced with an asymmetric threat, which operates mostly as dismounts using remotely controlled devices elab orate ly hidden among the normal debris common in urban landscapes. Additionally, the lethality of these small, well-hidden devices greatly exceeds that of similarly sized items used during World War II. When situational awareness and early detection fails, only added armor can reduce the risk to crewmen. The Armor Center has concluded that if the Abrams must grow to 74 tons, then future tactics, techniques, and procedures will have to adjust to take the weight increase into account. This is a radical change in philosophy. Previously, nearly all Abrams variants focused on frontal protection and the Armor Center is proposing the tank deploy with current levels of frontal protection to stay under 70 tons, if the projected threat allows. However, the Armor Center is not requiring the Abrams’ weight to be reduced to less than 70 tons. A 70-ton vehicle comes with a huge price tag. An M113A3, considered by many to be too light for 21st-century warfare, has one advantage over the Abrams — it operates for about $50 dollars per mile, compared with $400 per mile for the Abrams. Even the Bradley, now closer to 37 tons can operate for about $168 per mile. Considering that the Abrams has grown less than 21 percent of its original weight, compared with the Bradley growing nearly 57 percent greater than its original weight, another few tons seems reasonable. Although both vehicles are expensive to operate, they have improved in reliability and maintainability, mostly through advancements in electronic technology. The original M1 Abrams team was also challenged by the cost of the tank; however, they appear to have focused on unit cost rather than total life-cycle cost. For this reason, the Armor Center established a key system attribute, which mandates that any future variant of the Abrams must be easier to maintain and more reliable, with the assumption of lowering total ownership costs. In chapter four of King of the Killing Zone, Kelly raises the question: “What price armor?”7 Using the relative share of the gross domestic product conversion in a 2005 cost projection analysis, today’s tank should cost around $5.1M. In actuality, the tank is closer to $7M. If viewed in terms of cost to weight, the goal was around $88,000 per ton; today’s Abrams costs a little over $100,000 per ton. A 14- percent cost growth seems reasonable, if the Abrams achieved a 20-percent increase in weight/survivability, until viewed in terms of total life-cycle costs. Track wear has been the Achilles heel of the Abrams tank program, as it is the second largest consumable expense in the Army, only surpassed by meals ready to eat (MRE) consumption.8 Life-cycle costs not only include consumables, such as track, batteries, shock absorbers, weapons system barrels, and headset-microphones, but also repairable items such as engines, transmissions, electronic units, generators, and heaters. The cost to sustain the Abrams for one year is staggering — in 2006, the top-10 consumption and repair bills for the Abrams tank program exceeded $430M. Compared to that figure, the top-10 consumption and repair bills for the Bradley, the new M1068A3 command post, the Paladin self-propelled howitzer, the M1064A3 mortar carrier, the M577A3 command post, and the M113 family of vehicles (FOV) totaled around $255M. In 2006, the repair bill on the “The true value of the Abrams can only be measured in terms of its lethality and survivability. That value cannot be quantified, however, when compared to the countless lives the Abrams has saved, not only of armor crewmen, but of other soldiers within the formation who know that when they call “9-1-1,” the Abrams tank will bring the ‘HEAT.’ ” — 19

Abrams gas turbine engine alone was $229M. When viewed in total, the Abrams requires nearly 62 percent of the cost to sustain a HBCT, but actually accounts for only 22 percent of the tracked vehicles within the HBCT formation. Viewed in terms of weight being the deciding cost factor, experts underestimated the life-cycle costs that added mobility, made possible with a gas turbine engine, would impose throughout the tank program’s life. The true value of the Abrams can only be measured in terms of its lethality and survivability. That value cannot be quantified, however, when compared to the countless lives the Abrams has saved, not only of armor crewmen, but of other soldiers within the formation who know that when they call “9-1-1,” the Abrams tank will bring the “HEAT.” The Abrams crewman is the cornerstone of any future Abrams upgrade. For starters, the tank is too hot to operate comfortably for extended periods during summer months. Modern technology is amazing; however, it comes with two unavoidable penalties — advanced electronics generate heat and consume electricity. Overheating electronics are unreliable. A future key capability for the Abrams is to keep the crew capable of efficiently operating in all climates and, at the same time, provide greater reliability of its internal electronics. It is a very difficult challenge placed on our future materiel developers. A robust “cooling” system might compete for electricity with the other required electronics on a platform that has used nearly all available surplus electricity. It may seem unimportant, but a generator capable of an order of magnitude increase in available electrical power will enable the tank to add other technologies, such as active protection systems, remotely controlled weapons that reduce soldier