TRACKPADS History Wins the Future Back to Trackpads
A TRACKPADS COLLECTIONRESEARCH LIBRARY
ARMOR · July-August 2005

Light Cavalry Platoon — Armor Team Integration Procedures

First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk
pp. 6–10Features2005

Article

Digitized from the original journal. Page headers, page numbers, photo credits, and obvious layout artifacts have been removed; transcription errors may remain. Submit a correction if you spot one.

During Operation Iron Saber, 4th Platoon, Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, was attached to 2d Battalion, 37th (2-37) Armor, during combat operations in Al Kufa, An Najaf, and Diwaniyah from April to July 2004. Team Battle was an armor/cavalry company team, comprised of 3d Platoon, B Company, 2-37 Armor, and Headquarters Company, 2-37 Armor, and three scout platoons from Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d (3/2) Armored Cavalry Regiment. On today’s battlefield, platoon leaders assigned to light cavalry and armor units must be prepared to fight mounted and dismounted in the urban environment. During Operation Iron Saber, procedures were developed and used by my scout platoon, Killer 4, Killer Troop, 3/2 Armored Cavalry Regiment, during the execution of numerous reconnaissance missions and engagements with enemy forces in Iraq. These procedures, which are relevant to armor/cavalry company teams and armor companies operating in gun trucks, include task organization in the urban fight; seizing key terrain; using the M203 effectively in urban terrain; coordinating with armor in the urban fight; marking enemy positions for tanks; and dismounted observation posts. Organizing the Cavalry Scout Platoon for the Urban Fight Good task organization is important because it gives the platoon flexibility to handle any situation. Our experiences revealed that maneuvering mounted with no dismounted capability against an enemy in an urban environment was ineffective. Using all of the platoon’s assigned gun trucks without a dismount element does not provide the platoon leader the flexibility needed to conduct operations in an urban environment. Based on combat experience, amounted patrol, consisting of four gun trucks, can effectively conduct urban reconnaissance operations. If the platoon has more gun trucks available, take the extra crews and form a dismount element that will ride in the four gun trucks. The security posture increased to 360-degrees per gun truck by having the dismount teams riding in the gun trucks. Light Cavalry Platoon — Armor Team Integration Procedures by First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk

Soldiers can use any spare crew served weapons and radios from the gun trucks for dismounted operations. The platoon’s dismounted element consisted of two teams; a sergeant led one team made up of three soldiers and the platoon senior scout led the other team made up of four soldiers. The dismounted teams seized dominant terrain, cleared buildings, occupied observation posts, and operated as dismounted M240B teams. The dismounted teams carried two manpack radios (one each) and, depending how the platoon leader deployed the teams, they carried two M240Bs with M145 mounted scopes. The M240Bs, which were not being used, were crew served weapons cross-loaded from the gun trucks. The platoon leader should include M203 gunners in the plan for dismounted weapons organization. The M203 gunners, deployed on dominant terrain seized by the dismounted teams, provided the platoon leader immediate capability to engage and destroy enemy forces massing and seeking cover in alleys and side streets around the platoon’s position. For command and control purposes, the platoon’s senior scout controlled the dismounted element and rode in the platoon leader’s gun truck. When the dismounted team needed to be deployed, the platoon leader quickly tasked the senior scout using Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2). All leaders in the platoon had radio capability. If leaders do not have radio capability, they will miss important information passed over the net. When the platoon leader dismounted, a soldier with a manpack maneuvered with him, leaving the platoon sergeant in control of the mounted element. Seize a Dominant Position and Control the Terrain Once the platoon makes contact with the enemy, it is necessary to maintain that con tact to engage and destroy the enemy. In an urban fight, this can be difficult when the enemy uses urban obstacles to fight on his own terms and then breaks contact to displace and attack again. Instead of constantly maneuvering to maintain contact, the platoon should seize the dominant terrain in the area. The dismounted teams, who are clearing buildings, find a building to use as a dominant position to find and fix the enemy while the gun trucks cover all avenues of approach to the platoon’s position. From the dominant position, the platoon leader can observe the urban terrain and direct the platoon fight. The platoon leader can coordinate platoon fires from the gun trucks, coordinate with and direct armor to engage and destroy enemy positions, and deploy the dismounted crew served weapons to suppress enemy positions on rooftops, denying the dominant terrain to the enemy. Using the M203 Effectively in Urban Terrain On today’s urban battlefield, rules of engagement (ROE) issues can either delay or prevent indirect fire support. The M203’s capability to engage and destroy enemy forces using urban terrain as cover and concealment makes it an effective alternative when indirect fire is unavailable. The M203’s 40mm round minimizes collateral damage, which is important in the urban fight when enemy forces are in close proximity to innocent civilians. We quickly learned that the enemy would mass in alleyways and side streets a few hundred meters from the platoon’s position and maneuver to a firing position on the ground to engage, or engage from an elevated dominant position. The side streets and alleyways are urban dead space. To deny the enemy this terrain, we used the M203 to engage him in alleyways and side streets. Once the platoon established a dominant position, the grenadiers fired weapons to engage enemy forces who were massing in dead space where the platoon’s direct fire weapons could not engage. The grenadiers can fire marking rounds at the entrance Cavalry Scout Platoon Organization Killer 4-1 Killer 4-2 Killer 4-4 Killer 4-5 Gunner PL Driver Dismount-Senior Scout Dismount