exposure to small arms, rearward or 360-degree closed-hatch/in-close situational awareness, helmet-mounted displays, threat warning and jamming systems, or possibly electromagnetic armor. Much of this new technology, such as an active protection system, comes with yet another huge weight penalty — close to 1 ton! So what was the original team’s real issue with weight? Was it the cost of armor or the limitation of bridges? I think it had more to do with mobility. Many tank battles during World War II were cross-country dashes or occurred on unimproved dirt paths meant for horse-drawn wagons. Senior leaders directing the Abrams program during the 1970s had seen the heavy German tanks easily outmaneuvered by lighter, more agile, American tanks. In 1972, the United States focused on tank-on-tank warfare and mobility in the Fulda Gap, and, in 1972, the enemy had lighter and more mobile tanks. It was as difficult then as it is today to predict the benefit and cost of a 58-ton tank. Is it any different today? I think it is. Urbanization is the wave of the future and urbanization means more roads. If we are trying to influence people who live in the city, then surely the Abrams of the future will operate in the city. Today’s cities have much better road standards than they did 60 years ago. If the future area of operations has little road infrastructure, then it is debatable if it is a national security interest. Otherwise, lighter, more mobile, forces, such as the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault, Stryker brigades, Special Forces, or lighter allied formations, will be relied on to carry out operations. The only limitation we face today is a chemical engineering limitation; how much friction can track rubber glued to metal withstand? If the rubber fails, then we will have more frequent track replacement. Until that discovery is made, the Armor Center is willing to accept a 70-ton tank, with add-on kits that make it closer to 74 tons, for one reason — soldier survivability. Loader’s Armored Gun Shield (LAGS) Abrams Reactive Armor Tile (ARAT) Increasing soldier survivability is top priority for the Armor Center which is in the process of evaluating the tank urban survivability kit (TUSK). TUSK I will be delivered during July 2007 to the Iraqi area of operations. As mentioned in previous ARMOR articles, TUSK I will include the improved loader’s armored gun shield (LAGS) and Abrams reactive armor tile (ARAT), adding nearly two tons to the tank. A second iteration of TUSK is in its early stages of development and may include additional belly armor similar to that already in use by the Israelis and on Leopard 2 A6 tanks recently sold to Sweden. Weight reduction is important, but is not a critical area of concern. A target weight of 70 tons should be possible through advancements over the next 10 years in lighter, more capable armor technology — key is where to apply this extra armor capability. Protection for the flanks and belly are projected to be future key required capabilities, as well as the capability to keep the crew efficiently operating in all-weather climates while simultaneously providing greater reliability of internal electronics. These critical challenges led the Armor Center to establish a key system attribute mandating that any future variant of the Abrams must be easier to maintain and more reliable. There has been some argument that tankers are obese and too kinetic in their methods. The misconception that tankers lack the social skills and grace required to win the hearts and minds in 21st-century warfare is ludicrous! Today’s soldiers are capable of quickly transitioning from “steely-eyed-killers” to humanitarians handing out bottles of water to children playing soccer, even after one might have taken a shot at us with a paintball gun. However, the tank is not nice; it does not “transition.” It is growing to 74 tons and carries over 40 high-explosive warheads that can destroy nearly everything found in the urban jungle. It holds close to 11,000 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition (more than can be carried by a rifle platoon). It shoots one 120mm canister round capable of dispensing 1,100 tungsten balls with a lethality greater than that of 1,000 M4 rifles. It can crush a car and will kill the enemy if someone “breaks the glass in case of emergency!” It still is King of the Killing Zone! Notes 1Orr Kelly, King of the Killing Zone, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, February 1989, p. 88. 2King of the Killing Zone, p. 90. Colonel Charles Heiden, Combat Development Command, led the initial effort for tank requirements analysis in 1972. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 128. 5Ibid., p. 136. 6Ibid., p. 98. 7Ibid., p. 111. 8U. S. Army Materiel Command, data on consumable expenses for the U. S. Army in 2004. Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris is currently the assistant Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager for Abrams, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant product manager for large caliber (Abrams) ammunition, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; administrative contracting officer, Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, OH; combined arms team armor advisor, 42d Army National Guard, Fort Dix, NJ; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 70th Armor, 194th Separate Infantry Brigade, Fort Knox, KY; and scout platoon leader, D Troop, 4th Cavalry, 197th Separate Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. 20 —