Gunner TC Driver Dismount Dismount OP Kit Bag M240B W/M145 Scope Gunner

Driver Medic Dismount Gunner TC Driver Dismount Dismount OP Kit Bag M240B W/M145 Scope Figure 1 “The grenadiers can fire marking rounds at the entrance to side streets or alleyways, which can be adjusted by gun trucks on the ground or from a dismounted team observing the same area. Once the marking round is on line with the alleyway, the grenadier then fires into the alleyway. The incoming 40mm rounds will detonate in the alleyway or on the sides of the alleyway, killing or wounding enemy forces and denying that terrain as a covered position.” — 7 to side streets or alleyways, which can be adjusted by gun trucks on the ground or from a dismounted team observing the same area. Once the marking round is on line with the alleyway, the grenadier then fires into the alleyway. The incoming 40mm rounds will detonate in the alleyway or on the sides of the alleyway, killing or wounding enemy forces and denying that terrain as a covered position. The enemy had the choice to either stay in the alley and absorb the 40mm indirect fire or maneuver to another position. When the enemy attempted to maneuver out of the alleyway or side street to escape the 40mm fire, the gun trucks covering those areas engaged and destroyed them. Coordinating with Armor in the Urban Fight From the dominant position, the platoon leader can coordinate with the team commander and call armor forward to engage and destroy enemy positions. The platoon leader directs the tanks to maneuver parallel to, or down to, the alleyway or side street and engage the enemy in the alleyway with the tank’s coaxial machine gun. The platoon gun trucks will engage and destroy enemy forces maneuvering to escape the tank’s coaxial machine gun fire as they exit the other side. The tanks should not maneuver where the scout platoon cannot support them. Once the tanks have destroyed enemy positions or forced the enemy to withdraw, the scout platoon can maneuver forward and occupy anew position to maintain contact or regain contact, if needed. Marking Enemy Positions for Tanks Identifying enemy positions in an urban environment is difficult. Further, marking them so a tank can identify them is equally difficult. Our platoon used several techniques to mark enemy positions at night or during limited visibility. In operations during hours of darkness, enemy positions were marked using the 9mm laser mounted on the handgrip of the 9mm pistol. This is a good technique; however, if the soldier lasing the target gets tired, the laser could bounce around, making it difficult for the tank gunner and tank commander to identify the target. The PEQ-2 laser is an excellent tool to mark targets, both with the aiming laser or on spotlight mode. The PEQ-2 mounts on a crew served weapon attached to the mount on the gun truck. This is a more stable platform from which to laze enemy positions. When multiple engagements were occurring simultaneously and a PEQ-2 was unavailable to mark an enemy’s position, leaders would use a steady stream of tracers from their M4s until the tank gunner identified the enemy’s location. Leaders should also be prepared to mount the tank and direct the tank commander to the enemy’s position. During daylight operations, we used a steady stream of tracers to identify enemy positions, which proved to be an effective technique. As a planning consideration, all soldiers should either carry a magazine of tracers or have a tracer/ball mix loaded in every magazine to mark enemy positions. Use of Dismounted Observation Posts Based on combat experience, employing dismounted observation posts (OPs) is an effective technique to counter enemy forward-observer positions. Each dismounted team had an OP kit bag loaded on the gun trucks, which consisted of a manpack radio, binoculars, and a global positioning system (GPS). The dismounted team occupying the OP had an M203 and an M240B with amounted M145 scope. Mahdi militia forward observers adjusted 81mm and 120mm mortar fire on our positions using cell phones to communicate with the mortar positions. Enemy forward observers seemed to “From the dominant position, the platoon leader can coordinate with the team commander and call armor forward to engage and destroy enemy positions. The platoon leader directs the tanks to maneuver parallel to, or down to, the alleyway or side street and engage the enemy in the alleyway with the tank’s coaxial machine gun. The platoon gun trucks will engage and destroy enemy forces maneuvering to escape the tank’s coaxial machine gun fire as they exit the other side.” 8 — know the rules of engagement and did not carry weapons, making it difficult to determine hostile intent. Dismounted OPs observed enemy forward observers, usually positioned on rooftops or in doorways of buildings, making corrections to adjust fire over cell phones. They stood out from the rest of the environment because as mortar rounds impacted, they were in the open and not behind cover. The platoon engaged and destroyed enemy forward observer positions with M203 and M240B fire from the OP, crew served weapons fire from the platoon’s gun trucks, or tank cannon fire coordinated by the platoon leader. Dismounted OPs proved to be very effective when the terrain did not provide suitable observation and cover firing positions from which to engage. Sometimes the only cover available was piles of rubble or walls, which are not good vantage points from which to observe and engage the enemy. In this situation, dismounted OPs placed in front of covered positions can detect enemy forces. Once enemy forces are detected, the information is reported to the gun truck commander and gunner, then the gun truck moves from behind cover to engage. After the engagement, the gun truck returns to its covered position. Coordinate Between Platoons for Use of Illumination While conducting operations in Kufa during hours of darkness, on a number of occasions, there were multiple engagements occurring simultaneously, involving more than one scout or tank platoon. Engagements during hours of darkness can require illumination, such as a star cluster or parachute flare, to illuminate enemy positions. Illumination should be coordinated over the command net to allow friend ly gun trucks, who may be using darkness as concealment, to take up covered positions before flares illuminate and expose them. Failure to coordinate over the command net can leave friendly forces exposed to enemy fire when the flare pops. Recommendations for the Armor Community Armor companies need more M203s than currently authorized. The U. S. Army Armor Center and the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command should adjust the modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) to provide an M203 per tank crew. The M203 is a very effective weapon for engaging and destroying enemy forces in the urban environment. Combat experience demonstrated that tank commanders and loaders could effectively engage and destroy enemy forces from the hatch with effective M4/M16 fire. Tank crews equipped with M203s allow the crew to put 40mm fire where they need it, when they need it, creating a more lethal tank crew. It provides crews greater protection by allowing them to protect their flanks in close-quarter engagements from enemy ground forces maneuvering against tanks attempting rocket-propelled grenade or small arms engagements. If tank companies are operating in gun trucks instead of tanks, then they are essentially scout platoons and can use these procedures. Armor and cavalry platoons also need more manpack radios than currently authorized. The current battlefield demands that “Based on combat experience, amounted patrol, consisting of four gun trucks, can effectively conduct urban reconnaissance operations. If the platoon has more gun trucks available, take the extra crews and form a dismount element that will ride in the four gun trucks. The security posture increased to 360-degrees per gun truck by having the dismount teams riding in the gun trucks.”

Recommended Tasks for Substitution in STX 17-97F-10-3 from ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP

Conduct target acquisition

Conduct reconnaissance by fire

Conduct urban area reconnaissance

Establish an observation post

Search a building

Conduct tactical movement (dismounted)

Conduct overwatch

Conduct support by fire

Figure 3 armor and cavalry leaders fight dismounted. When leaders dismount, it is essential for them to have the capability to monitor the command net to report and receive information. Armor and cavalry platoons need in-depth training on assigned weapons systems. To build depth, the fundamental requirements are basic skill and sustainment training on the M16/M4, M203, M240B/G, and the M2.50-cal iber machine gun. Maximizing the use of training ammunition and simulators will also build depth in platoons. Having several soldiers capable of effectively operating many different weapons systems was crucial to the platoon’s success in combat. A platoon trained in-depth allows for greater performance on long-duration operations and for a good crew rest plan. During deployment, leaders should establish sustainment and cross-training plans on platoon organic weapons. Training can be conducted at the forward operation base and qualification can be performed when the platoon rotates to a range in theater — it is critical that all soldiers be trained on all weapons systems. Leaders should anticipate taking casualties. When a casualty occurs on a weapons system, if the platoon has been cross-trained on all organic weapon systems, a trained soldier can immediately replace the casualty. Implementing Effective Procedures During STX Training Readers can implement these procedures during situational train ing exercises (STX) by referring to Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 17-97F-10- MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Reconnaissance Platoon, Chapter 4, “Reconnaissance Platoon, STX 17-97F- 10-3, Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (Cavalry Scout Platoon).”1 Figure 2 is a copy of table 4-12 from STX 17- 97F-10-3, which lists the tasks trained during the STX.2 Once the platoon is proficient at conducting zone reconnaissance, it will be ready for progressively more difficult conditions. Figure 3 is an example of adding or substituting tasks to create a scenario to execute zone reconnaissance in an urban environment.3 The STX is an excellent opportunity to train in-depth on weapons systems and implement these procedures in an urban reconnaissance scenario. Leaders preparing for deployment should plan to cross train all soldiers on platoon-organic weapons systems. Maximizing use of training ammunition and simulators will build depth in platoons. M203 grenadiers can train in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) sites using training rounds to practice engaging alleyways and side streets from rooftops. If a MOUT site is unavailable, then platoon leaders can plan a nonstandard range to achieve the same training level. Platoons can train on marking targets for both day and night engagements during platoon ranges. One vehicle per section can spot the target and mark it using one of the above-described methods while the other vehicle engages the target. Learn and Fight from Experience The procedures described in this article will assist the light cavalry/armor platoon leader in conducting combat operations in urban terrain. The development process occurred during platoon after-action reviews (AARs) and during the planning process while the platoon leadership wargamed courses of action. From the AARs and wargaming sessions, the platoon leadership assessed what worked and what did not work and used proven procedures during combat operations. Notes 1Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 17-97F-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Reconnaissance Platoon, Chapter 4, “Reconnaissance Platoon, STX 17-97F-10-3, Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (Cavalry Scout Platoon),” 23 April 2004, p. 4-41. 2STX 17-97F-10-3, p. 4-41. 3ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP, Chapter 5. First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk is currently assigned to the U. S. Student Detachment, Fort Jackson, SC, pursuing a B. A. from Louisiana State University. He received an A. A. from Central Texas College. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Officer Candidate School, Airborne School, Air Assualt School, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, Primary Leadership Development Course, and Northern Warfare School (winter and summer). He has served in various command and staff positions, to include scout platoon leader, Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/2 ACR), Operation Iraqi Freedom; anti-tank platoon leader, Killer Troop, 3/2 ACR, Fort Polk, LA; senior enlisted advisor, Louisiana Army National Guard, Camp Cook, LA; and platoon sergeant, A Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. 10 — Battle Drills for STX 17-97F-10-3 Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (Cavalry Scout Platoon) TABLE 4-12 from ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP

T&EOs and TASK # Conduct tactical movement

Conduct passage of lines as passing unit

Conduct an area/zone reconnaissance

Execute actions on contact

React to indirect fire drill

Attack an inferior force

Reconnoiter an obstacle/restriction

Bypass threat contact

React to air attack drill

Conduct reconnaissance handover

Perform consolidation and reorganization

Rearm/resupply

End of indexed article

Citation

First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk. “Light Cavalry Platoon — Armor Team Integration Procedures.” ARMOR, July-August 2005, pp. 6-10.

First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk. “Light Cavalry Platoon — Armor Team Integration Procedures.” ARMOR, July-August 2005, pp. 6-10.

HELP IMPROVE THE RECORDSee something that should be corrected?

Report a transcription error, attribution issue, page-boundary problem, or stronger source. The article title and URL will be attached automatically.

Submit a correction →

Read deeper with Trackpads Books

Trackpads books turn research themes into longer narrative and reference works. Book purchases help support the project.

Explore Trackpads Books ↗

Listen to the history

Continue with Trackpads podcasts for military-history series, interviews, and narrated features.

Browse Trackpads Podcasts ↗